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The Lisbon Treaty introduced one of the most far reaching reforms of the EU foreign 
policy system. This has been particularly noticeable in the example of the rotating 
Presidency of the EU Council. By transferring the functions formerly associated with 
the Presidency to the newly established actors, the President of the European Council 
and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Presidency’s 
role has been severely limited. Yet with only limited formal provisions, the practical 
arrangements were to be clarified in due course of the implication phase. This thesis 
explores this phase by tracing the processes of the implementation and informal 
adaptation of the Treaty’s provisions in the post-Lisbon context of EU foreign policy 
making. The analytical framework incorporating new institutionalist and role-based 
insights aims to capture the institutional development of the Presidency’s role as an 
outcome of the institutional feedback and particular role making of the first Member 
States in the chair. The proposed model of role institutionalisation is argued to explore 
mechanisms of institutional change in a more in-depth manner as a constitutive process 
at the structural and agential levels. The concept of role making is used to capture and 
explore the influence of Spain, Belgium, Hungary and Poland on the inter-institutional 
positioning and functional scope of the post-Lisbon Presidency. At the national level of 
analysis, the individual role enactment of these countries reflects their national 
preferences towards both the system of European foreign policy and national role 
conceptions. At the same time, however, their individual role making is both enabled 
and/or constrained by the emerging system of the post-Lisbon foreign policy making 
(institutional feedback), and by a set of factors at the national, European and 
international levels. Consequently, the analysis confirms the added value of applying 
role theory while studying the Presidency, as well as highlights its analytical usefulness 
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CHAPTER I Introduction 
 
 
The lack of satisfactory progress in developing a common EU foreign policy has often 
been attributed to inadequate structure and insufficient institutional framework (for ex-
ample, Pol 2011, Regelsberger 2011, Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2011, Barber 2010, Porte-
la and Raube 2009, Pinelli 2007, Hadfield 2006, Smith 2004, Barbé, 2004, Wagner 
2003, Diedrichs and Jopp 2003). The rotating Presidency of the EU Council (the Presi-
dency) for decades maintained its central position within EU policy making. The six-
month chairmanship held in turn by each of the Member States over the various config-
urations of the EU Council (CEU) and its working groups (WGs) has ensured national 
representation and rotating leadership over EU affairs. With the successive expansion of 
policy areas, and the increasing complexity of EU policy making and subsequent en-
largements, the Presidency started increasingly to be perceived as the main reason for 
the EU’s ineffective performance on the international stage (Delreux 2012, Cameron 
2007). The lack of effective foreign policy strategy was often attributed to the Presiden-
cy’s powers to set the EU agenda which tended to shift every six months to reflect par-
ticular national interests of the Member State in the chair of the Presidency. In addition, 
with the small Member States being overwhelmed by an increasing workload and suf-
fering from the decreased credibility on the international stage, a change in the rotating 
system became one of the main issues on the EU institutional reform agenda. Conse-
quently, with the Lisbon Treaty (LT) being one of the most recent attempts to upgrade 
the EU institutional structure, this has been the most visible with reference to the func-
tions and inter-institutional position of the institution of the Presidency in EU external 
relations (Bunse and Klein 2014). The aim of this thesis is to examine the post-Lisbon 
role of the Presidency in this particular policy area. I adopt a role theory-based under-
standing of the role as a pattern of behaviour resulting from the interaction of expecta-
tions and purposive decision of the actor in charge of this role (this will be further ex-
plained in chapter 2).  
The LT did not provide a clear prescription of roles and the adoption of the new Treaty 
was followed by the period of informal adaptation during which the new division of la-
bour among new and old actors emerged in the making. The imprecise provisions creat-
ed an opportunity for the actors involved in their application to take active part in shap-
ing of the post-Lisbon regime. As noted by Van Hecke and Bursens’… the treaty re-
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mains rather vague, if not silent, about the way in which the relationship between the 
Council presidency and the [POTEC] presidency should work. Of course, this leaves 
room for manoeuvre to the players who need to implement the provisions of the LT on a 
daily basis’ (2014: 111). The question of this ability to influence the post-Lisbon struc-
ture of EU external affairs emerges as the central puzzle of this research. I argue that the 
first Member States used their time in the office to clarify the post-Lisbon provisions 
and to work out in the practice the functional roles of the Presidency. Yet, each of the 
four first Member States behaved differently while in the chair of the Presidency. Essen-
tially, this thesis aims to explain behaviour of the first Member States in the chair of the 
post-Lisbon Presidency. The case studies of the Spanish, Belgian, Hungarian and Polish 
Presidencies are used to analyse the process of institutional change and decision making 
in EU foreign policy post-Lisbon.
1
 
The 2009 institutional reform introduced by the LT restructured the institutional archi-
tecture of European foreign policy making by introducing a permanent Presidency over 
foreign affairs and the institutionalisation of the European Council (EC). The two new 
actors, the High Representative and Vice President for Foreign Affairs and Security Pol-
icy (HRVP) and the President of the EC (POTEC) took over the role of the pre-Lisbon 
rotating Presidency by ensuring organisational administration, representation and politi-
cal leadership over EU foreign affairs. With the introduction of new supranational ac-
tors and the decoupling of the existing role of the Presidency, this has represented the 
most far reaching reform of European foreign policy making so far. Following the im-
mediate changes, scholars and practitioners quickly concluded that post-Lisbon, the 
Presidency has become ‘politically irrelevant’ (Kaczyński 2012) and the LT assigned 
the Member State in the chair ‘virtually no role in the domain of external action’ (Missi-
roli 2010: 430). Further research challenged this by demonstrating that the role has been 
                                                          
1
 The case studies of the Presidencies are analysed by the combination of primary and secondary 
sources and data collected during elite and expert interviewing. The primary data on the first two case 
studies, the Spanish and Belgian Presidencies, was collected on the basis of primary and secondary 
literature. By the time this research project started both Presidencies, their involvement in the EU 
foreign policy making and potential impact on the emerging post-Lisbon system had been extensively 
analysed by academic and policy-oriented researchers. Due to the fact that the project was still at the 
preliminary stage only a limited number of interviews was conducted with the officials involved in the 
management of these two Presidencies. The data obtained from these interviews enabled a more in-
depth understanding of the case studies and a possible comparison with the Hungarian and Polish 
Presidencies. In the case of the two latter Presidencies, the primary data was collected through 
interviewing of the national, European and international officials involved in the Presidency’s 
management and the EU policy making system. The available primary and secondary sources served as a 
cross-checking material to provide a greater validity of the findings. This will be further elaborated in 
chapter 3 while discussing the research methodology.  
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severely limited, yet it has not been abolished altogether (Bunse and Klein 2014, Puetter 
2014, Van Hecke and Bursens 2014, Gostyńska 2011, Vanhoonacker et al. 2011, and 
Whitman 2008). As noted above, most of the previous functions associated with the 
Presidency in EU foreign affairs have been moved to the portfolios of the new actors – 
the HRVP and the POTEC. However, the LT did not prescribe the final functional or-
ganisation of the new system and thus it resulted in rather ambiguous provisions with 
reference to the functions and inter-institutional positions of the new actors and in par-
ticular of the Presidency (Bunse and Klein 2014, Puetter 2014, Van Hecke and Bursens 
2014). As noted by Avery (2007), this was a deliberate move. The imprecise institution-
al provisions were to enable a more flexible implementation and thus provide a greater 
functionality of the emerging system. This would enable both the old and new actors to 
work out and adjust their functions and inter-institutional positions in the subsequent 
process of informal institutional adaptation.  
This argument fits into the recent institutionalist strand on gradual and endogenous in-
stitutional change which focuses on periods of implementation of the new provisions by 
emphasising how inconclusive formal rules create institutional ambiguities (e.g. Ma-
honey and Thelen 2010, Farrell and Héritier 2007, Héritier 2007). Sheingate argues that 
these ‘ambiguities (…) provide critical openings for creativity and agency’, and this al-
lows for focusing the analysis on the influence of agents tasked with implementing new 
rules in practice (cited in Mahoney and Thelen 2012: 12). As noted by Bunse and Klein 
‘the precise roles of the newly created institutions (…) were only vaguely defined in the 
Lisbon Treaty, thus leaving scope for informal institutionalisation of new norms and 
behaviours’ (2014: 82). In the case of the LT, the vagueness of the new formal provi-
sions with reference to the post-Lisbon divisions of labour among new and old actors 
‘leaves room for manoeuvre to the players who need to implement the provisions of the 
Lisbon Treaty on a daily basis’ (Van Hecke and Bursens 2014: 111). This prompts two 
main research questions: 
1. How did the first Member States interpret their role and behaviour while in the 
chair of the post-Lisbon rotating Presidencies in the area of EU external relations?  
To what extent is the process of role institutionalisation based on the previous role of 
the pre-Lisbon Presidency (previous functions as well as the existence of pre-Lisbon 
intra role conflicts between agenda shaping and neutral brokering), on the institutional 
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feedback emerging from the fledgling system, and on the particular role making of the 
Member State in the chair (role preference and role enactment)? 
2. How did their individual performance affect the evolution of the inter-
institutional position and functions of the post-Lisbon Presidency?  
To what extent is the preference held by the Member States towards its time in the of-
fice (role preference) guided by informal expectations held by other involved actors, the 
national role conceptions of the countries with reference to its foreign and European 
policies, and the role assessment of the previous Presidencies’ performance (role as-
sessment)? 
What is the capacity of the country in the chair to project its individual role preference 
to the structural level and to shape the role prescription of the Presidency in the post-
Lisbon European foreign policy (role making)? What are the key factors affecting this 
capacity for role making? 
Subsequently, I aim to tackle the broader question of the process of institutional change 
in European foreign policy following the implementation of the LT. This is achieved 
through the example of the institutional adaptation of the Presidency’s functions and its 
inter-institutional position post-Lisbon by focusing on the policy area which has been 
affected by these changes to the largest extent – European foreign policy making.  
In order to address these questions, this thesis employs a role-based theory of institu-
tional change introducing a model of role institutionalisation. I argue that conceptualis-
ing institutional change as a two-stage model of role institutionalisation allows for a 
more comprehensive explanation of how actors interpret and implement ambiguous in-
stitutional provisions. This approach offers a more in-depth understanding of institu-
tional change by focusing on the process of institutional adaptation as the result of in-
teractions between actors tasked with implementation and interpretation of the new 
rules (role making), and the functional requirements emerging from the post-Lisbon 
system of European foreign policy making (the institutional feedback). While role mak-
ing makes it possible to capture the strategic action of individual Member States, the 
concept of role institutionalisation helps to assess the structural evolution of the post-
Lisbon Presidency’s role in the long term perspective, and to assess the level of individ-
ual Member States’ influence on the shaping of the new system. The concept of institu-
tional feedback aims to capture the structural factors within the process of the Presiden-
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cy’s institutional change by focusing on the emerging system, its new actors and their 




Role theory enables to bring additional focus to the micro-level of analysis by examin-
ing how these new functions are developed and articulated by the main actors involved 
in the shaping of the new policy making system. With no clear functions prescribed in 
the LT, the role the Presidency depends on the individual behaviour of the Member 
State in charge of this office. I argue that role theory can explain not only this behav-
iour, but also the variations among Spain, Belgium, Hungary and Poland. The role-
based concept of a national role conception enables to understand each of these coun-
tries’ strategy for the EU membership and subsequently for their approach towards the 
Presidency. By distinguishing between role preference and role prescription it is possi-
ble to examine the capacity of the Member State to purse their chosen Presidency’s 
strategy and the impact on the overall position and role of the post-Lisbon Presidency.  
Following the successful application of role theory to explaining foreign policy behav-
iour I attempt to test its ability to study institutional change. As I will demonstrate in 
Chapter 3, role theory has already proved particularly useful in studying both the EU 
foreign policy and the institution of the Presidency, it is thus possible that it might pro-
vide additional conceptual and analytical focus to study institutional change by focusing 
on the purposive behaviour of agents, Member States, within the emerging structure of 
the post-Lisbon regime. The application of role theory has been argued to better capture 
interplay between agential and structural levels of analysis (for example Wehner and 
Thies 2014, Harnisch et al. 2011, 2010, Thies and Breuning 2012, Breuning 2011, Ag-
gestam 2004, 2006). In the case of this research it will enable to capture the interplay 
between agents’ behaviour and the impact of the emerging system which shapes the in-
stitutionalisation of the new role.  
The process of role institutionalisation is explored through the examples of the first four 
rotating Presidencies, held by Spain (January-June 2010), Belgium (July-December 
2010), Hungary (January-June 2011) and Poland (July-December 2011). These four 
Presidencies should enable the investigation of the immediate implementation of the 
formal provisions of the LT during the two-year period of institutional adaptation. I will 
                                                          
2
 The concept of institutional feedback, along with other relevant concepts, will be further discussed in 
chapter 3. 
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examine how these four first Member States, with no clear formal role prescriptions, 
interpreted their role while in the chair of the Presidency and if their performance influ-
enced the shaping of the post-Lisbon system. This will make it possible for me to assess 
to what extent each of these Member States were involved in role making of the post-
Lisbon Presidency and to what extent this role was shaped by the other actors within the 
emerging system conceptualised here as the institutional feedback. Drawing on the em-
pirical findings, this thesis will demonstrate the usefulness of applying a role-based ap-
proach towards studying institutional change by demonstrating how concepts of role 
making and institutional feedback capture the constitutive mechanism of institutional 
change as a result of the interaction between the agential and structural levels. The next 
two sections will explore these two levels by analysing the institution of the Presidency 
and the system of European foreign policy making. The final two sections will provide a 
brief overview of the analytical approach and the research method applied, and will be 
followed by the outline of the thesis. 
1.1 The Institution of the EU Council Rotating Presidency 
 
The Presidency has been traditionally associated with four main functions – 
administrative management, honest brokering, political leadership/policy 
entrepreneurship, and finally internal representation of the CEU and external 
representation of the EU. Some of these functions have been informally associated with 
an opportunity to influence the European agenda by projecting national preferences (for 
example Bunse 2009, Thomson 2008, Warntjen 2007, Tallberg 2006, 2004, 2003, 
Elgström 2003). However, the question of whether the CEU chairmanship actually 
empowers or rather constrains the Member State in the chair with reference to 
projection of national priorities has been one of the most contentious issues in the 
academic research. Some authors have argued that due to the expectation that the 
country in the chair should be neutral and act as an honest broker, its pursuit of national 
preferences has been heavily restricted (Whitman 1998, Schout 1998, Kirchner and 
Tsagkari 1993, Ludlow 1993, Dewost 1984). Thus, the Presidency has been perceived 
as a supranational – Community function and often branded as ‘responsibility without 
power’ (Dewost 1984: 31). On the other hand, by employing theories of 
intergovernmental bargaining and agenda shaping processes, some researchers 
demonstrated the privileged position of the Presidency in its access to the European 
agenda and policy making process (Bunse 2009, Thomson 2008, Tallberg 2006, 2004, 
CHAPTER I Introduction 
21 
 
2003, Elgström 2003, 2006). This second strand of the literature, mostly dominated by 
the rational choice institutionalism and negotiation theories, conceptualises the 
Presidency as an intergovernmental function and deemphasises the rule of neutrality 
(Warntjen 2007, Tallberg 2006, 2004, 2003). The latter issue becomes even more 
interesting in the context of this research with reference to the influence and leadership 
capacity of the Presidency and the Member State in its chair on the position of this 
institution within the European policy making system. Consequently, by exploring the 
first post-Lisbon Presidencies held by Spain, Belgium, Hungary and Poland, this thesis 
seeks to analyse their influence, or lack of it, on the emerging post-Lisbon role of the 
Presidency in European foreign policy. 
The research on the Presidency has been further complicated by the fact that there have 
been few formal rules regulating the rotating CEU chairmanship (Leal 2010, Bunse 
2009). In its original design the Presidency was established as an institutional 
mechanism ensuring administrative organisation and coordination over European affairs 
(Fernández Pasarín 2008a). Over the decades its role and the overall pattern of 
behaviour expanded from mere administration to driving European legislation by 
seeking compromise between EU Member States and other institutions, and introducing 
new policy initiatives (Ibid.). Pre-Lisbon, this complex role set was particularly visible 
in the area of European foreign affairs where the intergovernmental method continued 
as the main mode of policy making, and thus influence of other European institutions 
was severely limited. A Member State in the chair of the Presidency enjoyed a six-
month period of spotlight by representing the EU externally and managing the EU 
official agenda.  
As this thesis will demonstrate, the Presidency’s functions grew over the years as an 
answer to institutional feedback, rather than by conscious design of the original actors. 
Its increasingly important position evolved as a reaction to the institutional deficiencies 
in administrative and leadership capacity in the process of advancing European 
integration and expansion into new policy areas (Fernández Pasarín 2008a, 2008b). This 
institutional adaptation resulted in the emergence of mutually exclusive rules of conduct 
and functions which can be perceived as in conflict with each other. As stated by 
Schout, ‘the Presidency has to be capable to combine sector-specific concerns with 
neutrality and with the need to provide leadership without one or the other being 
subordinate a priori’ (1998: 2). Therefore, the Presidency can be perceived as an 
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institution managing conflicting expectations, ‘juggling three balls at the same time, 
leadership, neutrality and national interests’ (Schout 1998: 2). It has consequently 
emerged as one of the most adaptable institutions within the European policy making 
system, with a portfolio of functions enabling the Member State in its chair to perform a 
rather flexible enactment of the CEU chairman’s role. It is yet to be seen if the post-
Lisbon Presidency would continue with this trend. 
The Presidency has not only been associated with the functions, provided by its 
institutional expectations, that the Member State in chair of the Presidency was 
expected to perform, but increasingly with more informal expectations directed towards 
individual Member States. Variations between individual Member States as well as 
variations with reference to various policy areas have emerged as the most recent 
research puzzle associated with the Presidency (e.g. Leal 2010, Schout and 
Vanhoonacker 2006, Elgström 2003). Such an approach allows for a more 
comprehensive picture of the Presidency as a constitutive interplay of structurally based 
expectations towards the role of the Presidency itself as well as towards individual 
Member States in the chair. It also enables individual interpretations by the Member 
States of their role while in the chair. 
Consequently, the institution of the Presidency, with its complex nature and its both 
formally and informally developed, and to some extent mutually incompatible, rules and 
functions, constituted an important, yet largely under-researched, academic puzzle 
already in the pre-Lisbon context. With the LT radically changing the context of the 
rotating CEU chairmanship in the area of European foreign policy this puzzle has 
become even more interesting as the formal functions of the Presidency became 
severely limited when the new actors formally took over management of EU foreign 
affairs. In the past, the Presidency managed to expand its functional role and inter-
institutional position by adapting it to the changing EU system and taking on new 
functions and expanding its functioning to new policy areas without formal 
institutionalisation of its role. With its growing functional role, the Presidency has 
evolved from a purely intergovernmental function towards a complex combination of 
national and European functions. As noted by Bunse, the Presidency’s hybrid nature 
refers to ‘an intergovernmental policy actor (with its own preferences, areas of 
expertise, and political and administrative culture) in charge of a supranational 
institution’ (2009: 2). This has particular relevance to the evolution of the Presidency’s 
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functions and inter-institutional position. In the context of European foreign policy, the 
pre-Lisbon Presidency’s role institutionalisation had been influenced by both common 
European expectations and the particular expectations expressed towards particular 
Member States. This was further influenced by the intergovernmental character of 
European foreign policy. Even though the LT upgraded the management of EU foreign 
affairs to the supranational level via newly created European institutions, it is yet to be 
seen how this will impact on policy making. As I will argue in the following section, 
this ambiguous character of European foreign policy, developed somewhere between a 
collective action and more or less common values and interests, might further affect the 
implementation of institutional change.  
1.2 European Foreign Policy  
 
The problem with explaining European foreign policy starts with the complex nature of 
the EU itself, with some definitions characterising it as a ‘quasi-state’, some treating it 
as another international organisation, and some arguing that the EU is sui generis 
(Böröcz and Sarkar 2005, Jenson and Saint-Martin 2003). This makes defining 
European foreign policy also a challenging task. The making of EU foreign policy 
comprises a mixture of various policy areas, such as foreign affairs, trade and 
development policies, economic relations, regional cooperation, and a mixture of 
intergovernmental and to some extent Community methods. This particular complex 
nature of EU foreign affairs seems to be one of the key factors influencing the role 
institutionalisation of the post-Lisbon Presidency, as the institution has retained some of 
the previous functions in the policy areas, for example of development and trade. Thus, 
post-Lisbon foreign policy making requires the coordination and cooperation of the 
various actors involved in the process at different levels (e.g. the European Council, the 
Foreign Affairs Council, sectoral working groups) and in different policy areas (e.g. 
CFSP, CSDP, enlargement, trade, development).  
Some researchers have argued that European foreign policy making has failed to be 
explained by International Relations (IR) theories which focus on relations between 
states, or traditional Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), due to its predominantly state-
centric approach.  As noted by Smith ‘(…) the study of [European] policy lies 
somewhat uneasily between European integration and international relations’ (2006: 
322). Authors working on the subject of EU foreign policy have long advanced the idea 
that the analysis of EU foreign policy and the foreign policies of its Member States 
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needs a distinct approach (e.g. Manners and Whitman 2000, Hill and Wallace 1996, 
Carlsnaes and Smith 1994, Hill 1993, Clarke and White 1989). The field of European 
FPA has expanded quickly with studies on the external role of the EU (Orbie 2008, Hill 
and Smith 2005, Lavenex 2001, Ginsberg 1999) and the individual Member States’ 
foreign policies (Keukeleire and MacNaughton 2008, Bulmer and Lequesne 2005, 
Manners and Whitman 2000). The third group of analyses investigates the interaction of 
European foreign policy with foreign policies of particular Member States (e.g. 
Torreblanca 2001, Strang 2007, Tonra 1999, 2001,). The latter approach has used 
concepts specifically designed for European studies, such as Europeanisation (e.g. 
Wong and Hill 2012, Alecu De Flers 2012, Alecu de Flers and Müller 2010, 
Torreblanca 2001, Tonra 1999). This approach implies that there is a mutual impact, 
both from the EU, on both the content of the foreign policy agenda and the structure of 
foreign policy making of its Member States and also from the Member States on both 
the institutional settings and the substance of European foreign policy making. This 
study draws on this reasoning by arguing that there is a bi-directional influence of the 
EU and the Member States on each other which can be captured in the process of role 
institutionalisation and application of role analysis. 
From the beginning, the functioning of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was 
‘less than supranational but more than intergovernmental’ (Wessels 1982). Additionally,  
as noted by Tonra, even though ‘there is (…) no ‘communitarization’ of CFSP decision-
making, a system is under construction that has certainly moved away from formal 
intergovernmentalism’ (2003: 733). The nature of cooperation in European foreign 
policy making has remained one of the key issues in academic research. Some 
researchers focus on capturing the gradual shift of the foreign policy making process 
from national capitals to Brussels by conceptualising it as the process of Brusselisation 
(Allen 1998). This ‘physical move of the CFSP governance system (and those officials 
involved) to Brussels’ (Juncos and Pomorska 2011: 4) results in a weakening of ‘the 
control exercised by the Member States on the decision-making processes’ (2011: 3).  
The concept of Europeanisation goes beyond Brusselisation, incorporating in the 
process mechanisms of social learning and socialisation and arguing changes at the level 
of construction of national interests and national identities (Wong 2006, Bulmer and 
Radaelli 2004, Tonra 2001). Consequently, over the years, European foreign policy has 
developed from a mere collection of mutual interests of the EU Member States to an 
CHAPTER I Introduction 
25 
 
increasingly coordinated cooperation at both national and European levels, to some 
extent a common understanding of European interests and, finally, the collective 
formation of identity at the European level. As a result of intensive socialisation and 
learning in the EU system of foreign policy making, Member States and their civil 
servants are subject to informally developed rules regulating common behaviour, for 
example the consensus-seeking norm and ‘reflex of coordination’ (Tonra 2001, Smith 
2001, 2004,Glarbo 1999, Smith 1998, Wessels and Weiler 1988). Therefore, the EU 
framework for foreign policy comprises a policy making environment with no formal 
mechanisms of rule enforcement or conditionality; rather being regulated by a culture of 
cooperation and persuasion through communicative action and peer pressure exercised 
to ensure appropriate behaviour. With the key features being consensus and problem-
solving, the policy problems are addressed by collective formulation of their definitions 
and solutions that are advocated by reference to European identity and interests (Smith 
2004). The common understanding results in European foreign policy making being 
regulated by willing compliance rather than strictly regulated conditionality. 
The particular framework of EU foreign policy making creates a distinctive informal 
normative context which creates expectations towards the behaviour of Member States 
and thus might influence the implementation of the LT’s provisions and how the 
emerging institutional ambiguities are interpreted. The LT has ensured the 
intergovernmental method of working for CFSP, and thus the particular role of the 
Member States, while at the same time strengthening the institutional framework at the 
supranational level. This has resulted in maintaining the complex nature of the 
interactions trapped between supranational institutions and intergovernmental reflexes. 
This recent shift triggers a question as to what extent this can alter the level of influence 
of Member States on EU foreign policy. Therefore, in the context of the Presidency, its 
intergovernmental character might create a window of opportunity for the first Member 
States in the chair to imprint their individual interpretation on the new role, reflecting 
their national stances towards foreign policy at the national and European levels. As this 
analysis reveals, this institutional creativity has been both empowered and constrained 
by the fledgling post-Lisbon system. Consequently, as argued before, the new role of 
the Presidency will develop as a result of institutional feedback as well as of the 
deliberate role making of the Member States in the chair of the first post-Lisbon 
Presidencies. 
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1.3 Analytical Framework, Methodology and Sources 
 
The recent strand of study of institutional change has shifted the focus from large, 
external event-based changes into examining the more gradual and endogenous 
transformation of institutions. One of the most relevant examples of this approach is the 
study by Farrell and Héritier (2007, 2005) introducing the concept of ‘incomplete 
contracting’ as a manner of operationalizing subsequent institutional ambiguities 
emerging as a result of formal institutional change. These ambiguities create the need to 
ensure the further institutional adaptation of working arrangements that are often 
informal in their nature. As argued by Mahoney and Thelen, the window of opportunity 
created by the need to ensure interpretation of the formal rules might turn into a conflict 
‘with different groups which deliberately exploit ambiguities and press interpretations 
that favour their interests’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 11). This is further highlighted 
by Héritier’s research into the EU comitology and codecision rules; based on the theory 
of power-based distributive bargaining it is assumed ‘that actors are competence 
maximizers that whilst seeking to increase the efficiency of an institutional rule also try 
to ensure that a policy will be enacted through procedures which maximize their own 
degree of control over the process of policy-making’ (2012: 40). This recent strand 
looking into the incremental and gradual transformation of institutions seems to provide 
useful insights for studying the informal adaptation of the Presidency’s role in the 
aftermath of what I argue was an incomplete formal change.   
This research, grounded in new institutionalism, applies role theory at the operational 
level of analysis. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 2, new institutionalism offers a 
bridging framework between institutional stability and institutional change through 
processes of gradual transformation and endogenous adjustments. It also acknowledges 
a constitutive relationship between agential and structural elements involved in 
institutional change. However, it does not provide enough theoretical underpinnings to 
understand actors’ behaviour on the international stage and thus trace how the 
institutional change happens. This is where role theory can provide a clear explanation 
through application of role-based concepts, such as ‘role conceptions (the role(s) a 
foreign policy actor believes it should play), role expectations (the role(s) that an 
external actor believe another actor should play) and role behaviour (the role(s) which 
are played)’ (Chappell 2012: 27). Chappell points to strategic culture as the main factor 
shaping the policy-makers’ actions and argues that the application of role theory proves 
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particularly useful in understanding how ‘this moves from the national to the EU level’ 
(2012: 23). The ability of a role-based analysis to integrate various factors at the 
national, European and international levels demonstrates its organizational value 
(Chappell 2012, Rosenau 1987, Walker 1987).  
As further explained in Chapter 3, a role-based model of role institutionalisation is 
based on interaction between the Member States in the chair of the Presidency and the 
fledgling post-Lisbon system of European foreign policy. I argue that the informal 
institutional adaptation of the LT’s formal provisions can serve as a vital intermediate 
variable in explaining the process of institutional change of the Presidency. This 
analysis adopts the concept of role making, originally developed by Herbert Mead 
(Harnisch 2012, 2011), which is further expanded by incorporating insights stemming 
from research on institutional entrepreneurship. The aim is to reintroduce the influence 
of agency and its preferences into studying institutional change. I argue that 
incorporating a role-based approach to new institutionalist framework might offer an 
analytical framework better equipped to capture the process of institutional change as an 
interactive and constitutive process of role institutionalisation at the structural and 
agential levels. Role theory seems to complement the new institutionalist accounts by 
zooming in on the micro-level of the analysis and on the processes of institutional 
change. Operating within concepts such as role preferences, role expectations, role 
enactment, role assessments, and role making will allow for exploration of an additional 
perspective, in particular for studying the agency - structure mutual interactions. Such 
an analytical framework allows us to take into account institutions as intermediate-level 
variables affecting the relative bargaining power of the actors over time. This is done 
through the establishment of rules of conduct which foster coalition while at the same 
time affect both national preferences and identities. It also emphasises Member States as 
institutionally-embedded agents who are thus being both constrained and enabled by the 
institution’s environment in their behaviour. This implies therefore them being at least 
theoretically capable of shaping this environment and thus pursuing institutional 
change. 
This research favours the interpretive qualitative approach which seems to be better 
suited to address an exploratory nature of this research. The rationale behind this choice 
is that the qualitative approach ‘is capable of saying a good deal more about the 
institution and countries chosen and shows a greater contextual detail than quantitative 
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methods can exhibit’ (Bunse 2009: 10). Furthermore, following the interpretative 
approach, the project seeks to ‘understand phenomenon through accessing the meaning 
participants assign to them’ (Orlikowski and Baroud 1991: 5) and at the same time 
‘emphasising not only the importance of subjective meanings for the individual actor, 
but also the social structures which condition and enable such meaning and are 
constituted by them’ (Walsham 1993: 246). Thus this research aims to explain the 
phenomenon of institutionalisation in the context of the LT implementation. This study 
seeks to explore the behaviour of the Member States in the chair of the Presidency in 
order to identify emerging patterns of behaviour, such as new role conceptions, 
expectations, informal practices and norms, and other factors which shape the 
subsequent stage of role institutionalisation of the Presidency. As argued by Aggestam, 
‘a vital insight into the way structural changes impact on foreign policy can be obtained 
from understanding how political agents perceive these conditions, rather than assuming 
deterministic adaptation’ (2004: 3). The interpretative approach is particularly 
significant as in order to answer the question of how the new role is being formed, it is 
necessary to look at the meaning that all of the actors involved in the process held 
towards the role of the Presidency, namely their expectations. The approach thus 
completes role theory in an attempt to look at the relationship between the agency and 
structure and more specifically their mutual interaction. Because this project’s main 
focus is to examine the quality of the correlation between agential and structural levels 
within the process of institutional change, it adopts a qualitative methodology in order 
to establish ‘explanation or understanding of the social phenomena and their context’ 
(Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 5).  
The methodology combines the use of interpretative process-tracing and comparative 
case-study method. The preference for a small number of case studies enables to 
prioritise an in-depth understanding of each individual case in all its complexity. As 
noted by Yin ‘case studies are preferred strategy when how or why questions are being 
posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context’ (1994: 1). Since this research 
project aims to capture the changing role of the Presidency, the first four Presidencies 
are analysed and compared in order to identify any emerging patterns of behaviour and 
functions which are shared among the subsequent Member States in the chair. The 
choice of the subsequently held Presidencies was also aimed to address the potential 
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problem of biased selection. Following the EU adopted pattern for the Presidency 
rotation, this selection covers big and small, old and new, and in geographical terms 
diversely located Member States. Such an approach potentially enables to account for 
various intervening variables such as size of the country, its traditional interests and 
previous experience of Presidency. As argued above, since the LT is a recent 
phenomenon the case studies available for research are limited. By focusing on the 
period of the aftermath of the institutional change I aim to undertake an in-depth 
analysis of behaviour of individual Member States, yet still remain capable of 
identifying evolving general patterns of the Presidency’s role in European foreign 
policy making.  
The study thus focuses on the first four Presidencies held post-Lisbon and in particular 
on the examples of the Hungarian and Polish Presidencies. These were the first two 
Presidencies to operate within the fully operational post-Lisbon structure. Following the 
appointment of the HRVP and POTEC in December 2009 the EEAS was put in place, 
and started to operate in January 2011 thus creating a new institutional context of 
European foreign policy making. The examples of the Hungarian and Polish 
Presidencies are examined in a comparative perspective against the first two 
Presidencies, the Spanish and the Belgian Presidencies in order to provide an overview 
of the two-year process of institutional adaptation. As earlier highlighted, the main 
research interviews were conducted in the period of 2011-2012. Thus, only limited 
number of the Spanish and Belgian officials was interviewed upon the completion of the 
Presidency. The primary data collection in the case of the first two Presidencies was 
based on relevant documents and secondary sources. In a case of the subsequent two 
Presidencies, the primary method of data collection was interviewing which was 
divided into three stages: a pre-stage before the Presidency commenced, during the six 
month months while in the chair finally after the Presidency was concluded. The aim 
was to capture any changes in the interpretations of the Presidency's role and its 
performance. Thus, the triangulation of data collection and data sources was to not only 
provide a greater reliability and validity of the findings but also to ensure a greater level 
of compatibility between all four Presidencies. 
By mapping functions developed by each of the Member State, Spain, Belgium, 
Hungary and Poland, it is possible to identify which of the functions were identified 
across all of these Member States and if and which functions were introduced by 
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individual Presidencies. Analysing the period of the chairmanship for individual 
Member States allows identifying the institutional capacity and the position of the 
Presidency at a given time. The subsequent comparison across four Presidencies will 
result in assessing what was the influence of individual Member States, namely Spain, 
Belgium, Hungary and Poland on the emerging role of the Presidency in the area of 
European foreign policy making. In order for the comparison to take place, a structured 
research design is set up and followed throughout the individual case studies. This will 
be further discussed in Chapter 3. Such a comparative approach, as argued by Della 
Porta, allows us to understand elements such as preferences, motivations and contexts 
and how they explain the phenomenon investigated (2008: 201-202). As explained by 
Collier, process-tracing refers to ‘the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence 
selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the 
investigator. Process-tracing can contribute decisively both to describing political and 
social phenomena and to evaluating causal claims’ (Collier 2011: 823). The case-study 
approach employs a process-tracing method in order to identify the patterns of 
behaviour of Member States in the chair of the Presidency. This is done in the form of 
the model of role institutionalisation. Employed in this thesis is the interpretative variant 
of process-tracing, understood as narration in search for patterns (Gysen et al. 2006). 
This approach will enable me to give an account of the events as they unfolded and 
identify emerging patterns of behaviour. Chapter 3 elaborates further on how the role-
based model of role institutionalisation has been used in the structuring of the process-
tracing analysis.  
The analysis is based on the analysis of crucial policy documents and public statements 
of the actors involved, as well as semi-structured interviews with national, European 
and international officials involved in the process of European policy making. Such a 
combination of research methods, document reviewing and elite interviewing, follows 
the logic of triangulation. This is understood as ‘the observation of the research issue 
from (at least) two different points’ (Flick 2006) in order to provide for greater 
reliability, verification and validity of the collected evidence, and subsequently the 
overall conclusions by cross checking and verifying collected data. As further pointed 
by Lewis and Ritchie ‘triangulation assumes that the use of different sources of 
information will help both to confirm and improve the clarity of precision, of a research 
finding’ (2009: 239). Moreover, for Decrop (1999) triangulation can reduce or even 
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eliminate personal and methodological biases and increase the probability of 
generalising the findings of a study as the gathered data reflects various research 
methods and data sources.
3
 Therefore, by employing the triangulation of methods of 
data collection the problems of validity and credibility of the findings and possible bias 
that comes from using a single method will be addressed.  
1.4 Contributions and Limitations of the Study 
 
The study will first of all contribute to the understanding of the nature and context of 
exercising the Presidency chairmanship in the post-Lisbon system. It will further 
contribute to comparative research on the CEU Presidency by providing empirical data 
on the Spanish, Belgian, Hungarian and Polish Presidencies. In theoretical terms, it will 
contribute to the development of approaches capable of exploring the subject of the 
hybrid nature of the Presidency and the usefulness of role theory in studying foreign 
policy making within the European context. In the context of the latter, the project will 
test the usefulness and applicability of a role-based framework in studying institutional 
change and interactions between the formal and informal dimensions of EU policy 
making. Consequently, the applicability of role theory into the study of institutional 
change will be further confirmed. The final result, the analytical model of institutional 
adaptation, can be applied to study other instances institutional change – focusing on 
both macro and micro-levels of analysis. Finally, by analysing the emerging architecture 
of the EU the study will contribute to the understanding of the impact that the LT has on 
the foreign policy making of the EU and its Member States. In general, the aim is to 
provide further understanding of the issue of collective action by states in matters of 
‘high politics’. 
One of the limitations of this research is that the main comparative analysis is based on 
the example of the first four Member States in the chair of the Presidency after the 
provisions of the LT began to be implemented in 2010. This created a unique 
transitional period, thus the context of exercising the Presidency may change over time 
and the identified role conceptions, role expectations and factors shaping the context of 
the role institutionalisation process may be only applicable to this particular context. 
                                                          
3
 One of the most comprehensive definitions is the one proposed by Thomas Schwandt: ‘Triangulation is 
a means of checking the integrity of the inferences one draws. It can involve the use of multiple data 
sources, multiple investigators, multiple theoretical perspectives, and/or multiple methods.” (p. 298) He 
continues: “The strategy of triangulation is often wedded to the assumption that data from different 
sources or methods must necessarily converge or be aggregated to reveal the truth’ (2007: 298). 
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Nevertheless, as argued before, the main purpose of this study is to develop a model 
enabling for examining the mechanism of incremental and endogenous institutional 
change. Moreover, the difference between the primary collection method between the 
first two and the two subsequent Presidencies might limit the comparability of the case 
studies. As explained earlier, in order to address this issue I include a combination of 
both research methods, namely the analysis of primary and secondary sources and 
interviewing as well as putting a place a structured research design based on the 
proposed model of role institutionalisation. Finally, by providing better understanding 
of the position and institutional capacity of the Presidency in the new hybrid system of 
European foreign policy making, this thesis aims to provide a better informed 
environment for the Member States in their preparations for the CEU chairmanship, 
consequently bridging the divide between the academic and policy making world. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter 2 presents the overview of the literature review on the subject of the Presidency 
by focusing on the pre-Lisbon development of its role, its influence capacity, particular 
hybrid nature and the conceptualisation of its role. The second part of the chapter 
presents the review of the scholarship on the subject of institutional change by 
highlighting contribution of the new institutionalist accounts. Additionally, I include 
insights from both the policy and institutional entrepreneurship in order to identify 
relevant analytical assumptions towards studying the particular impact of Member 
States on the role institutionalisation of the Presidency post-Lisbon. 
Chapter 3 introduces the analytical framework based on the role-based model of role 
institutionalisation. It introduces role theory into the analysis and discusses it 
application towards examining the institution of the Presidency, European foreign 
policy and finally the institutional change. The final sections also present the 
methodology used for this study, in particular, the comparative case design, data 
collection, and the interpretative version of process tracing. 
Chapter 4 – 8 present the empirical part of this research. Chapter 4 starts with 
examining institutional expectations towards the role of the Presidency in European 
foreign policy making as emerging from the analysis of the provisions of the LT. Each 
of the empirical chapters (5 on the Spanish Presidency, 6 on the Belgian Presidency, 7 
on the Hungarian Presidency and 8 on the Polish Presidency) will start with identifying 
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the role preference as held by the Member State in the chair and analysing their possible 
sources such as national role conceptions (foreign and European policy) and 
expectations held towards the post-Lisbon Presidency as well as towards the individual 
Member States in the chair. Subsequently, at the stage of role enactment, the analysis 
will focus on mapping Presidency’s functions performed by individual Member States. 
Finally, role assessment will be the key stage in assessing if the Member State in the 
chair managed to played its role according to its original role preference or rather role 
expectations, and finally if this managed to have any influence on the 
institutionalisation of the post-Lisbon role and institutional position of the Presidency in 
the area of EU foreign affairs.  
In the final chapter I compare the individual Presidencies in order to identify new 
patterns of behaviours and functions. Upon summarising and comparing empirical 
findings across the four subsequent Presidencies, the level of influence of the individual 
Member State on the emerging role position of the Presidency will be discussed. These 
findings will then be referred to the evidence emerging from the literature review. By 
comparing the role and the position of the Presidency before and after the 
implementation of the LT I will be able to trace the change and continuity in the role of 
the Presidency, as well as its new pattern of institutionalisation resulting from the 
interplay between the institutional feedback of the developing post-Lisbon system of 
European foreign policy making (structure) and the purposive behaviour of the Member 
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CHAPTER II Literature Review 
 
 
This chapter aims to review the literature with reference to the CEU Presidency and 
institutional change in order to identify relevant assumptions on how to study the 
process of informal adaptation and institutionalisation of the Presidency’s role post-
Lisbon. First, I review academic literature related to the institution of the Presidency 
itself. As I noted in the introduction, with no clear functions prescribed in the LT the 
Presidency’s role depends on the individual behaviour of the Member State in charge of 
this office. It is thus particularly important to examine the origins and evolution of the 
Presidency’s role and its pre-Lisbon inter-institutional position as implementing agents 
might rely more on the past experience, and thus previous patterns of development and 
functions might re-emerge. Subsequently, I focus on the Presidency’s hybrid nature, its 
influence capacity and the concept of the Presidency’s role. This is further expanded 
with a section exploring possible factors behind the variation in the level of 
successfulness in Presidency’s performance and policy entrepreneurship. Particular 
emphasis is placed on the literature that analyses so called ‘conditions for success’ and 
factors affecting general Presidency’s performance as these might provide useful 
insights into studying potential variations among the performances of the Spanish, 
Belgian, Hungarian and Polish Presidencies. 
The aim of the second section is to review scholarship on institutional change in order 
to provide conceptual and guiding assumptions about exploring the process of role insti-
tutionalisation in the post-Lisbon context. With the system of European foreign policy 
making being the focus of the research, it is argued by Peters (2012) that new institu-
tionalism might prove to be particularly useful with reference to its key assumptions 
that ‘institutions matter’, and that the policy making system is governed by formal rules 
of procedures, as laid down in the treaties and other legal documents, as well as by in-
formal norms and rules of conducts (the organisational culture) that play an equally im-
portant role in shaping the functions and the behaviour of Member States. As noted by 
Ripoll Servent ‘studying EU institutions has become almost synonymous with dealing 
with one form or another of new institutionalism’ (2015: 6). New Institutionalism (NI) 
seems to offer the most promising starting point for the analytical framework. However, 
since the research puzzle focuses on the period of the institutional change, the choice of 
theory should also be dictated by its capacity to account for exploring the policy making 
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system during the period of institutional change, which, in this particular case, is the 
subsequent stage of implementation of formal provisions in practice. The latter would 
point to the more recent historical institutionalist approach highlighting incremental and 
gradual transformation of institutions, and allowing for a more active outlook of agency 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010, Farrell and Héritier 2007, 2005, Héritier 2007).  
2.1 The Presidency in the Academic Research 
 
The institution of the Presidency has been subject to numerous analyses since it is usu-
ally high on the agenda in countries preparing for the Presidency. However, the research 
focus quickly disappears once the chairmanship is over, leaving little research that ap-
plies solid theoretical foundations. Therefore, academic research on this subject has 
been characterised as ‘a-theoretical and rather descriptive’ (Tallberg 2004: 1000). Ex-
cept for few studies, for example by Wallace and Edwards (1976), tracing the evolution 
of the role of the Presidency with reference to the Council of the European Community, 
and by O’Nuallain (1985) analysing the Presidencies of chosen Member States, this 
subject did not appear in the mainstream literature on the EU until the 1990s. A particu-
lar surge of academic interest was recorded in the 2000s, and since then, academic liter-
ature has emerged in two strands. One strand deals with the institution of the EU Coun-
cil of Ministers and thus only indirectly referring to the Presidency’s functions and posi-
tion within the institutional framework of the EU (Sherrington 2000, Hayes-Renshaw 
and Wallace 1997, Westlake 1995, Kirchner 1992). Several studies have been conduct-
ed in the form of comparative cross-countries or longitude analyses (Sherrington 2000, 
de Bassompierre 1998, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, Westlake 1995, Kirchner 
1992, O’Nuallain 1985), making it possible to draw correlations between Member 
States, but with only limited theoretical reasoning to support it. While studying the EU 
Council enables the better understanding of the decision making process within the 
Council and the inter-institutional architecture of the European system, it tends to ignore 
the complex nature of the Presidency which on the one hand refers to the formal institu-
tion of the chairmanship in charge of administrative management of the Council’s legis-
lation, and on the other to the more informally based institution held by individual 
Member States. The second strand of post 2000 studies have directly focused on explor-
ing the institution of the Presidency through various theoretical lenses (Leal 2010, Bun-
se 2009, Fernández Pasarín 2008b, Tallberg 2008, 2003, Thomson 2008, Wartnjen, 
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2008, 2007, Elgström 2006, 2003, Kollman 2003, Metcalfe 1998, de Bassompierre 
1998).   
More recent research has emerged in the form of descriptive evaluations of particular 
Presidencies’ performance often with no or only limited theoretical foundations (e.g. 
Auers and Rostoks 2016, Högenauer 2016, Kyris 2015, Vilpišauskas 2014, Laffan 
2014, Manners 2013, Christou 2013, Sundberg and Nilsson 2009, Kajncˇ2008, 2009, 
Ferreira-Pereira 2008, Whitman 2006, Hearl 2006, Whitman and Thomas 2005, Barbé 
2003, Friis 2003, Edwards and Wiesala 2000, Henderson 1998). These studies have 
benefited the empirical knowledge of what makes the term in the office a successful 
one. This is the most abundant area of studies with individual analyses being conducted 
after each Presidency. These evaluations are rather brief, and while they focus mostly 
on the fulfilment of the Presidency’s programmed objectives, they also assess its reac-
tion to unforeseen events (Lefebrve 2009). As in the previous case, the generalisability 
of these empirical accounts is limited, and is not the primary aim of the authors. Their 
greatest contribution to the field is identifying from a practical point of view the set of 
functions that the countries in chair are expected to fulfil. 
2.1.1 The Origins and Development of the Presidency    
 
The system of the rotating Presidency was created on the basis of the 1951 Treaty of 
Paris as the main working method for the institution of the Council of the Ministers for 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Its initial design was characterised by 
two key principles: ‘first that the Presidency would be exercised by the Member States 
(…) as a collective representative’, and ‘second that each country would occupy the 
office in turn on a basis of parity, irrespective of size, political weight or any other 
distinction’ (Wallace 1985: 2).4 Its main function was to ensure coordination and 
communication among the High Authority and the national governments. The modest 
formal provisions to set up the institutional system for the ECSC meant that the system 
would have to develop its working arrangements in practice, and clarify the inter-
institutional relations in due course of the functioning in a rather informal manner. This 
indicates that the original design for the Presidency assumed flexibility and further 
development through its institutional adaptation, which reflected the compromise 
achieved among the founding Member States. The creation of the Council was supposed 
                                                          
4
 Presidency’s functioning was also briefly stipulated in articles 26 and 28 of Treaty of Rome (1951). 
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to ensure institutional balance by acting as ‘a body of collective control and the centre 
of countries’ interests’ (Kersten 1988: 293 cited in Fernández Pasarín 2008b: 622). The 
working method of the emerging Council was supposed to reflect the principle of 
equality among the countries. The system of rotation was to ensure that every Member 
State stayed in the helm of the ECSC ‘on a basis of parity, irrespective of size, political 
weight or any other distinction’ (Wallace 1985: 2).  
Over the next thirty years, the Presidency’s role developed as a result of the inter-
institutional rivalry among the Council and the Commission, and the Member States’ 
decision to favour the intergovernmental mode for furthering of the European 
integration. As noted by Ludlow, ‘during the first decade of the EEC, a combination of 
a clear and comprehensive mandate in the treaty itself, a forceful but nevertheless 
politically sensitive Commission, an effective and cohesive [...] COREPER and the 
continued presence of some of the ‘founding fathers’ whose influence did not depend on 
whether or not their country held the Presidency masked the need for institutionalized 
political leadership within the Council and as a result delayed the emergence of the 
Presidency as a conspicuous player in its own right’ (Westlake 1999: 37). The fact that 
the cooperation at that time mostly focused on the economic issues also favoured the 
more technically oriented Commission. This became particularly apparent during the so 
called 'Luxembourg crisis' in 1965. Its origins date back to 1963 when the Commission 
presented a proposal for a new financial framework for the Common Agriculture 
Policy.
5
 In an effort to settle the CAP’s funding, the Commission proposed that the 
European Community could acquire its ‘own financial resources’. This was seen by 
Member States as a potential threat to the nationally located budgetary powers, and thus 
the subject outside of the Commission’s agenda (Dinan 2004: 104). The fact that the 
Italian Presidency managed to broker a compromise strengthened the position of the 
rotating Presidency by proving the institution’s capability of acting neutrally in 
compromise seeking at the European level (Wallace 1985: 3). This has been one of the 
clearest examples of the Presidency’s functional scope emerging as a result of the 
particular behaviour of a country in the chair. With the European Communities 
continuing to practice their policy making system, the functioning of the Council 
expanded, and consequently, the Presidency’s position grew accordingly both as a result 
                                                          
5
 For more on this crisis see Dinan 2004: 104. 
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of the institutional feedback and as the entrepreneurial activity of particular countries in 
the chair. 
The EPC launched in 1970 was placed outside of the traditional Community area, and 
based on the intergovernmental method of mutual consultations on issues of 
international concerns (Westlake 1999: 38). With no formal role envisaged for the 
supranational institution, its functioning was to be supplied by the Presidency of the 
Council. The functions mirrored the ones fulfilled by both the Council and the 
Commission at the communities’ level (Westlake 1999: 38). In 1974, the Presidency 
started to act as a spokesman for all of the EPC’s members vis-à-vis 'friendly' countries. 
The Council’s portfolio expanded to handle different areas with new instruments, such 
as consultations, declarations and spokesman ship. The Presidency became the main 
actor to coordinate foreign policy issues, and thus it also became responsible for 
ensuring the political development of the EPC (Wallace 1985: 8). This role in foreign 
policy quickly became associated with the informal exercise of agenda setting. Thus, 
‘the growth in the scope and effectiveness of political cooperation was made possible 
only by the constantly increasing authority vested in the Presidency’ (de Schoutheete 
1988: 82 cited in Tallberg 2006: 53). These changes emerged initially as informal 
practices, and were subsequently formalised in the Copenhagen Report in 1973.  
As argued by Wallace (1985), the 1960s and 1970s constituted ‘the functional take off’ 
of the Presidency. The position emerged as an important symbol of equality among 
Member States as well as the instrument of legitimisation of the European integration. 
The first twenty years also reinforced its ‘initial institutional design’ (Fernández Pasarín 
2008b: 623), leading to strengthening the intergovernmental side of European 
governance. Nevertheless, with ‘no manual of procedure for an incoming Presidency; 
each Presidency was free to acquit itself of the role and tasks as it saw fit’ (Westlake 
and Galloway 2006: 327).
6
 The subsequent three decades changed the evolution of the 
Presidency from its intergovernmental to the more supranational function, emphasising 
its role of the representative of the common European interests rather than national 
ones. This was linked to attempts to formalise tasks associated with the Presidency 
across various policy areas and to end the conflicting nature of their inter-institutional 
relations by fostering joint responsibility to further European integration (Fernández 
                                                          
6
 The Council’s rules of procedure officially changed only twice in 1957 due to the provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome and in 1969. 
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Pasarín 2008b:  625). The Council chairmanship started to be perceived as more of a 
Community function which made it difficult for a country in the chair to balance 
national and European interests. 
As noted by Leal the subsequent treaties (The Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and 
Nice) ‘to different degrees, boosted the relevance of the Presidency, continuing the 
formalization process of some of its functions and expansion into new policy domains 
without, however, bringing major changes’ (2010: 58). Following the shift towards 
more supranational European governance, the Presidency also shifted towards its 
communitarian function by becoming responsible for the overall European project, its 
coherence and thus inter-institutional cooperation with other European institutions. In 
the subsequent period of the European integration, the context of discussion to reform 
the policy making system and thus the rotating system was to a large extent influenced 
by the perspective of the further EU enlargements, which lead to the failed 
Constitutional Treaty and the adaption of the Lisbon Treaty. 
As observed by Elgström ‘the functions of the Presidency have been in continuous 
evolution since the birth of the EU […] and the tasks it performs have developed 
gradually though creation of informal practices, which over the years has become 
increasingly institutionalised’ (2003a: 4). This informal institutionalisation might 
provide important clues for the post-Lisbon development.                                                                                             
The expansion of functions and the increasingly central position of the Presidency 
developed as responses to the institutional feedback to further the scope and method of 
European integration and the subsequent shifts in inter-institutional balance between the 
involved actors. Firstly, the institution of the Presidency developed into a framework of 
formal and informal functions over the years; the role of the pre-Lisbon Presidency 
consisted of both supranational (honest brokering) and intergovernmental (agenda 
shaping) functions while gradually developing a greater emphasis on the supranational 
one. Secondly, this ambiguous role set developed as a result of the structure-based 
factor (the institutional feedback) and the agency-based factor (the role performance of 
the countries in the chair), as the country in the chair was able to emphasise some of the 
functions over the others according to its particular role preference. Apart from purely 
functional tasks such as organisational management, external and internal representation 
and neutral brokering among relevant actors, the Presidency also became associated 
with political leadership aiming to drive the European integration forward and often 
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being based on the efforts to reconcile European and national interests. The latter one 
became an important part of assessing the Presidency’s performance, and the so-called 
‘Presidency effect’ (the push to finish some legislative dossiers by the end of the six-
month term) was perceived as one of the advantages of the Council rotating system 
(SGCa/05.2012, Elgström 2003). It is thus to be examined if the post-Lisbon Presidency 
would continue with the previous development patterns.  
2.1.2 The Influence Capacity of the Presidency 
 
The question of whether a Member State is actually able to influence the political agen-
da of the EU has been subject to extensive academic discussion. As argued before, the 
functioning of the pre-Lisbon Council chairmanship was regulated by a few informal 
rules, of which the main one was the neutrality of and the emphasis on the role of an 
honest broker. Since the Presidency was supposed to be neutral and impartial, any polit-
ical initiative could have been seen as a breach of rules, and forcing national interests 
onto the agenda (Sherrington 2000, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, Council Guide 
1996, Westlake 1995, Kirchner 1992, O’Nuallain 1985). Member States that openly 
pursued their national interests were heavily criticised, and thus some researchers ar-
gued that while in chair, the ability of a country was even more limited than otherwise 
(Whitman 1998, Schout 1998). One of the Brussels official stated that ‘[b]y definition, a 
Presidency has to suppress its national interests’ (Elgström 2003: 1). This approach em-
phasised the supranational function of the Presidency and that it should act as the col-
lective representative of the EU Council. Several informal constraints were identified, 
as far as Member States’ attempts to influence the EU agenda were concerned. Some 
researchers argued that the ability to directly influence the agenda by introducing a con-
crete legislative proposal was constrained due to the short period of the Presidency (e.g. 
Whitman and Thomas 2005, Tallberg 2004, Kollman 2003, Scout 1998). Thus, the 
Member State in office was usually more preoccupied with issues on the agenda intro-




Nevertheless, for most of the Member States, the six-month period served as a window 
of opportunity to establish itself in a privileged position to advance some of the national 
                                                          
7
 The quantitative study by Thomson further proved that the Presidency’s ‘workload was mainly defined 
by the proposals introduced by the Commission under previous Presidencies, and the political progress 
achieved since then’ (2008: 612). 
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interests branded as the Presidency’s priorities (Kollman 2003, Kircher 1992). Most of 
the Member States are known for their national preferences, and during their Presiden-
cies they focus their agendas on advancing these topics of interest in the European fo-
rum. France, Spain and Italy, for instance, are all known for their support of the Medi-
terranean region, Sweden of the Baltic Region and the new Member States of Eastern 
Europe. Some of the achievements have been substantial. During its Presidency in 2007, 
Portugal managed to bring two of its national interests high on the agenda with the sec-
ond EU-Africa and the first EU-Brazil summits being held under its leadership (Fer-
reira-Pereira 2008). The French initiative adopted as the Union for the Mediterranean 
was the highlight of its Presidency in 2008 (Lefebrve 2009). The last Swedish Presiden-
cy focused on strengthening cooperation in the region of the Baltic Sea with a new 
strategy introduced in 2009 (Ryba 2009). It is possible to suggest, therefore, that the 
pre-Lisbon Presidency could act either as ‘a silencer or amplifier of national interests’ 
(Bengtsson et al. 2004). By taking advantage of both formal and informal powers, the 
Member States in chair were aiming to establish themselves in the privileged position 
and push for some of their national interests.  
Further insights into the mechanisms of the Presidency are found in the literature on in-
tergovernmental bargaining. European integration and particularly the International 
Government Conferences/Summits can be explained by applying theories of multilateral 
negotiations, which are widely used in world politics to explain how countries arrive at 
compromises (e.g. Tallberg 2010, Elgström 2006, and Metcalfe 1998). The concept at 
the core of such negotiations is the notion of ‘the power of the chair’ (Tallberg 2010, 
Elgström 2006). Tallberg (2010) pointed the delegation of authority to the chairman-
ship; the available power resources of negotiation chairs and the effects of formal lead-
ership on multilateral bargaining as the sources of the Presidency’s powers. His theory, 
based largely on RCI, the recent research into institutional design and principal-agent 
relationships in international cooperation
8, suggested that ‘the impact of formal leader-
ship on outcomes is the product of a two-step logic, where states first delegate process 
functions to the chairmanship in response to specific bargaining problems, and chairs 
subsequently draw on privileged power resources to influence the efficiency and dis-
tributive dimension of negotiations’ (Tallberg 2010: 242). This generally supports his 
earlier findings regarding the bargaining power in the EC (Tallberg 2008, 2004), and his 
                                                          
8
 For details see Tallberg 2010: 242. 
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theory of the demand for and supply of a brokerage chair which stated that ‘EU Presi-
dency possesses a set of informational and procedural resources that can help unlock 
incompatible negotiation positions and secure efficient agreements’ (Tallberg 2004: 
999). Additionally, he argued that these privileged resources are used by Member States 
to secure national gain. 
The two main resources available to the Presidency, and which are indispensable to 
conducting successful brokerage, are the access to privileged information and the pro-
cedural control (Tallberg 2010). The General Secretariat (GSC) is one of the best 
sources, as far as information on Member States is concerned (Quaglia and Moxon-
Browne 2006, Tallberg 2004).
9
 The Secretariat provides ‘expertise on the content of 
dossiers under negotiation’ (Tallberg 2010: 1003) and Member States’ position on vari-
ous policy issues. Another example of the resources exclusively available to the state 
holding the Presidency is the possibility of conducting bilateral confidential negotia-
tions with other Member States. The procedure of such quiet diplomacy called 'tour des 
capitals' or 'confessionals' has proved to be at the core of negotiation practice in Europe-
an affairs (Tallberg 2010, Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2006).
10
 Procedural control is 
another one of the privileges ensuing from organising and chairing every Council meet-
ing. The Presidency practically determines what is negotiated and when (Tallberg 
2004). The format of a meeting determines who is involved in negotiations, ministers or 
head of states, and whether it is a formal discussion or an informal talk about the possi-
bility of working out a compromise (Tallberg 2004). The final available procedural re-
source is called ‘the Presidency compromise’ (Tallberg 2004). A Member State in chair 
can propose its own text of a legislative initiative as an alternative to the Commission’s 
text. Since voting is not a very frequent procedure in the Council, and is often replaced 
by the informal expression of a lack of objection, it is thus easier to achieve the adop-
tion of legislation than in the more formal process involving the Commission (Tallberg 
2004). Thus, the Member State in the chair of the pre-Lisbon Presidency had an access 
to a number of formal and informal resources.  
                                                          
9
 The main task of the GSC is to gather information on Member States regarding their preferences and 
negotiation tactics. It also provides knowledge and support for the state in chair as far as the complex 
decision-making process in the Council and the EU are concerned (Tallberg 2010, Quaglia and Moxon-
Browne 2006). 
10
 The research by Quaglia and Moxon-Browne (2006) on the Italian and Irish Presidencies revealed that 
small Member States are usually more willing to use diplomatic measures than to ‘flex their muscles’ 
and they are more aware of national sensitivities through the additional information provided by the 
Secretariat. 
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Tallberg (2003) expanded the notion of the Presidency’s policy entrepreneurship Presi-
dency by introducing the term of agenda shaping. The Presidency’s influence on the 
European agenda can be thus distinguished by three strategies: agenda-setting (introduc-
tion of new issues onto the policy agenda), agenda-structuring (the emphasizing or de-
emphasizing of issues already on the agenda) and agenda-exclusion (the active barring 
of issues from the policy agenda). Each of these strategies enables a Member State to 
directly and indirectly use the Presidency as a chance to adjust the general agenda to its 
own priorities. Some case studies have shown that the period of adapting a new policy 
initiative can be more or less effective, depending on whether it is on the Presidency’s 
agenda of the country in chair (Schout 1998, Wurzel 1996). Advancing or delaying the 
adoption of initiatives on the EU agenda has been seen as one of the most common 
strategies used by Member States.
11
 The tactic of delaying the adoption of initiatives is 
also known as agenda-freezing (Sierra 2002). 
Thus, acknowledging that Member States see the Presidency as their main opportunity 
to promote national interests and influence the EU agenda is a widely recognised privi-
lege. The issue that empirical evaluations have mainly focused on is the content of each 
Presidency’s agenda e.g. Lefebrve 2009, Hearl 2006, Barbé 2003). The choice of the 
agenda’s objectives is very careful, and usually aims to reflect wider European issues, 
as ‘the closer the agendas (EU Presidency) the better the outcome of the Presidency’ 
(Henderson 1998: 4). As suggested by Sierra’s (2002) study on the Spanish Presidency, 
it is easier for a Member State to achieve a meaningful result when both national and 
European interests in the subject are high on the political agenda. Consequently, as ar-
gued by Schout ‘national interests can find a legitimate and acceptable position on the 
Presidency agenda and may lead to new initiatives or debates within the EU’ (1998: 4). 
The system of the rotating Presidency has been seen as generating ‘an impetus that con-
centrates the energies of each successive Presidency and thus provides the essential 
drive for making progress and achieving results’ (Bengtsson, Elgström, Tallberg, 2004: 
16). Thus ‘neutrality is undesirable’ (Schout 1998: 3). In addition to this, Kollman ar-
gued that such a system helped for new solutions and initiatives to be introduced ‘that 
might not be discovered or tried under other procedures’ (2003: 53). Thus, being in 
power for the period of the EU Presidency enables Member States to use their privi-
                                                          
11
 One of the examples was dropping the subject of energy liberalisation from the agenda during the 
French 
Presidency in 2000 (Kollman 2003: 57). 
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leged position in European affairs to advance national priorities. This influence capacity 
has been captured by Simone Bunse through the concept of policy entrepreneur, which 
seems to offer additional insights by capturing the Presidency through its hybrid nature 
as a combination of formal and informal powers (2009: 4).  
2.1.3 The Presidency’s Hybrid Structure  
 
There have existed two main perspectives on how the Member States perceive their six-
month period of the Council chairmanship. Firstly, following the traditional rationalist 
approach, it is assumed as an opportunity to influence the European agenda according to 
the national preferences, and the Member State in the chair behaves strategically in or-
der to achieve its priorities (‘the logic of consequentiality’). Secondly, following the 
constructivist approach, the Presidency is seen as the function of the Community, and 
thus the Member State in the chair following on the expectations of other actors focuses 
on securing compromises in the pursuit of the European interest (‘the logic of appropri-
ateness’). This further reflects the dichotomy of ‘the neutral brokering’ versus ‘national 
preference projection’ presented earlier, with reference to analysing the Presidency as 
either a supranational or intergovernmental function. 
Some approaches towards studying the Presidency have been trying to bridge the rather 
artificial rationalist versus constructivist division by analysing the Presidency as either 
the ‘silencer or amplifier’ of national preferences (Bengtsson et al. 2004). They concep-
tualise the Presidency as a hybrid comprising of both supranational and intergovern-
mental functions (Wallace 1986, Kirchner 1992, Ludlow 1993, Schout 1998, Westlake 
1999, Fernández Pasarín 2008b, Bunse 2009, Leal 2010). This is further explored by 
Simone Bunse in her research on the EU governance of small Member States in chair of 
the Council Presidency (2009). By applying insights from new institutionalism, the au-
thor elaborates on the concept of the Presidency as a ‘policy entrepreneur’ possessing 
additional formal, but most al all informal powers that enable the shaping of the EU 
agenda.  
The emphasis on the Presidency’s schizophrenic nature (both empowering the Member 
State with additional resources but at the same time constraining its behaviour by gener-
ally acknowledged rules of conduct, such as honest brokering) also attempts to bridge 
the traditional divide between rationalist and constructivist accounts. Analysing the 
Presidency as a hybrid function which both empowers and constrains the Member State 
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in the chair, seems to be a more promising approach for the purpose of this research; the 
Presidency can then be captured as ‘a complex role in which responsibility and oppor-
tunity are present at the same time’ (Fernández Pasarín 2008b: 619). Such an approach 
allows for exploring powers available for the Member State in the chair to exert poten-
tial influence on the process of shaping the new role for the Presidency while still ac-
counting for a set of informal rules which have been identified as shaping the Member 
State’s behaviour in the chair. In an attempt to continue with the recent developments, a 
bridging approach towards categorising the Presidency as either an intergovernmental or 
a supranational institution is adopted by applying such an analytical framework that in-
corporates insights both from new institutionalism and role theory. This thesis continues 
with the application of role-based approach into studying the institution of the rotating 
Presidency (Leal 2012, Elgström 2006); however, a distinctive model will be proposed 
in order to capture the institutional change of this institution (as presented in Chapter 3). 
The above analysis clearly demonstrates that the opportunity to influence the European 
agenda according to national preferences has been associated with the exercise of the 
Presidency. This agenda setting powers have never been officially sanctioned as one of 
the Presidency’s functions; nevertheless, it was informally associated with the expecta-
tions of the Member State to exert some sort of political leadership. Simone Bunse’s 
(2009) book on the small states’ leadership though the Council chairmanship on the EU 
governance has been one of the most advanced studies in theoretical terms on the influ-
ence and leadership capacity of the Presidency. By introducing an institutionalist con-
cept of the term ‘policy entrepreneur’, the author explored the influence of the Finnish, 
Belgian and Greek Presidencies across various policy areas (see figure 1).





 Figure 1. The Presidency as Policy Entrepreneur (Bunse 2009: 72) 
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The application of the term of policy entrepreneurship has become prevalent across Eu-
ropean studies, even though it was mostly used in cases of the Commission’s role as a 
policy agenda setter. Such an approach made it possible to trace the impact of the 
Commission on policy formulation (Kaunert 2010a, Kaunert 2010b, Dür et al. 2010, 
Peterson 2008, Kaunert 2007, Moravcsik, 1999, Pollack 1997, Laffan 1997) by pointing 
to its influence capacity grounded in the available resources. As noted by Bunse, the 
subject of policy entrepreneurship with reference to the Council has been largely ig-
nored.
12
 As presented within the debate on ‘neofuctionalist versus intergovernmental’ 
approaches, neofunctionalism understands supranational entrepreneurship as the main 
factor that shapes the EU decision making process, while intergovernmentalism per-
ceived its importance as ‘greatly exaggerated’ (Bunse 2009: 42). However, the applica-
tion of this concept might prove to be more suitable to capture the interplay of informal 
and formal venues for policy making that existed within the Council and the broader 
system of EU foreign policy making. By framing the influence capacity of the Presiden-
cy within the institutionalist concept of policy entrepreneur, Bunse portrays the Council 
Presidency ‘as a hybrid or ‘double hatted’ policy entrepreneur that attempts to influence 
the EU agenda and shape policy outcomes according to domestic preferences while at 
the same time advocating consensus (2009: 71, see figure 1).  
Consequently, policy entrepreneurship does not only refer to strict agenda setting – un-
derstood as an introduction of a new policy initiative onto the agenda – but also to in-
fluencing through management and mediation, and to proposing possible solutions to 
emerging issues and potential compromises (Bunse 2009). This is based on the access to 
privileged resources, namely information and expertise, and on states’ reputation and 
mediation skills (Moravscik 1999), thus reflecting the Tallberg’s concept of agenda 
shaping. The relative power stems more from the informal rather than formal powers 
and consequently, the exercised influence is channelled more informally through raising 
the awareness, launching discussions and through mobilising support for the preferred 
solution (Moravscik 1999). As demonstrated earlier, the Presidency has been tradition-
ally engaged in agenda shaping in a rather informal manner mostly due to the neutrality 
rule, but also due to the lack of extensive formal resources. Thus, the subsequent appli-
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 Except for Schimdt’s research on the informal practices of the agenda setting by the Council. For 
details see Schmidt, S.K. (2001) ‘A constrained Commission: Informal Practices of Agenda-Setting in the 
Council’, in Aspinwall, M. and Schneider, G. (eds.) ‘The Rules of Integration, Institutionalist Approaches 
to the Study of Europe, Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
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cation of the institutionalist concept of policy entrepreneurship to the case studies of the 
Finish, Belgian and Greek Presidencies enabled Bunse to capture the influence of indi-
vidual Member States on the European agenda by distinguishing between formal and 
informal levels of policy making, available resources and agenda setting venues.  
It seems that the hybrid nature of the Presidency combing both intergovernmental and 
supranational dimensions of policy making offers relevant insights into the influence 
capacity of the Presidency by bringing together both formal and informal dimensions 
and powers as available to Member States in the chair. 
2.1.4 Explaining Variations in the Presidency’s Performance and Influence 
Capacity  
 
As stated in the Presidency Handbook, the Presidency should be impartial, neutral and 
efficient (cited in Schout 1998: 1). As pointed out by some of the authors, the Member 
State in the chair should be guided by common European interests and achieve results 
accordingly (Elgström 2003, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, Kirchner 1992, Wal-
lace 1985). The Member State in chair should be impartial and neutral with reference to 
the interests of other Members, but most importantly to its own interests; as Schout stat-
ed: ‘[p]artiality destroys the credibility required for the mediation role, and a long and 
controversial national agenda will make constructive cooperation from the other Mem-
ber States less likely’ (1998: 4). In order to achieve results in negotiations among other 
states, the Member State in chair needs to be perceived as impartial – as an honest bro-
ker, to gain trust among negotiating states and propose a fair compromise. Some of the 
characteristic features of the Presidency, such as its rotating character, enforce the need 
to be a neutral leader (McKibben 2007).  
However, the Presidency in the role of a political leader is expected to move the Euro-
pean project further in its integration and bring some tangible results, usually under-
stood as the achievement of priorities set in the individual Presidencies’ programmes. 
The subtle balance between neutral and ineffective performance is difficult to manage. 
Member States are often criticised for being either too ambitious or not ambitious 
enough. Moreover, the success of the whole Presidency used to heavily depend on the 
organisation and on the results of two EC’s summits (Schout 1998). As noted earlier, 
this resulted in the development of the Presidency as a complex institution with number 
of rules and functions that were in conflict with each other (Schout 1998). Even though 
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theoretically a Member State is supposed to be neutral, it has already been acknowl-
edged that Presidency is an important chance for bringing national interests to the Euro-
pean level. The Member State in the chair should strive ‘to make sure that the delicate 
balance of being impartial and pushing national interests is achieved’ (Schout 1998: 6). 
This dichotomy between being effective yet ambitious, between fulfilling the function 
of a neutral broker as well as political leader has emerged as one of the key issues in 
assessing the Presidency performance (Elgström 2003b: 201) . 
Since it is not a question of whether the Presidency has the ability of agenda shaping, it 
is rather an issue of how Member States handle their national interest while holding of-
fice (Tallberg 2004). As mentioned before, the open pursuit of national interests is gen-
erally seen as greatly inappropriate. There is, however, a range of informal tactics avail-
able to Member States: they can, for example, use other EU institutions or coalitions of 
Member States as points of initiative (Maurer 2008). Presenting a subject of national 
importance as a vital European interest is a must (Closa 2002). As can be seen from the 
above analysis, promoting national interests is not an easy task and it requires skilful 
diplomacy and an in-depth knowledge of policy making for a country to succeed. How-
ever, as noted by most of the authors, individual Presidencies vary with reference to 
their performance and assessment, but also, once they decided to engage in exercise of 
policy entrepreneurship some Member States are more successful than others. This 
prompts the question of why some Member States decide on the risky venture of agenda 
shaping and what factors explain variations in the actual performance. The subsequent 
section will explore the factors affecting both the Presidency’s performance and its in-
fluence capacity. 
There is general agreement in the academic literature that the Presidency’s performance 
is conditioned by a range of factors, and that their analysis might provide useful ways to 
understand the variations among individual Presidencies. As noted by Closa (2002), 
these factors can be generally divvied according to the level of their manageability. In 
some analyses, these factors are referred to as ‘conditions for success’ as their effective 
management can increase the influence capacity of the Member State in the chair (Bun-
se 2009). These might affect the ways in which individual Member States define their 
role preference and how they subsequently enact those (Leal 2010, Elgström 2003). 
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In their research, Quaglia and Moxon-Browne (2006) distinguished three main factors 
that enable the successful holding of the Presidency: knowledge and understanding of 
the EU (both process and content expertise) and information on Member States’ prefer-
ences and strategies; the political credibility and reputation of the government holding 
the Presidency (honesty, impartiality but also political reputation); and finally, the gen-
eral orientation of the government in chair towards European integration (this helps to 
facilitate cooperation with other Member States). Bunse (2009) in her research on the 
leadership and entrepreneurship of small Member States grouped these conditions for 
success under four main categories: the leadership environment; the heterogeneity, in-
tensity and distribution of governmental preferences in the Council; inter-institutional 
relations with the Commission and the EP, and the office holder’. In general, these fac-
tors can be further categorised into structural and individual; however, this distinction is 
perceived by Leal as rather artificial, as ‘mutual relation holds between many’ (2010: 
187).  
Among the factors at the agential level, one of the most important ones is the level of 
preparation and the domestic political situation. Lack of national support and unity can 
undermine the position of the government as seen in the example of Italy, and its incon-
sistent approach during its Presidency in 2003 (Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2006). The 
example of the Irish Presidency of 2004 showed the advantage of having wide national 
political support as the main premise for consistent and efficient behaviour during the 
whole period of the Presidency. Since all of the political parties in Ireland are ‘europe-
anised’ there is an ideological divergence with reference to EU matters (Quaglia and 
Moxon-Browne 2006). For this reason, it was easier to achieve consensus as far as Eu-
ropean affairs were concerned. As Finn and Berenice Laura Laursen observed, in Den-
mark, the Presidency was seen as an important ‘national job’ and therefore the opposi-
tion decided to give the government full support during the Presidency’ (2003: 7). 
Adopting an internal agreement on political unity and consensus has become one of the 
most common practices to prevent opposition from undermining the government’s posi-
tion on the European stage (Kajncˇ 2009). Member States should also be aware of the 
political situation in each country as for example approaching parliamentary elections 
could put some debates on hold (Closa 2002, Friis 2002), or just distract the government 
from the European mission by campaigning at the national level.   
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Secondly, efficient management and administration are seen as key in fulfilling the rest 
of the functions (Vanhoonacker, Pomorska, Maurer 2010, Maurer 2008). As mentioned 
before, the Presidency’s administration tasks require extensive human resources and 
effective administration at the national level. There is not a single strategy for the inter-
nal organisation of the Presidency. Thus, the Italian organisation was usually less for-
mal and relied on the extensive socialisation of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Permanent Representative Office with its European counter partners (Quaglia and Mox-
on-Browne 2006). Civil staff, who are usually much more experienced, and thus more 
socialised into the European context, were used for day-to-day management. Italian pol-
iticians and national elites were only involved in official Council meetings and summits 
(Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2006). Consequently, the management of administrative 
and politically relevant issues was much more effective than brokering during the Inter-
governmental Conferences while dealing with sensitive and difficult topics. In contrast 
to the Italian example, the Irish structure during its last Presidency was more formal 
with the MFA taking the lead and the REPER increasing in size to reflect the govern-
ment structure of ministries representing major policy areas in the Commission. The 
main Irish priority was to maintain close relations with the Commission and Member 
States to deal with crises before they emerge as publicly controversial (Quaglia and 
Moxon-Browne 2006). Good contacts with European institutions have been seen as par-
ticularly important for a smooth performance during the Presidency (Hayes-Renshaw 
and Wallace 1997). Small Member States have been seen as more successful in pursu-
ing European Presidencies than large ones (Bunse 2009, Elgström 2003). They have 
fewer human resources and need to rely more on European resources, particularly on the 
Secretariat’s expertise and extensive information (Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2006). 
They are under more pressure to build extensive networks to facilitate information ex-
change and negotiation (Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2006).
13
 
One of the factors that affects the Presidency even before it starts is the reputation that 
the Head of State of the presiding country has had among its European peers. During 
the negotiations on the Constitution text in 2003, the low opinion of the diplomatic 
                                                          
13
 On the other hand, as mentioned previously, although Germany is one of the largest Member States 
and mostly relies on its own resources, it is still known for its excellent style of management: close 
cooperation with the preceding Presidency, realistic timetables, early communication, confident 
leadership styles that does not allow discussions to get out of hand (Maurer 2008). Extensive diplomatic 
relations and strong position among other Member States have been seen as additional advantages of 
being a large Member State (Maurer 2008, Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2006). 
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skills and expert knowledge of the Italian PM, Berlusconi, negatively affected the bro-
kering capabilities of the whole Italian team (Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2006). Even 
though the PM was perceived as neutral and impartial, he was not able to broker a deal 
between countries. In contrast, the Irish PM, due to his favourable reputation, managed 
‘to steer a middle path between existing vested interests of 25 Members’ (Quaglia and 
Moxon-Browne 2006: 357). He proved his position as a neutral broker from the very 
beginning by clearly stating the positions favoured by the Irish and proposing to make 
concessions in order to meet the demands of other Member States. It has been argued 
that small countries are usually seen as neutral as they do not have many national inter-
ests at stake (e.g. Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2006). 
14
 
Fourthly, the political view of the government on the subject of European integration 
has also been identified as a factor affecting a Member State’s performance (Closa 
2002, Elgström 2003, Bengtsson et al. 2004). The content of the agenda and level of 
engagement during the Presidency varies depending on whether a country is a strong 
supporter of the federalist or supranationalist forms of integration. Moreover, the gen-
eral foreign policy strategy and special relationships with countries outside the EU also 
influence a Member State’s performance in its function as an external representative.15 
Additionally, pragmatic alliances within the EU have an impact not only on the effec-
tiveness of achieving the agenda of the Presidency but also on the style in which the of-
fice is held.
16
 At the European level, the relationship between France and Germany is 
argued to have an impact on the style of the Presidency of other Member States. Ac-
cording to Pedersen (2002), a very close relationship between France and Germany 
caused by the Iraq war resulted in the general facility of achieving agreements in other 
areas. He further argued that ‘Presidencies are strongest in periods when the Franco-
German relationship is in trouble and the Commission is weak’ (2002: 299). It is possi-
ble to argue therefore, that the internal situation between other European institutions and 
                                                          
14
 The French Presidency of 2008 was ambitious in its priorities and external relations. Similarly to the 
Italian Presidency, the French one was also dominated by the personality of the main leader, Sarkozy, 
and conducted mainly with the use of national resources (Dehousse and Menon 2009). This Presidency 
further confirmed the general trend that tense relations with European institutions and disregard for 
small Member States occur more often when large Member States are in charge (Dehousse and Monon 
2009, Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2006). 
15
 The Atlanticist orientation of Greek foreign policy played an important role in its response to the crisis 
caused by the Iraqi conflict. Greece abandoned the role of the honest broker and sided with some of the 
Member States in favour of the invasion of Iraq (Dimitrakopoulos and Passa 2003). 
16
 The personal dislike between Anzar and Schroder resulted in several disputes during negotiations on 
the Agenda 2000 (for details see Closa 2002). 
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bilateral relations among the largest Member States has had an influence on the Presi-
dency’s performance. 
It usually falls to the Member State in chair to finish agenda of the preceding Presiden-
cies, and the priorities of the previous Presidencies can have an uncontrollable impact 
on the current Presidency. One such example was the UK Presidency in 2005, where the 
overall evolution of the time in the office was dependent on reaching an agreement on 
the Financial Perspective for 2007-2013 which was an issue initiated by the Luxem-
bourg Presidency (Whitman and Thomas 2005). The British government, for whom the 
problem centred on its rebate and views on the Common Agricultural Policy, was trying 
to postpone the discussion until after its Presidency, but ‘[o]ther Member States and the 
European Commission did not allow the issue to fall off the Presidency’s’ (Whitman 
and Thomas 2005: 6). The difficult negations and compromise-seeking by the proposal 
of concessions from the British side managed to secure the deal and as a result ‘the UK 
received grudging approval for its achievements’ (Whitman 2006: 62). Taking over un-
finished agendas can have either negative or positive consequences, and for this reason, 
a country in chair should become actively involved in the Council forum before the of-
ficial start of its own Presidency. Because factors beyond the control of a state in chair 
can greatly influence a country’s Presidency, the management of unforeseen events 
should be included in the Presidency’s strategy. 
At the international level, the external situation can have a negative effect on the Presi-
dency’s evaluation, as in case of the Czech Presidency. Its condemnation of the Israeli 
attack without consultation and against the opinion of other Member States caused a 
crisis within the EU. With reference to large Member States, such international crises 
usually have a positive impact, as these countries are able to show their international 
reputation and ability to deal with crises. This was the case of the French Presidency 
and its ambitious manner of dealing with the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2007 
(Dehousse and Menon 2009). Large Member States are also more likely to sideline the 
Presidencies of other Members when the subject of high politics is in place, as they con-
sider it their prerogative (Pedersen 2002). Moreover, international events can strengthen 
some of the national priorities by opening a window of opportunity at the European 
stage. For example, Spain managed to upload one of its top national priorities, the anti-
terrorist policy in the context of post-September 11
th
 attacks (Barbé 2003, Closa 2002).  
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Drawing on the above assumptions, it is possible to outline important general conclu-
sions with reference to expectations held towards the Presidency’s performance by ana-
lysing which Member State is in the chair. Big Member States tend to pursue more as-
sertive Presidencies with greater focus on promoting national interests, while small 
Member States prefers a more supranationalist approach prioritising the Presidency as a 
Community function. This can be further influenced by the ideological stance of the 
government, and its stance on the pace and the extent of European integration. There-
fore, Member States favouring the intergovernmental method will perceive their Presi-
dencies as both European and national opportunity, while countries favouring the feder-
alist approach will refrain from promoting national initiatives and give up their national 
positions for six months.  
The above analysis of factors fits into scholarship explaining the Presidency’s behaviour 
and thus variations among Presidencies by focusing on Member States’ particular char-
acteristics (Elgström 2003). Role theory approach seems to provide a more in-depth ex-
planation of the variations between Member States regarding their approach towards the 
Presidency (Leal 2010, Elgström 2006). In this thesis, these variations have been gener-
ally attributed to various national role conceptions held by Member States with refer-
ence to their foreign and European policies (e.g. Leal 2010). As argued by Leal, in order 
to better understand the variations between the Presidencies, and how the Presidencies’ 
roles are formed, it is not only necessary to look at the levels of role conception and role 
expectations, but also to look inside the role conception and explore the sources of these 
roles (2010: 176). This was earlier noted by Elgström country characteristics, its culture, 
historical experiences and domestic political factors can influence ‘the way rational ac-
tors perceive the state’s policy interests or to shape the role conceptions and the excep-
tions of appropriate behaviour by member states’ (2003a: 10). This approach draws on 
Holsti’s original research carried out in 1970. He saw the origins of the national role 
conception as the results of socialisation, but also shaped partly by history, culture and 
societal characteristics (Aggestam 2004a: 65), and also by ‘location and major topo-
graphical features of the state; natural, economic and technical resources; available ca-
pabilities; traditional policies; socio-economic demands and needs as expressed through 
political parties, mass movements, or interest groups; national values, doctrines, or ideo-
logies; public opinion mood; and the personality or political needs of key policy- mak-
ers’ (1970: 246). As demonstrated by Holsti, these sources of role have indirect effects 
CHAPTER II Literature Review 
55 
 
on role conceptions being feed through role expectations. As pointed out by Leal, these 
factors do not necessarily have to mediate through role expectations, they rather have 
direct influences on role conception (2010: 177-8). Nevertheless, it is generally agreed 
that these sources arise from domestic and structural factors, as explained by Wish: ‘de-
cision makers consider their national capabilities when formulating their national role 
conceptions, which in turn provide guidelines and standards for their foreign policy be-
haviour. Thus, national attributes provide a major source for the formulation of national 
role conceptions’ (1987: 96).  
Recent strands of role theory are characterised by attempts to capture factors influencing 
foreign policy making at the level of Member State by exploring both domestic and 
structural factors. The complex issue of the actor’s bounded intentionality is reflected in 
the notion of ‘situated actor’ (e.g. Aggestam 2004). Breuning argues that agents, under-
stood both as an individual and as a group, ‘are embedded in the social and cultural in-
stitutions of the states they represents as foreign policy decision makers’ (2011: 16). 
These institutions have shaped their perceptions and their understanding of the world 
events, as well as their behaviour in response to these. Role theory highlights the inten-
tionality of the actor to shape the structure and associated with this structure’s roles.  
In her research on the Portuguese Presidency in the area of European Crisis Manage-
ment, Leal presented a comprehensive overview of the possible sources of the Presiden-
cy’s role. Even though it was ‘fine-tuned’ by the author to fit the area of the crisis man-
agement policy, the overview can easily be adjusted to fit the broader area of European 
foreign policy making. Leal divides the sources according to two main levels: the struc-
tural level, namely the specific policy area and the institution of the Presidency itself, 
and the agential level which focus on particular characteristic of particular Member 
States in the chair.  
 




Figure 2. The Overview of Sources of Presidency’s Roles in Crisis Management 
(Leal 2010: 191) 
This thesis will build on this recent approach towards exploring variations among the 
chosen Member States by looking at their distinctive national role conceptions in their 
foreign and European policies (Leal 2010, Elgström 2003). However, some of the earli-
er identified factors might also have potential impacts on the Presidency’s performance 
and its influence capacity regarding the Spanish, Belgian, Hungarian and Polish Presi-
dencies. These will be taken into account as intervening variables as operationalized in 
Chapter 3. Even though the research on the influence capacity of the Presidency has 
been limited in its focus to the agenda shaping of national preferences, it still provides 
useful insights when analysing the process of role institutionalisation.  
2.1.4 The Concept of 'Role'  
 
This section will briefly analyse the notion of ‘role’ in the research on the Presidency. 
As Leal pointed out, the concept of ‘the Presidency’s role’ ‘tends to be defined in func-
tional terms’, which involve analysing it through the framework of tasks and functions 
that are expected to be performed while in the chair of the Council chairmanship (2010: 
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30). As noted by Elgström the Presidency’s functions are ‘factual functions rather than 
formal’ as they based rather on ‘established praxis’ than legal obligations (2003a: 
4).While different authors distinguish different tasks (as presented in Table 1), these can 
be summarised under four main functions: 
(1) ensuring the administrative and organisational coordination of the work in the 
Council, and acting as an internal representation of the Council within the insti-
tutional system of the EU (organisational management); (2) brokering and 
providing agreement among Member States; (3) representing the EU externally 
in international relations, and finally, (4) policy entrepreneurship/political lead-
ership. 
Author(s) Presidency’s functions 
Kirchner (1992) administrative, initiating,  co-ordinating, representational 
Westlake and Galloway (2004) manager, political initiatives’ promoter, package-broker, 
honest broker, representative to and from the other 
Community institutions, spokesman for the Council and 
the Union, international actor 
Hyes-Renshaw and Wallace 
(2006)  
 
business manager, manager of foreign policy, promoter 
of initiatives, package-broker, liaison point, collective 
representative  
Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 
(2006) 
business manager, mediator, political leader, internal and 
external representative 
 
Schout and Vanhoonacker (2006) organizer/task oriented leadership, broker/group-oriented 
leadership, political leadership/transformative leadership, 




agenda management, brokerage and representation 
Kietz (2008) manger of Council affairs, neutral mediator and broker 
of compromises, strategic guidance, source of initiatives 
and impulses, external representation of the EU, repre-
sentation of the Council to other EU institutions and in-
ternal representation within the Council  
Table 1. The Overview of the Role of the Presidency in the Academic Literature 
(Author’s Own Compilation Based on the Literature Review) 
CHAPTER II Literature Review 
58 
 
Further insights into this subject have been introduced by Schout and Vanhoonacker’s 
(2006) study on the Presidency’s functional management. By applying a framework 
based on examining demand and supply for specific roles the role assessment of the 
Presidency depends on the most suitable supply of a particular role/function in a par-
ticular context; while in the chair, the Member State needs to continuously decide if in a 
given time it should act as a broker, a political leader or the defender of national inter-
ests. This decision is largely influenced by various external (e.g. if the topic under dis-
cussion is old or new, sensitive or not; if there is lack of trust in the chair or there are 
multiple brokers) and internal factors (e.g. how important is the topic under discussion 
for the chairing country, if there is commitment from senior management or politicians, 
if a country is well prepared, if there is sensitivity between partners in the government). 
Different factors will result in different roles demanded at a given time. However, in 
order to understand how Member States decide which role to play, further mechanisms 
need to be taken into account, such as rationality, institutional expectations, political EU 
pressure and personal experience. As argued by Maurer, such an approach allows for a 
more in-depth and extensive evaluation by furthering the understanding of both external 
and internal influencing factors the Member State in the chair and its performance 
(Maurer 2008).  
A more in-depth outlook on the concept of role with reference to the Presidency is pro-
vided in Ole Elgström’s edited volume ‘European Union Council Presidencies: A Com-
parative Analysis’ (2003). The functional understanding of this role is expanded by the 
application of the rationalist and sociological perspectives, thus aiming to explain the 
actual behaviour of the Member State in the chair with reference to their decisions asso-
ciated with the Presidency’s functions. In his article, ‘The Presidency: The Role(s) of 
the Chair in European Union Negotiation’, Elgström defines the concept of role as ‘pat-
terns of expected or appropriate behaviour’ (2006: 172). Elgström explores the Presi-
dency’s performance through the lenses of sociological institutionalism. By building on 
the insights from role theory the author offers an explanation of variations among 
Member States while in the office of the Council chairmanship, and argues that ‘exist-
ing structurally based expectations are brought to the office by individual Member 
States to produce both common features and variety in role performance’ (2006: 171). 
Leal’s concept of role is conceptualised as ‘a pattern of behaviour associated with a cer-
tain position (…) entailing specific rights, duties and functions, even if can supplement 
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these with more discretionary activities’ (2010: 174). Such an approach does not assume 
the element of appropriateness in understanding the Presidency’s role. 
The research on the role of the Presidency has expanded form the purely functional un-
derstanding of the role of the Presidency as a set of functions the Member State in the 
chair is tasked with into a more role theory-based understanding it as a pattern of behav-
iour resulting from the interaction of expectations and the purposive decision of the ac-
tor in charge of this role. The latter conceptualisation allows the perception of the insti-
tution of the Presidency as a set of functions that are performed according to the particu-
lar role preference held by individual Member States This understanding makes it pos-
sible to overcome the limitation of studying the Presidency’s role Presidency either ac-
cording to the logic of appropriateness or the logic of consequentiality as identified in 
the literature review. 
2.2 New Institutionalism  
 
The particular interest in institutions and their effect on the actors’ behaviour and the 
wider international structure emerged as a prominent academic area of interest in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
17
 gradually leading to the development of 
the theory of institutions, called old institutionalism. The renewed interest in institution-
al variables as an explanatory factor in political science grew from the dissatisfaction 
with the expanding behaviourist theories in the 1950s and 1960s (Thelen and Steinmo 
1992: 1). This interest was mostly triggered by the research of James March and Johann 
Olsen, and their argument that organisational and institutional settings should be 
brought to the centre of research pointing in particular to the role of values and norms 
and thus undermining the emerging, and at that time largely ‘individualistic, and largely 
utilitarian, assumptions and methodologies’ (Peters 2012: 25). By emphasising the issue 
of ‘bounded rationality’, they introduced the logic of appropriateness as a concept 
providing the context of behaviour for the agency (Peters 2012: 29). The acknowledg-
ment that ‘institutions matter’ and that they shape the behaviour of actors embedded in 
the international system, triggered the further development of this theory and the emer-
gence of NI. As argued by March and Olsen, institutions emerge as the key factor shap-
ing political action and change in the contemporary political system (1995, 1989).  
                                                          
17
 Steinmo (2010) argues that HI existed long before the phrase started to be used pointing to Aristotle’s 
Politics or Madison’s work (for the list of the remaining authors see Steinmo 2010: 2). 
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NI aimed for a more comprehensive account of institutional settings, with the sociologi-
cal institutionalist definition of the institution highlighting a more informal side of insti-
tutions. The definition expanded to include a variety of both formal and informal norms 
and rules governing the organisations. Therefore, explaining the behaviour of actors as 
well as policy outcomes would be a result of the overall ‘rules of the games’ employed 
in a given organisation (Rosamond 2003: 114). The latter institutionalist approach 
seems to be particularly useful when applied to the institution of the Presidency, since it 
allows taking into account general Presidency’s functions as well as individual Member 
States’ performance which are both embedded in the EU context governed both by for-
mal and informal rules. Informality constitutes an important part of the Presidency’s 
culture, both empowering the Member State in the chair with additional resources as 
well as constraining it with the established rule of acting as a neutral broker.  
NI does not constitute a single unified theory; it is usually perceived as three separate 
strands: rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and historical in-
stitutionalism. These strands ‘paint quite different pictures of the political world’ (Hall 
and Taylor 1996: 1).  So far, the latter study ‘Political Science and the Three New Insti-
tutionalisms’ by Hall and Taylor has provided the most comprehensive overview of 
these approaches, focusing both on their distinctiveness with reference to how institu-
tions originate and develop, and also on what kind of influence they have on actors’ be-
haviour. These three approaches take ‘different positions on such fundamental issues as 
whether the identities of the actors can be given exogenously to the institutional analysis 
and whether it makes sense to assume a homogenous kind of rational or strategic action 
across cultural setting’ (Hall and Taylor 1992: 22). This is because they are rooted in 
different epistemological foundations, highlighting various aspects of the agency-
structure relationship which in turn offer different assumptions with reference to the 
process of institutional change.  
2.1.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism  
 
The difference between the three main strands of NI can be captured merely by looking 
at how each of these strands understands the very concept of ‘institution’. Thus, for 
RCI, institutions are purposively established rules which are agreed among rational ac-
tors in order to establish a stable and efficient framework for their interaction (Stacey 
and Rittberger 2003: 867; see also Thelen 1999: 371). Institutions are thus the main 
tools for solving collective action problems; their existence is preserved when they pro-
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vide actors with more benefits than costs, thus leading to the development of a particu-
lar equilibrium (Warleigh 2002: 8). This argument closely follows the ‘logic of conse-
quentiality’, as institutions are instrumentally established and used by actors to fulfil 
their interests. They are not capable of influencing actors’ strategic choices and they 
remained controlled by actors (Warleigh 2002: 9). The original preferences held by ac-
tors, and the outcomes expected by the actors, are the core of the actor’s instrumental 
rationality. Institutions exist as long as they fulfil their role of lowering the costs of 
solving collective action problems (Hall and Taylor 1996: 943, Shepsle & Weingast 
1987). Therefore, once the institution has ceased to provide the most effective solutions, 
it ceases to exist or undergo institutional change (Stacey and Rittberger 2003: 867). 
Such a functional approach seems to offer the most probable explanation for the limit-
ing of the role of the Presidency, as it has often been seen as the main reason for the in-
efficiency and incoherence of the EU’s performance in its external relations. 
Sociological institutionalism offers a broader understanding of what constitutes an insti-
tution: ‘institutions are conceived as a Gestalt of symbols, rituals, beliefs and 
worldviews which allows actors to understand – or interpret – the context in which they 
find  themselves’ (Warleigh 2002: 9). By emphasising informal rules and the socialisa-
tion effect of organisations, sociological institutionalism demonstrates how actors 
choose their behaviour pattern on the grounds of perceived appropriateness. Because 
interests and identities are endogenously produced as a result of the interaction between 
actors and institutions, the latter have an influence on reshaping the former (Checkel 
2000). Institutions have a two-fold effect: firstly, by serving as the ‘normative dimen-
sion’ they provide the cognitive scripts, categories and models that set the frames for the 
actor’s behaviour; and secondly, they are vital because ‘without them the world and the 
behaviour of others cannot be interpreted’ (Hall and Taylor 1992: 15).  
Cognitive processes such as learning and socialisation, which take place during the in-
teraction between actors and institutions, result in the reconstruction of the actor’s inter-
ests and preferences, and subsequently might lead to a change of identity (Hall and Tay-
lor 1992). This argument reflects well the socialisation effect of the Presidency, which 
is often referred to as a ‘membership test’ for new Member States. SI thus reflects the 
‘logic of appropriateness’, underestimating the fact that actors can use the institutions 
instrumentally in order to advance their interests. It presents a rather one-sided view of 
the motivation behind actors’ behaviour. SI conceptualises institutions as socially con-
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structed reflections of cultural understandings and, more generally, ‘of the way the 
world works’ (Thelen 1999: 386). It thus acknowledges the coexistence of formally es-
tablished institutional frames and more informal building blocks such as ‘the symbol 
systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the “frames of meaning” 
guiding human actions’ institutions (Hall & Taylor 1996: 947). As argued before, this 
allows for a comprehensive outlook of an institution as well as accounting for the possi-
ble influence institutions can have on what is perceived as acceptable behaviour, but 
also on actors’ preferences and even their identities (Hall & Taylor 1996: 948).  
These two approaches also differ with reference to their explanations of how institutions 
come to exist. For RCI, institutions are ‘the outcomes of purposive actions by instru-
mentally oriented individuals’ (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 8). They are created in or-
der to increase the efficiency of mutual interaction among the actors. Sociological insti-
tutionalists argue that the emergence of new institutional frameworks occurs not to pro-
vide greater efficiency, but to ‘enhance [the] social legitimacy of the organisations or its 
participants’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 949); or in other words, to better reflect the values 
and organisational culture of the institution. The debate between these strands of new 
institutionalism reflects to some extent the ongoing constructivist-rationalist debate.  
The application of RCI to this case study seems limited as the focus in RCI is on the 
formal rules. European foreign policy making has been, to a large extent, governed by 
informally developed rules, such as the ‘culture of consensus’. The institution of the 
Presidency, with few formal functions laid down in the official European documents, 
has been mostly ruled by informally developing rules and norms of conduct perceived 
as patterns of appropriate behaviour. SI might prove particularly useful with reference 
to the latter point, by highlighting the existence of patterns of appropriate behaviour. 
However, it struggles to explain institutional change. As stated by Hall and Taylor, ac-
cording to SI ‘institutions are resistant to redesign ultimately because they structure the 
very choice about reform that the individual is likely to make’ (1992: 8). The research 
puzzle of the changing role of the Presidency might thus be better addressed by the tool 
box offered by HI. 
2.1.2 Historical Institutionalism  
 
HI has been built upon structural functionalism in that political organisations are seen 
‘as the principal factor structuring collective behaviour and generating distinctive out-
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comes’ (Hall and Taylor 1992: 6). From the group theories HI incorporated the notion 
of group conflict and an assumption that the actor is capable of structuring this con-
flict’s character and outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1992: 6). It thus emphasises ‘the asym-
metries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions’ (Hall 
and Taylor 1992: 7). It has been held to offer a bridging approach between RCI and SI, 
as it ‘tends to conceptualize the relationship between institutions and individual behav-
iour in relatively broad terms’ (Hall and Taylor 1992: 7). This allows both potential ex-
planations to be included in the analysis: instrumental rationality – perceiving ‘actors as 
strategic, seeking to realize complex, contingent and often changing goals’ (Hay and 
Wincott 1998: 954), and the cultural approach, which sets off premises for the socialisa-
tion process.  
Most of all, HI focuses on ‘the effects of institutions over time, in particular the way in 
which a given set of institutions, once established, can influence or constrain the behav-
iour of the actors who established them’ (Pollack 2004: 139). It therefore shares some 
assumptions with SI, such as the influence of the shaping capacity of the institution on 
the preferences of the involved actors. The creation of institutions is built upon previous 
institutional settings and once it is established it is perceived as prior to any actions of 
the agents (Steinmo 2010). Thus, in order to understand how institutions work it is nec-
essary to take into account the original decisions establishing these institutions and to 
trace their subsequent implementation in the process of historical development. Identifi-
cation of the original interests – as reflected in the foundation of the institutions – is 
necessary to identify their cultural and ideological foundations. 
HI, following recent attempts to offer a middle ground approach with reference to the 
definition of the institution, has advocated a wider understanding that encompasses both 
formal and informal rules and norms.  As argued by Thelen and Steinmo ‘the emphasis 
on institutions as patterned relations that lies at the core of an institutional approach 
does not replace attention to other variables - the payers, their interests and strategies, 
and the distribution of power among them. On the contrary, it puts these factors in con-
text, showing how they relate to one another by drawing attention to the way political 
situations are structured.’ (1992: 13) 
The historical institutionalist perspective aims to offer a comprehensive framework 
which would be capable of exploring the variety of rules, norms and expectations asso-
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ciated with the institution of the Presidency. It seems that through the application of his-
torical institutionalist concepts such as ‘institutional feedback’, ‘critical juncture’ and 
‘path dependency’, the impact of the institutional change on the position and functions 
of the Presidency can be further accounted for. The following section will analyse the 
historical institutionalist tool box and clarify the concepts used. This will lay the 
groundwork for the subsequent analysis of the post-Lisbon role development of the 
Presidency. 
The concept of path dependency serves as the main explanatory element of HI. Never-
theless, its variety of definitions, starting with the very broad view that ‘history mat-
ters’, means that a clear understanding of the concept needs to be supplied before as-
sessing what it might be able to contribute to the empirical analysis. For Sewell, the log-
ic of path dependency is simply that ‘what happened at an earlier point in time will af-
fect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time’ 
(1996: 262-3). Some authors have taken this definition further by exploring how the 
previous decisions affect the direction in which institutions develop. This is where the 
concept of increasing returns proves its usefulness by explaining how the institution fol-
lows path dependency; as explained by Levi (1997: 28) ‘path dependence has to mean, 
if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has started on a track, the costs of 
reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of cer-
tain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice’ (1997: 28). 
Levi uses the example of a tree to better explain path dependency: ‘from the same trunk, 
there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn 
around or to clamber from one to the other – and essential if the chosen branch dies – 
the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow’ (Ibid.). 
In this way, HI emphasises the stability of institutional developments by emphasizing 
their continuity within the same path and the reinforcement of the original design in the 
aftermath of the institution’s establishment. It refers to standard operating procedures, 
behavioural norms, worldviews, or collective interests that are associated with a particu-
lar institution (Weingast 2005). Institutions, their working procedures, norms and organ-
isational structures, are thus a result of a development triggered by the original founding 
decisions. The latter factor limits the options available for actors, as ‘choices made at a 
particular moment eliminate a whole range of possibilities from later choices while 
serving as the very condition of existence of others’ (Hay and Wincott 1998: 955). By 
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emphasising the effect of initial choices leading to institutions’ creation and subsequent 
institutional inertia, HI perceives institutions as constraining actors more than enabling 
them. As one decision leads to another, it reinforces the direction in which the institu-
tion is already developing. This explains why institutions continue on their paths of de-
velopment, since the costs of going back or departing from the regular path would be 
too costly for the involved actors. Additionally, HI explains how positive feedback 
mechanisms reinforce the distributive power relations within institutions: ‘rules gener-
ate consequences that, over time, enhance the power resources of their advocates and 
broaden supporting coalitions’ (Jacobs 2010: 96). Therefore, path-dependency can be 
fostered by mechanisms of self-reinforcing positive or negative feedback. 
Yet institutional development often follows a path of unintended consequences, mean-
ing that it does not follow according to the initial design envisaged by the founding 
members. This is particularly visible in the example of the EU as presented by Rosa-
mond: ‘the institutional architects of the Community made their decision to formalize 
integration on the basis of particular motivations and preferences. But, the very act of 
creating a particular sort of institutions, with identifiable competencies and powers, un-
leashed logics that could not necessarily be predicted at the time.’ (2000: 117) 
The notion of critical juncture is the historical institutionalist response towards the issue 
of institutional change. It is referred to as the period when, due to external events, the 
development of the institution is interrupted. According to Mahoney ‘a contingent event 
is (…) an occurrence that was not expected to take place, given certain theoretical un-
derstandings of how causal processes work’ (2000: 513). Streeck and Thelen have high-
lighted that most of the institutionalist scholarship focuses on institutional change thor-
ough ‘a strong punctuated equilibrium model’ which emphasizes long periods of institu-
tional stability interrupted by short periods of exogenous shocks resulting in changes in 
institutional settings (2005: 1). As pointed out by Hall, however, the concept of critical 
juncture points to institutional change but does not provide any analytical assumptions 
as to ‘how institutions emerge from the disequilibrium’ (Hall 2010: 205, Thelen 2004, 
Mahoney and Thelen 2010). As Pierson further elaborates, ‘any new equilibrium may 
be as likely as any other’ (2004: 143-4). Thus, traditional historical institutionalists did 
not offer any insights into ‘the black box’ of the critical junctures, and thus failed to ex-
plore how institutions emerge from such periods of change. It has long been argued that 
all strands of NI are better equipped to explain continuity rather than a change in institu-





 HI better accounts for how the continuation of institutions demonstrates 
its resistance to change. The role of agency is perceived as limited due to the past deci-
sions determining the scope for subsequent actions, thus removing some possibilities.  
In order to deal with this inability of the institutionalist accounts to explain institutional 
change, some recent strands have shifted focus from these large, external event-based 
changes onto studying more gradual and endogenous transformations of institutions. 
Thus, RCI tried to frame an endogenous change as a result of endogenous shifts of in-
terest-based preferences, and SI as a result of changes in the cultural and behavioural 
frames. As the following analysis will demonstrate, the newest historical institutionalist 
analyses seem to offer the most promising avenues for a more comprehensive explora-
tion of institutional change through their incorporation of constructivist insights. The 
particular emphasis on the subsequent adaptation of formally ambiguous provisions en-
ables the analysis to account for both formal and informal processes of institutional 
change, while the greater focus on ideas introduces a more active agency into the tradi-
tional structurally deterministic explanations. 
2.1.3 Towards Endogenous and Incremental Institutional Change 
 
‘Institutionalism has been developed in part to explain the persistence of institutions, 
but that strength has also been its weakness’ (Peters 2012: 183). As argued above, most 
of the studies on institutional change tend to prioritise large scale shifts in exogenous 
conditions as a key factor leading to radical changes in institutional set-up, thus over-
looking a more incremental change through gradual institutional transformation. Histor-
ical institutionalists in particular pointed to the added value of expanding the notion of 
institutional change to account for more incremental and gradual internal processes. 
Mahoney and Thelen suggested that path-dependent lock-in is a rare phenomenon’ 
(2010: 3). They also noted that smaller gradual changes might accumulate over time 
into a large reformation of the institution (Mahoney and Thelen 2005). In their study 
they noted that ‘the ongoing worldwide liberalization of advanced political economies 
(…) evolves in the form of gradual change that takes place within, and is conditioned 
and constrained by, the very same post war institutions that it is reforming or even dis-
solving’ (2005: 4). This highlights the fact that institutional change may happen without 
the presence of large exogenous shocks, and that ‘gradual transformative change’ might 
                                                          
18
 As argued by Schmidt this refers to the fact that institutionalists definitions of institutions emphasise 
their static functions as the very constitutive elements (2011).  
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provide a better explanation for changes in political economy. As the authors argued 
‘there often is considerable continuity through and in spite of historical break points, as 
well as dramatic institutional reconfiguration beneath the surface of apparent stability or 
adaptive self-reproduction, as a result of an accumulation over longer periods of time of 
subtle incremental change’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2005: 8). By introducing ‘incremental 
creeping change’ they managed to move the institutional analysis beyond the punctuat-
ed equilibrium models (Mahoney and Thelen 2005: 9). 
The mechanisms seen in the traditional HI might also be a source of gradual change. 
Positive feedback as a result of learning might result in an informal development of 
knowledge, thus fostering institutional change (Cowan and Gunby 1996). This was fur-
ther confirmed by North (1990), who applied the concept of path-dependency in order 
to demonstrate how incremental change is a consequence of gradual learning. Overall 
institutional change depends, then, on the subsequent small modification of institutional 
settings which are a consequence of the choices of individual actors and entrepreneurs 
of organizations on the basis of improved information feedback from the environment. 
North not only pointed to learning as a mechanism behind the gradual institutional 
change but also identified the correlation between formal and informal rules (North 
1990: 140). These small initial changes can get ‘locked in’ through positive-feedback 
loops or increasing return effect, resulting in major institutional change (Pierson 2004). 
In addition, Pierson (2000) pointed to more time-stretch processes, such as cumulative 
causes, threshold effects and causal chains, as leading to institutional change through a 
gradual path-dependency not necessarily involving critical junctures.   
As pointed out by Héritier ‘a change may be designed intentionally on a large scale in a  
process specifically foreseen for that purpose and then be followed by a period of only 
incremental adjustments to new conditions and relative stability’ (2007: 1). As further 
noticed ‘these incremental changes extending over a longer period of time (…) may 
amount to substantial institutional changes’ (Ibid.). In the case of the EU, this might re-
sult in further sovereignty transfers to the supranational level. These changes can be ei-
ther formal (through legal ruling) or informally developed on the basis of everyday 
practice (interregnum integration). The latter would be developed by institutions, rather 
than Member States (Stacey and Ritterberg 2003: 863). As formal provisions in the 
form of ‘grand designs’ are usually quite limited in their substance, their implementa-
tion is usually followed by the emergence of more informal institutional rules. Héritier 
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accounted for this by developing the concept of ‘incomplete contracting’ (2007). Capo-
raso (2007) and Hart (2006) both argued that institutional rules are generally incom-
plete, as even formal rules, when applied in practice, must be interpreted and enacted.  
This requires some flexibility and informal judgement of the rule implementer (Hart 
2006: 30). The research of Farrell and Héritier (2007, 2005) further explores how role 
ambiguity and subsequent implementation triggers institutional change with reference to 
the EU system. 
The study by Mahoney and Thelen (2010) demonstrates some recent attempts to better 
incorporate agency into the institutional analysis by applying HI to study institutional 
change through exploring reasons why actors obey or ignore rules. This allows the 
analysis of institutional change to expand by including rules, norms and practices and 
how they produce self-reinforcing institutions. As argued by Thelen (2009), institutional 
change can occur in an endogenous and incremental manner through ambiguities be-
tween a rule and its interpretation and enforcement. The informal institutional adapta-
tion of the formal provisions can serve as a vital intermediate role in explaining the pro-
cess of the institutional change. Mahoney and Thelen identify the change as emanating 
‘from inherent ambiguities and ‘gaps’ that exist by design or [which] emerge over time 
between formal institutions and their actual implementation or enforcement’ (2010: 19). 
Therefore, institutions ‘are the object of ongoing skirmishing as actors try to achieve 
advantage by interpreting or redirecting institutions in pursuit of their goals, or by sub-
verting or circumventing rules that clash with their interests’ (Ibid.). 
With regard to EU governance, Farrell and Héritier (2003) explain the concept of in-
complete contracting by highlighting the increasingly complex agenda of the EU, and 
the particular context of negotiations over institutional rules, which are usually rushed 
through with last-minute adjustments, and formulated in numerous languages. Also, the 
ambiguity of the rule might be designed on purpose in order to accommodate political 
differences between Member States in order to offer a compromise solution. Subse-
quently, ‘institutional rules are not infrequently ambiguous, and individual participants 
can, in effect, take advantage of this ambiguity to redefine the institution on the fly’ 
(Jones 2001: 194). Héritier, using the theory of the distributional version of rational 
choice institutionalism, assumes that this period following the formal, often ambiguous, 
change may trigger a period of re-bargaining in which institutional rules and inter-
institutional relations are reassessed (2007: 8). Subsequently, her study applied the con-
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cept of incomplete contracting to explore inter-institutional adaptations of institutional 
rules, and to demonstrate the shifts in distributive consequences and shifts in power 
among various EU institutions. This was further confirmed by Naurin and Rasmussen’s 
research (2011), which demonstrated that EU institutional bodies adapt to the changing 
opportunity structures emerging after implementation of the formal provisions. Such an 
approach enables the traditional external dimension of institutional change to be com-
plemented by a more internal one. This combination of both micro and macro perspec-
tives results in ‘the combination of (…) preferences and the institutional context that 
determines the intra-institutional outcome’ (Naurin and Rasumssen 2011: 7). The insti-
tutional context emphasizes that institutional implementation ‘do[es] not take place in a 
vacuum in the EU system, but are often reactions and adaptations to opportunities and 
constrains created at the inter-institutional level’ (Naurin and Rasmussen 2011: 13).  
In their special issue on ‘Dynamics of formal and informal institutional change in the 
EU’ (2003) the authors, Jeffrey Stacey and Berthold Rittberger outlined an analytical 
framework based on both ‘history-making integration’ – this being a result of formal 
bargaining at the highest political level – and ‘interregnum integration’ – the result of 
more informal adaptation and bargains of EU actors in the aftermath of the implementa-
tion. By applying this framework to analyse the construction of the CEU, Lewis (2003) 
attempted to provide a more comprehensive explanation for the complexity of the 
Council as a hybrid institution of both intergovernmental and supranational function. 
With the formal rules laid down in the subsequent treaties, the Council was established 
as an intergovernmental institution; however, only by complementing the formal dimen-
sion with the informal one is it possible to account for the Council’s supranationalist 
functions, which developed during the interregnum integration as a result of the increas-
ingly collective and highly socialised nature of the cooperation (Lewis 2003: 1014).  
Mahoney and Thelen argue that ‘institutional change often occurs precisely when prob-
lems of the interpretation and enforcement open up space for actors to implement exist-
ing rules in new way’ (2010: 4). This opens up analysis on more dynamic accounts of 
agency by introducing ‘change agents’ as capable of triggering incremental transfor-
mation of institutions. The scholarship on role ambiguity and the subsequent institution-
al adaptation assumes that this ambiguity will be used by actors who aim to maximise 
their competences in the new institutional setting (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, Héritier 
2007, Farrell and Héritier 2007, 2004, Stacey and Ritterberg 2003). As further pointed 
CHAPTER II Literature Review 
70 
 
by Farrell and Héritier, ‘Treaty rules may prove more diﬃcult or complex to implement 
ex post than they appear ex ante’ (2007: 228). This might result in a conflict over the 
interpretation ‘in which the distinct bargaining strength of actors will be instantiated in 
expectations over outcomes and thus, over time, in patterns of choice over existing insti-
tutional rules or in the emergence of new informal institutions’ (Ibid.) 
Jacobs defines these change agents as ‘actors disadvantage[d] by the institutional sys-
tem and thus seeking to modify their positions by advocating new set up’ (2010: 96). As 
argued by Mahoney and Thelen, the window of opportunity created by the need to en-
sure interpretation of the formal rules might turn into a conflict ‘with different groups 
deliberately exploit[ing] ambiguities and press interpretations that favour their interests’ 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 11). This is further highlighted by Héritier’s research into 
the EU comitology and codecision rules; based on the theory of power-based distribu-
tive bargaining it is assumed ‘that actors are competence maximizers that whilst seeking 
to increase the efficiency of an institutional rule also try to ensure that a policy will be 
enacted through procedures which maximize their own degree of control over the pro-
cess of policy-making’ (2012: 40). 
This recent strand looking into the incremental and gradual transformation of institu-
tions seems to provide useful insights into studying the informal adaptation of the Presi-
dency’s role in the aftermath of an incomplete formal change. The scholarship on insti-
tutional change has been shifting towards a more endogenous perspective, with a focus 
on subsequent adaptation and informal rule development, as a result of deficiencies of 
formal provisions. Combining both formal and informal dimensions might result in a 
more comprehensive picture of institutional change. Often the institutions are designed 
in a rather general manner, so their implementation allows for more flexible adaptation 
of the written provisions in practical situations. This is the case with the LT and in par-
ticular the institutions of the Presidency, in which further developments in the post-
Lisbon context might take on a life on their own. However, even if this literature pro-
vides important insights into studying influence and leadership capacity at the agential 
level, the assumption of interest-driven actors does not fit into previously defined as-
sumptions with reference to the foundations of the behaviour of the Member States in 
the Chair, which are both value and interest driven.  
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Another attempt at endogenizing institutional change within the institutional approaches 
shifted the focus to ideas and discourse. As noted by Vivien Schmidt ‘discursive institu-
tionalism’19 ‘is an umbrella concept for vast range of theories in political science that 
take account of the substantive content of ideas and the interactive process by which 
ideas are conveyed and exchange[d] through discourse’ (Schmidt 2010: 3). As noted by 
Bell, this new institutionalist turn allows for a less constraining outlook on institutions, 
putting ‘interpretative agents operating in relatively fluid ideational and discursive con-
texts to explain institutional change’ (Bell 2011: 883). This outlook, also referred to as 
constructivist institutionalism, turns institutions into ideational construct (Peters 2012: 
75). Hay (2006) noted that this approach is particularly suited to use the concepts of 
ideas as an explanation for endogenous institutional change. Moreover, the shift towards 
a more ideational level of analysis allows for framing institutions as ‘simultaneously 
constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning, which are internal to ‘sen-
tient’ (thinking and speaking) agents whose ‘background ideational abilities’ explain 
how they create and maintain institutions at the same time that their ‘foreground discur-
sive abilities’ enable them to communicate critically about those institutions, to change 
(or maintain) them (Schmidt 2008 cited in Schmidt 2010: 4).  Thus ideas are both ‘cog-
nitive ideas justified in terms of interest-based logics and necessity (e.g. Jobert 1989, 
Hall 1993, Schmidt 2002) and normative ideas legitimated through appeals to values 
and appropriateness (e.g., March and Olsen 1989, Schmidt 2000)’ (Schmidt 2010: 3). 
The institutional change thus results from the changes of ideas and values through dis-
cursive mechanisms (Peters 2012: 120). The latter allows for the acknowledgment of 
policy entrepreneurs as important catalysts for change (Peters 2012: 120).  Nevertheless, 
it has been argued that these approaches ‘place almost all explanatory weight on agency 
and lose sight of institutions’ (Bell 2011: 891). This results in the exclusion of structural 
considerations (Peters 2012: 75). Therefore, this is the least structured version of new 
institutionalism and ‘provides the greatest ambiguity (and the greatest range of action) 
for members of institutions conceptualized in this manner’ (Peters 2012: 114).  
It seems that historical institutionalists grant enough acknowledgements to the role of an 
active agency, as actors are perceived as capable of learning from the past experience 
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 As Schmidt pointed out various authors focusing on the role of ideas and discourse in institutional 
change differ on conceptualising their approach, for example Blyth 2002 refers to ‘ideational turn’, 
Campbell and Pedersen 2001 to discursive institutionalism, Hay ideational institutionalism (2001) and 
constructivist institutionalism (2006).  
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and this subsequently allows for trigger institutional change (Bulmer 1998). Critical 
junctures shake the foundations of institutional frameworks and deflect them from their 
previous path dependency. It is in these instances that actors can become more active 
and take part in shaping the undergoing institutional alteration. They might want to seek 
maximisation of their power positions within the institution, but they also seek to adapt 
the normative foundations to reflect their individual preferences (Mahoney 2000). With 
the new ideas introduced into the institution the result might be a radical change of the 
previous culture. For the change to last, it needs to become rooted in the ideational 
foundations of the institution as a part of the legitimatisation process (Mahoney 2000).  
From the above analysis of the new institutionalist scholarship on institutional change it 
seems evident that HI offers a bridging framework between institutional stability and 
change, pointing to gradual transformation resulting from endogenous adjustments as 
well as accounting for both structural and agential levels of analysis. Bell argues that 
HI, combined with a constructivist approach, can offer ‘a more rounded account of how 
interpretative agents interact dialectically with institutional and wider structural contexts 
and produce change’ (2011: 884). Thus, as Schmidt (2011) noted, introducing ideas as 
explanatory factors allows agency back into historical analysis. This enables analysis of 
Member States in the chair of the Presidency as institutionally embedded active and in-
terpretative agents.  
The issue of the ambiguity of formal rules and its impact on institutional change emerg-
es as one of the key issues of this thesis. Sheingate (2010) argues that most of the for-
mal institutional rules are ambiguous and this ‘provides critical openings for creativity 
and agency’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 12). The subsequent interpretation of rules 
might have an impact on the further development of the institution. However, as noted 
by Sheingate, this ambiguity ‘invites conflict and contestation as actors struggle over 
the meaning, application, and enforcement of formal institutional rules’ (2010: 169). As 
noted above, such an approach can lead ‘to an overly muscular account of agency’ 
(Sheingate 2010: 170). There is thus a need to introduce a more balanced outlook on the 
interaction and mutual influence of agency and structure in which the agency is embed-
ded. According to Sheingate, institutional theory should thus aim ‘to understand how 
rule ambiguity provides opportunity for creative leeway at the same time that actors re-
main tethered to the institutions they inhabit’ (2010: 170). One such example has been 
the scholarship on institutional entrepreneurship, which argues that ‘the powerful actors 
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play a causal role in the emergence of new institution’ (Lamberg and Pajunen 2010: 
815). Such research has emerged from the intersection of entrepreneurship scholarship 
and institutional theory, and has been attracting increasing academic attention (Aldrich 
2011, Philips and Tracey 2007, Tollbert et al. 2001).  
The analytical assumptions provided by this chapter will be further used to operational-
ize the research puzzle by introducing into the analysis a role-based model of role insti-
tutionalisation. The concept of critical juncture emerges as the most effective way of 
focusing the analysis on the periods of institutional change. The LT’s provisions have 
reshaped the system of European foreign policy making and dramatically changed the 
context of the Council chairmanship by limiting its role. Nevertheless, HI seems to be 
less applicable when explaining the process of institutional change, as it does not offer 
theoretical hypotheses with reference to pointing to a particular direction of the institu-
tional development in the aftermath of a critical juncture. The pre-Lisbon Presidency’s 
role evolution emerged to a large extent as a response to the institutional feedback as 
well as some entrepreneurial activity of individual Member States in the chair. There-
fore, in order to understand the process of role institutionalisation of the Presidency, the 
analysis should be undertaken at the exact interaction of two levels: the structural level 
of the post-Lisbon system of European foreign policy making and the agential level of 
the Member State in the chair of the Presidency. The latter will be explored by incorpo-
rating a role theory approach which aims to explore the individual behaviour of the 
Member States in the chair, possible variations between their role preferences and final-
ly their impact on the emerging position and functions of the post-Lisbon Presidency. 
Role scholarship assumes the existence of ‘extraordinary moments’ which are defined 
as times of structural change during which ‘the role set is likely to become unstable, 
leading to a redefinition of roles and intensification of learning and socialisation pro-
cesses, as agents become more open to adopting different norm sets and different prac-
tices’ (Flockhart 2011: 98). Therefore, ‘such moments may leave the existing rules and 
institutions intact or lead to transformation, adaptation, or breakdown’ (Ikenberry 2008 
cited in Flockhart 2011: 98).  The analytical framework incorporating the insights of NI 
and role theory is expected to provide a more comprehensive explanation of how the 
Presidency’s role in the post-Lisbon European foreign policy making has developed as 
the result of the interaction between agency (role making) and structure (institutional 
feedback). 
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CHAPTER III Towards a Role-Based Model of Role Institutionalisation 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to present a role-based model of role institutionalisation 
in order to analyse the institutionalisation of the post-Lisbon Presidency’s role. In the 
first part, I present a brief review of role theory and its application to IR and FPA, and 
in particular, its contribution to the study of EU foreign policy making. Subsequently, I 
explain how insights from role theory, in particular, the concepts of role making and 
role institutionalisation, are used to inform the empirical analysis. The final part will 
present the methodological implications of using an interpretative research approach 
and the particular research design applied to study the process of the informal adapta-
tion of LT’s rules with reference to the functions, inter-institutional position, and pat-
terns of behaviours associated with the Presidency in post-Lisbon European foreign pol-
icy making. 
The following section will present the origins and the overview of the development of 
role theory by exploring its multidisciplinary nature. 
3.1 Role Theory, International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
Role theory is based on the basic assumption that social life is structured around charac-
teristic behavioural patterns, associated with particular social positions, which are the 
result of actors’ expectations towards own behaviour and those of other people (Biddle 
1979). Although it was initially developed as an approach within psychology and soci-
ology, it quickly proved useful for studying national foreign policy making.  Its applica-
tion to FPA was triggered by Holsti’s article (1970) in which he transferred the socio-
logical approach of analysing the characteristic patterns of behaviour, conceptualised as  
national role conceptions, into analysing how states perceive and enact their foreign pol-
icy. Holsti’s main argument was that a country’s performance ‘may be explained pri-
marily by reference to the policy-makers’ own conceptions of their nation’s role in a 
region or in the international system as a whole’ (Holsti 1970: 240). Roles as ‘policy-
makers own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and ac-
tions suitable to their state, and the functions, if any, their state should perform on a 
continuing basis in the international system’ (Holsti 1970: 245-6).  He analysed state-
ments of policy-makers and, based mostly on an inductive approach, he identified and 
created a typology of 17 national role conceptions. This approach, focusing on the ego 
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part of roles, was then extended by Walker (1987, 1978) and Wish (1980); it constituted 
an early attempt to incorporate role analysis into FPA and IR. 
During the Cold War, the confrontational character of the relations between the US and 
the Soviet Union limited role analysis to reflecting the ideological dichotomy in their 
role prescriptions in IR, while political science continued with the application of role 
theory to study decision-making process at the national level. The former strand, based 
on the relative stability of the East-West division, resulted in a rather static view of na-
tional role conceptions. Early applications of role theory mostly took the form of at-
tempts to transfer the conceptual language of role theory. Their primary focus was on 
exploring sources of national role conceptions and testing their effect on the actors’ be-
haviour in foreign policy (for example Le Prestre 1997, Wish 1980, Walker 1978). 
Therefore, role theory developed mostly within FPA and was concentrated within 
American academia (Thies and Breuning 2012: 2). The influence of a country’s identity 
and the importance of ideational factors reinforced the development of role theory in the 
1990s as a result of developments in the field of IR (Thies and Breuning 2012: 2). The 
epistemological division between role theory grounded in IR and FPA resulted in the 
emergence of two main strands of role theory: one based on psychological premises and 
emphasising the agential level (FPA), the other more rooted in structural theories (IR). 
These two remained discrete (Harnisch 2011, Keating 2009). The latter, mostly devel-
oping in the US, highlighted the stability of the roles and the actors’ material or cogni-
tive traits as the determining factors shaping their behaviour, thus closely reflecting the 
positivist approach. The former started to gain popularity within European and interna-
tional academia, and focused on a constructivist understanding. It emphasised the role 
of language and social interaction and analysed how roles provide ‘reasons for actions’ 
(Thies and Breuning 2012: 3). This division has been well reflected in the debate on the 
nature of the roles’ sources and to what extent they are domestic or international. 
The traditional role-based approach focused on examining the foreign policies of states 
through their understanding of the international system and their perceived role within 
it. Recent approaches have moved their analytical focus to the domestic level, focusing 
on the formation of role conceptions at the national level (Brummer and Thies 2014, 
Wehner and Thies 2014, Kaarbo and Cantir 2013). On the other hand, some research 
has shifted the focus to the level of increasingly complex and integrated external rela-
tions. As noted by Harnisch et al. roles can also help ‘to explore the patterns and evolu-
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tion of international social order’ (2011: 2). This order is ‘the result of myriad interac-
tions between actors trying to enact their foreign policy roles – be it within institutional 
contexts, multilaterally, bilaterally and unilaterally’ (Ibid.). Role theory thus proves to 
be useful in studying international relations. For example, the concept of role change 
has been conceptualised as a response to the states’ membership of various organisa-
tions. The issue of regional, but most of all European integration, has allowed for a 
more dynamic role analysis. In the field of European Studies role theory was originally 
applied by Lisbeth Aggestam to studying the foreign policy making of the UK, France, 
and Germany. This approach was then used to study the EU role in international politics 
in the book edited by Elgström and Smith (2006). Moreover, and what seems to be par-
ticularly useful for this research, a role-based framework was applied to study the insti-
tution of the Presidency by Elgström (2006) and Natalia Leal (2010). Their study sought 
to explain variations between Presidencies held by the individual EU Member States. 
Additionally, the recent edited volume by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hans 
W. Maull provides further insights into the conditions facilitating role change at the lev-
el of role conceptions of both states and international organisations, in particular with 
reference to the EU (Bengtsson and Elgström 2011) and NATO (Flockhart 2011). This 
has been further developed by Harnisch (2012) in an article aiming to incorporate the 
literature on role theory and learning in foreign policy by exploring the concept of role 
making. These recent contributions to role theory seem to be of particular relevance 
when studying the process of role institutionalisation in the post-Lisbon Presidency. 
In the early 1960s Biddle concluded that ‘role theory, as a set of unified positions, does 
not present0ly exist’ (1961: 191). The lack of a unified theory or universal application 
was further highlighted by Below (2015), Harnisch (2011a: 7-8), Nabers (2011: 75) and 
Thies (2009: 4) more than forty years later. It has been argued that role theory still lacks 
a clear and comprehensive framework; as commented by Searing ‘what is usually called 
role theory are frameworks consisting of topics, concepts, and assumptions’ (1991: 
1243). As argued by Sarbin and Allen the noun ‘theory’ is used ‘to denote a set of prop-
ositions employing a consistent idiom that guides the search for facts’ (1968: 489). 
However, this does not undermine the analytical strength as ‘the test of a scientific theo-
ry, of course, is not whether is it true but whether it is useful’ (Sarbin and Allen 1968: 
489). Thus, role theory is not a theory but rather an approach applying a unified set of 
concepts and assumptions about actors’ behaviour. In a simplified version, role theory 
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argues that humans behave in different ways that are predictable depending on their so-
cial identities and situations (Biddle 1986: 68); in other words, ‘the role performance of 
individuals is shaped by the expectations and behaviour of others’ (Magid 1980: 312). 
However, over the last few years the renewed interest in role-based research has provid-
ed further clarifications into the analytical foundations as well as the methodological 
implications of applying a role-based approach to study the behaviour of states at the 
international level as well as the formation of role conceptions at the level of a state 
(Beneš and Harnisch 2015; Wehner 2015; Thies 2014, 2013; Wehner and Thies 2014; 
McCourt 2014, 2010; Guzzini 2013, Kaarbo and Cantir 2013; Walker 2013).  
Searing has argued that because of its widespread and universal applicability such an 
approach might be applied to any area of research involving human behaviour, and that 
as a result, any attempt to create a single role theory might not be desirable (1991). In 
his study, he identified three main strands of role theory: structural, interactional and 
motivational. Each of these strands present different visions with reference to agency-
structure relationship; thus ‘the structural approach highlights connections between in-
stitutions and roles, the interactional approach focuses on the process through which 
roles are learned, and the motivational approach focuses on the content of roles, particu-
larly on the goals and incentives that drive them’ (1991: 1244). Starting from the origi-
nal contribution by Holsti, Mead’s symbolic interactionism became one of the key 
sources for role scholarship. In his empirical research Holsti downplayed the structural 
sources of roles, arguing that ‘the expectations of other governments, legal norms ex-
pressed through custom, general usage, or treaties, and available sanctions to enforce 
these are ill-defined, flexible, or weak compared to those that exist in an integrated soci-
ety and particularly within formal organisations’ (Holsti 1970: 243). This was addressed 
by Walker, who highlighted the analytical value of including the structural sources of 
the role (external expectations) by introducing the concept of role prescription into his 
empirical research (1978, 1987). His definition of role referred to ‘repertoires of behav-
iour, inferred from others’ expectations and one’s own conceptions, selected at least 
partly in response to cues and demands' (Walker 1992: 23 cited in Thies 2013: 30). 
Thies thus identified three approaches: structural, functional and organisational which 
highlighted ‘the individual as representative of a social position, while symbolic interac-
tionist and cognitive approaches focus on the individual as a person’ (2013: 30). The 
influence of Mead’s ideas – also with reference to the structuralist aspects – has also 
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been fully acknowledged by Harnisch. Role theory has thus been positioned in the mid-
dle ontological spectrum between individualism and structuralism. Role theory’s inter-
pretative approach focuses on interpretative knowledge by identifying meanings at-
tributed to national roles by the decision-making elites. As argued by Hopf ‘interpre-
tivists rely on reconstructing the intersubjective meaning of the structure for the subjects 
of the interests’ (2007: 640). Such an approach enables understanding of how people 
make sense of their social context and through these interpretations help to understand 
their behaviour. It opens the ‘black box’ of domestic process and aids understanding 
decisions from the standpoints of the decision-makers by reconstructing their reasons’ 
(Hollis-Smith 1990: 74).  
This research will follow the interpretative and interactional strand which allows for a 
more middle ground approach by focusing on the interactive processes between agency 
and structure in order to better account for structural, domestic, ideational and material 
factors. Application of the role theory approach will thus aim at demonstrating that 
structure and agency presuppose each other and that these two are mutually constitutive 
(Sewell 1992).  
The earlier lack of conceptual clarity in role theory’s application can be addressed by 
clearly outlining and defining relevant concepts; this will be thus the subject of the next 
section. 
3.2 Key Concepts 
 
As argued before, the multidisciplinary nature of role theory and its application to vari-
ous research areas has resulted in various methodologies being produced. This might 
have impacted on role theory insofar as it has sometimes been perceived as conceptually 
confusing (Leal 2010). Nevertheless, it seems that a fair consensus exists with reference 
to the core role concepts, the relations between them, and their particular empirical ap-
plications.  
The notion of role has been widely applied to study functional aspects of both states and 
various international organisations. These early attempts were rather instrumental in us-
ing this notion without clearly defining what was meant by the concept of ‘role’; there-
fore, the concept might have been perceived as lacking precise meaning (Jackson 1972 
cited in Aggestam 2004a: 63).  Sociological role theory was one of the first attempts to 
infuse the concept of role with a more analytical dimension. This approach was original-
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ly adopted from the field of theatrology by comparing an actor within the international 
social system to an actor performing on the stage according to a concrete script (Brad-
bury et al 1972 cited in Aggestam 2004a: 56, Sarbin and Allen 1968: 488-9). This 
script, which provides guidelines on the kind of behaviour which is associated with the 
particular context, reflects what the actor has learned previously regarding what kind of 
behaviour s/he should perform ‘to comply with the rules of the game’ (Bradbury et al 
1972 cited in Aggestam 2004a: 63). Therefore, the concept of role represents ‘a two-
way process between structure and actor’ (Hollis and Smith 1986: 285).  
More recently, Elgström and Smith have defined roles as ‘patterns of expected or ap-
propriate behaviour’ (2006b: 5). Some authors, however, have argued for a more neutral 
definition that incorporates characteristic patterns of behaviour associated with a specif-
ic position held by the actor or a specific context regardless if it is perceived as appro-
priate or not (Jackson 1972, Biddle and Thomas 1966, Singer 1965). This debate re-
flects the ongoing division between the structural and motivational researchers: the for-
mer see roles as ‘constructs that are maintained by institutions and have little to do with 
individual preferences’ (Homans in Searing 1991: 1245); the latter define roles as ‘sets 
of informal rules created and recreated through interactions, especially through negotia-
tions between individuals and their associates’ (Handel, Meltzer, Petras and Reynolds in 
Searing 1991: 1246). As argued by Searing, both of these strands underappreciate ‘indi-
vidual preferences, incentives and calculations (1991: 1246). Therefore the third strand, 
the motivational one, aims at capturing the role as ‘the part that one plays in an event or 
process’ (Searing 1991: 1248). As further argued by Searing: ‘to reconstruct such roles 
satisfactorily, it makes good sense to try to understand them as they are understood by 
their players, as dynamic interactions between rules and reasons, between institutional 
constraints and individual preferences’(1991: 1248). 
The driving forces behind role theory are role conceptions. These are defined as sets of 
norms expressing expected foreign policy behaviour and a country’s performance on the 
international stage. They constitute a ‘road map’ that policy makers use to simplify and 
understand complex social and political reality (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 3). This 
concept refers to both the ego- and alter-side of the actors and thus is usually divided 
into national role conceptions and role expectations (Biddle and Thomas 1966). The 
former focuses the analysis on the actor’s self-understanding of his role – on his subjec-
tive perception of how he should behave. As noted above, the structuralist approach to-
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wards role theory was challenged by Holsti, who conceptualised the actor as being ca-
pable of holding multiple roles and thus of emphasising one role over the others. 
Holsti’s understanding of national role conception refers to the more motivational ap-
proach and it is defined as ‘the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of 
decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if 
any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in 
subordinate regional systems’ (Holsti 1970: 12).  Kirste and Maull defined it as ‘an ac-
tor’s perception of his or her position vis-à-vis others (the ego part of the role) and the 
perception of the role expectations of others (the alter part of the role) as signalled 
through language and action’ (1996: 289 cited in Harnisch et al. 2011: 8). Subsequently, 
role expectations refer to ‘those expectations that other actors (alter) prescribe and ex-
pect the role-beholder ego to enact’ (Kirste and Maull 1996 cited in Aggestam 2004: 
64). As pointed out by Aggestam, expectations refer both to the obligations stemming 
from international organisation membership, and also to what other international actors 
expect of the particular actors (2004a: 64). These expectations can both empower and 
limit the actor in its behaviour as they ‘compromise[d] of the rights and privileges, the 
duties and obligations’ (Sarbin and Allen 1968: 496). In the final model of role institu-
tionalisation I distinguish between national role conceptions and role expectations. This 
enables me to analytically distinguish between expectations expressed towards the insti-
tution of the Presidency itself and towards the individual Member States in the Chair.  
The subsequent stage of the actual behaviour of an actor is referred to as the role per-
formance or role enactment (Sarbin and Allen 1968). The causal link between these 
concepts as presented by Holsti starts with the national role conception, which influ-
ences the role performance that is subsequently reflected in the actual behaviour of the 
actor, namely the state’s behaviour on the international arena. As argued by Aggestam, 
‘this correlation between role conception and role performance may only be applicable 
to more general roles’ (2004a: 65). With multiple roles held by countries ‘role concep-
tions do not determine outcomes directly, but merely define the potential range of op-
tions and strategies’ (Aggestam 2004a: 65). Thus, identifying and analysing the national 
role conception held by a country is only one analytical tool when studying countries’ 
behaviour in foreign policy.  
Role theory also emerges as a promising venue for analysing the ambiguity of institu-
tional rules and norms. The ability of an actor to act according to its role conception de-
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pends on how clearly the role is defined. The better the role is understood, the clearer 
the expected behaviour of that role is (Biddle and Thomas 1966). As distinguished by 
Barnett, the level of clarity according to which the role script provides actors with 
guidelines on how to behave can vary (1993 cited in Aggestam 2004a: 60). If the script 
sets detailed and well-defined guidelines it creates a role position and a clear role 
prescritipion (Ibid.). Some authors refer to role prescription as the expected behaviour 
of the state as set by international organisations (Breuning 1995: 237). Holsti defines 
role prescriptions as ‘cultures, societies, institutions or groups attached to particular po-
sitions’ (1970: 239). It is thus the influence of the external environment. Other intro-
duced the concept of ‘inventory of role’, which refers to the activities or functions con-
ceived as part of the role (Biddle and Thomas 1966) or the clusters or patterns of behav-
iours denoting both general and more specific types of roles (Turner 1988). Therefore, 
the concept of role prescription, defined as a set of normative and functionally oriented 
expectations defining expected behaviour, is used to identify the new post-Lisbon role 
of the Presidency. 
With a clear role prescription, an actor’s performance - role taking - would limit the ac-
tor’s ability to focus on its own perception and interpretation of the role. On the contra-
ry, in the case of role ambiguity (Bray and Brawley 2002), role preference would char-
acterise roles which are defined in general terms, thus granting the actor greater freedom 
of self-definition and greater flexibility in role enactment. Role ambiguity is ‘associated 
with positions that require the performance of few specific duties and responsibilities’ 
(Searing 1991: 1249). The notion of role preference captures the complexity and ambi-
guity of the Presidency’s role in the aftermath of the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty. With the emphasis shifted towards the agency and its interpretation, the actor 
becomes involved in role making, creating the possibility for the actor to project its own 
role conception into the international system.  
The interactionist perspective on role theory offers useful assumptions on role making 
by pointing to the ongoing creation of roles through constant social interaction (Turner 
1962). Roles are the result of negotiations that involve an interaction between a person 
and the environment (McCall and Simmons 1978). Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luck-
mann (1999) have argued that ‘[…] while the role playing presupposes the ability of 
people to take the role of the other, role making entails constructing, changing, adapt-
ing, and modifying a role in the course of a role performance’ (cited in Martin and Wil-
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son 2005: 652). Harnisch et al. use Ernest Renan’s concept of ‘daily plebiscites’ to ex-
plain the interactionist dimension of the role approach: ‘foreign policy roles are con-
stantly being reconstructed, hence recreated and thus often also subtly modified through 
the words and (inter)actions of many individuals – some more, some less influential in 
shaping social order’ (2011: 2). Thus, role making can be conceptualised as a ‘process 
of improvising, exploring, and judging what is appropriate on the basis of the situation 
and the response of others at the moment’ (Peterson 1986: 23). The latter seems particu-
larly capable of capturing the influence of the Member States in the chair of the Presi-
dency in the process of developing the new role.  
The structural changes in the European foreign policy system are at the core of this re-
search, and so the notion of role change constitutes an important part of the analysis. 
Even though the concept of role assumes stability to some extent, since it refers to char-
acteristic and repeated patterns of behaviour, role theory can still account for exploring 
change. In role scholarship, when change is discussed it is usually discussed with refer-
ence to the role conceptions held by countries (Folz 2011, Frank 2011, Maull 2011, 
Wolf 2011, Gottwald and Duggan 2011, Aggestam 2004a). As pointed out by Aggestam 
‘a role conflict exists when dominant role conceptions in the role-set are incompatible 
with one another’ (Aggestam 2004a: 68).  Therefore, the concept could also refer to 
changes at the organisational level, as in general role conflicts are more likely to occur 
‘when the conditions and context within which [roles] were originally formulate[d] 
change’ (2004a: 68). Role conflict is more likely to occur when ‘new roles are being 
added over time, as the institution develops and as the original context in which the ini-
tial roles were developed changes’ (Juncos and Pomorska 2010: 7). Thus, one can dis-
tinguish between conflict within the role set, between various roles (inter-role conflict) 
and conflict within the role (intra-role conflict). The last of these seems particularly rel-
evant to the issue of the dichotomous conceptualisation of the Presidency as a neutral 
broker and policy entrepreneur. Scripts for these two roles set contending expectations 
towards the actor’s behaviour, resulting in an ongoing inter-role conflict. This occurs 
when an individual has to perform roles that require incompatible behaviour or when 
there are conflicting organisational expectations and demands (Schwab, Iwanicki and 
Pierson 1983). Few studies have focused on exploring role change (Flockhart 2011) and 
0the formation of new roles (Sedelmeier 2006) in context of international organisations. 
These studies, which contain some insightful findings on the mechanisms behind role 
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change, provide a starting point for building a role-based model of role institutionalisa-
tion by introducing the concept of role institutionalisation. The next section introduces 
the understanding of role analysis as the operationalization of relationships between var-
ious role concepts. 
3.3 Role Analysis 
 
As argued before, different strands of role theory emphasise different causal links be-
tween role concepts and thus produce different models for role analysis. In her attempt 
to study the national foreign policy of EU Member States through a conceptualisation of 
‘homo politicus: a situated actor’ Aggestam applied the theory of structuration to opera-
tionalise the relationship between various role concepts. In doing so, she followed the 
main structurationist argument ‘that social structure is unceasingly mediated through the 
agency, and thus exist only as it is expressed in human social activity’ (2004a: 59). 
Three perspectives were distinguished: institutional, interactional and intentional. First-
ly, the institutional argument outlines roles ‘as a set of norms and expectations con-
strains behaviour’ (2004a: 59). This is further developed into the concept of role play-
ing, emphasising various levels of consensus regarding the particular role and the thus 
importance of intersubjectivity. According to this conception, roles can both enable and 
constrain an actor’s particular behaviour. This refers to the interactional approach which 
‘brings out agency and its capacity for defining its own roles’ (Aggestam 2004a: 60). 
Inspired by Mead’s symbolical interactionism, this approach focuses on the actual pro-
cesses of social interaction as a way of changing and creating new roles (McCourt 
2012). ‘Roles are sets of appropriate behaviour, not bundles of fixed duties; they emerge 
in interaction and give the actor a sense of its structure and the scope of possible action’ 
(McCourt 2012: 370). In order to gain a sense of what is expected, the actors ‘take the 
role of another’ in order to ‘view their state’s Self or identity from the perspective of 
others’ (McCourt 2012: 371). The third intentional perspective was to capture the agen-
cy’s knowledgeability and rationality in a bounded sense of the actors’ influence on de-
fining their own role. Such an approach was ‘crucial in relating reasons to structure and 
allowing for flexibility and judgement in playing of the role’ (Aggestam 2004a: 620). 
The original framework, which was built to explore perceptions of European foreign 
policy at the national level, focused on exploring the influence of EU membership by 
analysing the extent to which national role conceptions reflect ‘the socialisation process 
taking place between national foreign-makers in the EU’ (Aggestam 2004a: 10). This 
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was further developed into a model presented in Elgström and Smith’s edited volume on 
‘The European Union’s Roles in International Politics’ (2006). The model as presented 
in Figure 3 demonstrates how various role concepts interact with each other. Thus, the 
role prescription is operationalised as formal and informal normative and functionally 
oriented expectations defining the expected behaviour of the Member State while in the 
chair of the Presidency. Elgström used role theory to present the Presidency as ‘a struc-
turally situated position’ (2006: 173). Over the years, the institution of the Presidency 
has become associated with formal functional provisions as well as more informal 
norms of conduct.  
Using the concept of role taking, Elgström emphasised the interactional perspective of 
the Member State’s behaviour: ‘purposive roles are the result of dynamic interactions 
between institutional constraints and actor’s preferences’ (Elgström 2006: 173). There-
fore, as a result of learning and socialisation, actors may try to follow expectations as-
sociated with this position (Ibid.). However, they might interpret these expectations as 
constraints ‘which they have to take into account but that they want to interpret, stretch 
or circumvent, according to their own definition of the situation at hand ‘(Elgström 
2006: 174). Moreover, as actors face external expectations, they also face ‘expectations 
that are linked to internally derived roles, which stem from national self-images, tradi-
tion and culture’ (Elgström 2006: 184).  If these expectations, external and internal, are 
contradictory, actors have to balance them. This also refers to the existence of contra-
dictory expectations towards one role; the latter enables conceptualisation of the Presi-
dency through the concept of intra-conflict caused by ‘the potential conflict between the 
demands of the Presidency norms and the expectations that arise from its role as a de-
fender and promoter of national interests’ (Ibid.). As noted by Elgström, the norm of 
effectiveness, associated with the expectation of the Presidency to move the work of the 
CEU forward, and the norm of rotation, creates ‘a tendency that other Member States 
permit the present incumbent to pursue certain prioritized issues’ (2006: 185). This of-
fers an additional explanation for the influence capacity of the Presidency and its agen-
da shaping powers. Finally, Member States bring to the office a number of their national 
role conceptions which define their strategic actions in foreign policy (Elgström 2006: 
186). Consequently, the role approach results in a more complex outlook on the Presi-
dency in which ‘existing structurally based expectations of the Presidency’s role (that is, 
expectations of neutrality and impartiality, of effectiveness and of consensus-seeking) 
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interact with the particular role conceptions that are brought to the office by individual 
Member States to produce both common features and variety in Presidency role perfor-
mance’ (Elgström 2006: 172). 
In order to study the variations in the Presidency’s performance, Natalia Leal, in her 
PhD thesis, adjusted Aggestam’s model as presented in Figure 3 to capture role analysis 
associated with the Presidency. The particular relevance of Leal’s study for this research 
is that her project focuses on the European level of foreign policy making, and in partic-
ular, foreign policy making during the CEU chairmanship. The latter makes Leal’s work 
particularly relevant in conceptualising the Presidency’s performance through present-
ing it as a model of causal links between role concepts. As presented in Figure 4, Leal 
included an additional stage in her role analysis: role assessment was included to further 
emphasise the dynamism within the process of Presidency’s performance and the extent 
to which these concepts are mutually constitutive (Leal 2010: 175). The observation that 
the role conception is affected by both self-image and the others’ expectations leads to 
the question of how much interplay there is between them (Elgström and Smith 2006: 
6). Leal decided to explore this question and relate it to the level of role expectations 
understood as ‘the manifestations of our own conceptions (what we show others we be-
lieve to be our role) will influence other’s expectations of us’ (2010: 176). This constant 
recreation of both role conceptions and role expectations is caught in the framework of 
social learning. Consequently, as Leal argues, ‘an evaluation of each Presidency’s over-
all role (particularly of their role-playing and role performance) can be a vital element 
feeding back, through a process of social learning, to both actor and structural level: 
perceptions of the success of (previous) interactions and outcome, inform not only the 
ongoing and future role of any individual Member State while holding the Presidency 
but also following Presidency (different Member-State) roles’ (2010: 175).  
Both processes of learning and socialisation emerge as important explanatory factors of 
the behaviour of the Member States in the chair of the Presidency. Two issues emerge 
as particularly relevant for this thesis: firstly, including the final stage of role allows for 
an analysis of the relationship between particular practices as introduced by the individ-
ual Member States and the process of institutionalisation of these practices into a new 
post-Lisbon role; secondly, learning and socialisation might emerge as potential mecha-
nisms for the performance of individual Member States. 





Figure 3. Role Analysis by Aggestam (2004a) 
 
  
Figure 4. Role Analysis by Leal (2010) 
Introducing the concept of role change into Aggestam’s model enabled an investigation 
into continuity and change within foreign policy at the national level. Pointing to the 
multiple sources of roles and their particular sensitivity to institutional and time context 
would allow for exploration of potential reasons for role conflict both at the internal, 
national level and external, European levels of analysis. The change in the latter could 
trigger role conflict, as the previous patterns of behaviour might not be relevant for the 
new context, but also in the case of unexpected behaviour by other actors (Aggestam 
2004a: 68). As noted by Aggestam, critical junctures would be periods particularly 
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prone to role conflict, which might in turn trigger role change (2004a: 68). Inconsisten-
cy between national role conception and role expectations, as well as the existence of 
different role expectations, might point to the instability of the role and thus its potential 
role conflict (Aggestam 2004a: 69). Finally, role conflict would be possible in role sets 
including two or more contradictory role conceptions (Ibid.). However, as noted by Ag-
gestam, there are examples of countries pursuing contradictory role conceptions for 
years. For example, French role conceptions of distinctiveness emphasised the country’s 
national independence, while on the other hand it firmly supported European integration 
(2004a). This thus prompts the question of when the role conflict would result in a role 
change. This is where role theory echoes the generally limited specificity of roles, as 
earlier argued by recent historical institutionalists, and points to certain discretion in in-
terpreting roles (Aggestam 2004a: 70). Limited knowledge and expectations about the 
particular role trigger the actor into a more subjective role enactment. ‘Innovations take 
place when an actor faces external situations for which s/he has not been programmed’ 
(Ibid.). As pointed out by Stryker, more salient rules make the actor more reluctant to 
ignore role expectations (2006: 228). This might be a result of the previous socialisation 
and learning. Therefore, role ambiguity facilitates creative interpretation, which seems 
to be a feature of the post-Lisbon context.   
To sum up, this thesis continues with the recently established practice of applying role 
theory to study contemporary foreign policy making. The reviewed literature on role 
analysis offers insightful assumptions into the processes and mechanisms behind role 
making and institutional change; however it does not offer a comprehensive theoretical 
approach to the core of this research. Since the particular focus of this study is institu-
tional change, I argue that a distinctive framework combining the insights of role theory 
and new institutionalism might be more useful to tackle the research puzzle of the post-
Lisbon role of the Presidency in European foreign policy making. 
3.4 Operationalisation of the Role-Based Model of Role Institutionalisation  
 
One of the main issues facing the current scholarship on the institutional change is how 
to capture the interplay between agential and structural levels of analysis. ‘Roles can 
bridge the different levels of analysis, from the individual to the state to the internation-
al system’ (Thies 2013: 29). Roles thus offer a way to bridge the theoretical gap be-
tween structure and agency and might offer a new way of conceptualising institutional 
change. Additionally, as highlighted by Elgström and Smith, role theory emphasises the 
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dynamic interaction between the actors’ self-conceptions and structurally guided role 
expectations (2006). This promotes a view of the process of institutionalisation as inter-
play between actors’ individual interpretations of what they perceive to be their role and 
the influence of the emerging new system’s functional demands placed on these actors. I 
conceptualise the latter as institutional feedback and the former as role making. The in-
stitutional change refers to all of the actors involved in the system. Thus, when an actor 
is not capable of performing a new role, other actors will have to address the emerging 
functional requirements. This structural feedback from the emerging post-Lisbon sys-
tem with the functional demands created by the lack and/or the ineffective performance 
of other actors is defined as the institutional feedback. The proposed model of role insti-
tutionalisation provides an additional analytical step between exogenous institutional 
change, the implementation of formal rules, their interpretation and a new pattern of be-
haviour associated with a new role.
20
 As Le Prestre has remarked, defining a role needs 
to be combined with the role being accepted by other actors (1997: 5). The mechanisms 
behind this model – role making and institutional feedback – are relational, and the 
changing role is a result of the interactions among all of the actors involved in the sys-
tem. Thus, at the micro-level of analysis, the focus is on the Member States in the chair 
of the first post-Lisbon Presidencies and their interpretation of what the new role should 
entail; this is conceptualised as role preference. At the meso-level, the interactions be-
tween the Member State and the emerging system are captured by the concept of role 
making, examining the emerging functions, new patterns of behaviour of the involved 
actors through rule interpretation, implementation and rulemaking. It also involves the 
stage of clarifying interpretations and adaptation among various actors involved in the 
emerging new system and how they negotiate performing new roles introduced by the 
change of formal provisions. At the macro-level the changing role of the Presidency at 
the structural level and its ongoing institutionalisation is conceptualised as role institu-
tionalisation. All of these levels are connected and this contiguous relationship between 
them is reflected in the proposed model.   
As I argued earlier, the Lisbon Treaty introduced what can be referred to as role ambi-
guity with reference to the Presidency’s role in European foreign policy. Without a clear 
role prescription, resulting in the lack of clearly prescripted normative and functional 
                                                          
20
 The concept of role institutionalization was originally introduced by Elgström and Smith in the 
Introduction to the ‘The European Union’s Roles in International Politics (2006a)’, however it was not 
clearly defined.  
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behaviour, both the Member State in the chair and other actors did not face clear expec-
tations of what this position should be in the post-Lisbon context. Moreover, even in the 
pre-Lisbon context the Presidency’s role in general, but in particular in the area of Eu-
ropean foreign policy, was characterised by a low level of role specificity. The variety 
of functions that the Presidency was supposed to fulfil was best demonstrated by 
Schout’s ‘juggling three balls’ metaphor. Moreover, big Member States were usually 
much more active during their time in office (Bunse 2009). The previous research 
demonstrating variations between various Presidencies and between various policy are-
as further demonstrates how the Member State in the Presidency has been subject to dif-
ferentiated expectations (Leal 2010). Aggestam argued that a ‘certain amount of discre-
tion in interpreting roles appears indispensable to accommodate potentially conflicting 
roles that different contexts generate’ (2004a: 70). This seems to be particularly visible 
in the example of the Presidency: being subject to a complex range of different expecta-
tions has allowed for certain flexibility in behaving while in the chair. The ongoing in-
tra-conflict, as well as ‘the conception-performance gap’ characterising the EU’s per-
formance on the word stage (Elgström and Smith 2006a: 248) triggered the formal role 
change of the Presidency in an attempt to ensure a more efficient design and a clearer 
role prescription. Nevertheless, as a result of the LT, this role ambiguity was further re-
inforced as the formal provisions would have to be adapted in practice. Consequently, 
the first Member States in the chair of the Presidency were put in charge of the Treaty’s 
implementation and had to interpret formal provisions and adapt the role to the emerg-
ing system of European foreign policy making. Therefore, the analytical framework 
starts with the concept of incomplete contracting to highlight the ambiguity of formal 
provisions referring to the Presidency’s role and its further development. I argue that 
since the provisions failed to introduce a clear scenario for the Presidency’s functions 
and inter-institutional position, these first Member States had to interpret the role or 
even ‘produced the role’ in the process of role making (figure 5).  
As noted by Elgström and Smith ‘role taking is by no means a mechanical process’ 
(2006: 5). Aggestam (2004a) further stressed the interactive negotiation processes 
where actors confront their national conceptions with expectations. As scholarship on 
the interactionist role perspective argues, role enactment might be better portrayed as 
role making, namely the ongoing creation of a role by various actors through constant 
social interactions (Turner 1962). As noted by Turner, actors develop their individual 
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fine-tuned conceptions of rules. This is the result both of interactions with other actors, 
and previous experience and learning. In his model of role analysis, an actor’s self-
conception is a critical causal force in role making; ‘even when the macrostructure dic-
tates the formal position of a person, an individual’s self will dictate the more fine-tuned 
role that is assert’ (Turner 1988: 88-89). This is even more relevant when the structural 
roles are ambiguous and in the process of being developed.  Incorporating both insights 
on policy and institutional entrepreneurship, this concept thus aims to frame the Presi-
dency as an actor which seeks to influence the period of institutional adaptation accord-
ing to its national interpretation with reference to the emerging institutional system 
while at the same time aiming to behave according to the informal expectations ex-
pressed by other actors towards this role and more broadly towards the new system of 
European foreign policy. The process of role making is thus used to explain the process 
of institutional entrepreneurship in the context of the absence of clear formal provisions 
referring to the Presidency’s role. This ambiguous context provides a particular window 
of opportunity for the Member State in the chair to assume tasks and focus on policy 
areas which are not clearly regulated by the formal provisions. Such opportunism is fur-
ther enabled by the particular structural context, namely the particular nature of the 
post-Lisbon European foreign policy. As I noted in Chapter 2, the provisions of the Lis-
bon Treaty prompted the emergence of an even more complex system of European for-
eign policy making, with some areas being under the supranationalist management of 
permanent Presidency of the HRVP and some under the intergovernmental management 
exercised by the CEU Presidency. This has further reinforced the hybrid nature of the 
Presidency which now comprises both intergovernmental and supranational components 
of the post-Lisbon Presidency in European foreign policy making. 




Figure 5. Role Making of the Post-Lisbon Presidency 
The concept of role preference is used in the model to emphasise the latter assumption 
of role ambiguity with reference to the post-Lisbon Presidency’s institutional position 
within the emerging system. The analysis of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty demon-
strated the lack of a clear role prescription towards the role of the post-Lisbon Presiden-
cy in European foreign policy making. It thus created role ambiguity which had to be 
clarified by the actors taking up this role. This is framed as role making. It explores the 
behaviour of individual Member States in the chair and traces their capacity to shape the 
new role. With no previous examples to focus on, the first Member States in the chair 
would have to build their role preferences based on their interpretation of the limited 
formal provisions and informal expectations held by other actors involved in the system. 
The identification of role preference is developed through content analysis of docu-
ments on the individual Presidencies’ strategies, their official programmes as well as 
interviews with relevant national officials. 
Individual role making takes place in the context of the constitutive institutional feed-
back which refers to both formal expectations, as introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, and 
structural expectations emerging in due course of the subsequent implementation. The 
latter depends on the performance of other actors involved in the system; if they are un-
able to fully perform all of the tasks associated with their role positions, other actors 
might use this opportunity to take up some of these functions and consequently expand 
the original scripts of their roles. Formation of individual roles emerges thus in the con-
stitutive process of inter-institutional adaptation. Finally, each of the actors can be both 
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empowered and constrained by informal expectations held towards their individual be-
haviour. As argued earlier, the hybrid nature of the pre-Lisbon Presidency resulted in 
the chair holder facing both expectations referring to the institution itself as well as 
more individual expectations expressed towards the particular chair holder. Interviews 
with officials working in the capitals and in Brussels are the main source of exploring 
these informal expectations, as these are not institutionalised and formalised in any of 
the official documents.  
The previous analytical assumptions on the role conflict and role change constitute the 
focus of this framework. Harnisch’s research on role change further incorporates ele-
ments of learning into the interactionist approach of role theory. The interactive process 
of ‘role making’ is characterised by ‘the attitudes and actions a role beholder takes on 
when performing one role or reconciling several conflicting roles’ (Harnisch 2012: 49). 
Harnisch distinguished four main sources enabling role making and thus triggering 
learning. Firstly, the ambiguity of expectations surrounding in particular the newly 
emerging roles; secondly, the lack of proper expertise of the role beholder; thirdly, con-
flicting formal and informal role expectations; and finally the ‘so-called person-role 
conflict’ which refers to the contradiction between role conception and role expectation 
(2011: 50). All of these might refer to the post-Lisbon Presidency as well as to individ-
ual Member States in the chair. Highlighting the process of role making within this role 
analysis focuses the analysis on the actor’s activities in creative interpretation and for-
mation of the role. What is even more interesting, Harnisch highlights structural effects 
of role making as possible reconstruction of other actors’ roles in response to this new 
and unexpected behaviour. Consequently, the whole role set is reconstructed to accom-
modate changes within an individual role. This seems to be emerging as the key interac-
tion for capturing the process of institutional change, framed as ‘the conscious manipu-
lation of one’s own role taking behaviour to (re)shape the role of another actor, presum-
ably a counter or commensurate role’ (Harnisch 2011: 10). 
The next stage of the analysis is that of role enactment, exploring the actual perfor-
mance of the Member State during its six-month period in the office by examining their 
daily practices, particular functions and tasks. As argued before, role conflict is more 
likely during periods of institutional change. In his work, Biddle identified three poten-
tial behaviours that are prompted by role conflict: firstly choice or compromise between 
contending norms, secondly abandonment of the role performance, and thirdly nega-
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tions which lead to both the change of the actor’s behaviour as well as the change of the 
expectations regarding this role (1986: 83-4). This might shed some light on the possi-
ble behaviour of the Member State in the chair while facing role conflict. The stage of 
the analysis is based to a large extent on the pre-Lisbon Presidency’s functions, but it 
also aims to incorporate a more intuitive approach, enabling identification of newly 
emerging functions. The focus of this analysis is placed on the emerging norms, rules 
and practices, both formal and informal, which are associated with the new role of the 
Presidency.  
Grossman noted that ‘role theory may prove to be a useful tool in forecasting changes in 
state behaviour’ (2005 cited in Breuning 2011: 30). Most of the role-based research fo-
cuses on the constitutive and regulative impact of international organisations on states 
and conceptualising the change at the level of national role conceptions and role behav-
iour. In order to better capture the focus of this research and differentiate between role 
change at the level of agency and the level of structure, I introduce the concept of role 
institutionalisation. I argue that this concept is more capable of exploring the process of 
the Presidency’s role change as a result of formal expectations expressed towards the 
institution itself, informal expectations expressed towards the individual Member States, 
the emerging institutional feedback and the purposive behaviour of the Member State in 
this role.  
In the case of this research, role institutionalisation is triggered by top-down forces of 
institutional change brought by the adoption of the LT. The concept of role ambiguity is 
introduced to highlight the lack of a clear role prescription for the Presidency in EU for-
eign affairs. Given the incomplete nature of the LT’s provisions the implementing 
agents are tasked with interpretation and adaptation of the new provisions to ensure 
functioning of the new system. How agents understand these provisions is affected first-
ly by their national role conceptions and how they interpret their role on international 
and European stage, and secondly by the institutional context in which they operate. 
This interplay between implementing agents and functional demands of the emerging 
system can provide a comprehensive understanding of the institutional change of the 
Presidency. As pointed out by Poret and Rittelmeyer ‘in the EU institutionalisation 
means more rules, more formality, more stability, more ritualization, and developing 
roles that are able to shape attitudes’ (2014: 4). Therefore, the comparison between the 
first four Presidencies, the individual expectations they face and day-to-day working 
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arrangements they implement, allows us to identify development of stable practices and 
patterns of behaviour. The authors also noted that ‘institutionalisation should not be un-
derstood as a liner, automatic and imposed path but rather as the conjunction of multiple 
and multidimensional processes, progressing at unequal speeds and interacting together’ 
(Ibid.). Thus, the model of role institutionalisation captures the dynamic and ongoing 
process of interpretation, adaptation and consolidation of shared expectations and 
scripts associated with the newly introduced roles. Consequently, informal and formal 
norms, rules and codes of conducts become formalised into a new role prescription.  
The main aim of this section is to adopt the previous application of role analysis into 
studying institutional change. Consolidation of insights from the institutional analysis 
and role theory should allow for the building of a framework capable of capturing the 
emergence of the Presidency’s new role as a result of the role ambiguity created by im-
plementation of formal provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. The model below offers a sim-
plified overview of interactions between role concepts in the process of role institution-
alisation (Figure 6). The model, to a large extent, reflects most of the analytical assump-
tions stemming from role-based research in IR and FPA. Nevertheless, the focus of the 
analysis is shifted from foreign policy making to institutional change. The previously 
built model of role making, as the conceptualisation of a constitutive process of individ-
ual interaction between the structure (institutional feedback) and agency (role enact-
ment), is thus framed into a  model of role institutionalisation capturing the longer term 
perspective at the macro level. Therefore, the role assessment and role prescription are 
introduced to capture the individual effect of particular role making on the institutional-
isation of the new role in the ongoing process of institutionalisation.





Figure 6. Role Institutionalisation of the Post-Lisbon Presidency 
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3.5 Research Design 
 
In order to examine the development of the post-Lisbon Presidency’s roles, I apply a 
small-N structured comparison based on four case studies of the first post-Lisbon Presi-
dencies. I use the interpretative version of process tracing as an analytical tool to open 
the ‘black box’ of institutional change from the implementation of the LT’s provisions, 
through the informal adaptation of these formal provisions to every day practices to the 
institutionalisation of the new role and the Presidency’s inter-institutional position. Pro-
cess tracing has become increasingly popular in political science, due to its focuses on 
‘processes, causal mechanism and the constitutive interplay between structure and 
agency (Bennet and Checkel 2011: 1). It enables one to trace the interaction between 
variables and then leads to the studied outcome (Checkel 2008: 115). George and 
McKeown defined process-tracing as a method of within-case analysis to evaluate the 
‘decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes’ 
(1985:35). George and McKeown further explain that process-tracing ‘attempts to un-
cover what stimuli actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli 
to arrive at decisions; the actual behaviour that then occur; the effect of various institu-
tional arrangements on attention, processing, and behaviour; and the effect of other var-
iables of interest on attention, processing, and behaviour’ (1985: 35). This thesis will 
start with discussing the ambiguities around the role of the post-Lisbon Presidency, and 
will then trace its institutionalisation into a new pattern of behaviour associated with the 
institution. 
Process tracing allows to combine positivist and interpretivist approaches allowing to 
explore ‘both the causal what and the causal how’ (Venesson 2008: 232).  In the inter-
pretative version of process tracing, the focus shifts towards understanding the meaning 
behind the actors’ behaviour and their practices, and towards exploring the meaning of 
these in the process of institutionalisation. This version of process tracing ‘becomes nar-
ration in search of patterns’ (Gysen et al. 2006). Ruback notes that ‘process tracing is 
narration – storytelling in the service of relating a causal logic’ (2010: 478).21  It will 
thus be possible to trace relations between beliefs, perceptions and behaviour (Jervis 
2006). Process tracing is used to reconstruct and compare the foreign policy making 
processes during individual Presidencies in order to examine how each country inter-
                                                          
21
 For details on how to construct a process tracing narrative in a methodologically sound manner see 
Ruback 2010. 
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prets its role while in the chair of the Presidency, and how they subsequently implement 
this role in practice. I argue that in this manner it is possible to explore how various na-
tional role conceptions affect these interpretations (role preference) and the subsequent 
performances of the chosen Member States (role making). Role making focuses on eve-
ry day practices that take place in the post-Lisbon foreign policy making.  The compari-
son between the first four Presidencies makes it possible to trace the development of the 
role at the structural level in terms of its ongoing institutionalisation and regarding the 
consequences of the differences in the conceptualising and the implementation of the 
Presidency’s roles by individual Member States. This analysis, therefore, traces the pro-
cess of interpretation, conceptualisation, implementation and adaptation of the formal 
provisions of the LT to the working arrangements in the post-Lisbon system of foreign 
policy making. 
The first part of this project focuses on understanding and explaining the individual in-
terpretations held by the Member States with reference to their roles in the chair of the 
Presidency. This focus would encompass the States’ particular interpretations of their 
institutional positions, and will highlight the importance of beliefs and intentional 
meanings. This is why the study expresses preference towards the interpretative episte-
mology and qualitative methodology. As argued by McCourt, ‘role-playing is inherently 
interpretative’ (2012: 3); interpretative methodology emerges as key to interpreting ‘the 
scope of appropriate of behaviour’ (2012: 3). The rationale behind this choice is that a  
qualitative approach ‘is capable of saying a good deal more about the institution and 
countries chosen and shows a greater contextual detail than quantitative methods can 
exhibit’ (Bunse 2009: 10). Furthermore, following the interpretative approach, the pro-
ject seeks to ‘understand a phenomenon through accessing the meaning participants as-
sign to them’ (Orlikowski and Baroud 1991: 5), at the same time to ‘emphasis[e] not 
only the importance of subjective meanings for the individual actor but also the social 
structures which condition and enable such meaning and are constituted by them’ (Wal-
sham 1993: 246). The interpretative approach is based on the assumption that ‘we can-
not understand political phenomena unless we grasp the relevant meaning’ (Bevir and 
Rhodes 2015: 4). Therefore, ‘we can only explain actions and practices properly only if 
we appeal to the reasons that inform them’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2015: 5). Interpretivists 
claim that meanings are constitutive of actions: ‘political scientists can discuss actions 
and institutions properly only by evoking the intentionality of the actors. People act on 
CHAPTER III Towards a Role-Based Model of Role Institutionalisation 
98 
 
their beliefs, so social scientists can explain people’s actions only by appealing to their 
beliefs (….) To grasp the reasons for which someone acted is not just to understand 
their action but also to give a proper explanation of their action’ (Bevir and Rhodes 
2015: 3). 
Furthermore, an interpretative approach to institutionalism allows for opening the con-
cept of an institution to incorporate meanings (Hay 2016). Institutions as products of 
actions are informed by the varied and contingent beliefs and desires of the relevant 
people (Bevir and Rhodes 2015: 7). An interpretivist epistemology focuses on ‘attempt-
ing to make sense of or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to 
them’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 3). In the case of this project, this phenomenon is the 
process of institutional change and in particular, the question of how the new Presiden-
cy’s role forms as a result of the Member States’ individual interpretation and their sub-
sequent behaviour. As argued by Soulsby and Clark, studying institutional change as a 
process ‘enables researchers to understand better social actors’ own experiences of 
change and the ways in which they have made sense of and given sense to organisation-
al processes’ (2007: 1432). Thus, this study is also aimed at understanding the phenom-
enon of organisational change through examining the ways actors made sense of their 
context and organisational change. The interpretive framework for data analysis is 
summarised by the argument that organisational change during institutional change is 
accompanied by the presence of multiple interpretations, which in turn provide oppor-
tunities to influence the shape of the new role. Such an approach makes it possible to 
map different meanings with reference to Member States’ foreign policy roles, Europe-
an policy roles, interests, and the role of the Member State within the EU foreign policy 
within the particular context of EU normative framework. Consequently, the interpreta-
tive approach is compatible both with the role-based and the institutional approach. 
Moreover, as this study seeks to identify what the new role of the Presidency is, it ex-
plores the six-month period of the CEU chairmanship in order to identify emerging pat-
terns of behaviour, such as new role conceptions, expectations, informal practices and 
norms, and other factors which shapes the subsequent stage of the role institutionalisa-
tion of the Presidency. As argued by Aggestam, ‘a vital insight into the way structural 
changes impact on foreign policy can be obtained from understanding how political 
agents perceive these conditions, rather than assuming deterministic adaptation’ (2004: 
3). The interpretative approach is particularly significant, as in order to answer the ques-
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tion of how the new role is being formed, it is necessary to look at the meaning that all 
of the actors involved in the process held towards the role of the Presidency, namely 
their expectations. The approach thus completes role theory in an attempt to look at the 
relationship and more specifically, mutual interaction between the agency and the struc-
ture. 
3.5.1 Analysis of Data 
 
At the first level of analysis, the focus is to identify the role preference; how the Mem-
ber States interpret their role while in the chair of the Presidency. As Wehner and Thies 
noted, Walker pointed out that role theory, even though it possesses a conceptually rich 
toolbox, it is still characterised a methodologically poor (2015: 413). There are ‘no sys-
tematic ways of studying roles’ and ‘no models for developing a coherent method of 
evidence collection’ (Ibid., Thies 2014: 8). The interpretive approach does not have its 
own specific toolkit for producing data, but it is usually associated with ethnography 
(observation and interviewing), textual analysis, historical methods and narratives and 
storytelling (Bevir and Rhodes 2015: 24). For this project, a narrative interpretative pro-
cess-tracing based on a comparative case study emerges as the most appropriate ap-
proach to identify role preferences, to examine their enactment during the six-month 
period of the Presidency and finally to trace influences among individual Presidencies 
towards developing the new role.  
The process-oriented model of role institutionalisation integrated three levels of analy-
sis: action, interaction and institutionalisation. The micro-level aims to focus on the 
formation of role preference by the Member States and their strategic actions towards 
shaping the emerging post-Lisbon system of European foreign policy. Through the 
qualitative content analysis, I identify self-conceptions by coding the assertions that re-
fer to the conceptions and to decision makers’ hold of the ‘duties and responsibilities’ 
(Le Prestre 1997: 12).  As noted before, at this level I focus on identifying role prefer-
ences through examining national role conceptions with reference to Member States’ 
foreign and European policies. These are rooted in the states’ understanding of them-
selves, and in their conception of what they represent in the world (1997: 2). Research 
interviews, primary documents and secondary sources serve as primary material to in-
ductively identify role preference and role expectations. This data was themed accord-
ing to how the individual Member States saw their roles in the European and the inter-
national stage, as well as while in the chair of the Presidency. The expectations were 
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organised according to more general functional expectations held towards the institution 
of the Presidency itself and more individual expectations held towards the particular 
Member States in the chair. By comparing these expectations, I will evaluate if the hy-
brid nature of the Presidency continued in the post-Lisbon context.   
The meso-level focuses on daily practices and interactions between the Member States 
in the chair of the Presidency, and on the other actors involved in the European foreign 
policy making. The dynamic relationship between role making and institutional feed-
back is particularly relevant at this level in order to capture individual interaction during 
each of the Presidencies. This will be done by reviewing the relationship between role 
preference and role enactment in order to distinguish between the ideal type of the role 
and the actual behaviour. The data collected through document reviewing and inter-
views will serve as evidence for policy and decision-making processes and for unfold-
ing interactions taking place during the individual Presidencies by tracing the policy 
making process from the Presidency’s programme, through the EU’s agenda during the 
six-month Presidency and by analysing the content of WGs’ agenda focusing on the EU 
foreign policy making. The tracing of temporary sequences of events taking place dur-
ing the individual Presidencies and identifying the dynamics between the EU institu-
tions and other actors taking part in the EU system has allowed us to identify the func-
tional scope and inter-institutional position of Presidency within the new post-Lisbon 
system.  
The macro-level traces the development of the changing role of the Presidency across 
the individual Spanish, Belgian, Hungarian and Polish Presidencies, in order to capture 
the process of the ongoing institutionalisation. Assessing how other actors perceive the 
motives behind the individual role preferences and their subsequent behaviour while in 
the chair of the Presidency makes it possible to identify a new pattern of appropriate 
behaviour associated with the post-Lisbon Presidency. These assessments are mostly 
extracted from documents and speeches produced by the EU and international officials 
and experts. They are analysed by extracting interpretations on individual Presidencies’ 
performance and their impact on the emerging post-Lisbon system. It is important to 
highlight that all of these levels come into existence with each other through continuous 
relationships as presented in the model.   
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In its positivist version, process-tracing allows shifting from correlation to causation by 
taking ‘the causal mechanism inherent in hypotheses seriously and analysing in detail 
whether a particular pathway, triggered by an independent variable, was indeed causing 
a particular event’ (Panke 2012: 136). As argued by Beach and Pedersen, by applying a 
process-tracing approach the focus should be on identifying causal mechanisms ‘in or-
der to open the black box of causality as much as possible’ (Bunge 1997, cited in Beach 
& Pedersen 2013: 39). This means opening up the ‘black box’ of the institutional 
change. George and Bennett define causal mechanisms as ‘ultimately unobservable 
physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities 
operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or 
matter to other entities’ (2005: 137). Yet, it is necessary to adjust this approach, and to 
shift towards a more interpretivist one. As highlighted by Guzzini, interpretivist process 
tracing starts with ‘the understanding of international events, not with the events them-
selves’ (2013: 4). In the case of this research, the national interpretation of the change 
brought by the Lisbon Treaty as developed by the individual Member States. Thus, pro-
cess-tracing becomes narration in search of patterns (Gysen et al. 2006), as narratives 
offer ‘a clear sequential order that connects events in a meaningful way’ (Hinchman and 
Hinchamn 1997: xvi). 
Since this research project aims to capture the changing role of the Presidency, the first 
four Presidencies are analysed and compared in order to identify any emerging patterns 
of behaviour and functions that are shared among the subsequent Member States in the 
chair. Therefore, the main research method is a comparative case study approach. The 
choice of the subsequently held Presidencies was aimed to address the potential prob-
lem of biased selection. However due to the timing factor, as this research project’s em-
pirical phase started in December 2010, the primary method in case of the first two 
Presidencies were the qualitative content analysis of the secondary sources comple-
mented by a limited number of research interviews. In the case of the two latter Presi-
dencies, the primary data was collected through interviewing of the national, European 
and international officials involved in the Presidency’s management and the EU policy 
making system during the year of 2011. The available primary and secondary sources 
served as a cross-checking material to provide a greater validity of the findings. Thus, 
there is a difference between the data collection for the first two and the subsequent two 
Presidencies. Yet, in order to trace the Presidency’s role institutionalisation it was nec-
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essary to include the first two Presidencies which took place in 2010. The choice of 
Spain, Belgium, Hungary and Poland has additional research benefits. Following the 
EU’s adopted pattern for the rotating Presidency, this selection covers big and small, old 
and new, and in geographical terms diversely located Member States. Such an approach 
will potentially allow this project to account for various intervening variables such as 
the size of the country, its traditional interests, previous experience of Presidency hold-
ing and the level of socialisation. As argued above, since the focus of this research is the 
period of the implementation of formal provisions, the case studies available for re-
search are limited. By focusing on the period of the aftermath of the institutional 
change, this project aims to undertake an in-depth analysis of the behaviour of individu-
al Member States, yet will still be capable of identifying more general pattern of the 
Presidency’s role in European foreign policy making. By mapping the functions devel-
oped by each of the Member States such as Spain, Belgium, Hungary and Poland, it will 
be possible to identify which of the functions were identified across all of these Member 
States and if and which functions were introduced by individual Presidencies. Analys-
ing the period of the chairmanship for the individual Member States will make it possi-
ble to identify the institutional capacity and the position of the Presidency at a given 
time. The subsequent comparison across four Presidencies will result in assessing what 
the influence of individual Member States, was namely on the emerging role of the 
Presidency in the area of European foreign policy making. 
3.5.2 Research Material and Data Collection 
 
Process-tracing is based on the gathered diagnostic evidence within the process under 
study, and usually comprises a temporal sequence of events. This is done in this project 
by looking for the observable implications of the proposed model and by analysing if 
the observed evidence is in line with the specified explanations (Bennett 2010: 208). As 
required by the method of process-tracing, I collected extensive evidence in the form of 
primary and secondary data. The thesis mostly uses secondary sources for the purpose 
of presenting the contemporary research on the subject of the Presidency and with refer-
ence to the employed theoretical approaches. Further research has been conducted on 
the role of the Presidency in the post-Lisbon context and as well as with the reference to 
the individual presidencies of Spain, Belgian, Hungary and Poland. As pointed out ear-
lier the Spanish and Belgian Presidencies were primarily analysed through the analysis 
of academic and policy-oriented research while in the case of the Polish and Hungarian 
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Presidencies these were the secondary sources of data collection complementing the ex-
tensive expert interviewing. These pieces of research will be used as both guiding and 
cross-checking material. 
Primary sources include a selection of governmental publications and documents at na-
tional and European levels.
22
 Their selection was guided by reviewing documentation of 
institutions at the national, European and international level potentially involved in 
management of the Presidency and EU foreign policy making. Any documents referring 
to the Presidency’s role conception, to the actual Presidency’s performance while in the 
chair, to the Presidency’s assessments and describing accounts of EU foreign policy 
making during the 2-year old period (2010-2011) were included in the preliminary 
analysis. This was mostly a result of the extensive literature review undertaken at the 
initial stage of the research. Some of the institutions and particular documents were 
pointed out by interviewees. At the domestic level, the analysis of relevant documents 
includes, in particular, documents from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and other rele-
vant offices, REPER, and the office of the PM. At the EU level, the focus will be on the 
EU Council, its WGs and committees (particularly the FAC, other working groups and 
bodies relating to foreign affairs, COREPER II), and other European institutions taking 
part in foreign policy making, particularly the HRVP, POTEC, SGC, and the emerging 
EEAS. In general, where it was possible, the preference was expressed towards the Eng-
lish version of the documents; otherwise, the translation was conducted by the research-
er with particular reference to the relevant parts of the documents and interviews. The 
qualitative analysis of data was guided by themes identified in the model of role institu-
tionalisation.  
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 At the national level the selection of documents included: the discussion papers on the Presidency’s 
priorities and reports following consultation with relevant stakeholders published by the Member 
States' governments and its relevant ministries and agencies; the policy papers referring to the 
Presidency’s priorities and its role; the transcripts of Parliamentary debates; the drafts and  official 
Presidencies’ programmes; the Presidency’s statements and final concluding reports; the press releases 
and speeches issued mostly by the office of the Prime Minister and the MFA, and other relevant 
officials. At the European level, the selection included the transcripts of the WGs taking place during the 
European Convention; the reports issued or commissioned by the Secretariat General of the CEU; the 
CEU’s decision and regulation implementing the provisions of the LT; other documents produced by the 
Secretariat General of the CEU such as the Presidency’s handbooks, Rules of Procedure. Moreover, the 
analysis included the European institutions by analysing European Council's conclusions; the debate 
transcripts taking place in the European Parliament; press releases, statements and speeches referring 
to the LT’s provisions, the Presidency role in foreign affairs and the post-Lisbon foreign policy making 
system issued by the officials of the European Commission, the EEAS, the European Parliament, the 
office of the HRVP and officials from other relevant European agencies. The final analysis focused on the 
secondary sources such as academic papers, journal articles and policy papers published by think tanks 
and research institutes on the Presidency’s role in particular with reference to foreign affairs. 
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Due to the specific nature of foreign policy, the access to these documents is heavily 
limited. As noted by Bunse ‘CEU meetings are held behind closed doors and the details 
of Presidency confessionals are not recorded’ (2009: 15). In order to provide a more in-
depth understanding of the subject, a complementary research method is introduced: 
elite and expert interviewing. Extensive data was obtained from semi-structured inter-
views conducted with the civil staff and officials involved in the Spanish, Belgian, 
Hungarian and Polish Presidencies both at the level of staff working in Brussels at 
REPERs and at the level of national capitals in MFAs, as well as with officials working 
at European institutions: the EEAS, Commission and the cabinets of POTEC and 
HRVP. The interviews were semi-structured in order to ensure the sufficient level of 
comparability across various case studies (Travers 2001, Gilham 2000). Open-ended 
and general questions were included in order to allow interviewees to explore the sub-
ject, and thus present a more informal dimension of the policy making process (Rich-
ards 1999). In general, the questions aimed at exploring the attitudes and perceptions of 
the actors towards the role of the Presidency as well as at assessments of these Presi-
dencies with regard to the appropriate behaviour.  Most of the interviews were recorded 
otherwise the extensive notes were taken. All of the interviews were conducted under 
the rule of anonymity for ‘background information’. In case some particular quotations 
were chosen to be used in the thesis, the permission of the interviewee was ensured and 
used under the term agreed by both parties. Recording the interviews ensured its accura-
cy, nevertheless when the researcher felt that the interviewee would withhold some in-
formation, hand written notes were taken instead. 
Interviews are a few of the most commonly used sources of evidence from respondents 
who actually participated in the case under investigation (Beach & Pedersen 2013:134). 
Elite and expert interviewing has become the most widespread and useful method of 
information gathering with the reference to exploring the EU policy making process. It 
allows the access of information during closed discussions and meetings, the details of 
the negotiations between Member States as well the content of relevant documents 
where their access is restricted. Moreover, they provide information that makes it possi-
ble to explain particular behaviour and the perceptions of this behaviour held by various 
actors. The interviews were conducted in English except for the interviews conducted 
with the officials involved in the Polish Presidency. The transcriptions of the latter ones 
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were done in Polish, and only parts relevant for the research were translated by the re-
searcher into English. 
One of the biggest drawbacks of elite interviewing is that officials’ account might be 
distorted by their memory or deliberately being misrepresented to promote a particular 
vision held. The process of exercising the CEU chairmanship is usually a very prestig-
ious event for the Member State and thus, its officials have a particular feeling of the 
ownership, which is why they might attempt to influence the researcher in order to por-
tray their preferred vision of their time in the office. In order to address these issues the 
researcher aimed at conducting interviews at the various stages, before and during the 
exercise of the Presidency, and in the shortest possible time after the Presidency was 
concluded to achieve the most accurate account and perceptions of the events. It was 
however quickly discovered that while the interviewees conducted before and during 
the Presidency were useful in identifying other potential interviewees and relevant doc-
uments the fact that the officials were ‘already playing the role’ limited the usefulness 
of collected data with reference to the research questions. The most useful data was col-
lected by interviewing officials upon the completion of the Presidency. The interviews 
reference code provides the necessary information on the context of the interviewee, 
namely his/her national or/and institutional affiliations and the date the interview was 
conducted. For example, the code ESa/12.2010 refers to an official involved in the 
Spanish Presidency based in the CFSP Unit who was interviewed in December 2010. If 
all of the interviewees indicated the same theme or confirm the same event the reference 
code simply states ‘research interviews’. The latter ‘a’ identify this person as a first per-
son from the Spanish Presidency to be interviewed for this project.
23
 
The initial group of interviewees were chosen on the basis of their relevance to the re-
search questions rather than representativeness. The interviewees were chosen on the 
basis of their involvement and access to the chosen Presidencies and/or the European 
foreign policy making system within the project’s timeline. The initial selection covered 
national and European officials in charge of the themes relating to the foreign policy 
and the Presidency. The in-depth interviews were structured along overarching themes 
of the changing role of the Presidency, the difference between interpretation of the Pres-
idency’s role and the subsequent performance of the individual Member States and the 
impact this performance could have on the emerging post-Lisbon system. After tran-
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 The interview schedule and the list of interviewees are included in Appendix I. 
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scribing the interviews, the data was organised and coded along these themes and com-
pared between the four Presidencies. Such an approach allowed to ask the officials di-
rectly about their interpretations which are the focus of the interpretative research, how-
ever as pointed out earlier it also resulted in potential biases of how events were pre-
sented. In order to account for potential bias, as the information gathered during the in-
terviews were subjective and mostly focused on individual interpretations of events, I 
attempted to include selections of Member States, representatives EU institutions and 
other actors involved in the EU system.  
By applying different data-collection methods, and interviewing officials across various 
nationalities and institutions, it has been possible to compare and cross-check the gath-
ered information. Additional insights were provided by interviewing experts who work 
on the subject of the inter-institutional relations in the post-Lisbon European foreign 
policy in think tanks and research institutes based in Brussels and national capitals. The 
technical arrangements for these interviews followed the previously outlined arrange-
ments for the elite interviewing. These empirical findings were subsequently compared 
with the recent academic studies and policy orientated of the Presidency in order to test 
for the reliability of the collected findings. After the initial observation that the access to 
potential interviewees was restricted, the researcher decided to undertake a visiting re-
search stay at two think tanks, the Centre for the European Policy Studies in Brussels 
(September 2011 – March 2012) and the Polish Institute of International Affairs in War-
saw (April – June 2012), in order to facilitate contacts with relevant policy makers and 
experts. The subsequent interviewing appointments were achieved by employing the 
‘snowball technique’ which proved to be particularly useful in identifying and accessing 
interviewees who would otherwise have not been considered due to their more informal 
engagement in the process. Consequently, the triangulation of data sources also helped 
with a potential problem of a biased view. As noted by Hammersley ‘an account is valid 
or true if it represents accurately those features of the phenomena, that it is intended to 
describe, explain or theorise’ ((1987:69). Using various data sources, namely documents 
and interviews’ transcripts, allows us to capture difference in interpretation between 
various actors involved in the EU system. Thus, the combination of primary and sec-
ondary sources and the material obtained during the research interviews allowed for 
crosschecking and comparing the information gathered among different national and 
institutional affiliations. 
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The research also follows the academic standards of the ethical considerations. Firstly, 
the anonymity of the interviewees was maintained by ensuring that no one could be in-
dividually identifiable and the agreement was obtained with reference to how the indi-
vidual interviewees would be cited within the text. Prior to conducting interviewees, the 
potential participants were informed of the purpose of the research project and the main 
uses to which research materials will be put. Finally, the interview transcripts and inter-
view notes have been kept and can be accessed upon request. 
The aim of this chapter was to offer an alternative framework which would be more ca-
pable of capturing the research puzzle of institutional change as both depending on ex-
ogenous formal changes and subsequent informal inter-institutional adaptation emerg-
ing in due course of the formal implementation. Such an approach would enable to open 
‘the black box’ of the internal process of the institutional change. I argued that the pre-
vious role of scholarship might be adjusted to capture the institutional change of the 
post-Lisbon Presidency. As role theory already proved successful in resolving the agen-
cy-structure dichotomy in FPA, capturing the complex, hybrid nature of the Presidency 
(Elgström 2006) and explaining variations between individual Presidencies’ perfor-
mance (Leal 2010) it seems to be well-equipped to providing analytically relevant as-
sumptions for capturing the changing role of the Presidency. Moreover, it also offers an 
answer to the recent institutionalist attempts to conceptualise interactions of purposive 
but institutionally embedded actors in the process of institutional change. 
Consequently, the proposed role-based model of role institutionalisation enables to trace 
the process of institutionalisation of the Presidency’s role as a result of the interaction 
between the structure (formal provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, role expectations of the 
involved EU actors, namely Member States and European institutions, and other inter-
national actors) and the agents (role preferences held by the Member State in the chair). 
During the period of structural change, the agency is more dependent on its own percep-
tion of the emerging role set and thus, the role will be more dependent on its original 
role preference. The latter, and in particular the sources of this role preference, namely 
the national role conceptions of foreign and European policies, will have influence on 
the Member State’s behaviour while in the chair of the Presidency; thus influencing the 
overall new role of the Presidency and the development of the role prescription which 
sets a long-term scenario. 
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As set in the proposed model (Figure 6), institutional expectations, namely the formal 
legal provisions, constitute one of the sources of the Member States’ role preferences 
towards the role of the Presidency in the emerging post-Lisbon context. In this chapter, 
I will focus on the LT's provisions related to this subject. Due to the limited availability 
of direct references to the role of the Presidency in EU foreign affairs, it is necessary to 
analyse provisions referring to the newly established institutions of the POTEC and 
HRVP, as these are now officially expected to perform functions earlier associated with 
the Presidency. The analysis is extended to include the relevant Council's legislation 
setting further procedures for the post-Lisbon policy making system.  
 
The LT, being a result of the political compromise between the supporters and 
opponents of the Council rotating system, did not provide a clear role prescription for 
the Presidency. Drawing on the argument of 'incomplete contracting' I argue that vague 
provisions brought about the period of the subsequent institutional adaptation which, to 
a large extent, has been influenced by a changing political context. The failed attempt to 
introduce the Constitutional Treaty, and the ongoing economic crisis affected this 
period by triggering increasing intergovernmentalism in EU policy making. The 
political and economic contexts will be further discussed in the subsequent sections.  
Furthermore, the general tendency to ensure permanent management over EU foreign 
affairs has been undermined by the fact that the Presidency’s functions have been 
maintained in some of the policy areas, for example trade, development, and energy. 
This ensured management for some of the Council’s WGs and preparatory bodies and 
thus provided the Presidency with some functional scope in the EU foreign affairs. This 
functional scope further influenced the complex structure of the post-Lisbon system of 
EU foreign affairs that has developed as a result of the interaction between areas under 
both European and national management. As a result, a set of 'unintended consequences' 
developed which further affected the Presidency's role. This chapter thus aims not only 
to analyse the formal provisions referring to particular actors involved in the new post-
Lisbon, but also seeks to provide a wider context for the implementation of the LT. The 
first section will examine reasons behind the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the 
implications for the adoption of a new Treaty.  
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4.1 The Rejection of the Constitutional Treaty 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
While finalising the Nice Treaty in 2001 the Member States already agreed that further 
institutional reforms would have to be envisaged to make the enlarged EU work more 
efficiently. This was formalised in the Nice Declaration, an annex to the Treaty. 
Previous reforms of the EU treaties had been designed during IGCs; however, this 
particular one was to focus on a deeper and wider debate about the future of the EU, and 
thus its legal framework was to ensure the most extensive member participation at the 
earliest possible stage (Laursen 2012). During the EC’s meeting in Laeken in December 
2001 the Member States agreed, in attempt to ensure more transparency and inclusion, 
that the recommendations for the change of the Treaty would be the result of a 
convention (Piris 2010). The European Convention was set up in 2002 under the 
leadership of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the former French president. A broad mandate 
issued for the Convention was to ensure a comprehensive approach to the functioning of 
the EU (Piris 2010). The problem of institutional re-designing, in particular with 
reference to EU external affairs, quickly emerged as the most contentious and laborious 
one (SGCa/05.2012). One of the first arguments were that a more effective and efficient 
European foreign policy requires a stronger structure at the European level in order to 
provide a comprehensive and coherent approach over the EU’s external relations. Thus, 
it was argued that the rotating system of the Council’s Presidency should be replaced 
with a more permanent one. Among the main criticisms of the thus far rotating system 
were firstly the lack of consistency and continuity of the Council’s work, changes in the 
agenda to reflect the national focus of a particular state in the chair and finally the lack 
of sufficient resources of the small Member States (Piris 2010: 206, also see Laursen 
2012, Craig 2010 and Bunse 2009).  
 
Due to the sensitivity of the EU foreign affairs management, there was no particular 
group set up for institutional affairs; it was dealt with within the Working Group VII 
‘External Action’ and at the highest level of the Convention, namely the Preasidium. It 
comprised of the Member States’ representatives and the President of the Convention 
himself (Priris 2010: 26). Already, during the first meetings of the WG on ‘External 
Action’, in September and October 2002, it was noted that some kind of a merger 
between the position of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (HR) and the Commissioner for External Relations might ensure greater 
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coherence between various policy areas (SGCa/05.2012). The merger was further 
reflected in the joint paper presented in January 2003 by France and Germany. Their 
proposal called for a long-term presidency for the EC and a Commission’s president to 
be elected by the European Parliament (EP) (Norman 2003: 2). This was a compromise 
between France aiming for a strong President of the EC and for the HRVP not being 
part of the Commission, and Germany preferring a stronger HRVP institutionalised 
within the Commission and a less powerful manager rather than a political leader for the 
EC. Therefore, the HRVP’s vague job description was the result of the inability of these 
two major countries to decide on more a detailed solution (Piris 2010). This 
compromise was met with opposition from the small states as they feared that 
increasing the powers of the Council, and thus limiting those of the Commission, would 
generally reinforce the balance towards big Member States (Bunse 2009). The small 
states suggested in a counter proposal some limitations to the Presidency’s functions by 
transferring most of the executive tasks to the Commission (Crum and Coussens 2003). 
It quickly became apparent that the subject of the Presidency would emerge as one of 




The proceedings of the Group on ‘External Action’ furthered the idea of one position 
combining the functions of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External 
Affairs with the final proposal introducing the position of FM. This suggestion was 
challenged by the British representative and further supported by the representatives of 
Sweden, Spain and Ireland who questioned the appropriateness of the new FM to chair 
                                                          
24
 Another proposal presented by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in April was read as an attempt ‘to set up a 
directoire of the big Member States to run the Union by the integrationist supporters, namely small 
countries and the EP’s representatives’ (Norman 2003: 3). As cited by Norman:  ‘[d'Estaing’s] vision 
encompassed a Commission, which would be the highest authority of the Union, with a Council chair to 
prepare, chair and drive its work' (Ibid.). Such a  'Chairperson would be supported by a vice president, a 
FM and all three would be members of a EC board of seven which would also include two other 
members of the EC and the president of the Ecofin and justice and home affairs councils’ (Norman 2003: 
3). Consequently, this further strengthened the division between two main groups: the first one, 
favouring the intergovernmental approach to the EU foreign policy led by the British representative 
Peter Hain, and the second group headed by the German representative Peter Glotz advocating a 
gradual development towards communitarisation of CFSP (Grevi 2002). Peter Hain argued that 
‘communitarisation simply would not work because the credibility of the CFSP relies upon the Member 
States backing it up with their legitimacy, experience and resources, not on legislation from the 
Commission’ (Ibid.). As noted by Grevi this approach was supported by Spain whose representative Ana 
de Palacio stated ‘that CFSP does not have a legislative, but an executive character’ (Ibid). 
For further details on the discussions taking place during the meetings of the Working Group VII External 
Action see the minutes available at 
http://europeanconvention.eu.int/EN/doc_register/doc_register9713.html?lang=EN&Content=WGVII. 
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the Foreign Affairs and External Relations Council (Ibid.). Since the majority of the 
representatives expressed their support for the new position of the FM, this was 
included in the final draft. However, it was not envisaged as a simple merger, but 
instead the previous functions of the High Representative and the Commissioner would 
be attributed to the same person. This would enable this official to work in two work 
modes depending on the issue at stake (Grevi et al. 2002: 7). Such an approach was 
further reflected in the report of the WG on the ‘Legal Personality’, and their 
recommendations on abolishing the pillar structure and merging the distinctive legal 
personalities of the Union and of the Community into one (Grevi et al. 2002: 5).  
 
Subsequently, the focus of the IGC in 2004 was centred on the institutional issues 
regarded as the most complex ones (Piris 2010: 19). As noted by Piris, the fact that the 
final Treaty with additional protocols amounted to 400 pages indicates the Member 
States’ will to ‘control exactly how many competences they confer on the EU and to 
limit in precise manner, according to the subject matter concerned, how much power 
they confer on the EU institutions to exercise these competences’ (2010: 21-22). Even 
though the Treaty was referred to as ‘the Constitutional Treaty’ it would not transfer 
any additional national powers to the EU levels; rather, the name was supposed to 
indicate that it was a ‘major political innovation’ (Piris 2010: 23).The final proposal, 
aiming for ‘One Treaty, One Legal Personality and One Pillar’ (Piris 2010: 21), was 
rejected in the aftermath of the referendums in the Netherlands and France in 2005. 
Even though the structural changes were not the main reasons for these rejections, a 
new approach called for abandoning the Constitutional Treaty (Barbé 2010: 58), and for 
launching necessary institutional reforms under a more modest heading of the previous 
Treaties. The failure of the Constitutional Treaty stopped the federalist ambitions from 
making any substantial changes in the European decision making process 
(SGCa/05.2012).  
 
Following the two-year 'reflection period' after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, 
further attempts were intensified under the German Presidency which aimed to ensure 
the ambitious operational provisions in place by stripping the constitutional character 
(Piris 2010). Consequently, the LT was ratified in October 2007 and yet again rejected 
in the referendum in Ireland in June 2008. Following the additional consultations and 
packages for Ireland, the second referendum held in October 2009 was successful, and 
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started the formal implementation phase. Strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness 
of European foreign policy was seen as key in providing the organisation with a more 
influential position in world affairs. As noted by Howorth (2009), ‘of the sixty-two 
amendments [introduced by the LT] no fewer than twenty-five concern CFSP/CSDP’. 
Duke (2008) pointed out, however, that these resolutions had already been agreed on at 
the stage of the European Convention There was little difference between the LT and 
the Constitutional Treaty. This can be best illustrated by the fact that perhaps the most 
substantial difference between them, in terms of foreign policy structure, was changing 
the name of the position from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the High 
Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. However, while the 
Constitutional Treaty dealt with the external relations under a single and unified section, 
in the LT issues referring to the external relations were divided: while the section V 
TFEU deals with the external action, provisions on the CFSP are outlined in the TEU. 
As noted by Craig, this division 'reflects a difference of emphasis between the 
Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty', as the current approach of 'keeping greater 
distance' underlines the distinctiveness of the CFSP's intergovernmental approach 
(2010: 381). 
 
In an attempt to provide a comprehensive approach towards the post-Lisbon EU, 
External Action has integrated a number of different policy areas, such as common 
commercial policy, cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid, restrictive 
measures, international agreements, association agreements and EU delegations with 
international organizations, third countries and union delegations (Craig 2010).  Among 
the main changes introduced by the LT that had major impact on the foreign policy 
making of the EU was giving the organisation a legal personality. Duke (2008) and 
Howorth (2009) both viewed this step as a chance to enhance the EU’s status in 
international relations. However, as noted by Richard Whitman, the LT aimed at 
‘remodelling the wider foreign policy’ (2008: 2). This was to be done by focusing on 
restructuring the existing institutional architecture rather than changing the very nature 
of the EU foreign policy. This new system of policy making will be further addressed in 
the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
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4.2 The Post-Lisbon Institutional System of European Foreign Policy 
 
The subsequent part of the chapter will offer some preliminary introduction to the 
concept of the Presidency’s role and position in the aftermath of the implementation of 
the LT’s provisions. The aim of the analysis is to define the functions and the position 
of the Presidency in the wider EU institutional framework. As argued by the authors of 
the Joint CEPS, Egmont and EPC Study ‘… the LT now assigns virtually no role in the 
domain of external action [to the rotating Presidency]’ (2010: 142). The previously 
single institution of the Council Presidency has been split into three: the two-and-half-
year permanent EC’s presidency headed by the POTEC, the five-year permanent 
presidency of the FAC by the HRVP and the six-month rotating Presidency headed by 
the subsequent Member States. This reform was seen as a necessary solution to the main 
shortcomings of the Presidency system, such as ‘counter-productivity’ and being the 
‘symbol of internal incoherence, generalised confusion, erratic policy-shifts, and 
external incomprehension’ (Howorth 2009). 
 
As argued earlier, the LT did not produce a clear role prescription for the Presidency in 
EU foreign affairs. Its role, or rather the lack of a clearly specified role, can be 
interpreted by looking at the functions attributed to the newly created institutions.  Art. 
15 TEU transfers functions previously associated with the Presidency; those of chairing, 
preparing, managing and representing the EC internally vis-à-vis other institutions and 
externally in the hands of the POTEC. POTEC’s main task is to ‘identify the Union's 
strategic interests, determine the objectives and define general guidelines for the 
common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications' 
(Art. 26 TEU). Furthermore, under the new leadership, the EC is supposed to 'adopt the 
necessary decisions' (Ibid.) and thus become the main decision making body. It is also 
responsible for the external representation of the EU ‘without prejudice to the powers of 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (art. 15.6 
TEU). The effectiveness of the latter would depend on the practical division of labour 
between the POTEC and HRVP. 
 
On a daily basis, EU foreign affairs are to be managed by the HRVP (Art. 18 TEU) 
presiding over the FAC (art. 18.3 TEU).  Further articles empower the HRVP with the 
agenda setting powers and tasked this official with the preparations and the 
implementation of decisions related to foreign affairs (art. 27 TEU). The HRVP is also 
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responsible for representing the EU externally, and for ensuring consultation with the 
EP (art. 36 TEU). It is evident therefore that both the POTEC and the HRVP took over 
functions associated previously with the Presidency with reference to the EC and the 
practical conduct of EU foreign affairs. While this indicates again the Presidency’s 
removal from its previous positions within the new institutional architecture, as Piris 
(2010: 248) also acknowledged, the Presidency would maintain some of its functions in 
areas of shared competences, such as trade and development. Moreover, although the 
HRVP was tasked with ensuring the consistency of the Union external action (art 15.2 
TEU), this would also be dependent to some extent on the Presidency in the function of 
the chair of COREPPER II as well as the GAC with reference to the EC's strategically 
contribution. These areas would remain under the management of the Commission at 
the community level. Therefore, it became clear that the EU foreign affairs would 
develop into a complex system managed at both supranational and intergovernmental 
levels as illustrated in Figure 7. Finally, it must be noted that the LT has shifted the 
institutional balance within the EU foreign policy making by confirming greater powers 
of the EP in some of the external policies, for example expanding the procedure of co-
decision making to the EU commercial policy (ART. 207 TFEU), and ensuring the EP’s 
consent for international agreements (Art. 218 TFEU), thus ensuring its increasing role 
at the European stage. 
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Figure 7. The Post-Lisbon System of External Action according to Drieskens and 
van Schaik (2010)  
 
The emphasis on the CFSP’s intergovernmental character has been confirmed by 
maintaining its distinctiveness and thus by being ‘subject to specific rules and 
procedures’ (Art 24 TEU). This refers to the limited role of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ)
25
 and to the lack of regular legislative acts. This is further confirmed in 
                                                          
25
As noted by Sieberson the ECJ is only allowed to act if an issue refers to restrictive measures involving 
individuals and 'disputes over the interface of the Union's general authority and its specific authority 
relating to the CFSP' (2008: 180). In addition to this, the ECJ’s ruling is also applicable in determining the 
scope of the CFSP by 'deciding the questions of delimitation between areas (former pillars) (Barkan 202: 
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Art. 30 TEU that specifies that ‘any Member State, the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security  Policy, or the High Representative with the 
Commission’s support, may refer any question relating  to the common foreign and 
security policy to the CEU and may submit to it, respectively,  initiatives or proposals’ 
(art. 30 TEU). This enables agenda setting for the individual states. As argued by Piris 
(2010: 67) even though the LT removes the pillar structure, it preserves distinctive 
characteristics of the previously second pillar of EU foreign policy. As highlighted by 
new provisions added to the IGC’s mandate for the June’s 2007 meeting, the CFSP 
would be still maintained as a specific case and not included in the traditional three 
categories of exclusive, shared and supporting competences, which would set it 
somewhere between the national and European levels (Piris 2010: 74-76). Laursen 
points out that 'CFSP is mentioned separately as a competence without giving this 
competence a specific name' (2012: 8). Consequently, ‘the institutional specificities 
which characterised the second pillar [were] mostly preserved’ and ‘while the 
procedures and rule governing all other fields of action of the EU are described in the 
TFEU, those governing the CFSP are contained in the new TEU, thus further 
underlining the fact that CFSP will remain different from the other areas’ (Piris 2010: 
66). This ensured the securing of the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy 
making. 
 
The intergovernmental features were further secured by two declarations adopted on the 
basis of the British initiative: Declaration 13 reiterates that the institutional innovations ' 
do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States as they currently exist, for the 
formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of their national representation in 
third countries and international organisations'; Declaration 14 refers to the Security 
Council of the UN and  confirms that the new provisions 'do not give new powers to the 
Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the EP' (cited in 
Laursen 2012: 9). These declarations highlight therefore that on the one hand, some 
Members States were aiming for greater coordination and efficiency; on the other, they 
still opted to keep foreign policy at the intergovernmental level. Such tendencies might 
suggest the existence of more manoeuvring space for the Presidency in foreign policy 
making than what was originally designed in the LT. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
112).  The first one refers to co-called 'smarts sanctions' which might be applicable against terrorist (for 
details see Wouters et al. 2008).  
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As demonstrated above, the LT’s provisions stripped the Presidency of some of its 
formal functions, but failed, at the same time, to provide a clear division of labour in the 
area of European foreign policy. Further specifications were brought by two documents 
outlining the rules of procedure for the CEU (CEU 2009a) and the EC (EC 2009). The 
former put an emphasis on the Trio Presidency as the working method of the CEU 
chairmanship as ‘the Presidency of the Council, with the exception of the Foreign 
Affairs configuration shall be held by pre-established groups of three Member States for 
a period of 18 months’ (art. 1.1 2009a). 'The groups shall be made up on a basis of equal 
rotation among the Member States, taking into account their diversity and geographical 
balance within the Union' (art. 1.4 2009a). Such a group is ‘to hold the Presidency in 
turn for consecutive periods of 18 months taking into account the fact that there exist 
since 1 January 2007, in accordance with the Council's Rules of Procedure, a system of 
Council 18-month programmes agreed between the three Presidencies which hold office 
during the period concerned’ (Ibid.). The particular features of this chairmanship within 
the group can be determined by the group’s members (art. 2.3). This was further 
specified in the subsequent section stating: ‘each member of the group shall in turn 
chair for a six- month period all configurations of the Council, with the exception of the 
Foreign Affairs configuration. The other members of the group shall assist the Chair in 
all its responsibilities on the basis of a common programme. Members of the team may 
decide alternative arrangements among themselves’ (art. 1.2 2009a). This would 
indicate that subsequent three Presidencies included in one Trio could agree among 
themselves on different working arrangements, yet these arrangements were not further 
specified. Consequently, in the areas in which the Presidency's role was maintained it 
was limited by the mechanism of the Presidency Trio that fostered a more group-
approach. 
 
The chairmanship of COREPER and the newly established General Affairs Council 
(GAC) is confirmed upon the Presidency, and tasked with ‘ensuring consistency and 
continuity in the work of the different Council’s configurations in the framework of 
multiannual programmes in cooperation with the Commission’ (art. 3 2009a). The 
chairmanship of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is entrusted to a 
representative of the HRVP (art. 2 2009a). This decision, sets the practical rules for the 
chairmanship of the WGs in foreign affairs by splitting them into four categories: while 
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the first category, focusing on trade and development issues, was to be chaired by the 
Presidency, the second category of the geographic preparatory groups, the third 
category of the horizontal preparatory groups and the fourth category of the CSDP-
related preparatory bodies were all to be chaired by a representative of the HRVP 
(Annex II, 2009a).
26
 The latter provisions are subject to a transitional period as ‘for 
categories 3 and 4, the six-monthly Presidency shall continue to chair the preparatory 
bodies during a transitional period of up to six months after the adoption of the Council 
Decision on the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS)’ (Ibid.). For category 2, this transitional period shall last up to 12 months 
(Annex II, 2009a). Consequently, these provisions set a transitional period during which 
the Presidency was to continue with the pre-Lisbon role by filling in for the HRVP’s 
representatives. The latter would indicate, to some extent, the manifestation of the ‘path 
dependency’ of the development of the Presidency in the aftermath of ‘the critical 
juncture’ even if just transitional. Nevertheless, the role as the chairmanship of the 
Council’s preparatory groups would still had to be further specified with reference to 
some practical features. These specifications would be subject to the particular 
interpretations by the first Presidencies which, as argued earlier, would be to some 
extent dependent on the role expectations of other actors involved in the system. 
 
The EC's Rules of Procedure envisaged that 'preparation and continuity of the work of 
the European Council is to be ensured by the POTEC on the basis of the work of the 
General Affairs Council' (art 1.1 EC 2009). This might suggest that the country in the 
chair can be involved in the process of the EC's agenda setting through the GAC 
chairmanship. This chairmanship was further specified in article 3 with reference to the 
EC summits' agenda: ‘the President of the EC, in close cooperation with the member of 
the EC representing the country holding the six-monthly CEU Presidency and with the 
President of the Commission, shall submit an annotated draft agenda to the General 
Affairs Council’ (Art. 3.1 EU 2009). Finally, the Presidency should replace the POTEC 
in case of illness or death (art. 2.4 EU 2009).  The Presidency was also envisaged to 
perform the role of a deputy for the HRVP on a more daily basis (art. 2.5 CEU 2009b). 
Article 26 further elaborates on the HRVP's deputation, suggesting that the latter may 
be 'replaced by the member of that configuration representing the Member State holding 
the six-monthly Presidency of the Council' (CEU 2009a). However with reference to the 
                                                          
26
 See Annex II for the full list of working groups under the categories. 
CHAPTER IV The Formal Expectations towards the Post-Lisbon Role of the Presidency in 
European Foreign Policy Making 
119 
 
HRVP's representation before the EP 'the Foreign Affairs Council may also be 
represented (…) before European Parliament committees by senior officials of the 
European External Action Service or, where appropriate, of the General Secretariat' 
(Ibid.). Further cooperation between the Presidency and the POTEC and HRVP is 
ensured by a joint preparation of the Presidency's agenda as the draft agenda 'shall be 
prepared with the President of the Foreign Affairs Council with regard to that 
configuration's activities during that period (…) and in close cooperation with the 
Commission and the President of the European Council' (art. 2.6 CEU 2009a). 
 
The final document which set some structural sources for the Presidency’s role was a 
report issued by the Swedish Presidency on the EEAS. It aimed to set not only the 
functional scope and legal status for the EEAS, but also its composition and structure as 
well as available instruments and resources. The final part of this document focused on 
setting a timeline for the establishment of the new service. This referred mostly to the 
office of the HRVP as she/he would be responsible for presenting a proposal for the 
Council’s decision on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. The HRVP was to 
be ‘supported by a small preparatory team which should be composed of representatives 
of Member States, Commission and GSC’ (Swedish Presidency 2009: 10). Even though 
the Presidency was not directly mentioned in the document, it was expected that it 
would be substantially involved in the preparatory team, and would support the HRVP 
in the process of creating the EEAS (SGCa/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012). Thus, the 
Member States in the chair would be included in shaping the structure and formation of 
the EEAS. 
 
These rather general provisions have transferred the formal functions of a neutral 
broker, organisational manager, external and internal representative and leader to the 
portfolio of the new actors – the POTEC and the HRVP with reference to the EC and 
the FAC respectively. Therefore, the Presidency was stripped of some its previous 
official functions, while some were still maintained, even if more modest in terms of 
functional scope. These provisions provided some institutional expectations towards the 
new actors, the POTEC, HRVP and EEAS, and for the Presidency. Establishing the 
permanent chairmanship of the EC and the Council’s preparatory bodies dealing with 
foreign affairs was expected to result in more stable and thus coherent and efficient 
management of EU issues. Nevertheless, the subject of the EU’s external relations 
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remained a complex issue, combining various policy areas, in which some remained 
under the prerogative of the Presidency as presented below in Figure 8. As discussed in 
the subsequent section, the preliminary analysis highlights some possible unintended 
consequences of this complex system which might either constrain or empower the 
Member State in the chair, or indeed, might result in doing both.  
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Figure 8. Post-Lisbon System of European Foreign Policy Making 
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4.3 The Unintended Consequences of the Lisbon Treaty 
 
As argued before, due to the limited formal provisions, expectations towards the 
particular actors would have to emerge in due course of the implementation. The latter 
would result in unexpected formal and informal consequences, which would influence 
the emerging post-Lisbon system. The consequences involve, firstly, the shared 
management of the WGs and Council's bodies. The new position of the HRVP elected 
for a five-year term was aimed at strengthening foreign policy making by introducing 
coherence and coordination among two main institutions of the EU – the CEU and the 
Commission. The position has been described as double-hatted to illustrate the merging 
of two previous posts of High Representative for CFSP and that of External Relations 
Commissioner (e.g. Howorth 2009, Wessels and Bopp 2008, Avery 2007). (Devuyst 
(2012) even suggested that it might be triple-hatted if we consider the chairmanship of 
the FAC as a separate job. Conducting foreign policy at two different pillars – the 
Community pillar at the stage of the Commission, and the intergovernmental pillar at 
the stage of the EC and CEU – had been seen as one of the main reasons for the 
incoherent EU performance. The Treaty left room for further possible confusion, as the 
previous General Affairs and External Relations Council was split into two separate 
councils: the FAC to be chaired by the HRVP, and the GAC by the Presidency, thus 
breaking the hitherto chain of command (Kaczyński and Byrne 2011). Moreover, two 
major diplomatic committees have been similarly split between the HRVP (Political and 
Security Committee) and the Presidency (COREPER II), raising the problem of possible 
competition and lack of coordination between these two actors (Hughes 2008). 
 
 The second relevant unintended consequence was the lack of a formal role for the PM 
and FM of the country in the chair of the Presidency. The EC’s Rules of Procedure 
mentions ‘the Head of State of the Country Holding the Presidency’ in terms of 
rapporteuring, ‘which entails him/her to present Presidency’s priorities at the beginning 
and results at the end to the EP’ (Art. 4 2009b). Paul noted that already back in 2009 
both the Czech Republic and Sweden noted the potential lack of any role in foreign 
policy for the Presidency (2008: 21). Paul argued further that ‘Member States weren’t 
fully aware of the scope of their decision: the abolition of any prominent role for the 
two top figures of the government holding the Presidency’ (2008: 21). In more general 
terms, this also refers to the role of FMs as being excluded from the EC deliberations, 
which seriously diminished their role. Additionally, it soon became apparent that a full 
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implementation of the provision would not be possible until the new institutional 
architecture would be fully operational, namely until the EEAS would be functional to 
enable full logistic and content-related support for the HRVP. The role for the Member 
State in the chair would be substantially greater for the transitional period. 
 
As argued by many researchers, the evaluation of the new positions would be heavily 
dependent on the personalities that would be in charge of them (Duke 2008, Whitman 
2008, Howorth 2009). This would suggest that the particular role performance of 
individual actors could be influenced by the development of the new role prescriptions 
as well as the system itself, and this influence points to the possible process of role 
making. The process of deciding who should fill in the position of the POTEC and 
HRVP turned out to be ‘a complex behind the scene deal among big Member States’ 
(SGCa/05.2012). Howorth (2009) had argued even before the formal process of 
appointment started that ‘[t]he unfortunate aspect of the appointment procedure is that, 
instead of outstanding individuals simply being selected because of their recognised 
qualities, there will be a series of horse-trades between different constituencies, thereby 
rendering the outcome almost impossible to predict’. As argued by the authors of the 
Joint CEPS, Egmont and EPC Study, the final choice was the result of ‘the curious 
process of making appointments in the Union, based largely on a process of 
elimination’ (2010: 65). They also noted that these appointments were met with a sense 
of disappointment as neither Herman van Rompuy nor Catherine Ashton were regarded 
as charismatic personalities capable of exerting strong supranational leadership.
27
As 
further suggested by Hughes (2008), this choice could be seen as an attempt by the 
countries to remain in greater control of the EU and to leave European foreign policy in 
the sphere of intergovernmental cooperation rather than risk it  moving EU foreign 
policy making to the Community level. Finally, the LT did not remove the rule of 
unanimity
28
 in the European foreign policy, and the expectation that the Member States 
should seek, rather to be formally required to pursue, a common approach. No formal 
sanctions have been introduced if the States opt for a performance that undermines the 
EU common approach (Whitman 2008). 
                                                          
27
 As argued by Jean-Louis Bourlages, the expert on European affairs: ‘Europe’s leaders are very happy 
with their choice, as the appointments of two complete nonentities to take charge of their shared home 
fully satisfies their ego and strengthens personal legitimacy’ (cited in the Joint CEPS, Egmont and EPC 
Study 2010: 66). 
28
 The qualified majority voting is still limited to only a few cases - for details see Whitman, 2008. 
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All changes triggered by the LT in the area of foreign policy making were aimed at 
providing a more streamlined, coherent and unified process of decision and policy 
making, so the EU can act according to its rhetorical declarations. However, Berman 
(2010) explains that the LT has set a rather broad framework, leaving extensive space 
for further interpretation. An example for LT’s lack of specificity is that both the 
position of POTEC and that of HRVP were only provided with general specifications 
regarding their roles and functions. Moreover, the role of being external representative 
of the EU has been attributed to both institutions, creating possible space for over-
representation and conflict between these two main actors (Hughes 2008). The 
resolutions referring to the new EEAS were particularly left to broad interpretation 
when they enabled the HRVP to confirm the details in due course of the establishment 
of the service. According to Avery (2007), the lack of instructions was an attempt to 
provide the new structure with flexibility so it would be able to adapt to practical needs 
in due course of its development. Duke (2008) suggests, however, that leaving the 
provisions in the form of sketches was due to the sensitive nature of foreign policy in 
the sense that it is still seen as the overwhelmingly national issue. The process of 
implementing the Treaty’s resolutions into practical solutions would thus depend on the 
implementing agents and their particular interpretation. 
 
These ambiguities failed to introduce a clear upgrade for the European foreign policy 
and the changes have been largely criticised as not sufficient. As the joint report by 
CEPS, Egmont and EPC argued, even though the Treaty had upgraded the role of the 
EC and thus weakened the Commission, it did not provide a clear shift to 
intergovernmentalism. On the more supranational side, it ‘recognises the international 
legal personality of the Union, strengthens the powers of the EP, and increases the 
possibilities of majority voting’ (Joint CEPS, Egmont and EPC Study 2010: 22). The 
fact that the POTEC would not be a member of any of the national governments might 
also indicate ‘a step away from pure intergovernmentalism’ (Ibid.). Additionally, ‘the 
HRVP in her role as Vice-President of the Commission undermines its independence,  
because she has been appointed by the European Council, and is intimately engaged 
with Member States interests in her other role as Chair of the FAC and as important 
anticipant in the EC' (cited in Craig 2010: 426-7). However, the implementation of the 
LT was never seen as a manner of ‘radically [changing] the EU behaviour or 
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performance on the world stage’ (Howorth 2009). The changes that the LT instigated 
were agreed to ‘constitute a statement, a framework, and a mechanism, which should 
permit and encourage ever greater coordination and even integration of the EU foreign, 
security and eventually defence policy’ (Howorth 2009). As Gardner and Stuart (2010) 
further confirm: ‘The LT may not compensate for strongly divergent views or a lack of 
political will among the EU countries [, b]ut it will promote coherence and effectiveness 
when consensus is possible’. Consequently, the recent changes provided an additional 
structural framework for fostering cooperation among Member States, however, with 
the emphasis on ensuring the key intergovernmental features, no changes were 
attempted at the ideational level. Thus the reform did not aim at transforming the EU’s 
identity towards more supranational characteristics.  
 
4.4 The Post-Lisbon Presidency – Towards a New Path? 
 
Between 1950 and 2010, the Presidency emerged as a central institution in the European 
system of policy making. As pointed out by Westlake and Galloway the pre-Lisbon 
‘Presidency has alerted almost beyond recognition over the five decades, not only in 
terms of competences and tasks but also in terms of demands on resources’ (2006: 325). 
Its flexible nature, based on the EU’s intergovernmentalism, enabled the functions to 
expand quickly in an informal manner as a response to the increasing institutional 
demand. Thus, its agenda developed in response to the expectations of other actors. 
Some of these expectations were institutionalised in the subsequent European 
documents, and some continued as informally associated powers. The Presidency thus 
became a source of political leadership informally associated with the pursuit of 
national interest. Even with the increasing communitarization of the Presidency’s 
functions, the institution continued as a window of opportunity for countries in the chair 
to promote national priorities by developing more the informal side of the Presidency’s 
functions. The informal resources and practices enabled maximising agenda setting and 
influence capacity of the country in the chair to focus the EU agenda on nationally 
important priorities. 
 
I argue that the LT introducing the greater supranational management of EU foreign 
affairs while preserving its distinctive intergovernmental features allows the Presidency 
to maintain its hybrid nature. Even though the LT institutionalised to a large extent the 
communitarization of the function in the area of foreign policy, it is yet to be seen 
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whether the Presidency continue with its thus far informal and flexible development 
which would allow it to adapt to the changing institutional setting, or its role would 
decrease, leaving all of the functions, both formal and informal, up to the new 
permanent chairmen. As argued before, the lack of clear role prescriptions would 
indicate the importance of the subsequent adaptation of limited and ambiguous 
provisions to practical working arrangements; the latter would be further affected by 
particular political European and international context.  
 
The rejection of the position of the first EU FM was read by some as the result of a lack 
of agreement towards moving the whole EU (and in particular the area of foreign 
affairs) to the level of supranational governance under the Community method. The 
change of the title for the new position to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy was to demonstrate acknowledgment and acceptance of these 
concerns and guarantee the intergovernmental character of EU foreign policy. Changing 
the name but leaving the same functions demonstrates the expectation of countries that 
European foreign policy needs stronger institutional structure to ensure coherence, 
efficiency and better coordination (research interviews). Thus, even the Member States 
advocating the maintenance of the rotating system understood the potential benefit of 
having a more long term chairmanship of foreign affairs. Therefore, it was generally 
acknowledged that the Presidency would stop being the main actor in European foreign 
policy making. However, it was also acknowledged that it would be difficult to remove 
this position from the system entirely (research interviews). Thus, it was stated that the 
Presidency should be less active and leave the leadership to the new actors, but it was 
still reasonable to expect that the country in the chair would aim to promote some of the 
national priorities (SGCb/05.2012, ESa/12.2010, ESc/12.2010 and HUa/07.2011). ‘This 
might become an issue, and result in ‘turf wars so the Presidency must be really careful 
how to go about this’ (SGCa/05.2012). As one of the interviewees acknowledged, ‘we 
had to see how it all could work in practice, it was difficult to have clear expectations at 
the beginning of 2010; however, what is clear is that Member States are not ready to 
conduct common foreign policy at the Community level’ (SGCa/05.2012). 
Consequently, the increasing pressure towards ensuring further coherence, consistency 
and efficiency of the EU foreign policy system would have to be confined within the 
overwhelmingly intergovernmental expectations of Member States. 
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Furthermore, the process of filling in the positions of the POTEC and HRVP further 
demonstrated the countries’ attitudes toward interpretation of the LT provisions. The 
fact that both Herman von Rompuy and Catherine Ashton were perceived as consensus-
orientated leaders, would suggest that they would not seek to enforce strong leadership 
at the supranational level. Toby Vogel argued as early as in December 2009, that ‘the 
appointments that were made by the national government leaders on 19 November 
suggest that, in practice; the changes may not be as dramatic as some had hoped’ (Vogel 
2009). He further suggested that ‘the two appointments indicate that the EU wanted 
administrators and not visionaries, reliable implementers rather than people with their 
own ideas and agenda’ (Ibid.). The decision resulted in that ‘the EU leaders left 
themselves open to the criticism that they had been too unambitious and allowed 
political horse-trading to triumph over merit’ (Barbé 2010: 56). As it will be further 
demonstrated, the first two years of the implementation took place in the particular 
context of increasing intergovernmentalism in EU affairs, triggered by the ongoing 
economic and sovereignty crisis. 
 
The failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the particular political and economic 
context strengthened the intergovernmental spirit among the Member States, and this 
might also have a substantial impact on the interpretations of the LT’s provisions. The 
implementation of the Treaty took place in a different political context than during the 
European Convention. The Treaty’s designing agents were not the implementing ones. 
As noted by Piris the substance of the LT ‘was negotiated mostly by politician within 
the European Convention, and not by diplomats within an IGC. This partly explains 
why some of its provisions leave room for flexibility in the way they will be 
implemented in practice (…) (2010: 324)’. Thus, as he highlighted, its fate ‘will not 
only depend on its text (…) it will also depend on the persons who will develop its 
potentialities’ (Ibid.). Paul (2008: 21) further noted that the HRVP’s ‘political weight 
and influence will much depended on how [the] set of interactions is organised and 
‘how much room for manoeuvre the key actors grant the foreign policy chief’. As 
argued by Spence ‘The LT’s ambiguities were in part the result of a failure between the 
Constitution for Europe and the Lisbon Treaty to translate the ambition of political 
rhetoric into administrative practice, a point illustrated by the linguistic differences’ 
(2012: 120). This could further suggest that the Member States would be looking to 
preserve their special position in the system of European foreign policy making, and to 
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maintain its intergovernmental character. As stated by one of the interviewers, ‘The LT 
was supposed to bring better coherence and efficiency in foreign policy making through 
better coordination among countries but not to upgrade it to the Community level. The 
Member States are to remain the key decision makers and their interests are to remain 
the founding pillars for European policies’ (ESc/12.2010, GB/05.2012, FR/05.2012 and 
PLd/05.2012). In conclusion, the LT transformed the system of European foreign policy 
making without setting clear role prescriptions for actors involved in this system. Thus, 
the subsequent implementation would be subject to the interpretation of all actors 
involved in the process, and in particular those directly involved in implementing the 
new working conditions. The fact that most countries were not ready to accept a strong 
leadership at the European level might act as an indication towards the interpretation of 
the LT ’s provisions in the intergovernmental spirit, and thus ‘allow’ to some extent the 
Presidency to continue with its previous role. 
 
The LT did not provide clear role prescriptions but opted instead for a minimum 
scenario in which the new system of foreign policy making would be determined in due 
course of the implementation by emerging practical precedents. The subsequent 
documents produced by the SGC provided some instructions regarding the conduct of 
foreign policy making in the transitional phase, until the new actors would be ready to 
fulfil their positions and functions. The latter one temporarily empowered the 
Presidency to fill in some traditional functions, namely chairing the Council’s WGs and 
deputising the HRVP in her representative functions both internally and externally. 
While the formal provisions of the LT first of all act as a constraining factor with 
reference to the general position of the Presidency, the transitional period following the 
official implementation would be one of the enabling factors for the Spanish Presidency 
to perform a more active role. Without a clear role prescription, the new role would be 
more dependent on the interpretation of actors involved in the process and thus rely 
more on the development of the expectations of various actors. Finally, in the pre-
Lisbon period, the Presidency’s functions and powers were to a large extent set in the 
informal dimension of EU policy making system. The institutional expectations that 
stem from the European treaties and other documents were thus not the only source for 
the institutional expectations towards the new role. The latter ones were expected to 
emerge as an institutional feedback for the implementation of the new system, and a 
response to emerging unexpected consequences. Nevertheless, the Presidency would be 
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only one of possible actors expected to react to these consequences within the larger 
framework of European actors involved in the European foreign policy making system. 
 
Although the implementation of the LT’s provisions has created the most recent critical 
juncture in the process of the Presidency’s development, it was not clear if in the 
aftermath, the institution would embark on an entirely new path or continue to some 
extent on the thus far one. This could be affected by the EU’s ambiguous identity 
regarding foreign affairs, as changes in the functional dimension of the Presidency’s 
role have not been reflected in the reconstruction of its identity. The subsequent 
development of the institutional framework at the supranational level has not been 
accompanied with changes at the ideational level, which to a large extent maintained its 
intergovernmental features and the significant role for Member States. The fact that the 
intergovernmental method for the decision making process has been maintained, might 
enable the Presidency to play a greater role, as Member States have preserved their 
privileged position in EU policy making vis-à-vis European actors. Therefore, the 
position of countries in chair of the Presidency has not only been affected by the 
ambiguous institutional set up of the post-Lisbon European foreign policy making, but 
also by the special role that the Member States continue to play in this area of 
cooperation. Additionally, the particular political and economic context emerging from 
the economic crisis resulted in the increasing intergovernmentalism that might further 
strengthen the position of Member States vis-à-vis European institutions. Consequently, 
with only limited institutional expectations, the role of the post-Lisbon Presidency 
would emerge in a process of informal adaptation. The latter one would become an 
important part of the institutional change, and might thus either empower or constrain 
the position and scope for action for the country in the chair. As argued in the previous 
chapter, insights from role theory might be better suited to tackle the issue of informal 
adaptation of the LT’s provisions with reference to the post-Lisbon EU foreign policy. 
The following chapter, therefore, will continue with the empirical analysis by applying 
the combined theoretical framework of new institutionalism and role theory into 
studying the role and position of the Presidency in the post-Lisbon European foreign 
policy making.   
 
 




CHAPTER V Spain in the Chair of the EU Council (January – June 2010): 
‘Staying in the Front Seat’ 
 
In the previous part of this thesis I present a consolidated approach towards studying the 
process of role institutionalisation of the post-Lisbon Presidency in European foreign 
policy making. Without a clear role prescription the first Member States in the chair 
would be responsible for interpretation of these formal provisions, their informal adap-
tation to the institutional feedback and development of the subsequent informal practic-
es associated with the new role.  The subsequent four chapters aim to apply this analyti-
cal framework, based on the institutionalist insights and role theory, to studying the pe-
riod of the institutional change using the example of the first four Presidencies by Spain, 
Belgium, Hungary and Poland. This chapter will focus on the period of the Spanish 
chairmanship of the EU Council in the first half of 2010. It is structured according to the 
proposed model of role institutionalisation: the first section explores the Spanish nation-
al role conception as one of the potential key explanatory factors of its Presidency’s role 
preference, section two analyses expectations held towards the Spanish Presidency as 
the second potential source of its role preference. Section three focuses on the official 
programme of the Spanish Presidency and further discusses the role preference within 
the domestic, European and international contexts.  
In the second part of the chapter I focus on analysing Spain’s enactment of the Presi-
dency’s role by looking at the four functions traditionally associated with the Presiden-
cy: neutral brokering, organisational management, political leadership and internal and 
external representation of the EU Council and the EU, respectively. It is not my inten-
tion to assess any of the chosen Presidencies in term of their successfulness; rather the 
focus of the analysis is to explore their particular influence on the process of role insti-
tutionalisation of the institution itself. The section thus looks at the Presidencies’ per-
formance in an attempt to categorise emerging functions performed by individual Mem-
ber States in the chair. The final section will assess Spain’s contribution to the institu-
tional adaptation of the Lisbon Treaty’s formal provisions and to institutionalisation of a 
role prescription for the Council chairmanship in the post-Lisbon context. The analysis 
will also aim to assess how factors previously identified in the literature affect the Pres-
idency’s role preference and subsequent performance in the post-Lisbon period.   
 




5.1 National Role Conception – Spanish Foreign and European Policies 
 
Spain’s political landscape has remained to a large extent influenced by the 39-year pe-
riod of Franco’s authoritarian regime. Since its transition to democracy in 1975 the 
Spanish national role conception in foreign policy has maintained relative stability with 
reference to its core preferences: the support for the European membership and tradi-
tional interests focussing on the regions of the Mediterranean and Latin America. How-
ever, some degree of role change can be registered, for example with reference to the 
relationship with the US across various governments. Zapatero’s government, brought 
into power in 2004, aimed at providing Spanish foreign policy with a renewed role con-
ception based on three elements: firstly, attempts to join the EU French-German axis, 
secondly, promotion of national interests in two traditional areas: the Mediterranean re-
gion and Latin America, and thirdly supporting the new system of European foreign 
policy making while ensuring national influence in the areas of particular importance. 
As argued by Fernández Pasarín and Morata the comparative analysis of the previous 
Spanish Presidencies 'fits with the rational model which conceives the Presidency as a 
strategic actor seeking to satisfy national preferences within the confines of its formally 
designed institutional role' (2003: 188). This role influenced both the Spanish European 
policy as well as its role preference for the 2010 Council chairmanship. 
The 2010 Spanish Presidency marked the anniversary of the 25-year period of European 
membership. During this time both the governments and the society remained one of the 
most pro-European, as the European Community, and later the EU, became associated 
with the period of Spain’s democratisation, economic development and growing signifi-
cance on the international stage (Molina 2010). The European Community became also 
an opportunity to end the period of Francoist isolation on the European and international 
stage. As noted by Almarcha Barbado the latter was read as one of the most important 
benefits of the European integration as it helped to develop the foreign policy agenda 
and placed Spain on the international arena (1993: 278). The EU structural funds and 
the EU cohesion policy have transformed the Spanish economy making Spain one of the 
countries benefiting most from European funding (Morata and Popartan 2008).
29
 Span-
ish society has been one of the most pro-European ones; a Eurobarometer study con-
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 The establishment of the Cohesion Fund was attributed to a large extent to PM Gonzalez and half of 
the 1993-1999 budget went to Spain (Kennedy  2000: 112). One of his arguments was that it was in the 
European interest to invest in poorer regions as it would provide additional markets for investment. As 
noted by Kennedy (2000) the latter issue was also one of the first examples of uploading national 
interests by presenting them as common interests of the European Community. 




ducted in the autumn of 2009 showed that 64% of Spaniards agreed that European 
membership was good for Spain and 66% that the country has benefited from it (Euro-
barometer 2009). For many years the general strategy for Spain’s EU membership re-
mained under the common agreement between the main opposing parties: the Spanish 
Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Popular Party (PP) (Molina 2010). Thus, the subsequent 
governments regardless of their ideological positioning, the social-democratic Gonzalez 
(1982-1996) and centre-right Aznar (1996-2000), supported the further expansion of the 
European project and saw it as an integral part of the Spanish identity (Ibid.). Also the 
three main priorities identified in 1986 by the Gonzalez’s administration as European 
integration, Latin America and the Mediterranean have become an integral part of the 
Spanish national role conception. 
Europeanisation became a chance not only to modernise the Spanish foreign policy but 
also to adjust some outdated national positions originating back during the Franco peri-
od.  Spain was forced to face its historical pro-Arab stance after establishing diplomatic 
relations with Israel in 1986, which was one of the conditions of Spain’s entry to the 
European Community (Kennedy 2000:107). Thus PM Gonzalez was able to argue that 
this change was due to the Spain’s membership in the European Community rather than 
individual choice (Regelsberger 1989). European membership was also used by the 
Spanish government to distance itself from its traditional stance on the Western Saharan 
conflict and its previous support for the Polisario Front, thus enabling the improvement 
of bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco (Barbé 1996). The subject of the Pal-
estinian-Israeli conflict became one of the issues of the Spanish entrepreneurship on the 
European stage; in 1991 Spain hosted the first European conference on the Middle East 
peace process and later in 1996 Miguel Angel Moratines became the first EU Special 
Representative in this matter.  
As argued by Barbé one of the most successful areas of promotion of national interests 
on the European agenda was the Mediterranean region. This was quickly framed within 
the EU policy towards its neighbourhood: thus Spain, along with France and Italy, be-
came one of the main supporters and advocates of the Southern dimension. The exam-
ple of the two ECs of Essen (December 1994) and of Cannes (June 1995) demonstrated 
that Spain quickly adapted to playing according to Brussels rules. Within a strategy of 
promoting a balanced approach between the Eastern and Southern dimensions Spain 
managed to promote the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. As argued by Barbé (2000a) 




the successful policy entrepreneurship promoted Spain to become one of the major 
players in the Union at the time. With reference to policy areas on which Spain did not 
have any clear national preferences it followed the official European line and supported 
the common positions, such as in the case of Russia (Barbé, 2000b). The strong focus 
on Europe evident in Spanish foreign policy shows evidence of both successful upload-
ing to the European agenda and downloading from the European agenda.  
Some substantial changes in foreign policy strategy can be noted during the second term 
of Aznar’s government (2000-2004). The clear shift towards the more Atlanticist view 
was demonstrated in its support of the Iraq invasion and thus Spain distanced itself from 
the traditional German-Franco leadership. The uploading attempts with reference to Lat-
in America brought only limited results as Spain did not manage to put this region high 
on the list of the European priorities. Spain continued to pursue its national policy to-
wards the region by focusing its development policy on this region as a manner of com-
pensating for the limited attention of the EU (Gómez et al. 1999). In terms of the devel-
opment of the common European foreign policy Spain has been supporting its further 
integration, however on the basis of the intergovernmental method of decision making 
as means of safeguarding national preferences, most of all with reference to Latin 
America (Fernández, 1990: 5087). 
The change came with a government led by the socialist PM Zapatero, who took over 
the political stage in 2004. His appointment was quickly branded as a ‘second transi-
tion’ suggesting ‘a new phase of democratic development’ in the Spanish politics (Gri-
mond 2004). As noted by Powell (2009) Zapatero introduced a new role conception 
which was based first of all on rejection of pursuing a special relationship with the US. 
The PM argued that Aznar’s approach ‘was totally out of character with Spain’s foreign 
policy’ (Powell 2009: 521). One of Zapatero’s first decisions, already promised during 
the election campaign, was withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Iraq. Madrid’s terror-
ist attack in March 2004 was read as a political consequence of Spanish support for the 
US war on terror and the involvement of the Spanish troops in the invasion and occupa-
tion of Iraq. The Spanish troops constituted roughly one per cent of the allies’ military 
capacity thus it was rather the style of announcing the decision unilaterally that caused 
severe diplomatic tensions with Bush’s administration (Molina 2010, Powell 2009). Za-
patero sought to further distance himself from the previous government and this was 




stressed by a new national defence law passed in November 2005 which required par-
liamentary approval to send troops abroad (Powell 2009: 527).
30
  
The second element of the new role conception was greater emphasis on multilateralism 
and cooperation with international organisations. As argued by Zapatero, as the division 
between domestic and foreign policies became less distinctive, as a result of globalisa-
tion, the position of the country should be more associated with ‘soft power’; as ‘the 
future standing, reputation and inﬂuence of a middle power such as Spain would there-
fore increasingly depend less on speciﬁc actions than on what it might represent to the 
outside world’ (Powell 2009: 522). Furthermore, Zapatero’s government renewed the 
Spanish focus on development policy in Africa, which reflected a wider determination 
to place development aid at the heart of Spain’s foreign policy agenda.31 This was prob-
ably the clearest example of how Zapatero’s national role conception inﬂuenced his for-
eign policy priorities, and may be seen as an attempt on his part to position Spain as a 
‘norm entrepreneur’ (Ingebritsen 2006).  The government promised to double Spain’s 
ofﬁcial development aid by 2008.32 The overall Zapatero approach put more emphasis 
on promoting effective multilateralism and seeing the EU as one of the global actors in 
charge of this (Powell 2009). This can be read as ‘Spain’s come back to Europe’ and 
points to the third element of the new role conception, namely ensuring greater coopera-
tion within the EU and in particular with the Franco-German axis. Zapatero’s first offi-
cial visits in April 2004 were to Paris and Berlin. This was also reflected in appointing 
Miguel Angel Moratinos, a former EU representative, as a new FM.
33
 During their joint 
meeting in September 2004 in Madrid, Spain, France and Germany presented a unified 
response to the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld by stating that ‘old Europe is as 
good as new’. Finally, the invitation to attend a French-German summit with Russia in 
March 2005 was a sign that Spain was back at the ‘heart of Europe’. 
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 However, Spain still took part in training Iraqi police and maintained its financial commitment to Iraq’s 
reconstruction by donating US$20 million towards the organisation of the ﬁrst Iraqi elections, held in 
January 2005. Spain also re-confirmed its commitment to the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan which had been pursued under the UN Security Council resolutions from 2001 and 
2003. Moreover, the US continued to use its air and naval base[s] in Spain and further improvement in 
bilateral relations was brought in April 2007 with an agreement regulating the presence of US military 
intelligence in Spanish bases. The latter issue had been left pending when the Agreement on Defence 
Cooperation was updated in 2002. 
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 This was further reflected by changing the name of the ministry to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation. 
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 Spain’s development aid rose from 1,985 million euro in 2004 to 5,509 million euro in 2008 making 
Spain the eighth-largest aid donor worldwide (Powell 2009). 
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 Miguel Angel Moratinos served as the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace process 
(1996-2003). 




The previous three EU Presidencies were held in 1989, 1995 and 2002 and each of these 
Presidencies demonstrated some degree of continuity as well as some 'significant 
changes of strategies and goals' (Fernández Pasarín and Morata 2003: 173). This has 
been attributed to 'the progressive Europeanization of Spanish politics and policies' and 
'since 1996, the shift from a proactive approach, combining commitment to European 
integration with an increasingly clear-cut definition of national interests, to reactive atti-
tudes based on self-interests together with emphasis on single issues such as market lib-
eralisation and terrorism' (Ibid). All of the previous programmes reflected the traditional 
Spanish national priorities in the area of foreign policy, namely the Mediterranean poli-
cy and the EU relations with Latin America. This was an area of Spanish unique exper-
tise widely accepted by European actors. Nevertheless, there were particular differences 
in the Presidency management over the years, thus the first Presidency was centred on 
passing the so-called membership test. Spain focused on demonstrating its understand-
ing of the common European values and norms of conduct, management capacity and 
presented itself as a European country (Barbé 2009). The official agenda was to demon-
strate this by presenting a clear focus on European interests, nevertheless 'traditional 
priorities of the Spanish diplomacy received preferential attention' (Fernández Pasarín 
and Morata 2003: 181).   
The second Presidency was marked by a more nationalistic strategy and used to incor-
porate national interests into the European agenda ‘in particular through Spanish Lead-
ership in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative’ (Barbé 2009: 90).  This was 
further demonstrated by the official 'agenda of action focused on pursuing national in-
terests' (Fernández Pasarín and Morata2003: 182). Thus the aim was to demonstrate the 
central position of Spain within the EU (Moreno Juste 2001). Spain abandoned the role 
of the ‘good European’ and  put more focus on emphasizing its position as an important 
European power and one of the main decision makers within the EU (Fernández Pasarín 
and Morata 2003: 182).  In terms of foreign affairs the goal was to 'offset the progres-
sive shift of Europe's centre of gravity eastward' (Fernández Pasarín and Morata 2003: 
182); thus developing a role conception of Spain as a firm supporter of the EU southern 
neighbourhood. As noted by Moreno Juste finally ‘Spain had shown itself competent to 
lead the EU on a political as well as an administrative level’ (2001: 90) and promote 
national interests on the European agenda. The subsequent 2002 Presidency continued 
with this approach. Among the main achievements were the organisation of the Valen-




cia Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference at a very critical moment in the Arab–
Israeli conflict, attempts to trigger a new phase of the Barcelona process by emphasising 
the business integration of Mediterranean partners and a gradual development of a Euro-
Mediterranean free trade area (Fernández Pasarín and Morata 2003: 186). Nevertheless, 
the fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference ended with disappointment as some of the Ar-
ab leaders boycotted the meeting in a sign of protest against Israel. Spain failed to reach 
agreement on the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Development Bank (Barbé 2009). 
With the main goal of the Spanish Presidency to renew and strengthen the strategic as-
sociation between the EU and Latin America, a series of high level meetings did not 
bring any substantial results except for a new Free Trade Agreement with Chile (Barbé 
2009). In its relationship with Mercosur, Spain’s aim was to conclude similar agree-
ments in order to advance political relations, but most of all to increase trade levels. 
However, the ongoing economic crises in Argentina and Brazil seriously affected the 
Spanish economic interests and made it impossible to conclude any specific agreement 
with those countries (Barbé 2009).  
Consequently, each of the previous Presidencies was used by Spain to pursue their na-
tional foreign policy priorities by framing them as in the wider European interest. This 
continuity demonstrated stability of the Spanish national role conception in the area of 
foreign policy. Spain’s attitude towards European membership has been to some extent 
shifting according to the stances of particular governments, however one common issue 
remained the same: the Spanish ‘very peculiar position that does not fit into any of the 
categories into which all others may be grouped: the very prosperous and large; the very 
prosperous and small; the less prosperous and small’ (Powell 2002; see also Areilza 
1999). Barbé referred to this one as 'Spain's peripheral syndrome' (1999) and Powell 
observed the continuous drive to obtain 'a big power status' (2002). Consequently, 
Spain’s size categorises it as one of the big EU countries, however this has not been met 
by the appropriate political and economic power. The latter was to be further challenged 
by the emerging economic crisis that Spain started to experience with more visibility in 
2010. The previous Spanish experience points to an active Presidency emphasising na-
tional priorities and in particular developing EU relations in the regions of the Mediter-
ranean and Latin America. This might be further reflected not only in the particular role 
preference for the 2010 Presidency but also in the individual expectations held at the 
European and international levels.   




5.2 Expectations Towards the Spanish Presidency 
 
As indicated in the model of the role institutionalisation the main source of the Presi-
dency’s role preference, apart from the country’s national role conception, are the ex-
pectations held towards the role holder. This refers both to the structural factors based 
on the institutional position and official functions of the Presidency in the area of Euro-
pean foreign policy making, as well as more informal and individual expectations, not 
formalised in any documents, held by actors involved in the process of the European 
foreign policy making. This would refer to European institutions, both old and new, as 
well as other Member States. Since the formal provisions, as already outlined in the 
previous chapter, were limited and did not provide a clear role prescription, the informal 
expectations might emerge as one of the key factors influencing the role preference. In 
methodological terms this section draws on interviews conducted with European offi-
cials from the Commission, EP, SGC and some Member States
34
 in order to explore 
their perceptions of the Presidency’s role within the new post-Lisbon institutional archi-
tecture.  
Firstly, the main theme emerging from these interviews was the overall ambiguity of the 
formal provisions as well as their practical application. Therefore, it was acknowledged 
that the post-Lisbon Presidency should be ‘less active, more in the back seat’, ‘removed 
from the spotlight’ and ‘closely coordinated with the new actors’ (SGCa/05.2012, 
EPb/05.2012). It should not emphasise the traditional functions of providing leadership 
and agenda setting in European foreign policy; it should rather work behind the scene to 
ensure coordination of various external policies (SGCa/05.2012). Additionally, it was 
expected that Member States in the chair, in particular the PM and the FM should be 
given some role to play on the European stage and this would have to be worked out in 
practice. Nevertheless, it was noted that the post-Lisbon architecture only started to 
emerge and that Spaniards might actually be the last Nicean rather than first post-Lisbon 
Presidency due to their extensive preparations (SGCa/05.2012, GB/05.2012, 
FR/05.2012). The overall tendency was the acknowledgment of the institutional change 
limiting the formal role of the Presidency; however there was no clarity with reference 
to how this would be implemented in practice.  
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 In order to present a balanced view among EU countries the selection of interviewees aimed at 
presenting perceptions of various representatives – both small and big, and old and new Member 
States. 




Looking at the wider structure, the implementation of the provisions was affected by the 
particular EU political and economic climate which favoured a stronger role for Mem-
ber States and the intergovernmental method of working. The ambiguous approach was 
reflected in the lack of clear expectations towards the Spanish Presidency. On the one 
hand, some of the expectations were expressed towards the post-Lisbon role and posi-
tion of the institution itself, on the other hand it was apparent that without a fully opera-
tional post-Lisbon infrastructure Spain would have to step in and play a more active 
role. Consequently, there were no clear expectations towards the Spanish Presidency at 
the European level in both structural and informal terms. The ambiguous expectations 
created both an opportunity to pursue a particular role preference as envisaged by Spain, 
but also a major constraint as Spain was not able to identify expectations towards its 
role in the chair. Thus the emergence of a potential role conflict between ambiguous and 
even to some extent conflicting expectations towards the post-Lisbon Presidency and 
Spain itself might further undermine the Spanish Presidency’s performance. 
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Management 
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Low High High 
External and Internal 
Representation 
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Table 2 The Overview of Expectations Towards the Post-Lisbon Functions First 
Half of 2010 (Author’s Own Compilation Based on the Analysis of the Interviews) 
 
5.3 Towards the Role Preference of the Spanish Presidency  
 
The subsequent section focuses on the official programme of the Spanish Presidency, as 
its examination should enable an exploration of its particular understanding of its role in 




the Council chairmanship. Spain was the first country of the Presidency Trio comprising 
Spain, Belgium and Hungary and thus its joint programme was supposed to ensure a 
more coherent agenda and strategy for the following 18 months. The first post-Lisbon 
Trio emphasised its objective of ensuring a more unified approach by designing a single 
logo for all three Presidencies (Euractiv 26.01.2010). At the more substantial level the 
countries pledged a smooth transition towards the new working arrangements by priori-
tising the quick and efficient implementation of the LT (CEU 2009d); nevertheless the 
main emphasis was put on the issues of economic governance and financial affairs. The 
subject of external relations featured as a final section of the programme and presented 
an extensive selection of various horizontal policy areas, such as crisis management, 
human rights, as well as more concrete objectives visibly referring to particular national 
preferences of individual countries of the Trio.
35
 Such a comprehensive overview of the 
EU’s foreign affairs was due to the time factor as both the POTEC and HRVP were ap-
pointed in December 2009 after the Trio Programme was officially presented. The fact 
that it was prepared without any output of the new actors seriously undermined its cred-
ibility and applicability as it was expected that the POTEC and HRVP would prepare 
their own agendas (SGCa/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012, EEASc/04.2012). This would how-
ever require more time and thus it further empowered Spain to focus on its own individ-
ual programme (Ibid.). 
5.3.1 'Innovating Europe' - Official Programme of the Spanish Presidency 
 
The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and thus of the new institutional architecture 
was seen as an opportunity for Innovating Europe, the official slogan of the Spanish 
Presidency, with the new legal framework enabling for building ‘[..] a stronger, more 
united and more efficient Europe’ (Spanish Presidency 2010: 3). Four main priorities 
were set: the fast and full enforcement of the Treaty of Lisbon, the economic recovery 
and job creation, implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy and finally Europe’s 
global role. The new institutional context was emphasised throughout the text also with 
reference to particular expectation towards Spain; thus it was stated that Spain would be 
exercising ‘[a]s a transitional Presidency’ allowing for taking up ‘responsibility to make 
up for some temporary deficiencies of the new institutions’ (Ibid.). This would be done 
‘in close coordination with [new institutions] and with a view to addressing such limita-
tions as soon as possible’ (Ibid.). The main goal would be to ensure development of a 
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new working mode for European foreign policy making by accepting the political lead-
ership from the HRVP and POTEC: as stated in the programme ‘Spain will fully sup-
port all the new High Positions so they can exercise their competencies under the best 
possible conditions. Furthermore, it will take on the corresponding role as rotating Pres-
idency in the institutional structure established by the Treaty.’ (Spanish Presidency 
2010: 5). In more functional terms it was acknowledged that 'the Spanish Presidency 
will fully support the former in performing her functions, fostering the rapid implemen-
tation of the European External Action Service and actively contributing to a smooth 
and orderly transition to the Union’s new model of external action’(Spanish Presidency 
2010: 20). 
The new post-Lisbon context was also emphasised by referring to the Presidency Trio’s 
programme as a wider frame for the Spanish priorities (Spanish Presidency 2010: 4). 
This would indicate that the basis for the Spanish role preference would be firmly based 
on the institutional provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, the fact that Spain 
branded itself as a ‘transitional Presidency’ might have indicated that it understood the 
uniqueness of its time in the office and the restricted applicability of its scenario with 
reference to subsequent Presidencies. As indicated by some of the interviewees this 
could have been perceived by Spain as an opportunity to continue with the pre-Lisbon 
scenario as a preferred script for its chairmanship.
36
  This impression was strengthened 
by the ambitious list of goals Spain set for itself in the area of EU foreign affairs.  
Under the third priority of Europe as a global player Spain presented its ambitious vi-
sion of opening a new chapter in European foreign policy by fostering relations with the 
US, Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean. Further priorities referred to the ENP, 
EU enlargement in the region of the Western Balkans and strengthening cooperation 
with Asia; consequently covering every possible dimension of EU foreign policy. As 
acknowledged by Carlos Buhigas Schubert, a member of the Spanish Team Europe of 
the European Commission:  ‘the agenda looks too ambitious and, as a result, rather un-
focused’ (Euractiv 8.12. 2009). Spain thus clearly saw its Presidency as an opportunity 
to revive some of the EU foreign policy areas and to play an active role on the European 
stage. Therefore, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions was seen as an 
opportunity by ensuring ‘close collaboration with the President of the EC and the High 
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Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to make the most of 
all the possibilities rendered by the new Treaty’ (Spanish Presidency 2010: 11). Subse-
quently, the official role of the Presidency was also emphasised as Spain ‘shall foster 
on-going cooperation with the High Representative, specifically in connection with 
those areas linked to foreign relations, which will remain under the responsibility of the 
rotating Presidency, such as the enlargement policy, trade or justice and home affairs’ 
(Spanish Presidency 2010: 5). By emphasising the area of mixed competences Spain 
firmly acknowledged its remaining formal role. Finally, ‘It will be the responsibility of 
the Spanish Presidency to collaborate with the High Representative and the EP to pro-
mote the enactment of the necessary legal rules to establish the European External Ac-
tion Service and ensure its rapid implementation’ (Spanish Presidency 2010: 6). The 
final aim would be to ‘guarantee the transition to this new design supporting the work of 
the High Representative with its entire diplomatic network until the deployment of the 
new European Service’ (Ibid.). 
Consequently, the official programme of the Spanish Presidency presented a rather am-
biguous approach by emphasising its main aim as the full implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty through supporting new actors and creation of the EEAS while at the same time 
setting for itself an ambitious agenda in external relations. Spain announced its plan for 
an active chairmanship of the EU Council that remained supportive of the new post-
Lisbon context. This led to the  question of whether the Presidency’s activism would be 
only targeted to interpreting the new role or also using its ‘transitional Presidency’ as an 
opportunity to put itself in a more privileged position in order to advance some of the 
national priorities in line with the pre-Lisbon scenario. On the one hand, the emphasis 
on the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty would suggest a rather limited Presidency 
in the area of foreign affairs. The Spanish PM announced that if anyone wants to ‘call 
Europe’ (in reference to Kissinger’s famous question) they should call Van Rompuy’ 
(Euractiv 8.12. 2009) thus demonstrating his loyalty to the new system. On the other 
hand an ambitious agenda could not be realised by only supporting the HRVP and PO-
TEC in their new positions; to some extent it would also require a ‘more active stance 
of the Spanish Presidency and to some extent exercising their leadership capacity on the 
European stage’ (SGCb/05.2012).  As demonstrated above, the very fact that the Span-
ish Presidency put so much focus on the issue of external affairs created mixed expecta-
tions towards the Spanish chairmanship. This presented a rather schizophrenic view of 




Spain towards its role in office and was expected to be clarified during the first few 
weeks in office (ESa/12.2010). As observed by the Spanish Ambassador in Paris Fran-
cisco Villar ‘our role is to provide impetus to each dedicated Council, not necessarily to 
stabilise it, as is the case of the permanent Presidency. [. . .] The answer must be given 
in practice, not in the text’ (Euractiv 26.01.2010).37  
5.3.2 Role Preference of the Spanish Presidency – Domestic, European and 
International Context  
 
The particular context, at the domestic, European and international levels, became both 
an empowering and constraining factor for the Spanish original role preference. One 
such enabling factor was the experience thus far of the Spanish administration in both 
its running of the Presidency and its pursuit of national interests on the European stage. 
Spain had a long institutional memory of running the Council Presidencies. It has been 
generally argued that Spain successfully chaired previous Presidencies, and its adminis-
trative capacities would be sufficient to face the technical challenge of the European 
legislation. Its ambitious preparations had already started in 2008 and due to the inclu-
sive decision on the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty at that time had to be pursued 
in a two-fold manner: the first scenario assuming exercise of the traditional fully opera-
tional Presidency and the second of the new limited post-Lisbon role. With these two 
possible scenarios Spain was not sure if it should apply the Brussels or the capital-based 
models (ESa/12.2010, ESb/12.2010, ESc/12.2010). Thus, the decision to expand the 
REPER in Brussels by 80 new employees and lead the Presidency’s management from 
Madrid strengthened perception of the active and ambitious performance (Ibid.). The 
estimated cost of holding the Presidency was the roughly 55 million euros (Euractiv 
15.12.2009).  
On the domestic stage the four largest parliamentary groups (the Socialists in power, the 
Popular Party in opposition and the Catalan and Basque centre-right nationalists) signed 
an agreement that ensured a broad support for the government in matters related to the 
EU during the first semester of 2010 (E. Soler i Lecha and J. Vaquer i Fane´s 2010: 74). 
This was supposed to strengthen the position of the Spanish administration on the do-
mestic stage for the six-month period. On the other hand, it was clear that in the crisis-
ridden country successful performance of the Presidency would distract the public opin-
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ion and contribute to the popularity of the government; thus the compromise with the 
opposition parties was not expected to be maintained (ESa/12.2010). 
The ambitious plans were undermined by the worsening economic and financial situa-
tion with the Euro-crisis having particularly adverse effect on the Spanish economy.
38
 
The  Spanish plans to launch a new strategy for an economic recovery under the 2020 
Economic Strategy was met with some mocking reaction on the international stage, for 
example the Financial Times (05.01.2010) referred to the inauguration of the Spanish 
Presidency as ‘A Stumbling Spain Must Guide Europe’.39 Thus without a sound eco-
nomic reputation it would be impossible for Spain to play a major role in the EU while 
it was deeply focused on the ongoing economic crisis. It was also noticed that the gen-
eral Spanish capacity for influence was hindered by its status as the number one recipi-
ent of the European aid (Martín 2010).  
With the approaching parliamentary elections in 2012 Zapatero was keen to use the 
Presidency as an opportunity to distract the Spanish electorate from the economic situa-
tion and to gain additional support through the pursuit of active policy at the European 
level (ESa/12.2010, ESb/12.2010, ESc/12.2010). However, the impact of the crisis was 
most visible at the European and international level, as it dominated the working agen-
das and left little room for other issues, thus pushing the foreign policy off the European 
agenda. Consequently, expectations both towards the Spanish Presidency and its partic-
ular role preference should be analysed within the particular context created by the do-
mestic, European and international environments. These were both empowering and 
constraining Spain in its original plans. The latter context will be also analysed at the 
stage of the Presidency’s role enactment by constituting a set of possible intervening 
variables. It can be argued that the Spanish Presidency faced ambiguous formal and lim-
ited informal expectations. This enabled Spain to pursue its particular role preference of 
exercising support towards the new actors, yet still strive for ambitious and active per-
formance in EU external relations. This strategy will be tested in the subsequent sec-
tions presenting Spain’s role enactment with reference to organisational management, 
the EU and Council’s representation, neutral brokering and political leadership.   
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 The economic situation of the current economic situation with the economy being caught in the 
recession since 2008 and 20% unemployment rate, decreasing economic growth and growing deficit was 
the major factor which hindered the position of the Spanish government on the eve of the Presidency 
(SGCa/05.2012). 
39
 The Economist (07.01.2010) further commented that ‘Spain now leads the EU, but not by example (...) 
if you want your advice to be heeded, you need something credible to say’. 




5.4 The Spanish Presidency in Office – Role Enactment 
 
 The subsequent part of the chapter will focus on the process of role enactment tracing 
any changes in the initial perceptions towards the role preference and expectations, as 
well as the actual behaviour during the Spanish time in office. The analysis will take 
into account previously identified factors both enabling and constraining the Member 
State’s performance while in the chair. Being the first post-Lisbon Presidency Spain be-
came ‘an institutional guinea pig’ (Molina 2010: 7). The first few weeks in office were 
supposed to bring some clarifications into the arguably schizophrenic approach of Spain 
towards its role in the office (SGCc/05.2012). The launch of the Spanish Presidency 
was welcomed by the international press with comments pointing to possible problems 
connected to the new institutional setting, for example the New York Times 
(08.01.2010) noted that ‘some analysts worry that Spain’s assertive stance will provoke 
turf wars and set a precedent for other nations to follow’ and that the Spanish Presiden-
cy ‘could undermine one of the few concrete efficiency gains that the Lisbon Treaty 
promised, making it even more difficult to determine who is in charge’. This was fur-
ther emphasised with the example of the Spanish remarks on the issue of the possible 
lifting of China’s arms embargo which sparked fears that the Presidency would try to 
use its six months in office to actively pursue foreign policy making on the European 
stage.
40
 This issue was picked up by the international press, which used it as an oppor-
tunity to speculate on a possible institutional struggle surrounding the institutional 
change, for example the Economist (01.02.2010) argued that Spain was allowed to run a 
pre-Lisbon Presidency due to its extensive preparations.
41
 Thus, the beginning of the 
Spanish Presidency was marked by the lack of a clear role prescription, some confusing 
messages concerning its role preference and unclear expectations on the European and 
international stage. The image of the Spanish Presidency managed to suffer serious hin-
drance when the official website was hacked and the photo of the Spanish PM was re-
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The comment was originally delivered by the Spanish Ambassador to China (Jin 2010). This was 
repeated a few days later by the French FM during one of the press conferences. For more details see 
GIbney (2010). 
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 ‘For diplomatic reasons, people are being terribly nice about the way the Spanish are throwing their 
weight around and acting as if they are running a pre-Lisbon rotating Presidency. Last week, one senior 
European politician told a small group of reporters about how we had to understand the Spanish 
position because they had put so much work into preparing their six-month stint in the chair of EU 
meetings, on the basis that Lisbon might have been delayed yet again—leaving them to play the role of 
a traditional Presidency. Given that they had gone to all this trouble, the politician said, it was fair to 
regard Spain as a "transitional Presidency" between the pre and post Lisbon age.’ (Economist 
01.02.2010) 




placed by the fictional character of Mr Bean.
42
 This was one of the first indications that 
the performance would be seriously influenced by the generally ambivalent image of 
Spain. 
Nevertheless, as claimed by the Spanish Presidency, the first experience of joint cooper-
ation between the Spanish Presidency and the HRVP proved to be successful and effi-
cient (SGCb/05.2012). The case of the humanitarian crisis in Haiti demonstrated that 
the Presidency was not expected to be the primary actor in addressing the crisis man-
agement agenda, leaving this up to the HRVP. However, by expressing readiness to 
help, the Spanish Presidency indicated its supportive, but secondary position on the Eu-
ropean stage (SGCb/05.2012). During the Presidency’s presentation at AFET in January 
2010 the Spanish FM stated that ‘the Presidency helped the HRVP in the coordination 
of the forces on the ground and guided the collaboration with other EU Member States 
in providing aid’ (AFET 2010)43. This meeting also gave a chance to express the Span-
ish position on some of the issues on the European foreign agenda.
44
 One such issue 
was the sudden change of the Ukrainian electoral law which caused concerns among 
MEPs with reference to democratic developments in the country. FM Moratinos clearly 
demonstrated his loyalty to the HRVP by refusing to make any comments as this would 
‘be competence of HRVP Ashton to react and release an official statement on this situa-
tion’ (Ibid.). Thus, contrary to the expectations, the launching of Spain into its role 
brought further confusion regarding the Spanish approach to its Presidency. The sup-
portive stance towards new actors, in particular the HRVP, was seen by some as a 
chance to play an active role on the European stage and project some of the national 
priorities (ESc/12.2010). This was met with a rather unfavourable reaction on the Euro-
pean and international stage. The subsequent sections will examine the performance of 
the Spanish Presidency by closely analysing its role enactment with reference to the 
four main pre-Lisbon Presidency’s functions. 
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 It was soon explained that the website had not been hacked and the image was a result of a simple 
screenshot and a photo montage (BBC 04.01.2010). Nevertheless, the perception of compromised 
security of the Spanish IT system prevailed for few days.  
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 The notes on the meeting can be accessed at http://isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/publications-
downloads/2010_artrel_409_epupdate-afet-04feb10.pdf.  [cannot access this link – check address] 
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 The presidential elections were to take place on February 7, 2010. 




5.4.1 Organisational Management  
 
During the first half of 2010 chairmanship and management of the FAC meetings was 
assumed by the HRVP; however, as it quickly turned out without a fully operational 
EEAS the HRVP would not be able to exercise this role on her own. Thus, the Spanish 
Presidency became a source of administrative capacity for the HRVP’s performance by 
taking over management of the Council’s WGs (SGCa/05.2012). In general terms, this 
could be read as an indication of a ‘path dependency’ as the Presidency continued with 
its pre-Lisbon role emerging as the institution most suitable in assisting the HRVP. 
Nevertheless, even if a Spanish official was acting as a chair for a particular WG he was 
acting on behalf of the HRVP (SGCb/05.2012). As indicated by one of the interviewees 
the chair was expected to act according to HRVP’s instructions while at the same time 
addressing some particular national concerns; consequently the WGs’ chairmanship was 
under a joint management of the HRVP and the Spanish Presidency (ESc/12.2010, 
EEASa/04.2012). Overall, Spanish officials had their manoeuvring space restricted by 
the expectations of acting upon the instructions of the HRVP; this further strengthened 
the expectations of acting as an honest broker. It was also indicated that this certainly 
gave Spain a more privileged position vis-à-vis other Member States towards the agen-
da setting; however this was mostly caused by the lack of an extensive agenda held by 
the HRVP at the time which left management of some of the issues up to Spain 
(EEASa/04.2012, SGCb/05.2012). This would decrease with the consolidation of Cath-
erine Ashton in the chair of the HRVP and thus developing her own (EU) agenda. Nev-
ertheless, by having the decisive word at the stage of the WGs the Spanish Presidency 
managed to ‘steer in preparatory documents, [and thus] Madrid was able to take over a 
more assertive role within the Council’s foreign affairs structure than future Presiden-
cies’ (Bergmuller 2010: 9). A similar situation took place at the level of the PSC which 
was chaired by the Spanish Ambassador Carlos Fernandez-Arias Minuesa. The Spanish 
Ambassador performed his functions in very close cooperation and coordination with 
the HRVP and her cabinet thus ‘leading to a situation where the Ambassador [was] 
double-hatted as Spanish Ambassador and Ashton’s representative’ (Penalva 2010: 4). 
Such a working arrangement did not prove to be the most efficient as ‘the organisation 
and thematic preparation of the FAC meetings was not as thorough as was expected and 
especially, the agenda setting process happened to lack structure and continuity’ (Berg-
muller 2010: 9). Nevertheless, the coordination and communication set at the bilateral 




level ‘run smoothly and without any spectacular clashes’ (SGCb/05.2012, 
ESa/12.2010). 
Apart from the transitional functions performed by the Spanish officials on behalf of the 
HRVP the Presidency managed to continue its pre-Lisbon scenario with reference to a 
more informal dimension of policy making. The Gymnich meeting
45
 was held in Cór-
doba and co- chaired, along with the HRVP, by the Spanish FM. This gave the Presi-
dency greater influence over the agenda of the meeting (ESb/12.2010); nevertheless the 
agenda to a large extent was determined by ‘the rolling issues and current events’ and 
thus ‘most of the issues entered the agenda by default’ (SGCa/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012). 
However ‘you could still feel the Spanish flavour to the final agenda’ (SGCa/05.2012). 
Consequently, the Presidency could continue to some extent with the pre-Lisbon func-
tions which enabled Spain to play a more active role in European foreign policy mak-
ing; this however shifted to a more informal dimension of policy making. 
5.4.2 External and Internal Representation 
 
Officially the function of representing the EU externally as well as of the Council inter-
nally was transferred to the portfolios of the HRVP and POTEC thus leaving no formal 
role for the Presidency. With reference to the EC, Herman van Rompuy quickly filled in 
his position and took over all of the responsibilities. Such an immediate and efficient 
implementation of the provisions by Herman van Rompuy left no role for the Spanish 
PM (ESa/12.2010). This had been discussed before the Presidency as Zapatero and Van 
Rompuy held two meetings during which they discussed the interpretation of the LT’s 
provisions and clarified bilateral expectations towards the role prescriptions of the PO-
TEC and the Presidency (ESa/12.2010). The expression of the common understanding 
was demonstrated by publishing a joint article in the Guardian upon the inauguration of 
the Spanish Presidency.
46
 It indicated a compromise by emphasising the promotion of 
the EU’s new institutional order ‘in a spirit of co-operation’ while at the same time ac-
knowledging the joint commitment towards addressing ‘the priorities set out in the pro-
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 Gymnich meetings are named after the castle in Germany where the first meeting was held during the 
German Presidency of the EU Council in 1974. They are informal meetings of FMs held twice per year in 
the pre-Presidency period usually in the country currently in the chair of the EU Presidency. 
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Together we will address the priorities set out in the programme of the Presidency’ (The Guardian 
03.01.2010) 




gramme of the Presidency’ (The Guardian 03.01.2010). This was however quickly chal-
lenged by the organisation and management of the EU-US summit with the Spanish PM 
arguing that it should be hosted in Madrid. This was claimed to be caused by the PM 
looking for a spotlight and thus giving him a photo opportunity’47 in order to improve 
his image on the domestic stage. Upon cancellation of the summit the POTEC's 
spokesman Dirk De Backer further undermined the EU's unity by claiming that the 
summit 'was prepared by the Spanish. The permanent Presidency has never been in-
volved' (cited in Forelle 2010). The summit gained wide press coverage and became a 
symbol for turf wars surrounding the interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions 
(SGCa/05.2012, BEb/03.2011). More importantly, the US President's decision was in-
terpreted as 'a snub' towards Spain (Tovar 2010 cited in Molina and Tovar 2011: 9), as 
'the US President keeps travelling to Europe (…) without setting foot in Spain' (Ibid.). 
In contrast to the POTEC, the implementation of the HRVP’s role was less efficient and 
thus left more space for manoeuvring for the Spanish Presidency. The fact that the 
HRVP was without any administrative support and predominately preoccupied with 
creation of the EEAS acted as an enabling condition for the Spanish Presidency 
(SGCb/05.2012). In her double-hatted role of the HRVP and the Vice-President for the 
Commission it soon became obvious that the lack of any deputy would become a major 
issue undermining the development of the new system and implementation of her role 
(SGCa/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012). FM Moratinos deputised the HRVP on her request 
during some of the international meetings. These arrangements were informally agreed 
on and organised ad hoc in the course of the Presidency (SGCb/05.2012). The Spanish 
FM thus chaired some of the Association Councils: the EU-Egypt Association Council 
and the EU-Central Asia, and visited some of the countries, on behalf of the HRVP, 
namely the Balkan countries, South Caucasus and Mexico. Generally, Moratinos acted 
upon previous instructions; however the example of the already mentioned case of the 
EU arms embargo for China and the case of the Turkish membership perspective 
demonstrates how this deputisation was used to further national stances on these issues.   
The highlight of the Spanish Presidency was supposed to be the hosting of quite few 
international summits: the EU-US, the EU-Latin America (May in Madrid), EU-
Morocco (March in Granada), EU-Pakistan (April in Madrid), EU-Mexico (May in San-
tander) and EU-Egypt (June in Barcelona). The choice of these clearly reflects the tradi-
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tional focus of Spanish foreign policy. The rather unclear cancellation surrounding the 
EU-US summit
48
 only further strengthened the perception of the EU struggling with its 
new institutional system and emerging turf wars. It was generally perceived that the lo-
cation of the summit in Madrid only emphasised the cacophony of the new European 
leadership.
49
 A further two summits, the Union for the Mediterranean and the EU-Egypt 
summits were cancelled due to worsening Israeli-Arabic relations. During the first half 
of 2010 there were other summits held at the EU level which were chaired and prepared 
by the POTEC and the rotating Presidency did not play any institutional role, for exam-
ple the EU-Japan summit in Tokyo, the Nuclear Security Summit in US and the G20 
meeting in Toronto. Thus, the selection of the international summits co-hosted by the 
Spanish administration reflected to a large extent Spanish original preference. The EU 
representation in international organisations depended on the particular policy area and 
involved all three actors: the POTEC, the Presidency and the Commission in various 
configurations, particularly with reference to the areas of mixed competences. This 
caused a rather confusing perception of the European leadership on the international 
stage as indicated by all of the interviewees.  
The EU-Balkan summit was another event which was supposed to be the highlight of 
the Spanish Presidency. The summit was supposed to gather the most relevant interna-
tional actors, including the US and Russia. Nevertheless, due to problems with the char-
acter of Kosovo’s representation the formula of the summit changed to ‘Gymnich char-
acter’, lowering the diplomatic rank of the meeting.  The informal character of the ‘high 
level summit’ further increased the influence of the Spanish Presidency over the sub-
stance and management of the meeting (ESa/12.2010). The summit was officially 
chaired by Moratinos; there was no final declaration as to the particular character of the 
summit. The final statement was drafted by the Spanish team and presented by the 
Spanish FM. The press conference was chaired by the Spanish Presidency and was at-
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 As commented by the White House on February 1
st
 there were never any plans for the president to 
attend the summit. However, it was argued that the reason was the institutional confusion ’setting too 
many phone numbers in place’ (ESa/12.2010) and ‘excessive summitry’ explained by the fact that the EU 
held too many summits without any real substance to them (Euractiv 02.02.2010). For more comments 
see Mock (2010). 
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 As cited by the Wall Street Journal (01.02.2010) one of the senior US officials commented:  ‘We don't 
even know if they're going to have [a summit]. We've told them, 'Figure it out and let us know’ (cited in 
EU Observer 01.02.2010). 




tended by the Commissioner Füle. Moratinos portrayed the meeting as a success
50
; nev-
ertheless it was generally argued that the final statement lacked any relevant sub-
stance.
51
 The significance of the meeting was undermined by the modest number of 
heads of state and the fact the HRVP left the meeting immediately and was not present 
during the press conference (ESa/12.2010, ESc/12.2010).
52
 
Finally, the Spanish Presidency acted as the EU external representative through its 
framework of embassies and consulates.
53
 Consequently, in comparison with the Span-
ish PM, Moratinos was more active in his capacity as the HRVP’s deputy then his na-
tional capacity as the FM of Spain.  This can be explained by the institutional feedback 
stemming from the implementation of the HRVP’s role as well as the particular person-
ality of the Spanish FM. He had been also considered as one of the candidates for the 
position of the HRVP due to his extensive European experience while acting as the EU 
Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process (1996-2003). The particular 
interpretation and enactment of the HRVP’s role by Ashton enabled Moratinos to inter-
pret his role in a wider capacity and thus play an active and visible role on the European 
stage. Consequently, the interpretation of the particular roles in the initial phase of im-
plementation depended to a large extent on individual personalities in charge of these 
roles.  
5.4.3 Neutral Brokering  
 
The function of honest brokering, one of the most debated but firmly institutionalised 
expectations towards the pre-Lisbon Presidency, was to become a part of the expecta-
tions towards the role of the HRVP. However, with the transitional character of the 
Spanish Presidency and the fact that the Spanish officials were ‘acting on behalf of the 
HRVP’ the role of an honest broker would be still highly relevant. The performance of 
the Spanish Presidency in this area will be analysed using the example of the process of 
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 ‘Today in Sarajevo, I think the European Union and the Western Balkans decided to have a new deal. A 
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adopting the Council’s decision on establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
European External Action Service.  
The EC’s conclusions adopted in December 2009 set a deadline for the Council’s deci-
sion on the establishment of EEAS to be adopted by the end of April 2010. It soon be-
came apparent that formation of the EEAS would become a subject of ‘the usual Euro-
pean turf wars’.54 The presentation of the proposal by the HRVP on March 4, 2010 dur-
ing the COREPER meeting revealed substantial divergent preferences among Member 
States (EEASb/06.2012). As one of the officials commented even the choice of the ven-
ue in which the subject should be discussed became an issue: ‘there was such excitement 
about deciding where the EEAS should be discussed, with some countries obsessed with 
the GAC format and others preferring the FAC alternative’ (cited in Euractiv 
22.03.2010).  Bringing the EP into consultations revealed further differences of opinion 
with reference to the basic nature of the EEAS (EEASb/06.2012).
55
 In order to facilitate 
a possible compromise the issue was put on the agenda of the Gymnich meeting on 
March 5, 2010 in Córdoba to enable ‘a more informal discussion’ (Ibid.). 
The three main contentious issues were: the question of the HRVP’s deputisation and 
thus the EEAS’s institutional design, the staffing policy and the general nature of the 
EEAS – intergovernmental versus supranational.  The EP set a separate group of three 
rapporteurs to deal with negotiations: Elmar Brok (EPP, DE), Roberto Gualtieri (S&D, 
IT) Bernhard Rapkay (S&D, DE) and Guy Verhofstadt (ALDE, BE) (Euractiv 
24.03.2010). Their main proposal was that three relevant Commissioners - Štefan Füle 
(enlargement and neighbourhood policy), Andris Piebalgs (development) and Kristalina 
Georgieva (humanitarian aid) - should be acting as the HRVP’s official deputies 
(Euractiv 24.03.2010). This was contrary to the design proposed by Ashton which set 
‘the French-style post of secretary-general’ who ‘would run the EEAS web like a spi-
der" (cited in Euractiv 24.03.2010). The main argument was that ‘a civil servant, such 
as a secretary-general, cannot represent the EEAS vis-à-vis the Parliament’ (Euractiv 
24.03.2010). Thus, another proposal was presented in the EP’s letter outlining a design 
of three deputies for the HRVP: the first one dealing with bilateral affairs, the second 
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 For example British and Swedish FMs David Miliband and Carl Bildt submitted a joint letter to the 
HRVP on March 3, 2010 warning about the consequences of such turf wars. For details see (Euractiv 
05.03.2010). 
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 The EP was directly involved in setting up the EEAS as the co-decision procedure was required to 
adopt the EEAS’s budget.  




with multilateral issues and the third dealing with crisis management. The second issue 
of the staffing policy referred to new Member States calling for ‘a geographical bal-
ance’ which would compensate for the underrepresentation thus far of these countries in 
the EU institutions; the latter proposal was rejected by old members (Euractiv 
22.03.2010). 
Therefore, upon official presentation of the draft of the Council decision by the HRVP 
on March 25, 2010
56
 the EP issued a statement criticising in particular the issue of depu-
tisation, as the position of ‘the secretary-general and deputy secretary-generals does not 
provide the politically legitimised deputies that the High Rep needs in order to do her 
job properly’ (Euractiv 26.03.2010). Additionally, it was pointed out that the proposed 
structure would result in the Commission services and the EEAS working in parallel 
instead of enabling for a full merger (Ibid.). This was further emphasized in a letter 
from April 21, 2010 by Joseph Daul, Martin Schulz and Guy Verhofstadt arguing that 
‘the current structure does not reflect the Community interest or promote a genuine Eu-
ropean added value, but rather the return of intergovernmentalism’ (cited in Kovacheva 
2010). The HRVP presented its revised proposal on April 23, 2010, which was adopted 
by the Council decision three days later. This preliminary agreement stated that this 
would ‘provide a basis for consulting the EP’ (CEU 2010b). The official negotiations, 
held in the framework of a quadrilogue comprising the EP, CEU, Commission, and the 
HRVP, were finally concluded during a meeting organised by the Spanish Presidency 
held in Madrid on June 22, 2010. One of the results was the sealing of the agreement on 
reinforcing the scrutiny of the Parliament over the CFSP and EU external action, which 
opened a way for securing the final compromise (EEASb/06.2012). 
 The process of adoption of the Council decision on the EEAS reflected traditional in-
ter-institutional rivalry; as described in the FIIA paper: ‘in the post-Lisbon debate on the 
EEAS, the Commission has attempted to ensure its control over EU foreign policy, 
while the EP has demanded greater democratic oversight and defended the 'Community 
method' of decision-making. The Council has been torn between the imperative of creat-
ing a functioning service and the instinct to safeguard national prerogative’ (Behr et al. 
2010: 2). Nevertheless, the attempts of the Spanish Presidency to secure a compromise 
demonstrate ‘the Presidency effect’ which tends to strengthen determination of the 
country in the chair to report some tangible results of its efforts. In the case of Spain it 
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was its determination to ensure the compromise among the European institutions. Con-
sequently, ‘the final agreement was a result of week-long negotiations and good will of 
all actors involved, but to some extent was brokered by Spaniards’ (EEASb/06.2012).  
5.4.4 Policy Entrepreneurship/Political Leadership  
 
The final part in this section aims to examine the Spanish Presidency’s performance 
with reference to the function of agenda shaping and political leadership. One of the 
Spanish priorities was the enlargement policy and in particular the Turkish membership 
perspective (ESa/12.2010). The eventual accession of Turkey to the EU constitutes one 
of the key national interests and thus was also to be kept high on the Presidency’s agen-
da (ESa/12.2010). In February 2010 the Presidency organised a high-level Spanish-
Turkish meeting. As argued by Deniz Bulut Ture, such a ‘comprehensive meeting with 
a large group of ministers is a sign of the determination to push cooperation to the next 
level and utilize these strong ties in Turkey’s accession talks with Europe’ (cited in 
Zeynalov 2010). By organising a high-level visit of the Turkish PM in Spain, a few days 
before the Gymnich summit Spanish officials were trying to foster agreement on allow-
ing Turkey to take part in the summit.
57
 Including the latter issue on the Gymnich agen-
da further demonstrates the influence of the Spanish Presidency; nevertheless, the over-
all management of the Gymnich meeting was done by the HRVP (ESa/12.2010). Never-
theless, as argued by Colomina at el. Spain failed to advance any common positions 
with Turkey on Iran or Gaza (2010: 4); thus clearly demonstrating the limits with refer-
ence to the bilateral Spain-Turkey relations.   
The assessment of the influence of the Spanish Presidency could be also done by 
benchmarking the performance against expected outcomes, one of which was the re-
launching of the EU-Cuba relations on the principle of delinking the questions of human 
rights from the broader political dialogue. Such an approach has been generally met 
with resistance from the EP which adopted a resolution in 2007 setting the condition for 
normalisation of relations with Cuba on the principle of human rights and the progress 
of democratisation. Thus any progress on this matter would not only depend on finding 
a common position among EU countries, but most of all with the MEPs. Nevertheless, 
Spanish efforts towards changing the EU position failed as the  'non-decision over Cuba' 
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demonstrated the Member States' preference for maintaining the thus far held approach 
towards the EU-Cuba relations and made further cooperation conditional on ensuring 
greater political liberalisation (Bermudez 2011 cited in Molina and Tovar 2011, Co-
lomina et al. 2010: 9). Among the original plans was also a plan to establish a Palestine 
state in 2010 (EU Observer 21.12.2009); however it was decided not to introduce this 
on the European agenda due to the divergent stance of the Member States 
(ESc/12.2010). 
The modest progress was recorded with reference to reinvigorating the EU policy to-
wards the Mediterranean under the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean. Dur-
ing the Spanish Presidency, two years after the official launch of the initiative by the 
French Presidency, Ahmed Jalaf Masade (Jordan) was agreed on as the first secretary 
and the statute for the SG was adopted (Fernández Sola and Sorrozza Blanco 2010). 
However, the significance of this development was undermined by the fact that he last-
ed only 10 months in this office (Molina and Tovar 2011: 10). Further achievements 
included the first EU-Morocco summit. One of the tangible results was the establish-
ment of a joint parliamentary commission with the aim of facilitating agreement on the 
bilateral national indicative programme 2011-2013. The final declaration was delivered 
by the POTEC, but it was fully prepared under the leadership of the Spanish team 
(ESc/12.2010). 
The Latin America summit held on May 18, 2010 in Madrid was overshadowed by con-
troversies over the representation of Honduras (Bello cited in Euractiv 2010); however 
it still brought substantial outcomes, such advancing the Association Agreement’s chap-
ters on trade, political dialogue and cooperation. The summit was concluded by signing 
a new Action Plan underlining the importance of sustainable development and social 
cohesion in the region. This was reflected in the establishment of the Latin American 
Investment Fund with the initial budget of 125 million euro (Malamud 2010). Moreo-
ver, as a result of the Spanish efforts the EU and Mercosur decided to resume negotia-
tions on the Association Agreement (ESc/12.2010).
58
 Finally, it was acknowledged that 
the Spanish team managed to finish negotiations and subsequently signed the Associa-
tion Agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay.
59
 Nevertheless, it has 
been argued that efforts towards creating the Central American Free Trade Zone are 
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driven by the American countries rather than the EU (Colomina et al. 2010: 4). One of 
the most substantial outcomes of the summit was its contribution to the civil society di-
mension by establishing the Euro-Latin American Assembly and the Euro-Latin Ameri-
can Foundation (Ibid.). Therefore, the particular transitional character of the Spanish 
Presidency was also reflected in its considerable influence on European foreign policy 
in the first half of 2010, which significantly reflected Spain’s original preferences. 
5.5 Role Assessment 
 
As argued by Colomina et al. 'the best conclusion of any assessment of the external ac-
tion of the last Spanish Presidency of the EU in 2010 is that no assessment is possible' 
(2010: 1).  Even though 'Spain managed to keep for itself some of the limelight in sev-
eral foreign policy matters that were deemed crucial' (Colomina et al. 2010: 3), it was 
also criticised 'for continuing to occupy spaces that, in the new order, pertain to the 
permanent institutions’ (Ibid.: 5). The role assessment of the Spanish Presidency was to 
a large extent undermined by its transitional character. Thus most of the interviewees 
noted that due to the particular context Spain should not be assessed on the basis of the 
Lisbon criteria. The subject of external relations became the main focus during the final 
discussion on the performance of the Spanish Presidency in the EP, revealing some am-
biguous expectations towards the post-Lisbon Presidency. During this final appearance 
the Spanish Presidency’s efforts were acknowledged by Presidents of both the EP and 
the Commission. However, some of the MEPs were less favourable to the Spanish par-
ticular role preference. As highlighted by MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit the scenario pur-
sued by the Spanish Presidency revealed 'a real problem of dysfunctionality' and he ar-
gued that the Lisbon Treaty failed to design functional arrangements for co-existence of 
the rotating and permanent Presidencies.
60
 Furthermore, MEP Francisco Sosa Wagner 
argued that it was necessary to make a ‘distinction between its political management on 
the one hand, and the work that has been carried out by the workers in the engine 
rooms, on the other’. As he further explained ‘it is the first of these that has failed, and 
that is due to a lack of adequate impetus from the Presidency of the Government, which 
has fashioned a European Presidency in accordance with the swing of the pendulum’ 
(Ibid.) One of the Polish MEPs Pawel Kowal noted lack of progress in the subject of the 
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EaP by stating that ‘We cannot accept a situation in which the European Union’s objec-
tives depend on which country currently holds the Presidency. If it is a Presidency from 
a Member State in the south, it works on objectives related to the south, and if it is from 
the east, it works on different objectives’ (Ibid.). Thus, clearly various MEPs held vari-
ous visions for the Presidency’s role post-Lisbon. 
The latter assessment was also reflected to some extent by the interviewees who noted 
that the role of the Presidency might be still relevant in the neighbourhood policy. This 
could be done by managing the dossiers on trade, and thus in more general EU foreign 
policy. Therefore, the ENP might be one of the areas in which the Presidency could ex-
ercise some political leadership; nevertheless this would have to be done in coordination 
with and under overall management of the HRVP (ESc/12.2010). As stated above, the 
assessment of the Spanish Presidency was to a large extent marginalised by its transi-
tional character. However, some preliminary indications with reference to the Presiden-
cy’s role started to emerge. This would refer most of all to exercising functional support 
for the newly established actors and ensuring their fullest operational capacity in the 
shortest time possible. Thus, the Presidency would also bear responsibility for the co-
herence and effectiveness of the new system. This might result in ensuring the role for 
the Presidency in foreign affairs for the subsequent Presidencies. 













Moderate High High 
Neutral Brokering Moderate High Moderate 
Policy Entrepreneur-
ship/Political Leadership 
Low Moderate High 
External and Internal 
Representation 
Low High High 
Table 3 The Overview of the Role Expectations and Role Preference of the Spanish 
Presidency (Author’s Own Compilation Based on the Analysis of the Interviews) 




5.6 Role Institutionalisation under the Spanish Leadership – Towards the Role 
Prescription 
 
The previous analysis of the formal provisions demonstrated the lack of a clear role pre-
scription of the Presidency’s role in EU foreign affairs. This has been further demon-
strated by the example of the Spanish Presidency. The limited provisions set ambiguous 
expectations of more permanent management over EU foreign policy at the suprana-
tional level while maintaining its intergovernmental features and thus ensuring the spe-
cial role for Member States. Therefore, a more detailed role specification and thus par-
ticular expectations would have to emerge during the course of the formal implementa-
tion. As demonstrated by the case study of the Spanish Presidency this would emerge in 
the form of informal practices and working arrangements among various actors in-
volved in the post-Lisbon system. 
The Spanish Presidency enables for analysis of the institutionalisation of the Presiden-
cy's role in the immediate aftermath of the formal implementation. The role preference 
of the Spanish Presidency indicated a rather ambiguous stance emphasising in declara-
tory terms the new institutional context limiting the role for the Presidency, while in 
practical terms taking advantage of the transitional character to pursue an active foreign 
policy-making with particular focus on nationally important priorities. Therefore, the 
rhetorical support for the implementation of the new system was contradicted by pre-
senting an ambitious agenda in terms of the European foreign policy. This was also en-
abled by the institutional feedback of the emerging system. It further empowered the 
Spanish Presidency by enabling it to exercise a supportive function towards the HRVP 
in her role. The Spanish Presidency thus performed the traditional pre-Lisbon functions 
of administrative management, external and internal representation, neutral brokering 
and even more sensitive role of an agenda shaper. The analysis of the Spanish role pref-
erence demonstrated how the six-month term in office is used to pursue traditional na-
tional interests which can be traced to Spanish national role conception in European and 
foreign policies. Additionally, it can be also argued that Spain was facing some contra-
dictory expectations: on the one hand towards the post-Lisbon Presidency's role, on the 
other hand towards the role of Spain in EU foreign policy based on the traditional Span-
ish preferences and previous behaviour as illustrated in table 3.  
The role of the HRVP and the lack of a fully operational system left more space for the 
rotating Presidency. Thus, Spain fulfilled the functions associated with the Presidency 




in the pre-Lisbon period, namely chairmanship of the Council WGs, as well as the PSC 
and the FAC (on request by the HRVP), representation and brokering. However, while 
exercising these functions Spanish officials felt that they were in a double-hatted posi-
tion representing the HRVP rather than Spain. The deputisation of the HRVP, emerging 
as one of the ‘unexpected consequences’ created a ‘window of opportunity’ for the 
Spanish Presidency. The latter demonstrated the Presidency’s role institutionalisation as 
a result of the institutional feedback. This was in turn used by Spain to pursue some of 
its national priorities thus expanding the role of the post-Lisbon Presidency to exercise 
the function of the policy entrepreneurship. The deputisation of the HRVP enabled the 
Spanish team to access formal powers, such as agenda control, information access and 
procedural management, which had been available for the Presidency in the pre-Lisbon 
context. In addition, the Presidency maintained its functions in the more informal set-
tings of European foreign policy making, like the Gymnich meetings, thus setting a new 
practice. Further clarifications were brought into emerging features for the post-Lisbon 
Presidency: the informal character of working arrangements with the new actors, a new 
role for the HRVP’s deputy and the growing significance of providing coordination be-
tween various levels of the European policy making system. Thus, the function of the 
Presidency demonstrated to some extent path dependency, with Spain taking over some 
of the roles associated with the pre-Lisbon Presidency. Consequently, the period of the 
Spanish chairmanship of the Council was characterised by both deliberate role making 
and the institutional feedback of the emerging the post-Lisbon system. 
The application of the role theory approach proved particularly useful in exploring the 
Spanish Presidency as an interactive and constitutive process of individual role making 
and the expectations emerging from the institutional feedback of the emerging system. 
In terms of the leadership capacity of the Spanish Presidency this was mostly visible in 
terms of clarifying the new role for the Presidency. As observed by Penalva the Spanish 
Presidency was the last of the pre-Lisbon Presidencies (2010: 5). Therefore, the role 
making of the Spanish Presidency was limited to a large extent by its transitional char-
acter. The uniqueness of the Spanish period in the office makes its experience less rele-
vant for the subsequent Presidencies. Additionally, both the role preference and the sub-
sequent role enactment were affected by the particular context at the domestic, Europe-
an and international level. These two levels both empowered and constrained the Span-
ish Presidency. Thus, the deteriorating economic and financial situation of Spain deteri-




orated the perception of the Spanish role on the European stage. This was particularly 
visible with the reconstruction of the government structures undertaken between April 
and June 2010 with the main aim of reducing spending (Molina and Tovar 2011: 13). 
The contingent factors emerging at the international level: the worsening of Arab-Israeli 
relations, directly affected the ability of the Spanish team to deliver meaningful results 
within European foreign policy making.  
The rather mixed assessment was caused by the high expectations set by the Spanish 
government itself. As argued by Molina ‘rather than opt for a moderate approach as to 
what could be expected from this six month period, [Spain] chose to raise expectations 
by stressing the historic importance that the challenge held for Spain and for Europe’ 
(2010). As stated by the President of the European Commission during the final debate 
in the EP ‘Spain has set an example. I am sure that Belgium, once it assumes the rotat-
ing Presidency of the Council, will continue to take the same approach, or even step up 
this approach, knowing, as we do, Belgium’s great European tradition’. Therefore, the 
expectations towards the subsequent Presidency held by Belgium were based on the 
















Chapter VI Belgium in the Chair of the EU Council (July – December 2010): 
‘Moving to the Back Seat’ 
 
The unclear expectations towards the post-Lisbon Presidency’s role allowed the Spanish 
Presidency considerable leeway in their interpretation and role making. This was used 
as an opportunity to pursue a mixture of the pre-Lisbon Presidency, by taking a spot-
light on the European stage and promotion of national priorities, and the post-Lisbon 
Presidency, by aiming to support the performance of the new actors – the POTEC and 
the HRVP. The final result was a rather confused perception of the multi-actor leader-
ship at the international stage and the surfacing turf wars at the European level. The 
Spanish Presidency brought some clarifications with reference to expectations of both 
European actors and Member States; however its impact on the post-Lisbon role and 
inter-institutional position of the Presidency was to a large extent limited by the particu-
lar transitional context.  
This chapter continues with the empirical analysis examining the Belgian Presidency of 
the EU Council in the second half of 2010 as applied in the previous chapter, starting 
with an examination of the role preference and its sources, namely national role concep-
tions and informal expectations. The second part of the chapter focuses on the perfor-
mance of the Belgian Presidency and the final section undertakes its assessment and 
evaluates Belgium’s influence on the role institutionalisation of the post-Lisbon Presi-
dency's role.  
6.1 National Role Conception – Belgian Foreign and European Policies  
 
Belgium is one of the founding countries of the European Community as well as one of 
the countries most experienced in chairing the Council Presidency. Its small size and 
federalist features triggered development of a consensus-oriented approach towards its 
politics and policy making system. This was further fostered by Belgium’s lengthy 
membership in the European Community (and the EU) and its successful exercise of the 
greatest number of the Council’s Presidencies. As a small Member State with only lim-
ited important national interests Belgium prioritised functions of honest brokering and 
driving the European agenda forward, rather than pursuing particular national agenda 
setting. Nevertheless, during the previous times in the office, as further analysis will 
demonstrate, Belgium still managed to promote some of the national interests, as well as 
its particular federalist preferences towards the European project. Thus, the national role 




conception and the particular nature of Belgian policy making might have had signifi-
cant influence on its behaviour while in the chair of the 2010 Presidency. 
Being one of the founding states Belgium continues to record a high percentage of sup-
port for the EU membership, with the 2009 Eurobarometer indicating 66% support 
(Standard Eurobarometer 73). The particular character of policy making at the national 
level constitutes an important factor for the Belgian role conceptions with reference to 
both European and foreign policies. As a federalist country the Belgian domestic deci-
sion process incorporates both regional and national levels of decision making; the 
complex structure is also reflected in the substance of Belgian foreign policy (Criecke-
mans 2010). The strategy of transferring some of the policy areas to the European level 
is also seen as a mechanism for ‘coping with tensions rising from the perceived diverg-
ing interests and policies of the constituent communities’ (Coolsaet and Soetendorp 
2001: 131). This is further reflected in the particular consensus style of policy making at 
the national and European levels. As observed by Coolsaet and Soetendorp '(...) Belgian 
foreign policy makers still try to convince their partners to accept their views on certain 
foreign policy issues during the political decision-making process leading to a common 
position. But once agreement on a common position has been reached (…) [the gov-
ernment] will adopt it as (…) [its] national position’ (2001: 130). The experience of the 
consensus and inclusive decision making system at the national level indirectly affected 
Belgium’s capacity at the European level. The extensive attempts to ensure consensus 
and compromise derive from the domestic political culture and are results of its diverse 
society, in religious, linguistic and cultural terms. Thus, many politicians prioritise the 
de-escalation of conflict over problem solving. This is further reflected in  the individu-
al style of politicians and diplomats, '[p]olitical leadership and statesmanship do not 
come naturally in Belgium' (Houben 2005 cited in Petrova 2007: 7),  but 'what Belgian 
diplomats see themselves as best at is the art of reaching compromise' (De Gucht 2006 
cited in Petrova 2007: 7) As further noted by Willame  'Belgian foreign policy is one of 
followership  (…) marked by the lack of integrative political figures ' (1999 cited in Pe-
trova 2007: 7). Consequently, it can be argued that the core of the Belgian national role 
conception is its default drive for achieving consensus and its compromise-oriented 
multilevel decision making system; thus its performance at the European level favours 
pursuit and development of common interests over particular national ones.  




Furthermore, as argued by Petrova, 'Belgian strong support for European integration, 
lack of assertiveness internationally and predilection for pursuing policies within the 
European framework have been variously attributed to its historical legacies, smallness, 
and weak national identity' (2011: 8). For Belgium, from the beginning the European 
integration was associated with Belgian economic development, securing a better posi-
tion at the international stage and increasing its influence through a collective approach. 
As argued by de Schoutheete, 'Europe has become a point of identification in a country 
where national self-consciousness and identity are rather weak and seem to restrain bold 
independent initiatives internationally' (1992 cited in Petrova 2007: 8). Thus, European 
integration seems to be the main focus of the Belgian national identity and its main goal 
is to ensure further advancement of the European project with the long-term aim of es-
tablishing a federal union (ESb/12.2010). This has been done by subsequent attempts to 
expand the supranationalist features of the EU decision making process as well as fa-
vouring expansion of the areas of integration (Franck et al. 1999). The main strategy for 
Belgium's membership has been dominated by the attempts to ensure balance between 
big and small Member States (ESb/12.2010). Thus, the main aim has been to ensure 
‘means of levelling the playing field’ by ‘reducing the power and influence of the great 
Member States over the smaller’ (Coolsaet and Soetendorp 2001: 131). Consequently, 
Belgium has been one of the few supporters of the introduction of qualified majority 
voting in the Council in the area of EU foreign affairs as it has seen it as a manner of 
reducing the voting power of large Member States (Coolsaet and Soetendorp 2001: 
132).  Belgium, among other small countries, was also one of the key supporters of 
maintaining the rotating system for the Council Presidency, seen as the main mecha-
nism of providing the EU with institutional balance and equality among big and small 
Member States (ESb/12.2010, see also Bunse 2009). 
As a small state with only limited national interests, Belgium's role conception reflects 
to a large extent the European perspective with reference to most of the international 
affairs and with only limited focus on key issues of national importance. As argued by 
Coolsaet and Soetendorp the foreign and security policy has never been regarded as a 
high priority for Belgium (2001: 134).  One of the few national priority areas linked to 
the colonialist traditions is the issue of Africa, with conflict management and peace 
building in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) being one of the key examples 
demonstrating Belgium's agenda setting at the European stage. The particular focus on 




ensuring sustained security-related management of the interventions in this region was 
the focus of the 2001 Belgian Presidency (Kelly 2007-2008: 60). With the limited fi-
nancial and political resources of a small state Belgium tends to take advantage of Eu-
ropean policy making to secure additional resources and thus increase the overall effec-
tiveness of  its individual national policy towards Africa (Coolsaet and Soetendorp 
2001: 138). Finally, with reference to most of the foreign issues on which Belgium had 
not elaborated any particular positions, the EU framework offers a possibility for expan-
sion of national positions without the requirement of applying extensive national re-
sources (Ibid.). 
The traditional consensus approach has been also reflected in the particular role prefer-
ences towards its Council Presidencies as Belgium has been usually associated with the 
role of neutral broker rather than political leader (research interviews). The most recent 
Belgian Presidency in 2001 centred on the institutional reform with the highlight event 
being formulation of the Laeken Declaration setting the Belgian vision for the enlarged 
Union and the timetable for the debate on the future of the EU (Kerremans and 
Drieskens 2003: 155). As noted by authors the 2001 Presidency was characterised by 
'procedural ambitions' referring to 'achieving a positive effect on the likelihood of reach-
ing agreement, especially on difficult and highly politicized issues, irrespective of the 
substance of such agreements' (Kerremans and Drieskens 2003: 157). This further high-
lights the role of the mediator in brokering compromises among Member States and 
emphasising the development of the European agenda. Nevertheless, in the area of for-
eign affairs the Belgian government aimed to pursue agenda setting by putting the is-
sues of Africa high on the European agenda (Kerremans and Drieskens 2003: 159).
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The national focus was reflected in the number of high-level international meetings, for 
example the Euro-African summit in Brussels in October 2001
62
. The Belgian govern-
ment also used its Presidency as an opportunity to put the issues on the agenda of the 
EC summit in Laeken (Kerremans and Drieskens 2003: 160). One of the key achieve-
ments was influencing the Commission stance on the 'Programme Indicatif National' 
which was supposed to facilitate EU development assistance to this region (Ibid.). Fi-
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 This particular interest was traced to the PM Verhofstadt’s previous activities as a member of the 
parliamentary commission dealing with Rwanda in 1996 (Kerremans and Drieskens 2003: 159-160). 
Additionally the region of Africa had been also of special attention to FM Louis Michel (Kerremans and 
Drieskens 2003: 160). 
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 There were also high-level visits of the EU Presidency to Burundi, Rwanda, Congo and Zimbabwe in 
November 2001. 




nally, Belgium was praised for the role it played during the 'World Conference against 
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance' in Durban (South 
Africa). The Belgian team acted as both a broker and a political leader, and thus 
strengthened the image of the EU on the global stage (Ibid.).   
Consequently, Belgium’s membership strategy can be summarised as a small Member 
State with limited national interests in foreign affairs clearly favouring further integra-
tion at the European level, seen as a mean of balancing interests between big and small 
Member States. The latter has been also demonstrated by political leadership exercised 
towards further integration. Its national role conception demonstrates a high level of 
stability across subsequent governments and has been influenced by its domestic expe-
rience of a consensus and compromise-seeking decision making system. This has been 
widely demonstrated by Belgian policy making at the European level as well as in the 
case of its previous Presidencies. Therefore, even when exercising political leadership 
this was rather targeted at achieving common European goals rather than particular na-
tional ones. The latter emphasis on the neutrality of the Presidency's role and national 
federalist preferences towards the further development of the EU project might to a 
large extent influence individual expectations held towards Belgium and its 2010 Presi-
dency. 
6.2 Expectations Towards the Belgian Presidencies  
 
Since no new formal agreements were adopted in order to clarify the ambiguous role of 
the Presidency and its position within the new institutional set up this section will focus 
on the informal expectations held by European and national actors.  
The six-month term of the Spanish Presidency demonstrated a high level of ambiguity 
with reference to the division of labour under the new provisions. Nonetheless, the new 
working arrangements were to emerge in the form of informal practices and rules rather 
than new formal provisions (SGCa/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012). Thus, the framework of 
the institutional expectations remained limited in its scope, allowing the Presidency’s 
role to develop informally. This might indicate that the post-Lisbon Presidency would 
continue with its pre-Lisbon ‘path dependency’ through informal role expansion. The 
Spanish Presidency, even if limited in its impact on the new institutional architecture 
due to its transitional character, managed to have a direct impact on the expectations 
towards the Belgian Presidency and the post-Lisbon scenario in general. It was expected 




that due to its characteristic of the ‘small Member State’, extensive previous Presidency 
experience and its overall successful performance while in the chair, ‘the Belgians 
would be doing a much better job at not stepping on anybody’s toes’ (SGCa/05.2012). 
This would indicate that Spain’s active performance was not considered as ‘appropriate 
behaviour’ in the post-Lisbon context. 
As argued before, small Member States have been usually perceived as more successful 
in exercising the Presidency’s functions, focusing rather on the European agenda and 
favouring the cooperative approach involving all of the actors. With a rather limited 
number of national interests the small states’ Presidencies do not aim for the spotlight 
and an extensive national agenda. Thus, they are usually perceived as genuine ‘honest 
brokers’ working in the interests of all Member States (research interviews). Nonethe-
less, even such an experienced country as Belgium was not certain what was expected 
of its Presidency in 2010. As one of the Belgian officials stated ‘this time we do not 
quite know what it means to have the Presidency’ (cited in Bunse et al. 2011: 55). In 
addition to this,  the domestic situation with a caretaker government taking over after 
the inconclusive parliamentary elections further lowered expectations towards the Bel-
gian Presidency in terms of exercising any kind of leadership. However, due to the par-
ticular design of multilevel governance this lack of government was not expected to 
hinder overall Belgian performance on the European stage (BEa/03.2011, 
BEb/03.2011). This latter will be further elaborated in the subsequent section. 
The 2010 Presidency would be Belgium’s 12th time in the office, making it one of the 
most experienced countries in the EU. Its previous Presidency, held in 2001, became 
associated with the particularly successful leadership in response to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks which proved that Belgium can be successful not only in managing the legisla-
tive work of the Council but also in crisis management and reacting to unexpected 
events. Consequently, as summarised by Van Hecke and Bursens, Belgium enjoyed ‘a 
rather strong reputation of running a successful Presidency’ (2011: 17). 
Expectations towards the Belgian Presidency were built on the basis of its role concep-
tions as a small Member State favouring a more federalist vision for the EU and thus 
more supranationalist policy-making method for the European foreign policy making. 
Thus, it was generally expected that, in contrast to the Spanish one, the Belgian Presi-
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Low High High 
External and Internal 
Representation 
Low High High 
Table 4 The Overview of Expectations Towards the Post-Lisbon Functions Second 
Half of 2010 (Author’s Own Compilation Based on the Analysis of the Interviews) 
 
6.3 Towards the Role Preference of the Belgian Presidency  
 
The Presidency’s programme set specific plans for the six-month period of the second 
half of 2010. It reflected the Trio Presidency programme in both the general structure 
and the substance of its strategic framework. The operational programme presents more 
concrete tasks to be completed based on the current European agenda and the rolling 
issues left by the Spanish Presidency. Prioritising the Presidency Trio’s programme 
served as another indication that the Belgian Presidency’s aim was to fully implement 
the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions and limit its role to following the already established Eu-
ropean agenda rather than focusing on national priorities. 
6.3.1 'Europe in Action!' - Official Programme of the Belgian Presidency 
 
The official programme of the Belgian Presidency introduced briefly the challenges fac-
ing the EU at that time, focusing on the ongoing economic crisis. It also emphasised the 
new institutional architecture and its potential contribution to the EU system as ‘these 
new institutions should allow us to lend new impetus to European development’ (Bel-




gian Presidency 2010: 4). Therefore, the main working method for the Belgian Presi-
dency would be 'through collective action and by establishing intensive dialogue with 
institutions and Member States’ (Belgian Presidency 2010: 4). The final section referred 
to ‘external relations’ and aimed ‘to consolidate the European Union's role as a force for 
global peace and security’ (Belgian Presidency 2010). In order to achieve this, the pro-
gramme prioritised creation of the EEAS. With reference to EU external representation 
‘the Belgian Presidency wants to optimise the potential of the new treaty and place em-
phasis on uniqueness of representation’ (Belgian Presidency 2010: 9). Secondly, the 
Presidency’s plans highlighted the continuation of the enlargement process, the opening 
of markets by focusing on the work of Doha Development Round and concluding the 
free trade agreements with South Korea. Thirdly, a particular focus was placed on the 
promotion of human rights. Fourthly and finally, during the six-month period  ‘The 
Heads of State or Government of the European Union will meet their Asian  and Afri-
can counterparts at two summits [with] the aim of strengthening cooperation and part-
nership with these continents and to address global challenges together’ (Belgian Presi-
dency 2010: 9). Thus, the final priority firmly pointed to Africa and Asia as regions of 
particular interest. Nevertheless, these issues were emerging from the EU working 
agenda rather than from the national one. 
The operational programme further highlighted the implementation of the LT: ‘The 
Belgian Presidency will continue the work carried out under previous presidencies to 
implement the Treaty of Lisbon (…) and will ensure, by working together directly with 
all individuals involved, that working methods and the sharing of responsibilities are 
consolidated and stabilised in full compliance with the Treaty of Lisbon.’ (Belgian Pres-
idency 2010: 11). This would be primarily done by ‘supporting the High Representative 
so that the European External Action Service can be effectively created and fully opera-
tional as soon as possible’ (Belgian Presidency 2010: 11). Therefore, ‘the recruitment of 
personnel to the Service at all levels, and the progressive transformation of the Europe-
an Union’s delegations are priority tasks’ (Belgian Presidency 2010: 47). Ensuring op-
erational capacity of the EEAS was seen as a necessary condition for ending the transi-
tional period. 
The Belgian Presidency emphasises the LT as ‘a true turning point in the organisation 
of the Union’s external relations (…) as it will strengthen the coherence of our Union's 
actions and its influence around the world’ (Belgian Presidency 2010: 46). The Presi-




dency acknowledged functions of the new actors, the POTEC and the HRVP and recog-
nised their central role in the new system of policy making. Nevertheless, ’in this transi-
tion period, in keeping with its European commitment, Belgium will do everything 
within its power, including the making available of personnel, to ensure the smooth ap-
plication of the new measures introduced by the Treaty in support of the President of the 
EC and the High Representative’ (Belgian Presidency 2010: 47). Furthermore, ‘with 
regard to the Common commercial policy, coordination within the Foreign Affairs 
Council will continue to be provided by the rotating Presidency’ (Belgian Presidency 
2010: 47) and ‘the Presidency will work towards the effective implementation of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in terms of common trade policy, particularly concerning the new rela-
tionship which must be built with the EP’ (Belgian Presidency 2010: 49). This demon-
strated the aim of exercising administrative and functional support as the Presidency's 
main function post-Lisbon, and thus highlighting the inter-institutional coordination of 
the complex system of EU external relations as a key task for Belgium. The fact that the 
issues referring to EU foreign policy, except for the implementation of the Lisbon Trea-
ty and swift creation of EEAS, were presented in the final part of the programme 
demonstrates further the perception held by the Belgian Presidency that this area should 
not be featured high on the Presidency's agenda.  Hosting of the EU- Africa summit 
would be the closest representation of national priorities of Belgium (ESb/12.2010). 
Otherwise the programme lacked any of the nationally important subjects.  This would 
further demonstrate the aim of the full implementation of the new system, rupturing 
with the practices thus far and removing the Presidency from any of the spotlight and 
leadership opportunity. 
6.3.2 Role Preference – the Domestic, European and International Context  
 
The thus far strong reputation of Belgium's exercise of the Presidency became chal-
lenged in 2010 by a particular domestic political context. The sudden resignation of 
PM Yves Leterme in April 2010, caused by the inability to reach an agreement over 
Brussels’ electoral borders between French- and Dutch-speaking parties, forced the col-
lapse of the Belgian government (Euractiv 27.04.2010). Belgium thus found itself pre-
paring for early elections only few months away from stepping into the chairmanship of 
the EU Council. The elections held on June 13, 2010 left the country divided with the 
New Flemish Alliance winning in the northern, Dutch-speaking part of the country, and 
the Social Party winning in French-speaking Wallonia. The victory of the Flemish party 




with its separatist tendencies was an indication of the willingness of the Northern part of 
the country to give more powers over the EU affairs to regional governments 
(ESb/12.2010). The earliest the new government was expected to be formed was Sep-
tember (Euractiv 01.07.2010); thus it was possible that the new government with new 
officials would have to take over control of the European issues and the daily manage-
ment of the EU Council’s management halfway through the Presidency. The opinion 
that this might lead to problems with ensuring continuity of Belgian performance was 
widely reflected in the international press coverage.
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 The fact that the Flemish party did 
not have any previous diplomatic experience was identified as a factor potentially hin-
dering the performance of the Presidency (Drieskens 2011: 92). In the aftermath of the 
2007 elections negotiations between parties lasted seven months; thus, Belgium might 
have found itself without a new government not only during the launch of the Presiden-
cy, but even during the whole six-month period.
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 The latter was admitted by both the 
caretaker PM Leterme and the rest of the government officials (Euractiv 27.05.2010). 
At the same time their efforts focused on ensuring that this would not have any substan-
tial impact on the performance of the Belgian team.  
Due to the complex system of governance spread across federal and regional govern-
ments the substantial part of the Presidency agenda would be under the exclusive juris-
diction of regional governments. This formula was already tested during the 2001 Presi-
dency (Drieskens 2011: 92). This on the one hand would allow Belgium to maintain its 
performance as the chair of the EU Council despite not having a new fully functional 
government in place; on the other hand, some ‘problems may surface with regard to ef-
fective coordination of multi-level inputs and shared responsibilities between regions 
and the partially enabled federal government’ (Bello 2010). However, due to the tradi-
tional Belgian cooperative approach already at the stage of the preparation of the Presi-
dency's programme the main focus was to ensure the most inclusive approach, involving 
in the discussion as many political parties as possible. This was to ensure a general 
agreement on Belgium’s strategy and national political support for the Presidency 
(ESb/12.2010). As pointed out by Secretary of State for European Affairs Olivi-
er Chastel during one of the pre-Presidency interviews:  ‘In Belgium, approving a Pres-
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idency programme is almost like approving a national policy programme’ (Euractiv 
02.06.2010) therefore indicating the extensive framework of  multi-level negotiations 
enabling the achievement of general consensus at the national level. Finally, the lack of 
a full-time federal government was even portrayed as a possible advantage; as explained 
by PM Leterme during the presentation of the Belgian programme in the EP on July 7, 
2010: ‘(…) one of the advantages of the current political situation in my country is that 
we can devote almost all our time to the EU rotating Presidency’ (Leterme 2010).  
Following the example of the Spanish Presidency, Belgium stressed that the implemen-
tation of the LT would be its primary priority. This would mean that with reference to 
foreign affairs ‘you will not hear my views on foreign policy’ as declared by FM 
Vanackere (Willis 2010). The declared lack of willingness to use its Presidency as an 
opportunity for agenda shaping was argued to be mostly due to the lack of strong na-
tional priorities. As noted by Van Hecke and Bursens 'a fierce defence of national inter-
ests presumes a clear definition of these interests; Belgian politicians will be mainly 
dealing with domestic issues, there won't be much time left to define those interests’  
(2010). Nonetheless, Belgium still saw its time in the office as a chance to project its 
particular vision for the post-Lisbon EU foreign relations. As noted by Belgium's EU 
ambassador Jean De Ruyt during one of the events on the Belgian Presidency at the Eu-
ropean Policy Centre in Brussels: ‘We [the EU] have ... to redefine our role in the 
world, in the new world with emerging powers and the new polarity’(EU Observer 
11.06.2010). This was to be facilitated by the new institutional innovations introduced 
by the LT. As Ambassador De Ruyt explained, the goal was to bring to conclusion the 
transitional phase opened by the Spanish Presidency and ‘stabilise the new institutions’ 
by the end of the year (Sampol 2010). He also pointed out the growing role of the EP in 
adopting international agreements. This was expected to appear on the agenda of the 
Belgian Presidency as the ‘Framework Agreement’, adopted between the Commission 
and the EP confirming the growing powers of the EP in adopting international agree-
ments. However, it was met with some objections from Member States (EPc/05.2012, 
EPd/05.2012). Thus, Belgium was ready to mediate between Member States and the EP 
and the Commission (Ibid.). 
Nonetheless, Belgium was thus aiming to use its Presidency to actively pursue its vision 
for European integration and in particular its method of working. Some indications on 
the latter can be found in the presentation given by Foreign Affairs Minister Karel de 




Gucht during an opening of a diplomatic conference in Brussels in 2009. He pointed out 
that the Presidency would be used to re-establish the EU institutional balance as increas-
ingly the EU became ‘governed by an executive board of big countries’ (Euractiv 
21.04.2009). Thus, the aim would be to ‘restore the proper functioning of the EU insti-
tutions (…) in which the utmost respect of the Community method occupies a primary 
position’ (Ibid.). This was further emphasised during a press conference with Leterme 
held on June 25, 2010 as he  confirmed the primary role of the Belgian Presidency as an 
honest broker and thus aiming for ‘concrete progress in moving closer to Europe by all 
countries involved’ (cited in Van Hecke and Bursens 2011: 33). 
As argued above, the Belgian Presidency aimed to end the transitional period in Euro-
pean politics and ‘set good precedents, manage to execute the full potential of the LT 
and create something lasting’ as stated by a Belgian official (cited in Bunse et al. 2011: 
54-55). State Secretary for European Affairs Chastel stated that the Belgian Presidency 
‘will mark a rupture – or break – from current practice following the entry into force of 
the LT in December’ (Euractiv 27.04.2010). Thus, the Belgian team was aiming to set a 
new scenario for the role of the Presidency in the post-Lisbon European foreign policy 
making. The latter would mean that the Member State in the chair would step down 
from the European spotlight, focusing rather on exercising a supportive role towards the 
new actors, the POTEC and HRVP.  As Secretary Chastel stated ‘both [Herman Van 
Rompuy and Catherine Ashton] will have full responsibility for their entire field of 
competence’ (Ibid.). This did not mean that the Belgian Presidency would be missing all 
together from the EU foreign affairs, rather, as stated by Chastel, Belgium would 'not 
step aside but will implement the LT, all the LT and nothing but the LT’ (Ibid.). This 
meant that Belgian MFA and its diplomatic corps would be at the HRVP’s disposal and 
as he emphasised, the Presidency would focus on doing 'everything the HRVP considers 
the rotating Presidency should do. And not the opposite, not on an equal footing’ (Ibid). 
Therefore, Belgium left the practical application of its Presidency's role preference to be 
decided by both the POTEC and the HRVP and thus allowing them to decide what 
should be the functions of the post-Lisbon Presidency and its position within the new 
institutional architecture. Nonetheless, as suggested by Bello (2010) this could ‘also be 
read as making virtue out of necessity, suggesting an unusual willingness to surrender 
presidential prerogatives to EU bureaucracy in order to deflect attention away from in-
ternal Belgian complications’.  




This ‘supporting and back seat approach’ was reflected by intensive coordinative efforts 
held regularly with the cabinets of the HRVP and POTEC in the pre-Presidency period 
and later during the Presidency itself. The former was to clarify any confusion in the 
division of labour as surfacing in the example of the Spanish Presidency 
(SGCa/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012, EPd/05.2012). Thus, the issue of hosting international 
summits, one of the most contentious issues on the Spanish agenda, was to be decided 
in advance (ESc/12.2010). The pre-Lisbon practice did not provide any ultimate solu-
tion as EU summits held with its international partners used to be organised either in 
Brussels, or in the capital of the country in the chair of the Presidency, or finally in the 
capital of the partner country. Belgium agreed on new arrangements which stipulated 
that all bilateral summits with non-EU countries would be held either in Brussels or in 
the partner countries' capitals (SGCa/05.2012). Furthermore, multilateral summits 
would be held in Brussels; in case of the Belgian Presidency it was the EU-ASEM 
summit to be held in October 2010 (Ibid.). It was decided that the latter would be hosted 
by the Belgian Presidency as it had been preparing for the summit for over two years 
(Ibid.). Moreover, it was agreed that the practice established by the Spanish Presidency 
of hosting the Gymnich meetings by the Member State in the chair of the Presidency 
should be continued (Ibid.). This was seen as 'a gesture of goodwill' towards accommo-
dating the Presidency's input without formally undermining the new system 
(SGCb/05.2012). Nevertheless, as confirmed by Belgian officials all of the EU foreign 
policy statements would be made exclusively by the HRVP, not by the Presidency 
(Ibid.).  
In conclusion, the role preference of the Belgian Presidency envisaged that its actual 
performance would be conditioned by the performance of the POTEC and the HRVP. 
This might suggest that the political leadership of the Belgian Presidency might be lo-
cated not in the pursuit of concrete priorities, but rather in actively shaping the new in-
stitutional system and setting a lasting scenario for the post-Lisbon functional Presiden-
cy. However, with the post-Lisbon system only starting to take shape the expectations 
towards the Belgian Presidency were still shaped to a large extent by its transitional 
character. Therefore, these expectations would have to adjust to account for insufficien-
cies of the emerging system and would require the Member State in the chair to play a 
more active role through deputisation and supporting the HRVP in her supranationalist 
functions. The first months of the HRVP's time in the office demonstrated her inability 




to exercise political leadership in EU foreign affairs thus creating a vacuum at the Euro-
pean level, yet Belgium was not expected to fill this in; rather to encourage the HRVP 
to play a more active role (ESa/12.2010). This further indicated the transitional charac-
ter of the Belgian Presidency which might affect its enactment of the original role pref-
erence as well as its ability to shape the post-Lisbon system. 
6.4 The Belgian Presidency in Office – Role Enactment 
 
 The subsequent part of the chapter will focus on the period of role enactment of the 
Belgian Presidency while in the chair of the EU Council. The analysis will take into ac-
count previously identified factors both enabling and constraining the Member State’s 
performance while in the chair as well as the particular context of the Belgian Presiden-
cy. The subsequent part of the chapter will be structured according to the pre-Lisbon 
functions of organisational management, external and internal representation, honest 
broker and political leadership. 
6.4.1 Organisational Management   
 
First of all, Belgium had to continue with the practice established by Spain and took 
over chairmanship of the Political and Security Committee and the Council's WGs in 
the absence of the EEAS. As already indicated with reference to the Spanish Presidency 
the chairmanship was implemented on ‘behalf of the HRVP’ thus limiting the possible 
agenda setting and management to following instructions as supplied by the HRVP and 
her cabinet. The management of the WGs were perceived as not very efficient, mostly 
due to the limited capabilities of the HRVP’s office to supply agendas of the meetings 
and draft documents well in advance. Thus, Spain decided to use this as an opportunity 
to pursue its own agenda whenever it was possible. The Belgian Presidency, facing the 
same dilemma, decided not to overstep its prerogatives and rather limit its individual 
initiative. This led to further 'mismanagement' of foreign affairs as perceived by Mem-
ber States (SGCa/05.2012, POTEC/04.2012, EPd/05.2012; Vogel 2012). The FAC 
meetings as well as some of the WGs lacked proper preparations and it was difficult to 
agree on conclusions as the Belgian chair did not have enough detailed instructions on 
the original objectives of the HRVP (Ibid.). This was seen as a result of HRVP’s strate-
gy of micromanagement which left her unable to cope with the various issues on the 
FAC agenda (SGCa/05.2012, POTEC/04.2012, EPd/05.2012; Vogel 2012). As already 
demonstrated by the Spanish Presidency, acting on behalf of the HRVP left the Presi-




dency with no national representation during meetings. Nonetheless, in the case of Bel-
gium it further strengthened its original preference of prioritising honest brokering 
among Member States’ preferences over ensuring political leadership.   
The perceived 'mismanagement' of the FAC put pressure on the Belgian Presidency and 
created a demand on Belgium's role as a mediator between the Member States and the 
HRVP (ESa/12.2010). The latter development could be seen as an informal expansion 
of the Presidency’s role of internal representation within the European institutional ar-
chitecture. Following the adoption of the Council decision on establishing EEAS in Oc-
tober 2010 the HRVP moved to appoint her permanent chairs, starting with PSC in No-
vember 2010 (EU 2010a) and following with the rest of the WGs in December 2010 
(EU 2010b)
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; thus leaving it up to the Hungarian Presidency to work out practical ar-
rangements among the EEAS and the Presidency with reference to chairmanship and 
management of the Council's WGs. 
6.4.2 External and Internal Representation 
 
As presented in the previous chapter the external representation of the Council was tak-
en over by the POTEC and the HRVP. Nonetheless, as argued before, the issue of who 
should chair and where to host international summits had been to a large extent decided 
in the pre-Presidency period. Thus, the Belgian Presidency acted as a host to two inter-
national summits: the EU-ASEM and the EU-Africa. In comparison with the Spanish 
Presidency this constitutes a visible reduction in the number of international summits 
chaired by the Presidency. This was also perceived as an indication that this function 
would be gradually taken over by the POTEC and the HRVP (ESb/12.2010). Neverthe-
less, the example of the Belgian Presidency still demonstrated a particular national pref-
erence with reference to the region of Africa. 
The 8
th
 EU-ASEM summit was held in Brussels in October 2010 was supposed to be the 
highlight of the Belgian Presidency as its biggest international event with 46 heads of 
state and government coming to Brussels. As argued by Drieskenset et al. it was ‘the 
first opportunity for the post-Lisbon EU to present itself to its Asian partners in a high-
level context’ (2012: 213). The original role preference of the Belgian Presidency to 
play a secondary role to both the POTEC and the President of the Commission as the 
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official representatives of the EU fell through, as the expectations of the Asian leaders 
were to deal with the individual Member States rather than the EU (Ibid.).
66
 As ex-
plained by Telo (2011) ‘On several occasions the Asian partners of ASEM have reacted 
with bewilderment to the proposal of the Belgian Presidency to attribute a central role to 
President Van Rompuy on the occasion of the official opening of the conference.' He 
presented the perception of the Asian states which argued that  'ASEM is a forum of 
states and not a meeting of the regional organisations of Europe and Asia, that is to say 
a forum where states meet and participate as individual entities’ (Ibid.). The Belgian 
team managed to convince the Asian representatives 'on terms of the exceptional case' 
to allow the summit to be hosted by the POTEC. As argued by Telo’ perhaps the na-
tionality of President van Rompuy also played a positive role’ (Ibid.). However on the 
international stage the European leadership framework was still perceived as ‘over-
confusing’ (SGCa/05.2012). 
The Belgian chairmanship of the EU representation to the EU-Africa summit was a re-
sult of the Belgium team taking over the representation of the EU in Libya in the ab-
sence of EU Delegations in this country (ESb/12.2010). Since the summit was hosted by 
Libya, Belgian officials emerged as the EU representative rather by default than by a 
strategic decision. Nonetheless, as stressed by Renier Nijskens, Director of the Africa 
Desk at Federal Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the summit ‘was co-chaired by EC 
President Van Rompuy [as] in the context of preparing the summit, Belgium acted un-
der the authority and at the service of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, Catherine 
Ashton’ (Europafrica 2011). Thus, the Belgian teams both in Tripoli and in Brussels 
were responsible for organisation of the preparatory meetings (Drieskenset et al. 2011: 
212). As further noted by the authors ‘the Belgian team (…) had to explain the post-
Lisbon reality to its Libyan counterparts, who were still assuming that Belgian PM 
would speak on behalf of the EU’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, Belgium’s successful perfor-
mance at the summit became undermined due to the contentious issue of ‘the possible 
participation of Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, who was indicted 
by the International Criminal Court’ (Ibid.). The EU countries threatened to withdraw 
their participation in the case of the Sudanese President’s appearance. The Belgian team 
                                                          
66
 The perception of the united EU representation was also hindered by the fact that the invitations to 
the summit were co-signed by the Belgian PM, the presence of Belgian national flag and the presence of 
the Belgian PM during the press conference (Drieskens, Debaere, De Ridder and Nasra 2010: 213). 




proposed a compromise by supporting the Libya’s bid for the seat at the UN Human 
Rights Council (2011-2013) in exchange for withdrawing the invitation for the Suda-
nese President (Ibid.). The Belgian team took part in drafting texts of the Tripoli Joint 
Declaration and the 2011–2013 Action Plan. However none of these documents man-
aged to bring any substantial changes to the relations. Consequently, the Belgian Presi-
dency had a limited impact on the substance of the meeting agenda and failed to trans-
late its ambitions towards the meeting due to the general lack of support from the Afri-
can and EU countries (Ibid.). 
The remaining summits: Brazil (Enterprise Conference on 14 July), South Africa (28 
September), China (6 October), South Korea (6 October), Ukraine (22 November), Rus-
sia (7 December) and most importantly the postponed summit (24 November) demon-
strated the fully applied post-Lisbon model of EU representation comprising of the PO-
TEC and the President of the Commission, and the HRVP on particular occasions. The 
Belgian Presidency did not play any direct role with reference to these summits, thus 
creating rather ambiguous expectations that the Presidency can still play a more active 
role with reference to preferred policy areas (SGCb/05.2012, ESc/12.2010, 
BEb/03.2011).  
The consolidation of the post-Lisbon EU external representation was supposed to be 
reflected in the attempts to secure a right of participation for the POTEC in the UN 
General Debate. This request was met with scepticism at the UN level on the grounds 
that other regional organisations might become marginalized in their relations with 
the UN (Wec 2011). The Belgian Presidency proved to be quite active in this matter by 
looking for a possible compromise. One was proposed in the form of a revised draft of 
the original resolution prepared by Member States including additional provisions 
'granting other regional organisations demonstrating advanced patterns of integration 
the same rights' (ESa/12.2010).  However, during the General Assembly held on Sep-
tember 14, 2010 the resolution was not even put to the vote due to the high level of di-










With reference to the internal representation of the Council this was also managed by 
the HRVP; nonetheless the Belgian Presidency continued the practice established by 
Spain of filling in ‘on behalf of the HRVP’ during the briefings and meetings with the 
EP (SGCa/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012). Additionally, the Presidency had to step in to fur-
ther increase coordination between various configurations of WGs to ensure sufficient 
horizontal and vertical coherence of EU affairs. However this continued in a rather in-
formal capacity without any formal institutionalisation (SGCa/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012, 
EPd/05.2012).  
The continuation of the practice which had emerged under the Spanish Presidency of 
filling in for the EU representation in countries without EU Delegations became an in-
stitutionalised rule under the Council decisions adopted on January 19, 2010 for the first 
half of 2010 (CEU 2010c) and on June 30, 2010 for the second half of 2010 (CEU 
2010d). Other than the case of the Belgian representation in Libya this did not result in 
enhancing the political capacity of the Presidency as the Belgians were prioritising se-
curing of  the EU common interests rather than the national ones (FR/05.2012). Both 
external and internal representation as performed by Belgium in the second half of 2010 
illustrated its attempts to perform a minimalist Presidency. However, challenged by the 
institutional feedback, it had to perform a more active role. This, however, became an 
opportunity for illustrating how such an active performance might be done in support of 
the new system. 
6.4.3 Neutral Brokering  
 
Following the example of the Spanish Presidency the performance of the Belgian Presi-
dency in its role of honest broker will be analysed using the example of the process of 
the EEAS's formation. 
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As outlined in the previous chapter the Spanish team managed to make a breakthrough 
during the inter-institutional negotiations between the HRVP, the Commission and the 
EP in June 2010. This enabled the EP to approve the draft of the revised Council’s deci-
sion as negotiated by the Spanish Presidency on July 8, 2010. Following agreement on 
the revised version at the GAC meeting on July 26 the decision was transferred into the 
hands of the European Commission which expressed its agreement on the same day. 
Nevertheless, the formulation of the EEAS could not have been implemented without 
two further regulations: the staff and financial regulation and the EEAS’s budget 
(ESa/12.2010). As argued by Drieskens et al. this is where the Belgian Presidency’s in-
put was much appreciated. The particular Belgian context of multilevel governance and 
thus extensive experience in complex negotiations made it one of the most appropriate 
brokers on the complex issue of negotiations on staffing with reference to quota and 
flexibility (2010: 210). The negotiations were concluded with the adoption of the Staff 
and Financial Regulation on October 20, 2010 by the EP (Euractiv 21.10.2010) and by 
the Council on November 18, 2010 thus leading to official creation of the EEAS on De-
cember 1, 2010. Belgium thus continued the practice established by Spain of ensuring 
brokering and coordination among various actors involved in the complex post-Lisbon 
system in the process of formation of the EEAS. 
6.4.4 Policy entrepreneurship/political leadership   
 
The Belgian Presidency was definitely the first one that should not be judged according 
to advancement of national priorities in its role enactment since only few of the priori-
ties were listed in its agenda. Nonetheless, one of the most concrete results would be the 
conclusion of the EU-South Korea free trade agreement signed in the margins of the Oc-
tober EU-SAEM summit held in Brussels. The agreement was ‘the most ambitious ever 
concluded by the union’ resulting in the creation of approx. 19 billion euros of new ex-
ports for EU producers (Euractiv 17.09.2010). Its adoption was presented by the Bel-
gian FM during a press conference stressing that  ‘this is the first generation of bilateral 
trade agreements which will bind Europe and Asia together in an ever-closer economic 
bond (…) and a very big step in opening markets in Asia for our companies’ (Ibid.). 
The Belgian Presidency was the key broker which managed to secure Italian support for 
the agreement by proposing ‘a compromise to delay by six months the introduction of 
an agreement that Rome fears could hurt its car industry’ (Ibid.). Thus, as noted before, 




the area of trade remained one of the policy areas in which the Presidency could contin-
ue to play a more active role. 
The subsequent area of the role enactment will focus on the inter-institutional relations, 
in particular with reference to the POTEC and the HRVP.  The relations with the PO-
TEC were to a large extent facilitated by the fact that Van Rompuy was a former Bel-
gian President, thus he already enjoyed close relations with Belgian officials and politi-
cians and could rely on an extensive network of personal connections (ESb/12.2010).  
Following the informal practice set by the Spanish Presidency regular contacts were es-
tablished between the cabinets of the POTEC and the HRVP and the Belgian Presidency 
(SGCa/05.2012). In the case of the POTEC, this enabled extensive coordination, but the 
rotating Presidency did not have much influence on the substance of the conclusions of 
the EC meetings (SGCa/05.2012). The Belgian Presidency brought to an end the infor-
mal practice established by the Spanish Presidency, but not favourably perceived by the 
European actors (ESb/12.2010), that a head of state of the Member State in the chair 
joined the POTEC for the post-EC press conferences. Only the last one, concluding the 
six-month period of the chairmanship, was to be attended by the Belgian Presidency 
(Bunse et al.  2011: 56). 
The cooperation with the HRVP and her cabinet was not perceived to be as smooth. The 
practice of coordination meetings was established early on; nevertheless they did not 
provide sufficient input from the HRVP with reference to meeting agendas and docu-
ments (ESb/12.2010). As pointed out by Vanhoonacker, Pomorska and Maurer, addi-
tional bi-weekly coordination meetings were organised from March 2010 onwards 
amongst high-level representatives of the MFA/REPER and the HRVP’s cabinet; sub-
sequently ‘the role of this task force was to set the foreign policy agenda under the lead-
ership of the HRVP’ (2011: 71). Nevertheless without proper and timely outputs the 
agenda of the Council's bodies and WGs were prepared only a few days in advance and 
documents were not distributed on time. This reinforced the negative perception of the 
HRVP’s management style. One of the interviewees indicated that the HRVP was trying 
to foster a rather Community-style policy-making taking advantage of her previous 
Commission experience (GB/05.2012). Most of the Member States did not find this an 
appropriate method for foreign policy making post-Lisbon (Ibid.). 




 In addition to this, the HRVP asked to be deputised sometimes only a week or even a 
few days in advance, which proved to make it difficult for Belgium to manage any me-
dium-term planning (ESb/12.2010, ESc/12.2010). As pointed out by one of interview-
ees ‘the cooperation with Ashton and her team was strained’ and ‘the biggest challenge 
was the limited access to the HRVP’ (Vannhonacker, Pomorska, Maurer 2011: 71). A 
few months after finishing its Presidency the Belgian FM admitted during a press inter-
view that the performance of the HRVP Ashton was ‘characterised by silence on im-
portant foreign policy issues, (…) little long-term strategy and poor management of her 
agenda (Willis 2011). He also noted his disappointment with reference to the EEAS and 
its lack of significant analytical output on the debate about the EU relationship with 
strategic partners. He further stated that ‘the analysis prepared by the staff of Ashton 
was rather disappointing. It was an inventory of what people who watch the world al-
ready know: China is important, emerging market, be careful’ (Willis 2011). Yet the 
Belgian Presidency did not step in, leaving it up to the HRVP to manage and organise 
foreign affairs of the EU, further demonstrating the limits of the post-Lisbon Presiden-
cy. 
6.5 Role Assessment 
 
Overall, the assessment of the Belgian Presidency undertaken by the European officials 
focused on its pursuit of supportive and administrative functions. As explained by 
Vanackere 'the Belgian Presidency intentionally chose not to partake in issuing declara-
tions and political statements, but instead focused on its role as a facilitator' (Brand 
2010). As indicated by one of the interviewees Belgium set the precedent for the post-
Lisbon 'invisible' Presidency (FR/05.2012). This was further emphasised by a Belgian 
official: ‘The PM is no longer in the driving seat, but for the technical Councils he is 
now more involved. Both our PM and FM are now requesting much greater discipline 
from their cabinet’ (cited in Bunse et al. 2011: 56). The chairmanship of some of the 
WGs and most of the Council's bodies such as COREPER II and the GAC affected the 
position of the Presidency and thus ensured its active role in external relations 
(ESb/12.2010). As further observed by the authors ‘Leterme worked behind-the-scenes 
rather than in the limelight to ensure effective high-level coordination work with the 
president of the EP, President of the Commission and the President of the EC’ (Bunse et 
al. 2011: 60). Therefore, the Belgian experience contributed to the further institutionali-
sation of the Presidency's role which expanded further towards supporting the perfor-




mance of the new actors and the post-Lisbon complex system through coordinating 
functions.  
One of the priorities of the Belgian Presidency was to establish ‘a point of no return’ so 
the subsequent Member States could not revert to the previous model of the ‘pre-Lisbon 
Presidency'. The impact of Belgium's role making was further strengthened by the gen-
eral positive assessment. The overall performance was regarded as successful and in the 
spirit of the LT by all of the European actors, the Presidents of the European Commis-
sion, EP and the EC, thus meeting the expectations set for Belgium. As pointed out by 
Lété (2010) ‘Belgium may have truly been the first country to lead an EU Presidency in 
post-Lisbon style’. 
It is difficult to assess the capacity for influence of the Belgian Presidency since from 
the very onset of the Presidency the Belgian team was stressing its commitment to the 
new actors and their powers. Among the new EEAS appointments presented on Sep-
tember 15 Belgium received two positions:  Heads of Delegation in Senegal and Burun-
di. However, it was generally expected that after securing such a high ranking position 
as the position of the President of the EC Belgium would not be a front runner in terms 
of the EEAS senior appointments (Bunse et al. 2011: 210). No political leadership of 
the Belgian Presidency was recorded with reference to nationally important priorities, 
for example the Congo. The latter was mentioned by the FRIDE analyst Bello as he 
pointed out that ‘in the DR Congo (DRC)/Great Lakes of Africa region (…)  Belgium's 
historic ties (…)  are particularly suited to providing European leadership and input at a 
time when the DRC's post-transition arrangement faces its sternest test to date' (Euractiv 
24.06.2010). He further argued that Belgium could ‘create much needed leeway for EU 
crisis and peace-building interventions with measurable impacts’ (Ibid). However, the 
role preference of the Belgian Presidency did not provide any space for exercising in-
fluence over nationally important areas of EU external relations. The characteristics of 
agenda shaping in the area of European foreign policy started to adjust to the post-
Lisbon reality and become more top-down as a result of the strategic leadership sup-
plied by the POTEC. In September 2010 the latter organised a special session of the EC 
on the subject of the EU foreign relations (EU Observer, 11.06.2010). Thus as conclud-
ed by Bunse et al. ‘[The Presidency] looks more like a service provider to the EC or 
middle manager now, than a source of political leadership’ (2011: 60). Therefore, Bel-
gium brought further clarifications into the role of the Presidency: it should continue in 




its capacity to provide supportive and functional administrative function rather than a 
political institution associated with agenda setting. Yet, some of the interviewees indi-
cated that even though this should be the post-Lisbon role prescription for the Presiden-
cy, some of the Member States, in particular the big ones and with strong national prior-
ities in foreign policy, might want to restore the scenario for a more politically charged 
Presidency aiming for political entrepreneurship. Consequently, the impact of the min-
imalist scenario as pursued by Belgium might be challenged by some of the Member 
States on the grounds that Belgium did not have a permanent and functioning govern-
ment at that time (GB/05.2012, FR/05.2012). Nevertheless, it seems that Belgium also 
demonstrated that through actions such as ‘supporting and back seat Presidency’ some 
degree of political leadership and influence on the European agenda might still be exer-
cised. 
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6.6 Role Institutionalisation under the Belgian Leadership – Towards Role 
Prescription  
 
With only limited informal clarifications brought by the Spanish Presidency and no fur-
ther institutional expectations Belgium continued to have more leeway for its individual 
role preference. To a large extent this role preference was built on the assessment of the 




Spanish Presidency, which was generally perceived as the last pre-Lisbon rather than 
the first post-Lisbon Presidency. Therefore, Belgium wanted to discontinue the experi-
ence up to this point and establish a precedent for the new post-Lisbon Presidency. 
Thus, the Belgian team aimed for a limited involvement in foreign affairs, leaving the 
management for the European actors. This was however challenged at the structural 
level as the HRVP was not capable of performing the role on her own. Eventually influ-
enced by the emerging expectations at the institutional level Belgium had to play a more 
active role than it had originally planned. As in the case of the Spanish Presidency the 
emerging system empowered Belgium to pursue some of the functions traditionally as-
sociated with the pre-Lisbon Presidency. The analysis of the role preference and the 
subsequent role enactment clearly demonstrated the impact of the national role concep-
tion in European and foreign policy. The traditional consensus and compromise-seeking 
style of policy making enabled the Presidency to be positioned as the main supporter for 
the HRVP in her administrative, representation and brokering functions. The only func-
tion Belgium decided not to perform was the one of agenda setter and political leader, 
clearly demonstrating its traditional preference for supranationalist policy-making also 
in the area of EU foreign affairs. 
In the past, following the historical institutionalist argument of ‘unexpected conse-
quences’, the role expansion of the Presidency was a result of the changing relative 
power of the other European actors, in particular the Commission. In the multi-actor 
environment of the EU the functions of one actor depends on how other actors interpret 
and perform their functions. The findings of the chapter further confirm this argument 
that the performance of the Presidency depends on the performance on the other actors, 
in particular the POTEC and the HRVP. The role enactment of the Belgian Presidency 
depended on the performance of Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton in the 
chair of their functions. The efficient performance of Van Rompuy facilitated the aim of 
the Belgian Presidency of performing its minimalist approach. While reference to the 
HRVP ‘the back seat’ approach was undermined by the perceived inefficient perfor-
mance of Catherine Ashton in her role, characterised by excessive micromanagement 
and lack of sufficient political leadership. Therefore, the general underperformance in 
foreign affairs was noticeable. The Belgian Presidency did not step in to provide politi-
cal leadership but rather maintained its supportive, functional role preference through 
increasingly acting as a ‘broker’ between the HRVP and Member States. The Belgian 
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Presidency became one of the contact points for other Member States thus further 
strengthening its functions of neutral brokering. 
The supportive stance towards the POTEC resulted in its increasing exercise of political 
leadership in foreign affairs as demonstrated by the example of the EC thematic meeting 
in September 2010. At that time the agenda setting started to become more top-down 
and exercised by the European actors. The function of the Presidency became more 
technical by translating strategic political decisions into Council decisions through their 
formulation in the Council preparatory bodies, Thus, as observed by  Bekke (2011) 
there was a ‘shift from a political to an administrative leadership of the Presidency’. The 
function of the Belgian Presidency shifted inwards (Drieskenset et al.2011: 209), focus-
ing on internal representation and coordination between various Council configurations 
(primarily the FAC and WGs).  This role was summarised by Deputy PM Vanackere 
during his last press conference on December 20, 2010 by comparing the Presidency to 
a car: thus the Presidency is ‘(…) not an additional wheel of the car but a mechanism to 
coordinate the smooth running of the four existing wheels of a car’ (cited in Van de 
Voorde 2012: 5). 
The case study of the Belgian Presidency further demonstrated the constituted process 
of the institutionalisation of the Presidency's role as a result of particular role making, 
which was further challenged by the way the institutional feedback with the developing 
system required a greater role than originally envisaged by the Belgian team. Nonethe-
less, it was also recognised that due to the particular circumstances of Belgium being a 
small country and having a caretaker government, the applicability of this model will be 
rather limited with reference to big Member States and members with strong national 
interests in European foreign policy (SGCb/05.2012). The long-term impact on the in-
stitutional set up was also limited due to the transitional character of the Belgian Presi-
dency, namely the lack of a fully-fledged EEAS. As observed by Taylor (2011) 'Bel-
gium has provided one answer to the Lisbon treaty's ambiguities, but it is not the only 
one possible'. Therefore, the subsequent Presidency – led by Hungary – was supposed to 
bring some new clarification of the function and position of the rotating Presidency un-
der the full-time EEAE’s chairmanship of the PSC and most of the Council WGs on 
foreign affairs and the fledgling EU diplomatic service.  
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The Belgian Presidency aimed at introducing 'a point of no return' for the post-Lisbon 
Presidency’s role in external affairs by setting a precedent of a supporting and function-
al Presidency, and thus enabling the full development of the capacities of the new ac-
tors. Nevertheless, without the fully developed institutional system, namely the opera-
tional EEAS, the HRVP was still not capable of performing all of the functions on her 
own. Thus the original role preference of the Belgian Presidency was challenged by the 
institutional feedback creating further informal expectations towards its role. Thus Bel-
gium played an active role on the European stage by supporting the HRVP through ex-
ercising tasks of organisational management, internal and external representation and to 
some extent neutral brokering. The functions of agenda setter and political leadership 
still not having been fully addressed at the European level resulted in a political vacuum 
and 'mismanagement of foreign affairs' (SGCa/05.2012); however Belgium deliberately 
decided not to address these issues. As demonstrated by Belgium’s term in the office, 
the role of the Presidency depends both on a nationally envisaged role preference and 
institutional feedback which might either empower or constrain the Member State in its 
pursuit of the original strategy. The latter might also have an impact on the informal ex-
pectations which might change in the course of the term in the office, thus requiring the 
Member State to adjust its strategy and subsequent behaviour, as was the case with both 
Spain and Belgium. As noted before, the Hungarian Presidency would be the first post-
Lisbon Presidency operating alongside a ‘more or less’ fully operational EEAS, and 
thus it would bring further clarifications towards the post-Lisbon institutional dynamics.  
This chapter continues with the empirical analysis examining the Hungarian Presidency 
of the EU Council in the first half of 2011 by applying the analytical framework of the 
role institutionalisation as outlined in figure 6. 
7.1 National Role Conceptions – Hungarian Foreign and European Policies  
 
Both Hungary and Poland belong to the group of the Central and Eastern European 
countries that regained their independence in 1989 after almost fifty years of Soviet 
dominance. They were also among the 2004 'big bang enlargement' that expanded the 
EU from 15 members in 2003 to 25 in 2004, and moved the EU external border further 
towards Eastern Europe. Their processes of transformation and modernisation, both in 
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economic and political terms, became quickly associated with European integration as 
the accession process set numerous conditions for candidate countries. The first years of 
the EU membership were still characterised as an ongoing adaptation process, learning 
how to behave in a new decision making environment, as well as the first attempts to 
project national preferences onto the European agenda. Therefore, both Hungary and 
Poland preparing for their first Council Presidencies were conceptualising them as the 
traditional 'membership test' to demonstrate understanding and skilfulness in European 
affairs (research interviews). However, in case of Hungary the Presidency would be also 
an opportunity to pursue a renewed conception of a more assertive and multidimension-
al foreign policy as envisaged by PM Orbán. The shifting role conception in foreign and 
European policies might be particularly relevant in explaining the original role prefer-
ence and subsequent behaviour while in the chair of the Presidency. 
Since the democratic transition in the early 1990s Hungarian foreign policy demonstrat-
ed a high level of continuity among various governments and was traditionally centred 
on three issues: the North-Atlantic and European orientations, the focus on regional co-
operation, and a policy of supporting ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries 
(Varga 2000). The first aspect was directly affected by Soviet dominance of this region 
of Europe. As pointed out by Ágh 'in the early 1990s, there was euphoria in Central and 
Eastern Europe, usually accompanied by the slogan ‘Return to Europe’ which promised 
a short and painless Europeanization process '(1999: 847). Thus, references to Europe-
anization or Westernization emerged as the most important legitimation mechanisms for 
Hungarian governments and their transformation efforts (Ágh 1999: 841). This would 
also refer to modernization of foreign policy, as it was in the case of Spain.  
Secondly, the particular focus on the regional policy has been influenced by the location 
of Hungary which 'is situated midway between the West and the East' thus, its central 
position makes it a 'ferry county' and enables it to become a 'regional hub' (Varga 2000: 
120). This position was to be achieved through membership in regional organisations 
(Ibid.). One of the first and by far the most successful initiatives was a project of ‘The 
Visegrád Three' launched in 1991 by Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia with the 
main aim of supporting each other in their European accession. Later it developed into a 
more extensive cooperation in the framework of the 'Visegrád Group' which became a 
platform for coordinating national stances at the European level with reference to vari-
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 Finally, the migration policy was referring to the complex issue of the status 
of Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries (Varga 2000: 118). This issue 
was also among the first ones to be focused on the European stage through initiatives 
aimed at establishing a protection monitoring system for minorities in Europe (Varga 
2000: 121). Consequently, these three themes have constituted a core of the emerging 
Hungarian national role conception. It has remained stable across subsequent govern-
ments, however under the leadership of Orbán Hungary has adopted a much more asser-
tive approach towards its national interests (HUa/07.2011). 
This was already the case the first time Orbán took over the leadership of the country in 
1998. The change of government at that time did not bring significant changes in for-
eign policy strategy as Orbán's administration (1998-2002) continued with its focus on 
the EU membership, however the EU was increasingly seen as an opportunity of secur-
ing national interests on the regional and international stages (HUa/07.2011). As cited 
in the governmental  strategy on foreign affairs  'the main question of accession to the 
Union is whether we will succeed (...) in building a country capable of using the possi-
bilities of the Union, or whether we allow ourselves to be pushed to the margins of Eu-
rope' (MFA HU 1998). As further emphasised 'the aim of the negotiations carried on 
with the EU is, by now, to make sure that the assertion of our economic interests be-
comes the focus (...) It is a legitimate expectation that the Hungarian government should 
represent the national interests in a consistent and resolute manner' (Ibid.).  
Upon joining the EU in 2004, these three main foundations of the Hungarian national 
role conceptions had direct impact on its membership strategy as well as its priorities 
within the European foreign policy. One of the examples is the ENP launched in 2004, 
originally designed by the EU as the answer to the biggest EU enlargement ever and the 
shifting of its borders to the East. For the Hungarian administration the ENP from the 
beginning served as a framework for addressing the issue of Hungarian minorities in 
this region (HUa/07.2011, MFA HU 2008: 9). 
                                                          
69
 Further analysis of the Visegrád cooperation can be found for example Dangerfield, M. (2009) ' The 
Contribution of the Visegrád Group to the European Union's ‘Eastern’ Policy: Rhetoric or Reality?', 
Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 61 Issue 10; Dangerfield, M. (2008) ' The Visegrád Group in the Expanded 
European Union: From Preaccession to Postaccession Cooperation', East European Politics & Societies 
Summer Vo. 22 no. 3; Fawn, R. (2001)  'The elusive defined? Visegrád co‐operation as the contemporary 
contours of central Europe', Geopolitics Vol.6, Issue 1. 
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Another particular focus of Hungarian foreign policy making within the EU has been 
centred on the enlargement policy in the region of the Western Balkans and the Eastern 
dimension of the ENP. However, this has been rather limited to reflect particular na-
tional interests concerning Russia and Ukraine (HUa/07.2011). Thus, for Hungary the 
term ‘neighbourhood’ has been rather confined to referring to the Western Balkans and 
Ukraine (Racz 2011). In the 2002 'National Security Strategy’ Ukraine and Russia were 
identified as the priority areas in the post-Soviet space (MFA HU 2002). With reference 
to the region of the Western Balkans its importance is due to economic factors as 'more 
than fifty percent of Hungary’s foreign direct investments (3 billion euros) are directed 
at the Balkans' (MFA HU 'Hungary in the World').  It shows that stabilization of this 
region constitutes one of the key goals for the further development of the Hungarian 
economy.  
Following a landslide victory of the Fidesz party in 2010 parliament elections Viktor 
Orbán became a PM for the second time. Fidesz's nationalist and conservative ideology 
was expected to transform not only domestic, but also foreign policy of the new gov-
ernment (HUa/07.2011). Nevertheless, it seemed that the traditional approach would 
continue as the new strategy published in 2011 identified key objectives as developing 
bilateral relations with neighbours and maintaining the policy towards Hungarian mi-
norities (MFA HU 2011). The emphasis on regional cooperation was further strength-
ened with Orbán's first foreign visit being to Poland.
70
 This was also combined with at-
tempts to further foster the position of Hungary in Europe; one of the strategies was to 
reinforce the role of Central Europe through advancing the influence of the Visegrád 
Group. Fidesz aimed to establish it as the main consulting and coordinating framework 
in the region with reference to key issues, such as the approaching talks on the EU 
budget and energy policy. However, this approach was undermined to a large extent by 
the 'government’s ethnic understanding of national identity, expressed in the controver-
sial law concerning Hungarian minorities abroad, which has badly affected relations 
with neighbouring countries', particularly with Slovakia (Leconte 2012: 138). The in-
creasing assertiveness and emphasis on pursuit of national interests has created a rather 
unfavourable cooperation environment for the Hungarian government. This attitude was 
also reflected in the Eurobarometer's results, as Hungary remains one of the most neu-
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 As highlighted by Leconte, usually Hungarian prime ministers' first trips were to Brussels, or Paris and 
Berlin, in order 'to signal their 'western orientation' (2012: 138). Thus, Orbán's decision was supposed to 
send a clear message of the importance of the strategic partnership to the region.  
Chapter VII Hungary in the Chair of the EU Council (January – June 2011): 'Between the 
Domestic and European Presidencies' 
189 
 
tral countries in which the positive and negative opinion towards the EU membership 
are usually recorded at the same level.
71
 
The new administration argued that the 8-year period of central-left governments had 
been characterized by a reactive foreign policy with no substantial involvement at the 
regional and European levels (HUa/07.2011). The new approach thus aimed for a more 
active and multidimensional approach, also aiming for rapprochement with Russia and 
thus addressing the issue of the decreasing US focus on Central Europe (Ibid.). Com-
pared to the previous term in the office, the image of the government became more in-
fluenced by a firm and controversial stance on Hungarian minorities.
72
 Furthermore, the 
government continued with the support for the Western Balkans' accession process. The 
FM’s first official visit was to Sarajevo to attend a regional Balkan conference followed 
by Belgrade where he announced the intention to facilitate Serbia's accession to the Eu-
ropean Union during the Hungarian Presidency (HUa/07.2011).  
Additionally, during the annual meeting with ambassadors in Budapest in August 2010, 
on the eve of the Hungarian Presidency, Orbán announced his aim of pursuing a much 
more courageous, active and 'assertive' foreign policy; as he called for 'taking the na-
tional initiative back' (HUa/07.2011). The continued emphasis on regional collaboration 
was reflected in the words of FM János Martonyi claiming that cooperation among the 
Visegrád countries (…) is so close and intimate that 'some people within the Union are 
worried about the creation of a bloc and therefore they consider its existence a risk [to 
the Union]' (Hungarian Spectrum 2010a). Consequently, the European policy of 
Fidesz’s administration would be further conditioned by prioritising the national stance 
in some areas not compatible with the European one. The increasing Euroscepticism 
was further demonstrated with PM Orbán frequently criticising the EU, its values and 
mode of operating (SGCa/05.2012).
73
 As noted by one of the Hungarian experts ‘PM 
Orbán could not decide whether the EU was a friend or an enemy’ (Balázs 2011: 9). 
Moreover, in one of the speeches he ‘compared the influence of the EU to the oppres-
sion of the Habsburg Empire and Soviet dictatorship’ (Balázs 2011: 9). With reference 
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 The 2010 Eurobarometer demonstrated that 45% of Hungarians hold the neutral view that 
membership is neither good nor bad (Standard Eurobarometer 73). Also in terms of perceived benefits 
stemming from the EU membership the 2010 Eurobarometer showed that only 44% of Hungarians 
indicated the positive effect (Ibid.). 
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 During Orbán's term in office, the Hungarian parliament adopted the Status Law providing special 
legal status, albeit no citizenship, to ethnic Hungarians in surrounding countries. 
73
 This was also emphasised in a speech given by the PM during the COSAC meeting in Budapest in 
February 2011 (HUa/07.2011).  
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to Russia, the Fidesz party's stance and Orban's personal stance seem to project a rather 
ambivalent approach. During one of the conferences in 2007 Orbán commented on the 
conflicting mentalities of Russians and Europeans towards the energy policy, arguing 
that Russians tend to use natural gas and oil as a political weapon (Hungarian Spectrum 
2010b, HUa/07.2011). In the 2008 joint letter co-signed by Georgia, Ukraine and Po-
land Orbán condemned Russian military aggression in Georgia. Nevertheless, during 
one of the visits to Russia in 2009, while acting as a vice-president for the European 
People's Party, Orbán emphasized his attempts to improve bilateral relations and extend 
cooperation (Hungarian Spectrum 2010b). Therefore, the announcement of more multi-
dimensional and active foreign policy would also indicate an increasing emphasis on 
Hungarian-Russian relations.  
Thus, following the argument of the relevance of national role conceptions for the Pres-
idency's agenda this would indicate that issues of minority rights, enlargement policy 
and relations with the EU eastern partners should be featured high among the issues on 
the Hungarian Presidency’s programme. The announcement of a more active foreign 
policy might indicate a rather different scenario than the one pursued by the Belgian 
Presidency - much more active and assertive with emphasis on national interests. As 
argued by Korkut the European stance of Fidesz, and thus the new government, 'is con-
ditioned by the realization of its own conservative vision for the EU' (2009: 11).  As fur-
ther noted by the author 'Fidesz pays allegiance to the EU in a selective manner, without 
ascribing to it in full, particularly in the areas of gender rights and freedom of expres-
sion' (Korkut 2009: 11). The ideological stance of the government and in particular its 
approach towards the EU emerges thus as a key factor for the particular role preference 
towards its Presidency. This would challenge the traditional approach pursued by new 
Member States of aiming to prove themselves as good and socialised partners, rather 
than conveying their particular national stance, and as argued in the subsequent section 
this would also affect the expectations held at the European level towards Hungary and 
its time in office.  
7.2 Expectations Towards the Hungarian Presidency 
 
As argued before, Fidesz's distinctive ideological foundations would not only influence 
the foreign policy of Hungary, but also its particular strategy for the Presidency. One of 
the earliest indicators was the reorganisation and restructuring of the staff working in 
national ministries and REPER (HUa/07.2011, HUb/07.2011, HUc/09/2011). Thus six 
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months before the inauguration of its first Presidency the Hungarian government decid-
ed to replace a number of senior civil servants in charge of the Presidency's preparations 
(Vida 2011). This 'undermined trust in the Hungarian Presidency even before it began' 
(Kaczyński 2011: 3). This ambivalent image was further reinforced by the lack of pre-
vious experience and no institutional memory in exercising the Presidency’s functions 
(SGCa/05.2012, BEa/03.2011). These steps combined with announcement of a more 
active and assertive foreign policy, created rather ambiguous and unclear expectations 
towards the approaching Hungarian Presidency (Ibid.).  
Such an ambivalent attitude would be particularly relevant with reference to foreign af-
fairs, as the second summit of the EaP was scheduled to take place in Budapest in May 
2010. According to one of the Hungarian officials the fact that Hungary would be the 
official host for the summit would place its team in the centre of preparations in both 
functional and more importantly political terms (HUb/07.2011). This would enable 
Hungary to 'exert some sort of influence on the substance of the policy' (Ibid.). This was 
further highlighted by other officials who pointed that the organisation of the summit 
would create an opportunity for agenda setting; however this would be limited to rather 
informal activities with the key role played by the HRVP and EEAS (HUa/07.2011, 
HUb/07.2011). Moreover, it was also stressed that because Hungary, as well as other 
Member States from this region, were perceived as countries most interested in the EaP 
Hungarian officials would have to make sure to 'focus its performance according to Eu-
ropean rather than national interests' (Ibid.). Thus, even with the new post-Lisbon sys-
tem the Presidency was to contribute to the summit's preparations; however it was rather 
unclear how this would be organised and it would have to be further developed during 
the course of the Hungarian term in office (Ibid.). With the consolidation of the Lisbon 
context and the fully operational EEAS the general expectations were advocating for an 
administrative and functional Presidency 'taking part in foreign policy making, but not 
leading' (SGCa/05.2012). However, the emerging EaP summit fostered questions con-
cerning further clarification on labour division with reference to the organisation of 
summits (SGCb/05.2012). Most of the interviewees indicated that this would be a real 
test for the new system when the new and old actors should be integrated in a single 
framework under a unified European leadership. It was also pointed out that the modest 
role of the Presidency, ensuring logistical and administrative support, might not be suf-
ficient for the Hungarian PM who would like to be more visible on the European stage 
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during Hungary’s time in office (SGCa/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012). Thus, yet again due to 
the lack of a clear role for the Presidency and some institutional expectations resulting 
from the organisation of the EaP’s summit it was not clear what the Hungarian perfor-
mance would be like.     
The expectations towards the Hungarian Presidency were to a large extent affected by 
its domestic situation, as indicated by all of the Interviewees. In 2009, while facing pos-
sible bankruptcy, Hungary agreed on the bailout conditions as offered by the EU and 
IMF. This was, however, challenged by the new government which called for re-
negotiation of these terms (Kaczyński 2011). The ambivalent political orientation of the 
new administration, combined with unclear economic plans, further reinforced the al-
ready unfavourable view of Hungary on the European stage. This was particularly rele-
vant with reference to economic affairs as demonstrated earlier in the example of the 
Spanish Presidency, but it would also influence the general image of the Presidency. On 
the eve of its first Presidency Hungary was emerging as a rather Eurosceptic, uncooper-
ative and economically unstable country, thus creating rather ambiguous expectations of 
its ambitious plans which might undermine the new post-Lisbon system (research inter-
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Table 6. The Overview of Expectations Towards the Post-Lisbon Functions First 
Half of 2011 (Author’s Own Compilation Based on the Analysis of the Interviews) 
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7.3 Towards the Role Preference of the Hungarian Presidency 
 
Hungary was the third and final country of the Presidency Trio, Spain-Belgium-
Hungary. It had already become evident during the Belgian Presidency that due to the 
time factor the Trio’s programme did not reflect the current European agenda and thus 
required radical modification (Drieskens 2011). The individual Belgian agenda thus 
shifted the focus towards economic governance and the handling of the ongoing eco-
nomic and sovereignty crisis. Following the Belgian example Hungary revised its pri-
orities and decided to remove two of its original priorities – water management and cul-
tural diversity (Euractiv 16.11.2010). This caused a delay and the agenda was only pub-
lished in December 2010, however the list of priorities better reflected the rolling Euro-
pean agenda (SGCa/05.2012, HUa/07.2011). This might provide further evidence for 
the argument by Missiroli and Emmanouilidis, who claimed that the added-value of the 
Presidency Trio is largely confined to the socialization effect during  the preparatory 
phase, and the joint agenda  'disappear thereafter’ and each individual  Member State 
tends to ‘act on its own’ (2009: 4). The changes of the Hungarian programme reinforced 
the already ambiguous expectations towards the Hungarian administration as on the one 
hand  the individual agenda was more 'in tune with the current working agenda' 
(HUb/07.2011); however this might also suggest a more individual, nationalistic, stance 
towards the Council Presidency (SGCa/05.2012). The Presidency's slogan of 'Strong 
Europe' as argued by Ágh 'was imported from home and indicated the dominance of its 
domestic policy over EU policies' (2012: 70).  
7.3.1 'Strong Europe' - Official Programme of the Hungarian Presidency  
 
The strategic framework of the Hungarian programme was structured around four main 
themes: Growth, Jobs and Social Inclusion; Stronger Europe – Building on the Founda-
tions and Protecting the Future; A Union Close to its Citizens and the final one Enlarg-
ing Responsibly and Engaging Globally. The latter was divided into two sections cover-
ing enlargement and external relations. As already pointed out the main focus empha-
sised 'handling the consequences of the economic crisis and launching a new form of 
cooperation with the aim of  ensuring that we will be better equipped to prevent crises 
in the future' (Hungarian Presidency 2010a: 4). In terms of implementation of the LT, 
this issue did not feature as one of the key tasks, as it did in the case of the Spanish and 
Belgian Presidencies. However, the new system was acknowledged throughout the offi-
cial agenda, for example it was stated that 'The Presidency will be ready to work closely 
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with the actors in this new framework in order to provide coherence and efficiency in 
the international engagements of the EU' (Hungarian Presidency 2010a: 14). This is fur-
ther reinforced with reference to the fledgling EEAS as 'it will be a shared task to make 
use of the opportunities provided by this new body, and to ensure that it becomes fully 
functional as soon as possible in all parts of the world' (Hungarian Presidency 2010a: 
15). This might indicate that the transitional character, which significantly influenced 
the previous two Presidencies, would not be so relevant in case of the Hungarian Presi-
dency and the period of 2011 Presidencies would no longer be regarded as transitional. 
Thus the Hungarian Presidency's influence on role institutionalisation might be more 
lasting. 
More concrete actions for external relations were specified under the Operational Pro-
gramme. The opening sentences provide some explanation on how Hungary sees its po-
sition within the inter-institutional relations: 'According to the Lisbon Treaty , in the 
field of Common Foreign and Security Policy the rotating Presidency does not play a 
central role' (Hungarian Presidency 2010a: 53). Therefore, the role is limited to support-
ing the HRVP and EEAS in 'fulfilling all their tasks enshrined in the Treaty' (Ibid.). 
Nevertheless, the programme still outlines a set of priorities for the Hungarian period of 
the chairmanship: strategic partnerships, the review of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and CSDP.  The EaP summit was seen as an opportunity to 'foster common un-
derstanding between Member States as well as between the EU and our Eastern neigh-
bours' (Hungarian Presidency 2010a: 54). The post-Lisbon context is further reinforced 
as Hungary presents its role with reference to organisational management of the summit 
as 'a constructive role supporting the activities of the relevant EU actors' (Ibid.). Finally, 
following the example of the previous Presidencies the Hungarian team would aim to 
'maintain close and efficient co-operation with the EP in pursuing the Union’s trade pol-
icy objectives' (Hungarian Presidency 2010a: 55). Consequently, Hungary acknowledg-
es both the post-Lisbon context of its Presidency as well as an opportunity for the lim-
ited pursuit of national priorities.  
7.3.2 Role Preference - the Domestic, European and International Context  
 
The choice of priorities illustrates that the original role preference contained to some 
extent an ambition to play a much more active role in European foreign policy, com-
pared to the previous Belgian Presidency. Among main priorities, were those directly 
referring to EU foreign policy, such as strengthening the eastern dimension of the Euro-
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pean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) through the initiative of the EaP. In one of the inter-
views PM Orbán announced that 'promotion of the EaP would be one of the most im-
portant objectives in foreign policy' (ENPI 11.02.2011). This was to be facilitated by 
extensive preparations which would include a 'tour de capitals' by the PM in order to 
'ensure extensive consultation process throughout Europe' in the anticipation of the 
summit (Ibid.). However, the foreign policy agenda was rather restricted to the subject 
of the enlargement and neighbourhood policy, rather than traditional CFSP issues. Con-
sequently, the official agenda brought some clarification towards the role preference of 
the Hungarian Presidency. Reflecting the ongoing European agenda would indicate a 
more communitarian approach, while limiting the foreign policy agenda to more Com-
munity-related areas would indicate support for the new European-led post-Lisbon sys-
tem with a limited, but still relevant, role for the Presidency. 
As presented in the section on role expectations the ideological stance of the Fidesz ad-
ministration not only influenced its domestic and foreign political strategy, but also to a 
large extent European and international perceptions. The rather ambivalent expectations 
towards the Hungarian administration became more negative in December 2010 when a 
new media law was passed in Hungary. The overall analysis of the legislation indicated 
that it would endanger the freedom of speech and of the press; this led to questioning of 
the democratic orientation of the government.
74
 The subject of the compatibility of the 
law with European regulations and values was widely discussed in both EU and domes-
tic circles just a few days before the official start of the Presidency.
75
  
The adoption of the media law undermined the image of the Hungarian Presidency, but 
it also had some more practical consequences as the first official presentation of the 
Hungarian Programme, which took place in the EP in January 2011, became dominated 
by the debates on the freedom of speech and questioning the democratic orientation of 
Orbán's government
76
. This was also confirmed by FM Martonyi in one interview as he 
admitted: ‘criticism about the Media Law has made the government’s work more diffi-
cult’ (Martonyi 2011). The perception of 'democratic backsliding' (Gati 2011) was fur-
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ther reinforced by the subsequent steps of the government in the course of its Presiden-
cy:  reducing the competences of the Constitutional Court and passing a new Constitu-
tion in April 2011. Both steps were regarded as damaging the foundations of the demo-
cratic state and weakening the democratic system (SGCa/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012, 
EPc/05.2012). Furthermore, the new Constitution was criticised by both the EU and the 
Venice Commission, the legal watchdog of the OSCE.
77
 As indicated by most of the 
interviewees, both Hungarian and European, Orbán's administration underestimated the 
spotlight that the Presidency brings with itself and thus did not expect such an extensive 
opposition with reference to the media law and other domestic reforms. This was the 
key factor for the Hungarian Presidency role enactment and its role preference. In the 
aftermath of the debate in the EP PM Orbán lost the remaining interest in the Hungarian 
Presidency and withdrew his personal engagement from the European level 
(ESb/12.2010). Thus, almost from the beginning the Presidency lacked sufficient politi-
cal involvement at the highest political level. This, however, did not affect the Presiden-
cy's performance at the functional level which focused on organising and managing the 
Council’s administrative proceedings. The role enactment of the Hungarian Presidency, 
as will be further analysed in the subsequent sections, demonstrates a clear division be-
tween the daily management of the Presidency and the Council's proceedings, as per-
formed by civil servants mostly based in Brussels, and the limited involvement at higher 
political levels in Budapest. Such an approach allowed for consolidation of the more 
functional scenario as introduced by Belgium, even though this had not been the origi-
nal plan. 
Furthermore, even though the subject of the economic crisis featured as the top priority 
for the Hungarian Presidency its potential impact was heavily constrained by the fact 
that Hungary was not a member of the Eurozone and by its own difficult economic do-
mestic situation. It was thus expected that this area would be managed by the POTEC 
who already confirmed its ability of political leadership with reference to EU economic 
governance (FR/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012). Overall, it seems that the role preference at 
the political level was to a large extent influenced by expectations which emerged in the 
aftermath of the adoption of the new media law. The overall expectations towards Hun-
gary had already been low, due to its lack of experience, small size and not being a 
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member of the Eurozone, however the unfavourable perception of the Hungarian gov-
ernment and its domestic reforms further damaged the overall image and severely low-
ered any remaining expectations.  
Due to the experience of the Spanish but most of all of the Belgian Presidencies some 
clarifications towards the post-Lisbon system started to emerge. The simplistic observa-
tion that there would no scope for involvement for the Presidency in foreign affairs be-
came replaced by a more detailed analysis of the working arrangements, as these were 
needed for a smooth functioning of the complex and multi-actor system. It was evident 
that due to its traditional role in for example trade and development the Member State 
would still be involved in the management of EU foreign affairs; even though this in-
volvement would be much different from the pre-Lisbon practice. Therefore, the Presi-
dency would be expected to support the performance of the HRVP, fill in on her re-
quest, as well as provide functional contribution when needed. Additionally, the Presi-
dency was also expected to contribute to quick and efficient implementation of the Lis-
bon Treaty's provisions by ensuring the formation of the EEAS, and in the case of the 
Hungarian Presidency ensuring its fullest operational capacity. Finally, through the 
management of COREPER II and the GAC the Presidency would be expected to con-
tribute towards the overall coherence over EU external relations. Thus, as demonstrated 
by the example of the first Presidencies, the post-Lisbon Presidency would face general 
expectations towards the role of the institution as well as more individual expectations 
associated with the particular Member State in the chair, which might either empower or 
constrain the particular behaviour of individual Member States. 
7.4 The Hungarian Presidency in Office – Role Enactment 
 
The subsequent part of the chapter will focus on the role enactment of the Hungarian 
Presidency while in the chair of the EU Council. The analysis will take into account 
previously identified factors both enabling and constraining the Member State’s per-
formance while in the chair. The sections are structured according to the pre-Lisbon 
functions of administrative management, representation, both internal and external and 
honest broker as was the case of the previous two Presidencies. However, the empirical 
analysis will be completed with several case studies which might provide a more in-
depth analysis of the interplay of various role concepts as affecting the role making as 
well as institutionalisation of the post-Lisbon Presidency's role. 
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The Hungarian Presidency was the first Presidency to perform alongside the EEAS and 
its permanent chairmanship over most of the Council’s WGs and other preparatory bod-
ies in the area of foreign policy. With the official take off of the EEAS in December 
2010 it achieved only initial operational capability in January 2011. It became apparent 
that the process of nominating chair holders of various Council configurations would be 
still ongoing throughout the period of the Hungarian Council chairmanship.
78
 The 
EEAS’s college of directors was only completed on April 1, 2011 with the appointment 
of Mara Marinaki as the managing director for global and multilateral issues (CEU 
2011a). Consequently this might indicate the transitional character of the Hungarian 
Presidency and thus prolong the transition period of the post-Lisbon European foreign 
policy. 
7.4.1 Organisational Management 
 
In the anticipation of the EEAS’s permanent chairmanship some transitional working 
arrangements were set up from January 2011 onwards; however in contrast to the previ-
ous arrangements under the Spanish and Belgian Presidencies most of the WGs were to 
be chaired by the European representatives, for example the COEST was chaired by a 
representative of the SGC (SGCa/05.2012). This reflected the growing tendency to-
wards limiting the Presidency’s involvement in foreign affairs stemming from the fledg-
ling EEAS (SGCa/05.2012). The potential chairmanship by Hungarian officials was 
seen as a continuation of the transitional character of the institutional post-Lisbon ar-
rangements and might have resulted in a strengthening of the position of the Presidency 
in post-Lisbon management over foreign affairs; thus one of the first goals of the devel-
oping EEAS was to set a practice of treating the country holding the Presidency as a 
regular Member State (EEASa/04.2012).  
This quickly proved to be unrealistic as the Lisbon Treaty introduced a complex institu-
tional architecture with a fragmented management structure over EU external relations. 
The Presidency maintained its chairmanship over the main Council’s preparatory body 
COREPER II ensuring the horizontal coordination and oversight of the legislative man-
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agement of external affairs. Thus in order to ensure both vertical as well as horizontal 
coordination over the EU external relations, on the initiative of the SGC, preparatory 
meetings started to be convened regularly with the aim of gathering representatives of 
various European institutions working on various external policies (SGCa/05.2012). 
The Hungarian officials became involved in the management of EU external affairs and 
responsible for ensuring coordination, both vertical, across various Council configura-
tions, and horizontal, across various external policy areas.  Thus, the initiative, as advo-
cated by the SGC, enabled for maintaining the Presidency’s role as a coordinator over 
the EU external affairs and thus ensuring its post-Lisbon role. This however was a result 
of the institutional feedback stemming from the developing post-Lisbon architecture 
rather than a deliberate attempt on the behalf of the Presidency. Such a development 
was welcomed neither by the EEAS, as they were concerned with undermining its posi-
tion and role in foreign affairs (SGCa/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012), nor by Hungarian civil 
servants who felt uneasy and confused about their role without support from Budapest 
(HUa/07.2011, HUb/07.2011). 
The first half of 2011 brought some indications towards the new foreign policy making 
process; firstly the overall role of COREPER II started to decrease as decisions were 
made at the lower level of WGs and PSC (HUb/07.2011). This was argued to be a de-
liberate attempt by the HRVP to minimise the influence of countries on the EU decision 
making process (GB/05.2012, FR/05.2012). The agenda of COREPER II started to fea-
ture an increasing number of ‘A’ issues, which had already been decided and agreed on 
at the level of WGs, without leaving any space for political discussion at the ambassa-
dorial level (GB/05.2012). This was to further decrease the potential role of the Presi-
dency in terms of structuring the agenda. On the other hand, some informal practices 
had established the Presidency in a more privileged position vis-à-vis other countries. 
The representatives in the chair emerged as ‘more equal than others’ thus being more 
likely to take the floor during the meetings (HUb/07.2011, HUc/09.2012). According to 
the EEAS’s officials Hungary did not overuse this practice to present national prefer-
ences, rather it presented its stance with reference to potentially relevant issues and pol-
icy areas being in the charge of the Presidency, thus further strengthening the rather 
background and coordination role of this institution (Ibid.). This was mostly attributed 
to the functional character of the Hungarian Presidency (BEb/03.2011).   
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Some clashes emerged between the Hungarian Presidency on one side and EEAS and 
the HRVP’s cabinet on the other side with reference to the structure of the agenda for 
the Gymnich meeting (Grevi 2011). Finally the Presidency’s proposal of including the 
enlargement policy was included in the schedule of the meeting, however the Presiden-
cy’s role in preparations of the Gymnich meeting as indicated by one of the interview-
ees remained 'a rather grey area without any formal determination' (Grevi 2011: 11). 
The cooperation between the HRVP, EEAS and the Hungarian Presidency ran smoothly 
overall, however some clashes were reported. These mostly referred to the 'management 
style of both EEAS and HRVP' which, as indicated by most of the interviewees, lacked 
not only strategic planning towards EU foreign affairs but most of all lacked general 
mid- and long-term planning. This was visible in the late distribution of documents and 
lack of sufficient preparation for the Council's meetings. Some of the interviewees high-
lighted the 'HRVP’s micromanagement style', but also the fact that both the HRVP and 
EEAS were largely influenced by the Commission's experience and thus aimed for a 
more independent system of policy making which side-lined the Member States. As cit-
ed by one of the interviewees ‘it was like having the 28th Member State at the table’ 
(GB/05.2012). As further observed by this interviewee 'Ashton and EEAS were trying 
to run CFSP as yet another Community area' (GB/05.2012).  
Consequently, due to the fragmented management and chairmanship over external af-
fairs the Presidency maintained its involvement and role by ensuring horizontal and ver-
tical coordination and thus being closely involved in the management of external affairs 
due to its chairmanship of other WGs dealing with external relations and COREPER II. 
However, this was not used by the Hungarian officials to pursue particular national 
preferences as outlined in the Presidency’s programme. This was partially due to the 
lack of strong national preferences in the area of foreign affairs, and partially due to the 
limited involvement at this highest political level. As argued before, after the initial pe-
riod and turmoil caused by the Hungarian internal affairs, the Presidency’s management 
was left to Brussels-based officials who did not want to show any initiative, rather wait-
ing for the new institutions to take the leading role (HUd/07.2011). Thus the Presiden-
cy’s role emerged in a rather informal way by ensuring greater efficiency and coherence 
to post-Lisbon European foreign policy. 
Even though the agenda of the Presidency Trio as well as the individual programme of 
the Hungarian Presidency set some priorities in the area of external relations, the Hun-
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garian involvement in the EU legislative management was limited to supporting the of-
ficial agenda and the EU stance as set by the permanent chairs (SGCb/05.2012). The 
Hungarian representatives attended the meetings in their national capacities, however 
still mostly refraining from taking strong national positions, rather favouring the EU 
official line as presented by the European officials; consequently even when taking the 
floor in a national capacity the Hungarian officials were trying to follow the European 
stance (HUa/07.2011). This could indicate that even the limited role still reflected the 
pre-Lisbon practice of the Member State in the chair acting in the EU rather than a 
strictly national capacity. 
7.4.2 External and Internal Representation 
 
The Hungarian team continued with the emerging practice of deputising the HRVP. The 
role of the EU external representative was performed by Hungary even in the pre-
Presidency period as, upon request by the HRVP, FM Martonyi represented the EU in 
Hanoi, during the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference and Regional Forum. The sum-
mit was however criticised for ‘leaving behind a set of flat statements by its representa-
tive, an unexpectedly low-profile EU Foreign Minister’, thus missing an opportunity for 
advancing cooperation between the EU and Asia (Delgado Rivera 2010). However, this 
was mostly attributed to the lack of strategic thinking and planning at the European lev-
el than the HRVP not attending the meeting (ESc/12.2010, SGCb/05.2012). Further-
more, in October 2010 the FM co-chaired the EU-Tajikistan and EU-Uzbekistan Asso-
ciation Councils on behalf of the HRVP (Hungarian Presidency 2010b). As noted by 
Enikő Győri, Minister of State for EU Affairs: ‘the Lisbon institutional framework has 
sufficient flexibility for the Presidency to manage affairs keeping in view the interests 
of the EU and to the satisfaction of all the Member States’ (Európai Tükör 2010). Yet, 
as indicated by a Hungarian official, the EEAS aimed to maintain this practice in as 
minimal a role as possible thus issuing detailed instructions for the Presidency's delega-
tions (HUa/07.2011, HUc/09.2012).  
Hungary also hosted the 10th Meeting of ASEM during which it officially represented 
the EU.
79
 Originally the meeting was to be held on 28-29 March, 2011 in Tokyo, how-
ever due to the Japanese earthquake Hungary emerged as the most natural replacement 
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 Traditionally, organisation of ASEM’s summits was conducted joint-
ly by two European coordinators, the European Commission and the Presidency, and 
two Asian countries.
81
  Hungary hosted two meetings, the first of executive officials on 
18-19 April, 2011
82
 and then FMs on 6-7 June 2011 (Hungarian Presidency 2011). Nev-
ertheless, with reference to the substance of the meetings Hungarian officials exercised 
only limited influence, rather relying on instructions supplied by the EEAS, but this was 
also because Hungary still lacked clear strategic priorities towards the Asian region 
(HUb/07.2011). 
Hungary also became the host of the 21st ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly held 
on 14–18 May, 2011, gathering representatives of 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries and the delegation of the EP (Hungarian Presidency 2011a). The Hungarian 
Presidency took this opportunity and put the issue of water management on the agenda 
during the second day of the meeting (HUb/07.2011). Almost 96% of the Hungary’s 
water supply comes from abroad, which enabled the country to develop extensive 
knowledge of cross-border cooperation and particular expertise in the subject of water 
management. This particular interest was also reflected in the attempts to advance this 
issue higher up the European agenda by Hungarian officials within the framework of the 
EU development policy. FM Martonyi also acted in an EU capacity when emphasising 
the EU determination to maintain its budgetary assistance commitments to the countries 
of this region (HUa/07.2011). He also acted as a co-chair of the foreign affairs ministers 
of the 27 EU countries and 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries held in Brussels 
on 31 May, 2011. On each of these occasions the Hungarian team was issued instruc-
tions by the HRVP’s cabinet; however as argued by one of the interviewees even in the 
presence of these instructions a Member State is capable of focusing the meeting on 
some areas of particular national interest which are alongside the European ones, for 
example water management (HUa/07.2011, HUb/07.2011). 
Hungary continued the practice of representing the EU externally in the framework of 
its national embassies in Libya, Iran and Belarus, as analysed in the subsequent section. 
Nevertheless, the Hungarian involvement in Libya was limited to performing a func-
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tional role in coordinating evacuation and ensuring a physical presence on the ground 
rather than playing a meaningful diplomatic role. This was confirmed by the HRVP her-
self in one of the interviews, while commenting that Hungary would not be required or 
expected to play any mediating role in the Libyan crisis.
83
 This further illustrated expec-
tations at the European level potentially limiting the role for the Hungarian Presidency 
to rather focus on technical and functional dimensions of the crisis management.  
7.4.3 Neutral Brokering 
 
Neutral brokering was one of the key functions in the pre-Lisbon context as the Presi-
dency was responsible for driving the European legislation forward by fostering posi-
tions acceptable to all of the Member States. The new institutional set up transferred the 
official management of foreign affairs into the hands of the HRVP and POTEC. This 
would indicate that the Presidency would not be expected to play the role of an honest 
broker. Since the chairmanship of most of the WGs and other Council’s preparatory 
bodies was chaired by European representatives Hungary could have shed the pre-
Lisbon Presidency’s practice of neutrality and presented national positions. However, as 
already demonstrated earlier, both Belgium and Hungary had ‘a rather special sense of 
loyalty’ towards the HRVP and EEAS and thus refrained from the pursuit of national 
interests, rather supporting the development of the European position (SGCb/05.2012, 
HUa/07.2011). The Hungarian performance in the function of neutral brokering will be 
further analysed using the case studies of the debate on the EEAS and HRVP which 
emerged in May 2011 and the review of the ENP. 
7.4.3.1 The debate on the EEAS and HRVP 
 
The Hungarian Presidency took over from the Belgian Presidency a mediating role be-
tween the emerging EEAS and Member States. The management of foreign affairs re-
mained a challenging task with the EEAS still developing its operational capacity over 
the first half of 2011. However, the general perception of 'mismanagement' was mostly 
attributed to the HRVP’s management practices. The ongoing perception that the daily 
management and organisation of Council's meetings was worse than in the pre-Lisbon 
period started to be voiced by Member States (SGCa/05.2012). 
On May 4, 2011 the Belgian FM for the first time publicly criticised the HRVP’s per-
formance as ‘characterised by silence on important foreign policy issues, with little 
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long-term strategy and poor management of her agenda’ (Willis 2011). He further 
pointed out that the vacuum created was filled by individual Member States thus 
strengthening the intergovernmental character of EU foreign policy making. One of the 
examples was the joint UK-France-Germany statement issued in the aftermath of the 
lack of a common EU response towards the events in the North Africa (Ibid.). This be-
haviour by the Belgian FM constituted an official rupture with the practice followed 
thus far of supporting the HRVP.
84
 This revealed rather conflicting expectations to-
wards the EEAS among various Member States and European institutions.
85
 This was 
further illustrated by the example of the EEAS’s budget and the discussion held during 
the FAC on May 23, 2011. The UK rejected the HRVP’s proposal calling for a 6% in-
crease in the EEAS’s budget. The British Minister for Europe, David Lidington, pointed 
out that the HRVP and EEAS were trying 'to do too much' (Traynor 2011). In contrast, 
French FM Juppe urged the HRVP to be more active even in the absence of the com-
mon voice among all of the Member States (Ibid.). In addition to this, the Austrian for-
eign ministry submitted a discussion paper arguing for a greater role of the EEAS and 
the EU Delegations in terms of consular protection and crisis management 
(HUb/07.2011).
86
  It also called for increased ‘information exchange and calls for better 
distribution of sensitive documents, blaming current problems on security concerns and 
restrictions at EU delegations’ (Willis 2011). Thus, it became apparent that there was a 
lack of agreement among Member States with reference to the role of the HRVP and 
EEAS as well as the further development of the EU foreign policy. 
 The added value of the extensive EU Delegation system was particularly appealing for 
small Member States with limited national resources. The European Voice’s article cit-
ed a diplomat from one of the small Member States stating that ‘The Brits are trying to 
strip this down, while we want to build it up’ (Willis 2011). He further stated that 
‘smaller countries viewed the service as a way to amplify their voice – a megaphone – 
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while bigger nations tended to see it as a rival’ (Ibid.) The Hungarian Presidency was 
absent from this debate and refrained from presenting any particular national prefer-
ences during its time in the office, seeing this as a potential obstacle towards the further 
cooperation with the HRVP and EEAS (HUa/07.2011, HUb/07.2011). Some insights 
were offered by the Hungarian FM during a conference in Brussels concluding the 
Hungarian Presidency on 27 June, 2011, as he noted that ‘EU foreign policy chief Cath-
erine Ashton is doing her best so that this common foreign and security policy will be 
built up ... but it's not yet there’ (Novinite 2011), thus he emphasised the working pro-
gress of the fledgling system. 
The Member States continued criticising the last-minute preparations of the FAC and 
the general style of meetings management. The Hungarian Presidency having a special 
feeling of loyalty towards the EEAS refrained from any criticism. It tried to establish 
itself as a communication channel in order to clarify expectations of Member States to-
wards the permanent chairmanship of the WGs and other Council’s configurations. It 
also aimed to facilitate discussions on possible working arrangements aimed at ensuring 
greater efficiency of foreign affairs management (HUe/07.2011). However, this is not 
what Hungary was expected to do, at least by most of the Member States, in particular 
the large ones. This would require involvement at the highest political level, which was 
perceived as very limited in the case of the Hungarian Presidency (SGCb/05.2012); thus 
its mediation role was limited due to no demand and the low political level of the Hun-
garian Presidency (HUa/07.2011 and HUb/07.2011). 
7.4.3.2 The Review and Debate on the ENP 
 
The review of the ENP started as a standard exercise to be led by the European Com-
mission, however with the events unfolding in North Africa, as well as the deteriorating 
situation in Belarus as a result of the rigged presidential elections held in December 
2010, the EU was forced to acknowledged that its performance thus far in the neigh-
bourhood had not been successful and failed to enforce its values in action.
87
 Thus, by 
admitting that the EU tends to favour security over democratisation of the regions in its 
Southern neighbourhood a new approach was expected to bring a revised policy to-
wards this region as well as in the general framework of the ENP (HUd/07.2011).  
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The Arab Spring events reinforced the internal divisions among Member States with 
reference to the ENP and distribution of EU funding. Thus countries traditionally asso-
ciated with their support for the Southern dimension strengthened their calls for an in-
crease in the level of funding for the countries in North Africa. This was expressed in a 
non-paper letter sent by the FMs of France, Spain, Greece, Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia 
to the HRVP on February 16, 2011 calling for a shift in the current EU assistance from 
East to South.
88
 Italian FM Frattini called for the creation of 'a Marshall Plan type of 
funding mechanism' which would allow them to assist with the democratisation of the 
Southern neighbourhood and thus strengthening the EU presence and influence in this 
region' (Frattini 2011). 
This brought a reaction from 'the second block' advocating an increase in integration 
with the EU eastern neighbours mostly associated with the Central and Eastern Europe-
an states. A compromise position was proposed by German FM Guido Westerwelle. In 
his letter addressed to the HRVP he favoured application of stricter conditionality and 
the performance of the neighbourhood countries as the main conditioning factor of the 
level of cooperation (Ciechanowicz and Gotkowska 2011). This need for a more differ-
entiated approach towards the EU neighbours was also expressed by the FMs of Sweden 
Carl Bildt and of Poland Radosław Sikorski in the letter sent to the HRVP in October 
2010 (Rettman 2010b). In its capacity as the Presidency Hungary prepared a non-paper 
in anticipation of the extraordinary meeting of the EC on the Southern Neighbourhood 
on March 11, 2011.
89
 It set out its vision for the EU response to the Arab Spring by ad-
vocating assistance in democratic transition and advancing frameworks for experience 
sharing with particular focus on the economic situation. It was further stressed that ‘alt-
hough recent dramatic developments have focused the Union’s political attention on its 
Southern Neighbourhood, the EU must remain fully committed to strengthening rela-
tions also with its Eastern European Partners’ (Hungarian Presidency 2011b). Neverthe-
less, apart from this paper Hungary did not manage to position itself as an honest broker 
between Member States and exercise any influence on the substance of the review. It 
was Poland, the subsequent Member State in the chair of the Presidency in the second 
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 The letter is available at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Lettre_a_Mme_Ashton.pdf 
(accessed on 30.07.2013). 
89
 Another non-paper was presented by European People's Party MEPs Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (Poland), 
György Schöpflin (Hungary), Andrey Kovatchev (Bulgaria), Eduard Kukan (Slovakia) and Traian 
Ungureanu (Romania) on 25 May, 2011. The copy is available at http://www.euractiv.com/europes-
east/non-paper-european-neighbourhood-analysis-505103 (accessed on 30.07.2013).  
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half of 2011, that aimed to play a major role in redesigning the EU democratisation pol-
icy by proposing creation of a more flexible and rapid funding instrument. This will be 
further discussed in the subsequent chapter on the Polish Presidency where it will be 
demonstrated that Poland’s proposal suffered from the fact that it was perceived as not 
capable of neutral brokering as it had been already strongly associated with the Eastern 
dimension of the ENP. Therefore, Hungary might have been better positioned to seek a 
balanced approach within the new approach of the ENP. 
The demand for honest brokering with reference to every day management of foreign 
affairs decreased towards the Presidency as it was the HRVP and the EEAS, in particu-
lar the chairs of the WGs, that were to seek compromises and develop solutions among 
Member States. Nevertheless, as the example of both the Belgian and Hungarian Presi-
dencies demonstrated some neutral brokering was required with reference to the rela-
tionship between the HRVP and EEAS on one side and the Member States on the other 
side; yet Hungary was not perceived as the most suitable actor to do this. Thus, Hungar-
ian officials refrained from commenting on the style and efficiency of performance of 
both the HRVP and EEAS and did not play any relevant role in the ongoing debate. Fur-
thermore, even though the ENP was one of the few priorities in the area of external rela-
tions Hungary did not manage to influence the process of its reviewing by mediating 
between countries traditionally supporting the Southern versus the countries supporting 
the Eastern dimensions. This was not perceived by Hungarian civil servants as the ex-
pected behaviour from either the Presidency or Hungary (HUa/07.2011) and there was 
no input at the higher level. 
7.4.4 Policy Entrepreneurship/Political Leadership 
 
With the EEAS in place it was its representatives that were supposed to manage the Eu-
ropean cooperation in the area of foreign affairs and exercise agenda setting thus replac-
ing the Presidency in its pre-Lisbon role. However, as the above analysed case studies 
demonstrated the complex institutional structure of post-Lisbon foreign policy making 
enabled Hungary to perform some of the functions, which put this country in a more 
privileged position and thus potentially offered access to additional resources. This 
could have been used, as it had been in the pre-Lisbon context, to ensure promotion of 
Presidency’s priorities and influencing the European agenda according to the national 
preferences. The agenda-shaping powers of the Hungarian Presidency will be assessed 
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in the subsequent section with the example of the EaP and the Libyan crisis as areas of 
the greatest involvement of the Hungarian Presidency. 
7.4.4.1 Eastern Partnership  
 
The Hungarian Presidency set itself a few goals in the area of foreign affairs; one of 
them was the Eastern dimension of the ENP and in particular the organisation of the 
second summit which was to be held in Budapest in May 2011. However, already in 
February 2011 Budapest announced postponement of the summit and that it would be 
co-hosted by the Polish Presidency (Vogel 2011b). It was apparent that it would be the 
Polish team that would be the main driving force behind the summit (SGCa/05.2012, 
HUb/07.2011). The official reason as stated by Hungary was the schedule and logistical 
difficulties, as the summit was to be organised a few days before the G8 summit.
90
 Even 
though this was confirmed by the HRVP as she stated that ‘there is nothing strange in 
the meeting postponement, an entirely logical decision was made’,91 the fact that Hun-
gary was not able to gather enough support and ensure the highest possible representa-
tion among Member States during the summit emerged as a more convincing argument 
(GB/05.2012, FR/05.2012, EPc/05.2012).
92
 As assessed by Balázs Dénes ‘In February 
when the EaP top meeting was cancelled it was really difficult not to see that as a major 
diplomatic failure especially because of the obscure explanations of the postponement’; 
he further pointed out that it resulted in the Hungarian Presidency not hosting any major 
event (Dénes 2011).
 93
 When asked to comment on this unexpected change the former 
FM Balázs referred to it as ‘a double loss for Hungary’ (Népszava 2011). Hungary’s 
position was further weakened when Poland announced the organisation of the 17
th
 
Central and Eastern European summit on the same day as the cancelled EaP’s summit 
was supposed to take place. The additional weight to the meeting was added by the 
presence of the US President Barack Obama. This was widely commented on in the 
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 For details on the HRVP's statement see HIR24 (2011). 
91
 The text of the statement is available on the website of the Hungarian Presidency at 
http://www.eu2011.hu/document/joint-decision-about-postponing-eastern-partnership-summit-press-
release (accessed on 05.05.2012).  
92
 One of the interviewees commented that during one of the press conferences one of the Hungarian 
foreign officials admitted that the some unsuccessful efforts had been made (BEb/03.2011). 
93
 Presentation by Balázs Dénes at ‘Success or Failure: Review of the Hungarian Presidency of the Council 
of the European Union’, the Hungarian Europe Society, the European Liberal Forum, the Friedrich 
Naumann Stiftung für die Freiheit and the Republikon Institute, 25.06.2011, Budapest. 
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The Hungarian Presidency managed to keep the issue of the EaP high on the European 
agenda with reference to the sanctions against the Belarusian regime, EU-Ukraine nego-
tiations on DCFTA and Moldova’s trade preferences (Vandecasteele et al. 2013). How-
ever, as indicated by one of the interviewees the Hungarian Presidency rather followed 
the European agenda than exercised any agenda setting in the strict sense of proposing 
original initiatives. The European agenda started to be controlled by the EEAS and 
HRVP even if most of the Member States complained about the inefficient management 
of the FAC meetings and lack of political leadership. In March 2011 Hungary proposed 
to organise a special informal meeting of the development policy, which remained un-
der the chairmanship of the Presidency, focusing on the issue of the ENP; this was how-
ever not followed up by the Hungarian officials and was not met with any enthusiasm at 
the European level (HUc/09.2012).
95
 It was the Slovak government that organised a 
successful meeting with representatives of the EaP countries, Belarusian opposition as 
well as the HRVP and Commissioner Füle in the framework of its Presidency of the 
Visegrád Group (Euractiv 28.02.2011). Overall, as argued by Racz the EaP plays only a 
regional role in Hungarian foreign policy and thus it was not seen as the top priority for 
the Hungarian Presidency (2011). As argued earlier Hungary's strategic preferences 
have been reflected in the particular conceptualisation of its neighbourhood which prior-
itises the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova. The special focus on the latter two 
was reflected in the 'Danube Strategy', adopted under the Hungarian leadership, which 
aimed to present a comprehensive framework for the further development of this region. 
Specific conclusions on the Strategy were adopted during the GAC on April 13, 2011 
(CEU 2011) and further endorsed by the EC on June 23/24, 2011 (EC 2011) on the ba-
sis of the Commission's proposal.
96
 The significance of the Strategy was undermined by 
the fact that no new funding was to be pledged (Euractiv 01.03.2010); however one of 
the main priorities was identified as water management thus clearly reflecting the Hun-
garian original preference (HUc/09.2012).  
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 For example see Hungarian Spectrum (2011c). 
95
See also Hungarian Presidency (2011h). 
96
 For details on the proposal see COM (2010) 'Communication on the EU Strategy for the Danube 
Region', 8.12.2010. 
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7.4.4.2 Libyan Crisis 
 
The fact that Hungary was not invited to the Paris-led summit on Libya held on March 
19, 2011 pointed to the irrelevancy of the Hungarian Presidency with reference to the 
political level of EU foreign policy making (Euractiv 28.02.2011).
97
 As argued earlier 
Hungary’s involvement in the management of the Libyan crisis was mostly limited to 
functional and technical assistance and stemming from the Presidency’s competences in 
external areas of the EU crisis management policy; there was no influence on the politi-
cal and strategic dimension which was made by big countries, such as France and the 
UK and to some extent by the HRVP, EEAS and European Commission 
(SGCa/05.2012, HUb/07.2011). The lack of involvement of Hungary in the Libyan cri-
sis at the political level was further contrasted with the more active involvement of Po-
land as the FM was part of the Contact Group on Libya (MFA PL 2011a). He was also 
the first European senior official to visit Benghazi on May 11, 2011 and to recognise 
‘the interim rebel council as a legitimate interlocutor' (Reuters 2011a). Hungary did not 
use its potentially privileged access to information as well as other resources stemming 
from representing the EU in Libya and Belarus, rather agreeing to act in the background 
supporting the post-Lisbon actors. 
7.4.5 The example of the Libyan Crisis 
 
The contribution of Hungary towards role institutionalisation of the post-Lisbon Presi-
dency will be further explored with the example of the Hungarian performance with ref-
erence to the Libyan crisis. Such an analysis will further demonstrate the position as 
well as expectations towards the Member State in the chair of the Council, with particu-
lar reference towards management and representation of the EU. 
 The events of the Arab Spring brought sharp divisions among Member States, which 
became particularly visible with the unfolding of the Libya crisis. Some Member States, 
led by the UK and France, started to advocate a military mission in order to bring the 
end of the Gadhafi’s regime, while most of the Member States ruled out involvement in 
such action. Due to the lack of a united stance among Member States the HRVP was 
mostly absent and did not provide any strong leadership in the EU response to these 
events. This prompted some of the Member States to take their individual stance on this 
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 The Associated Press introduced the subject of the conference under the headline ‘Orbán is missing, 
the rotating president, embarrassing’ (HUa/07.2011). 
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issue. The Hungarian Presidency, along with the other permanent European institutions, 
was put in the spotlight and thus often asked to comment on these issues. In the light of 
the modest European guidelines, the Hungarian team had to often refer to the national 
foreign policy framework (HUb/07.2011). In the non-paper prepared for the extraordi-
nary summit of the EC on the Southern Neighbourhood the Hungarian Presidency 
called for EU unity and support for the no-fly zone over Libya under the mandate of the 
UN Security Council while taking no position on a possible military mission (Hungari-
an Presidency 2011c). After the extraordinary meeting the Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán 
presented the adopted EU stance towards the Libyan situation. Favouring a more cau-
tious approach the PM sided with countries refraining from military operations by em-
phasising that ‘nothing would force Europe to go to war with the Arab countries’ and 
that ‘military operations that could result in losing the trust of Arab nations, must be 
avoided’ (Hungarian Presidency 2011d). This was further stressed by FM Martonyi in 
his statement delivered on March 3, 2011 in which he ‘welcomed the UN Security 
Council’s decision on air strikes against Libya' (Gulyas 2011), but also pointed out that 
‘a military operation could only aim at protecting civilians and not at changing Libya’s 
political system’ (Hungarian Presidency 2011d); thus Hungary would not participate in 
the military operation against Libya. This position reflected the general stance of the 
Central European states, arguing that further military action was impossible due to the 
insufficient military capacities of these countries after already being involved in military 
missions in Afghanistan and their general reluctance caused by the Iraqi intervention 
(Kecskes 2011). Hungarian officials maintained its presence in EU foreign affairs by 
commenting on the most important issues, in general supporting the EU stance without 
shying away from presenting national stances, but only at the highest political level of 
the PM and MFA. 
As pointed out earlier the initial controversies over the Hungarian government’s actions 
influenced the performance of the Hungarian Presidency in the first two months of its 
Council chairmanship. This was also reflected in almost non-existent cooperation with 
the post-Lisbon European actors, the POTEC and the HRVP at the beginning of the year 
(SGCb/05.2012). Nevertheless, the following months brought the reorientation of the 
Presidency’s management and the general cooperation ran smoothly with the Hungarian 
officials taking a supporting and background role in external affairs (SGCa/05.2012, 
FR/05.2012). As will be presented with the example of the Libyan crisis, the Presidency 
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still plays an important role in crisis management as it is still responsible for the man-
agement of numerous policies outside the competences of the HRVP and EEAS, such as 
the humanitarian affairs. On March 3, 2011 the Hungarian Minister of State for Europe-
an Affairs joined Kristalina Georgieva, EU Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, in a 
visit to Tunisia to establish cooperation with the transitional authorities and to assess the 
situation on the Libyan-Tunisian border (COM 2011a).  FM Martonyi visited Egypt on 
March 22, 2011 in a similar exercise of assessing the situation on the Egyptian-Libyan 
border (Hungarian Presidency 2011c). However, Hungary was not part of the fact-
finding mission sent by the HRVP on 6 March, 2011. It was headed by Agostino Mi-
ozzo, the managing director for crisis response in the European External Action Service, 
and facilitated by the Italian government (Vogel 2011c). This showed the limits of the 
Presidency's capacity to actively engage at the European level. 
Following the practice established by the previous Presidencies of assisting the emerg-
ing system of EU Delegations by ensuring representation by the Member State in the 
chair of the Presidency on behalf of the EU, Hungary became one of the few countries 
present in Libya acting as an official EU representative. The Hungarian embassy in 
Tripoli maintained its operations and Ambassador Bela Marton emerged as a coordina-
tor of EU personnel still present in Libya at that time (Hungarian Presidency 2011e).
98
 
As a response to the HRVP’s statement calling to stop the use of force (CEU 2011b) on 
February 19, 2011 the Hungarian ambassador was issued a statement by the Libyan for-
eign ministry threatening ‘to suspend cooperation with EU on immigration issues if the 
EU keeps making statements in support of Libyan pro-democracy protests’ (Reuters 
2011b). Following the request from Member States on February 23, 2011 Hungary acti-
vated the Civil Protection Mechanism which is an EU-based mechanism enabling coop-
eration in crisis evacuation.
99
  This was led in close cooperation both with the European 
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 Hungarian FM Janos Martonyi received a formal letter of gratitude from his American counterpart, 
Hillary Clinton, for Hungary’s diplomatic activity during the recent military operation in Libya. Hungary’s 
embassy in Tripoli was among the few that were not fully evacuated and continued to serve, providing 
assistance in the release of captured journalists and the handling of casualties of other nationalities. The 
Tripoli embassy became the representative of some 50 countries that decided to airlift their own 
personnel out of the violence-torn North African country (Racz 2011). 
Hungary is one of the three EU Member States which still have diplomats in the country, besides Cyprus 
and Greece. 
99
 The European Union’s Civil Protection Mechanism, the cooperation of Member States’ disaster 
response bodies, is controlled by the Commission’s Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) seated in 
Brussels. The MIC stands on the alert on a 24/7 basis and immediately notifies Member States’ civil 
protection authorities when it receives a request for assistance, either from any Member State or, as 
has been the case this time, from an EU institution. In such cases, the European Commission consults 
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Commission and the EEAS and the evacuation of the EU citizens was completed four 
days later.
100
   
Following the UN Security Council resolution of 26 February 2011 the Hungarian offi-
cials used one of the last remaining procedural advantages and presented the sanction 
proposal as an ‘A’ item on the agenda of the WG on Transport, Telecommunications 
and Energy on February 28, 2011 (HUa/07.2011). Under the chairmanship of the Minis-
ter for National Development Tamas Fellegi decided to apply a fast-track procedure to 
adopt sanctions (Ibid.)
101
. The original UN-based sanctions focusing on an arms ban 
were extended to stop the EU trading with the Libyan regime in particular reference to 
equipment which might be used for internal repression and imposed a visa ban on and 
froze the assets of a total of 26 individuals (Hungarian Presidency 2011g).
 
 Further ex-
tensions of the sanctions were dealt with in the framework of the FAC, for example on 
11 March, 2011 the sanctions were extended to subsequent Libyan people and organisa-
tions, such as the Central Bank (CEU 2011c). Further restrictive measures adopted at 
the FAC on March 10, 2011 had been prepared by the Hungarian-led WG (Hungarian 
Presidency 2011c). This was however led by the HRVP and EEAS rather than by delib-
erate attempts of the Hungarian officials (HUa/07.2011, HUb/07.2011). Finally, the 
Hungarian team, in a coordinated effort with the European Commission and EEAS, put 
the issue of migration on the agenda of the Justice and Home Affairs Council. This fa-
cilitated the adoption of the decision to launch the Joint Operation Hermes 2011 with 
reference to the refugee crisis at the Italian island of Lampedusa and to take part in co-
ordination of the exercise in Malta (Hungarian Presidency 2011b). The Libyan crisis 
demonstrated the complexity of the EU post-Lisbon external policy as a comprehensive 
approach requiring involvement of all of the European institutions involved in EU for-
eign policy, among them the HRVP and EEAS, POTEC and the Presidency. 
The Hungarian experience further contributed to the development of the coordination 
mechanisms in terms of the EU representation. It also indicated a potential added value 
of the Presidency supporting the stance of European institutions and contributing addi-
                                                                                                                                                                          
the Council’s rotating Presidency, and determines the course of action it needs to take to tackle the 
situation. Member States can resort to the Civil Protection Mechanism if their own resources are 
insufficient to properly handle the problem or disaster that affects them (Hungarian Presidency .2011e). 
100
 For the details on this issue see Hungarian Presidency (2011f) ‘Libya: Hungarian Presidency facilitates 
evacuation of EU citizens’. 
101
 As pointed out by the Hungarian Presidency the sanctions were adopted less than 25 hours after the 
original UN decision making it the quickest adopted sanctions in the EU history (Hungarian Presidency 
2011b). 
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tional national resources in the service of the EU. However, the Hungarian case study 
illustrated that the Presidency’s replacement as the EU representative functions accord-
ing to the availability of the HRVP and instructions prepared at the European level thus 
leaving only limited scope for the country in the chair of the Presidency to take ad-
vantage of this opportunity in pursuit of national preferences.  
7.5 Role Assessment 
 
The role assessment of the Hungarian Presidency reflects its internal divisions: 'political 
adventurism of the government and the professionalism of experts and the state admin-
istration' (Ágh 2012: 68). This was further reflected in other international assessments, 
for example Péter Balázs, the Hungarian expert, argued that at the functional level it 
was a generally good assessment of the Brussels-based team, 'but this cannot be said of 
the government level' (Népszava 2011). To a large extent the assessment of the Hungar-
ian performance was overshadowed by the controversies with reference to domestic leg-
islation, first the media law and then the constitution. Nevertheless, at the Brussels level 
the Hungarian team was positively assessed; in the area of foreign affairs the Hungarian 
officials worked to support the HRVP and emerging EEAS, enabling in particular the 
latter to establish itself on the European stage. The framework of regular consultation 
between the EEAS's and the Presidency's officials, as initiated by the SGC, not only 
provided a better cooperation and coordination platform, but also emerged as a more 
permanent mechanism to be repeated by subsequent Presidencies (SGCa/05.2012). Thus 
through its constructive and flexible approach the Hungarian team managed to further 
clarify the role of the Presidency and set some informal institutional expectations with 
reference to cooperation between the Presidency teams and the EEAS (SGCa/05.2012).  
Additionally, even though officially the Hungarian Presidency was praised for its active 
contribution at the European level, this was done informally and did not result in any 
institutionalisation of these working arrangements, therefore limiting any potential for-
malisation of the greater role of the Presidency. Furthermore, as indicated by one of the 
interviewees, transferability of the Hungarian experience towards possible future crisis 
management actions was limited by referring to the Hungarian Presidency as ‘working 
in the transitional period with only limited operational capacity of the EEAS’s and 
fledgling EU Delegation’s system' (HUa/07.2011); consequently suggesting that in the 
future the role of the rotating Presidency would decrease also in the area of management 
of an unexpected agenda. 
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High Low Moderate Low 




Low Lack Moderate Lack 
External and Internal 
Representation 
Moderate Low Moderate Low 
Table 7 The Overview of Role Expectations and Role Preference of the Hungarian 
Presidency (Author’s Own Compilation Based on the Analysis of the Interviews)  
 
7.6 Role Institutionalisation under the Hungarian Leadership – Towards Role 
Prescription 
 
The Hungarian Presidency would be the first post-Lisbon Presidency operating along-
side a fully-operated EEAS, thus it would bring further clarification of the post-Lisbon 
institutional dynamics and the more lasting scenario. Therefore, it was expected that 
Hungary would support the EEAS in becoming fully operational. The original role pref-
erence and the subsequent performance of the Hungarian Presidency was to a large ex-
tent affected by the ideological stance of the Fidesz administration as well as personal 
stance of PM Orbán, favouring a more conservative vision of the EU and more assertive 
national stance on the European stage. With a new foreign policy strategy calling for a 
more national and multidimensional foreign policy the Presidency was expected to per-
form a much more active role compared to the previous Belgian Presidency. However, 
with the adoption of the controversial media law the government undermined its posi-
tion as well as the overall image of the Presidency from the early start of its time in the 
office. As a result of the increasing criticism at the European level PM Orbán limited 
his engagement in the Presidency's performance. Therefore, the Hungarian Presidency 
was characterised by a visible division between its more functional dimension as per-
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formed by the team based in Brussels and more political which was to be supplied at the 
highest political level from Budapest. This lack of political engagement of the Hungari-
an PM enabled the Presidency to perform its more low-key and functional role for 
which Hungary was positively assessed at the European level.  
The analysis of the role enactment demonstrated that with the fledgling EEAS Hungary 
was still expected to play a more active role in order to compensate for the lack of re-
sources at the European level. Moreover, the involvement of the Presidency in the man-
agement of some of the policy areas, for example trade and development, enabled Hun-
gary to maintain its role in the post-Lisbon system. In the absence of a clear role pre-
scription this created an opportunity for the Member State in the chair to use it not only 
to gain more spotlight on the European stage, but also for agenda shaping. However, 
with the permanent leadership of foreign affairs at the European level the Presidency's 
activities became more informal and indirect in line with the emerging expectations. 
Consequently, the analysis further confirms the relevance of the institutional feedback 
on the process of the role institutionalisation of the post-Lisbon Presidency. With refer-
ence to the second element of the proposed model - role making - the political context 
of the Hungarian Presidency limited its ability to pursue its original plan of more active 
chairmanship in the area of external relations. This would be a result of the personal 
stance of PM Orbán towards its European partners and in more general terms the Euro-
pean project.  It seems that the fact that the Eurosceptic government, and in particular 
the PM, decided to limit the involvement  enabled the Brussels team to exercise the 
Presidency according to the new post-Lisbon standard - a supportive, administrative, but 
hardly political Presidency.  Thus, Hungary performed its Presidency efficiently in 
Brussels while 'banning it from Budapest' (HUb/07.2011). 
The Hungarian Presidency brought further clarification towards expectations for the 
post-Lisbon Presidency and its inter-institutional position. Thus, the model of the so-
called ‘supporting Presidency'102 started to emerge with the Presidency playing a more 
active role in foreign policy making. Since no deputy was designated for the HR and 
with her exhaustive role of being also the Vice-President of the Commission it soon be-
came clear that she was not capable of fulfilling all of the duties on her own. The need 
                                                          
102
 See Gostyńska and Liszczyk (2011) . 
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to find a deputy at the appropriate political level became a pressing issue.
103
 Therefore, 
the Hungarian FM and Minister for European Affairs were the ones deputising the HR 
during some of the meetings with third countries’ representatives and in her contacts 
with the EP. This was perceived as beneficial for both of the actors as the country in the 
chair of the Presidency managed to regain some of its lost visibility at the European and 
international level. 
All in all, the Hungarian Presidency further reinforced the 'Belgian scenario', setting in-
formal, but already quite significant, expectations limiting the role of post-Lisbon Presi-
dency in the previous function of political leadership, even if this had not been the orig-
inal role preference. The particular context of the Hungarian Presidency might further 
limit its overall influence on the process of role institutionalisation; nevertheless, the 
scenario for 'supporting Presidency' started to become a widely accepted rule in the 
post-Lisbon context. The subsequent Polish EU Presidency was expected to further test 
the new rules in the second half of 2011 being the second, after Spain, big Member 
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 The issue of ensuring a corresponding political level of the potential HR’s deputy was a particular 
issue as far as the relations with the European Parliament were concerned (interview EP). 
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The ambitious original approach of the Hungarian Presidency in the area of external af-
fairs was undermined by the particular political and domestic context which resulted in 
the division between the Brussels and Budapest-based Presidencies. The fully functional 
and efficiently run Presidency was challenged by the lack of sufficient political in-
volvement at the highest political levels. Thus, even if not according to the original role 
preference, the actual performance of Hungary enabled further consolidation of the 
‘supportive, functional Presidency' initiated by Belgium. The positive role assessment 
of the functional and administrative support ensured by Hungarian officials towards 
both the HRVP and EEAS clearly demonstrated the limited space for the post-Lisbon 
Presidency to play an assertive leadership role in European foreign policy making. This 
also resulted in emerging role expectations and consolidation of a more lasting role pre-
scription. Poland's extensive preparations indicated that the country would be seeking a 
much more active and more political Presidency in order to demonstrate its growing sta-
tus on the European stage. This prompted the question of whether Poland would chal-
lenge the increasingly consolidated role expectation of a merely supporting Presidency 
and propose a different role preference.   
This chapter continues with an analysis examining the Polish Presidency of the EU 
Council in the second half of 2011 by applying the analytical framework as outlined in 
figure 6 of the model of the post-Lisbon Presidency’s role institutionalisation.  
8.1 National Role Conceptions – Polish Foreign and European Policies 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, Polish and Hungarian national role conceptions were 
transformed after regaining independence in 1989 demonstrating considerable effects of 
the EU membership and Europeanization process (for example see Kamińska 2013, To-
ro 2013, Pomorska 2011). Thus, the main objective of the post-Soviet Polish foreign 
policy strategy focused on 'coming back to Europe' through ensuing prompt NATO and 
EU accession. The first was seen as a guarantee of sovereignty and security, while the 
latter as a 'civilisation choice' in terms of political and economic development 
(PLb/04.2012). The EU accession process became associated with the extensive politi-
cal, social and economic transition that Poland and other countries in the region under-
went in the 1990s. Nevertheless, throughout this period the US maintained its special 
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status as the most desired ally for countries in Central and Eastern Europe due to its in-
ternational status (Edwards 2006). The emphasis on European integration and maintain-
ing the special relationship with the US would become a source of Poland’s ambiguous 
performance on the European stage pre- and post-accession. Since 2008, with the signif-
icant changes introduced by Tusk's administration, Poland would increasingly pursue a 
more cooperative and consensus-seeking approach on the European and international 
stage. The revisited role conception, maintaining a high profile on Eastern Europe while 
pursuing a much more cooperative stance towards European partners and Russia, would 
result in a more constructive and increasingly influential position of Poland within the 
region as well as within the EU. Therefore, Poland managed to consolidate its status as 
the expert on issues associated with the Eastern dimension of the ENP, but also increas-
ingly becoming a key player with reference to other issues, such as energy policy and 
economic governance (research interviews). Thus, it seems that for Poland its Presiden-
cy, instead of being simply the traditional membership test, would rather be a test of its 
position and influence on the European stage.  
Poland's initial three years within the EU were marked as a rather ambiguous time illus-
trated by an unclear membership strategy (PLb/04.2012). This was to some extent influ-
enced by its traditional focus on the bilateral relationship with the US. The particular 
Atlanticism of Poland, as well as other new Member States, became one of the most di-
visive issues in the history of the European project (Edwards 2006) and resulted in one 
of the most disruptive divisions within the EU. The difference between the 'old' and 
'new' Europe was best visible with reference to their opposing stances on the US 'War 
on Terror' and in particular the invasion in Iraq. Poland, along with seven other coun-
tries, issued a letter of support and took an active part in the US-led operation in Iraq by 
contributing military and financial support
104
. This was done in contrast to both Germa-
ny and France and the President of the latter country issued a strong statement criticis-
ing the 'new Europe' (Zaborowski 2004). Poland started to be perceived as 'a Trojan 
horse of America within the Europe' (Coskun 2007: 77) which largely undermined its 
position on the European stage, but also on a more substantial level resulted in Poland's 
preference for maintaining the intergovernmental character of the EU foreign policy as 
well as prioritising NATO's military cooperation over the fledgling European frame-
work. The continued support for its US ally as well as its assertive stance during the ne-
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gotiation on the EU Constitutional Treaty with reference to the voting system triggered 
a worsening of the Polish image on the European stage. At that time Poland was often 
referred to as 'the EU new awkward partner' (Grabbe 2003). This ambiguous and asser-
tive, yet not very influential, approach continued to mark Poland's behaviour over the 
first few years of its EU membership. Despite this, Poland remained one of the most 
Euro-optimistic countries with the one of the highest percentages of people supporting 
membership and indicating a positive impact of EU membership
105
 
One of the areas of national importance for Poland’s European policy was the subject of 
EU relations with its Eastern neighbours; this was to be become 'the Polish speciality in 
the EU' (Copsey and Pomorska 2010: 3). Thus, even before the official accession Po-
land had tried to shape the emerging EU policy towards this region by trying to shift the 
focus of EU neighbourhood relations from the South to the East.
106
 The 2004 enlarge-
ment shifted the EU external borders towards the East and thus creating a new immedi-
ate neighbourhood. The Polish and EU approaches towards the region of Eastern Eu-
rope significantly differed at the time: while Poland had extensive relations at political, 
economic and social levels, the EU rather saw the region as the domain reserved for 
Russia and thus did not pursue any active policy (Sabik 2008: 3). In 2003 Poland pre-
sented a paper advocating elaboration of the Eastern policy of the EU which would in-
clude a clear membership perspective for the countries of Eastern Europe, namely 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Sabik 2008: 1-16).  Poland did not manage to persuade 
any meaningful changes at the European level at the time; however the issue of Eastern 
relations would become one of the key features of the Polish European policy. Never-
theless, the first few years of the Polish membership in the EU became dominated by 
the increasingly Eurosceptic administration led by the Kaczyński brothers.   
After winning the 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections a more nationalistic 
party Law and Justice took control over politics in Poland. The new administration an-
nounced 'a new beginning' which would aim for 'not only a break with the past but the 
political consensus which had governed Poland since 1989' (Bobinski 2007: 2). With 
reference to foreign policy the government called for a new active and more assertive 
foreign policy as Poland 'would not be conducting foreign policy on their knees with 
respect to their partners abroad' (cited in Bobinski 2007: 2). The new rhetoric presented 
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the EU membership as 'a nuisance' and even against the traditional Polish values and the 
way of life' (Bobinski 2007: 11). The Eurosceptic attitude was further reflected in the 
ongoing negotiations on the future of the Constitutional Treaty. The new administration 
adopted a tough stance towards the voting system in the Council under the slogan 'Nice 
or Death' (Bobinski 2007: 10). Thus extremist rhetoric damaged relations with Europe-
an partners and in  particular with Germany by arguing that the voting system as pro-
posed in the Constitutional Treaty would ensure Germany's position as the hegemonic 
power in Europe (Bobinski 2007: 11). The particular ideological stance of the Law and 
Justice administration also influenced the Polish stance towards Russia and due to 
worsening of the bilateral relations Poland vetoed re-negotiation of the EU-Russia 
Agreement for Partnership and Cooperation (Kamińska 2007). This was seen as a 
measure not 'aimed at Russia - but the EU itself' (Kamińska 2007: 5). Such uncoopera-
tive and 'single-out' behaviour left Poland with no allies and as described by one of the 
European official 'no Member State would ever like to be in the position of Poland at 
that time' (cited in Copsey and Pomorska 2010: 10). This not only revealed the lack of 
experience of Poland within the EU, but also significant differences among Member 
States with reference to the relationship with Russia and Eastern Europe. The Polish 
influence on the European stage was affected by the credibility of the Polish govern-
ment due to its ideological stance and particular style of policy making. As argued by 
Szczerbiak Poland lacked a coherent and coordinated strategy for its EU membership 
and its European policy was 'characterised by a series of unsuccessful and ill-thought-
through initiatives, and unprepared statements' (2012: 18). This was also reflected in a 
rather ambiguous stance towards promoting an intergovernmental vision of the EU 
while at the same time 'calling for a stronger common stance vis-à-vis Russia' (Szczer-
biak 2012: 20). 
The turning point came in 2007 after the Civic Platform party won the parliamentary 
elections with one of the most spectacular victories in the post-communist elections. 
The new government led by Donald Tusk called for 'return to normality' (Tusk 2007) 
after the controversial term in the office of the Kaczyński brothers. This was quickly 
branded 'the second return to Europe' (Świeboda 2007). One of the main priorities was 
to rebuild the image of Poland as a reliable and constructive partner on the European 
stage. Thus, the approaching Polish Presidency was seen as not only the traditional 
membership test for new EU members, but also a test of the new constructive approach 
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in European affairs (BEb/03.2011). Preparations for the Polish Presidency became an 
opportunity for restructuring the management of European affairs at the European level 
as well as developing a professional diplomatic service both in Warsaw and Brussels 
(BEb/03.2011). One of the immediate changes in the European strategy was adopting 
the priority of the quick and smooth ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. It was also re-
flected in a shift of support towards the further institutionalisation of EU foreign policy 
making (PLb/04.2012). Nevertheless, the refusal of President Kaczyński to ratify the 
Treaty until the conclusion of the second referendum in Ireland revealed how the ongo-
ing rivalry at the domestic level damaged the government's efforts of improving its im-
age at the European levels. This soon spread over other policy areas, such as foreign 
policy, for example the emerging turf wars over international representation, in particu-
lar with reference to the EC summits, became a common feature of Polish politics until 
the tragic death of President Kaczyński in the airplane crash in April 2010.107 
 During the term of office of Tusk's administration Poland managed not only to improve 
its image among European partners, but also develop its skills of persuasive advocacy 
and alliance building.
108
 Such an approach resulted both in securing a support for a 
common stance towards the Russian invasion of Georgia in May 2008 and in adoption 
of the joint Swedish-Polish initiative of the EaP. The issue of the Georgian invasion was 
seen as one of the major tests for Polish effectiveness on the European stage 
(PLd/05.2012). Poland initiated an extraordinary meeting of the EC and by referring to 
the subject of European stability and security managed to gather support for a statement 
condemning the Russian action (Cianciara 2009). This demonstrated the added value of 
the new approach as pursued by Tusk's administration. One of the cornerstones of the 
Polish strategies was aimed at improving bilateral relations within the EU, in particular 
with Germany and France. This was done in the framework of the 'Weimar Triangle' 
which Poland wanted to use for strengthening its position within the EU (PLd/05.2012).  
As indicated by one of the Commission officials 'it is important to recognise that Po-
land's role in the EU is highly conditioned by its relationship with Germany, which in 
turn is conditioned by Germany's relationship with Russia' (cited in Cianciara 2009: 6).  
One of the biggest successes of the Polish diplomacy was the project of the EaP. It was 
a result of the 5-year period of Poland’s learning 'do's and don'ts' of policy making with-
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in the EU. With the main aim of securing its borders Poland was trying to initiate an EU 
policy towards the Eastern neighbours and placing it high on the EU agenda. The origi-
nal aim of securing a membership perspective for Ukraine quickly turned out to be un-
realistic and not capable of securing support from other Member States. Tusk's admin-
istration took a more pragmatic approach, rather focusing on the deepening of sectoral 
integration in various policy areas than bluntly calling for a membership perspective for 
countries in Eastern Europe (research interviews). During the 2004 Orange Revolution 
which challenged the rigged presidential election in Ukraine, Polish President Kwas-
niewski played a high profile role along the EU High Representative Javier Solana in 
the EU efforts to ease the political crisis. As noted by Szczerbiak the fact that this polit-
ical crisis was handled in a peaceful manner was attributed to Poland's engagement and 
this was 'widely recognised as one of Warsaw's most constructive and successful inter-
national initiatives' (2012: 105). Therefore, the substance as well as agenda setting of 
the EaP demonstrated better understating of the European context by Poland. Moreover, 
by securing Sweden's support as a co-founder of the proposal Poland managed to take 
advantage of Sweden’s position and its more extensive experience and skills in Europe-
an policy making. Even though the proposal was assessed as 'somewhat lacklustre, and 
did not represent anything particularly new for the eastern neighbours' (Copsey and 
Pomorska 2010) the project became a flagship of  Polish diplomacy within the EU and 
thus emerged as one of the key national priorities in the area of foreign policy for the 
Presidency.  
Over the previous six years Poland has aimed at consolidating its position and influence 
on the European stage. The perception of Poland significantly improved, which was 
demonstrated by awarding the Charlemagne Prize to PM Tusk on the eve of the Polish 
Presidency in recognition of 'efforts in promoting European understanding' and 'bring-
ing the former Soviet-bloc country in the heart of Europe' (Deutsche Welle 2010).  As 
argued by Kamińska Poland not only became a key European player 'truly committed to 
European values but also favouring further deepening of the European integration pro-
cess' (2013: 22). Nevertheless, as further noted, 'the paradox of the Polish foreign policy 
is that Poland is too weak to be a powerful actor on the international arena, but also too 
strong, considering the size and population of the new EU members, to agree on all 
conditions proposed by the EU and other organizations' (Kamińska 2007: 6). Poland has 
been one of the largest net recipients of previous and current EU budgets. Consequently, 
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there are some similarities between the Spanish and Polish positions within the EU as 
both countries do not have sufficient political and economic capacity to turn into one of 
the most influential EU Member States. According to Szczerbiak this ambiguous posi-
tion is a result of 'tension between Poland's EU aspirations and capabilities together 
with its intergovernmentalist philosophy in theory and actual support for deeper integra-
tion in many areas in practice’ (2012: 79). On the eve of its Presidency Poland was still 
searching for its place on the European stage. Borowski highlighted two possible con-
ceptions for the European policy of Poland: the first one of Poland becoming one of the 
key big Member States or the second one of Poland opting for a position of a middle-
size state acting as a 'speaker for the new Europe' (2010).  The six-month term in the 
office of the Council Presidency might thus provide some clarification into Poland's Eu-
ropean and foreign policy strategies. 
8.2 Expectations Towards the Polish Presidency 
 
The two-year period of the implementation of the LT brought some clarifications to-
wards the Presidency’s role; it was both the subject of more general institutional expec-
tations towards the institution itself, as well as more particular expectations held to-
wards the individual countries in the chair. In the case of Poland there were strong ex-
pectations of an active and leadership role in the area of Eastern Europe (research inter-
views). Thus, some of the interviewees indicated that Poland’s performance might result 
in undermining the consolidation of the post-Lisbon system in favour of pursuing 'a 
more pre-Lisbon type of Presidency’ (SGCa/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012). This was par-
ticularly reflected in the responses of the interviewees based in the SGC and the EEAS. 
While the latter saw this as 'potential violations of the new system and attempts to un-
dermined the EEAS's position in order to secure greater influence over the EU affairs’ 
(HUa/07.2011), the former pointed to a 'potential cooperative relationship which might 
further clarify the post-Lisbon foreign policy making' (SGCa/05.2012). On one hand, 
some of the interviewees noted that this would be regarded as rather 'inappropriate be-
haviour', on the other hand Poland’s leadership in the case of the EaP emerged 'rather 
naturally as a result of its previous entrepreneurship, extensive expertise and the ap-
proaching summit of the EaP' (GB/05.2012).  
These expectations were even stronger on the international stage with countries of the 
EaP expecting Poland’s engagement and involvement with reference to the substance of 
the EU project (UA/01.2012). Thus countries of the EaP and in particular Ukraine held 
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very high expectations towards Poland’s term in office and the approaching summit, 
calling for 'natural sympathy' based on similar historical experiences (Mahoney 2011a). 
There was a clear expectation from the Polish as well as Ukrainian and to some extent 
European side that under the Polish chairmanship priority would be given to negotia-
tions with Ukraine on the Association Agreement and that it might be even signed by 
the end of 2011 (SGCa/05.2012, GB/05.2012, UA/01.2012). 
Poland was to face a set of ambivalent expectations which on one hand expected 'some 
sort of Polish leadership' (SGCa/05.2012) while on the other emphasised the post-
Lisbon context of the Presidency. As mentioned above, on the eve of the Polish Presi-
dency the scenario of the post-Lisbon Presidency in the area of foreign policy already 
existed and referred to following the leadership of the HRVP and acting as a deputy on 
her request. Poland however decided to take advantage of this newly established prac-
tice and negotiate the terms of this arrangement by agreeing to deputise for the HRVP in 
the indicated areas (PLg/01.2012). At a joint meeting held in May 2011 the HRVP and 
the Polish FM agreed how this division of labour would work under the Polish chair-
manship of the Council. From the planned European agenda for the second half of 2011 
presented by the HRVP Poland indicated the areas in which it would like to be more 
active, namely the EaP, Common Security Policy, and relations with Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (PLg/01.2012). These subjects had been generally known as not of any particu-
lar interest to the HRVP, however such an arrangement was still perceived as a rather 
sensitive issue as Poland's performance might undermine the new post-Lisbon system 
through setting a precedent of exercising a more nationally-motivated deputisation of 
the HRVP (SGCb/05.2012). One of the key factors enabling this arrangement were 
good working relations between the HRVP and Polish FM Sikorski, which to a large 
extent enabled Poland's expectations to play a more active role to be accommodated 
(SGCa/05.2012, EPc/05.2012). Consequently, this agreement allowed Poland to escape 
any subsequent accusation of undermining the newly established institutional setting; on 
the contrary, the close cooperation with the HRVP was seen as a clear indication of 
support for the new context of EU foreign policy making. Poland managed to formalise 
some of the expectations and place itself in a privileged position vis-à-vis other Member 
States securing access to the HRVP as her deputy and thus to the EEAS’s agenda and its 
resources. 
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8.3 Towards the Role Preference of the Polish Presidency 
 
Poland was the first country of the second post-Lisbon Presidency Trio along with 
Denmark and Cyprus. The joint programme setting a working agenda for the following 
18 months acknowledged the new post-Lisbon context by emphasising the close coop-
eration with the European actors as well as using 'to the full all possibilities the Lisbon 
Treaty offers' (CEU 2011d: 7). Therefore, the new system was not only seen as a con-
straint for the Presidency's performance, but also an opportunity for establishing close 
cooperation of all involved actors. One of the main objectives would be management of 
the ongoing economic crisis and thus the EU economic governance was expected to 
continue dominating the European agenda (GB/05.2012). Nevertheless, maintaining and 
strengthening the EU global role featured as an area of 'high strategic importance' in the 
strategic framework of the Programme (CEU 2011d: 9).  The subject of external rela-
tions was briefly mentioned in the last section of the operational programme and mostly 
referred to more Community-related policy areas, such as trade and development and 
more generally calling for development of the EU global role. The programme included 
a note explaining that it was prepared without input from the HRVP. The Presidency 
Trio's countries issued a formal request to the HRVP's cabinet asking for coordination 
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of working agendas, however the EEAS refused to contribute due to lack of operational 
capacity to provide 'such a long-term strategic planning with reference to EU foreign 
policy' (EEASa/04.2012). One of the Polish officials admitted that it was a clear indica-
tion that the EEAS and the HRVP 'wanted to maintain the full leadership and manage-
ment over this policy area limiting the role and engagement of the Presidency to mini-
mum' (PLg/01.2012). This was in contrast to the Polish strategy which aimed for a more 
active performance on the European stage, also with reference to external relations and 
in particular the areas of strategic national importance - the Eastern dimension of the 
ENP (PLg/01.2012). Poland was thus aiming to adjust the 'supporting Presidency' sce-
nario to enable its more active performance as well as influencing the EU agenda ac-
cording to national preferences (Ibid.).  
It became clear that in order for the Polish Presidency to be able to achieve any of the 
set priorities relating to EU foreign policy it needed to secure the EEAS’s support and 
trust that such cooperation could be beneficial on both sides and that it would not result 
in diminishing the role of the EEAS; thus the cooperation between the Polish officials 
and the HR intensified (PLa/04.2012). Poland was gathering additional support for its 
agenda by touring European capitals and consulting the EP’s Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs (AFET). The main aim was to convince Member States and European actors that 
Poland would hold its Presidency in full support of the new institutional set up limiting 
the official role of the Presidency; however, still leaving some manoeuvring space to 
engage in promotion of some of the policy areas (ESc/12.2010, GB/05.2012, 
PLa/04.2012). 
This approach was also reflected in the decision not to continue the practice set by the 
previous Presidency Trio to have a single logo for all three Presidencies. Instead Po-
land's logo was designed by one of the most famous Polish artists Jerzy Janiszewski 
who had designed the well-known 'Solidarność' logo, now one of the most known his-
toric symbols of the Polish struggle towards freedom and democracy. Therefore, the 
Polish government wanted the Presidency’s logo to refer directly to this tradition and as 
stated by PM Tusk 'it will be quite symbolic and adequate to the significance of Poland 
holding its first EU Presidency' (Polish Presidency 2011b). This was perceived as an 
indication of Poland's efforts towards its Presidency but also that Poland would be much 
more assertive, active and ambitious than the rest of the Trio's members 
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(SGCa/05.2012). This was further reinforced by the official programme of the Polish 
Presidency. 
8.3.1 Official Programme of the Polish Presidency 
 
The strategic framework of the Polish Programme focused on three main areas: Europe-
an Integration as a Source of Growth, Secure Europe's Food, Energy, Defence and Eu-
rope Benefitting from Openness. Even though the economic governance and the ap-
proaching negotiations of the EU’s seven-year budget were among the first priorities 
identified by Poland; two of the main strategic objectives referred to EU external rela-
tions. Highlighting that ‘Europe also needs to focus more on the international situation’ 
the focus was placed on the EU relations with its neighbours (Polish Presidency 2011a: 
5). By emphasising the interplay between various policy areas under the Presidency’s 
management and the European actors, for example energy and the ENP Poland aimed to 
place itself in the centre of the decision making process without undermining the post-
Lisbon context (GB/05.2012). This was done by emphasising the external dimensions of 
policy areas still under the Presidency’s management and chairmanship, for example 
mobility issues, transport, and energy frameworks with reference to cooperation within 
the ENP. In terms of the EaP it was clearly stated that the Presidency would aim ‘to 
conclude Association Agreements (…)  (by finalising or making substantial progress in 
its negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova), make progress in the process of visa liber-
alisation and deepen sectorial cooperation’ (Polish Presidency 2011a: 10). The ap-
proaching summit was seen as a potential factor enabling ‘further impetus for the EaP’s 
continued development’ (Ibid.). Furthermore, the same emphasis was put on the South-
ern dimension of the ENP, as the Presidency would strive to ‘initiate cooperation based 
on partnership, focused on supporting democratic transformations, building modern 
state structures’ with the countries of this region (Ibid.). This was however to be under-
taken within the new institutional settings and thus ensure further practical implementa-
tion of the LT (Polish Presidency 2011a: 5). Pointing to both dimensions of the ENP 
was aimed at providing a ‘more European approach, however the particular national 
flavour was very distinctive also with prioritising the subject of the EU-Russia rela-
tions’ (SGCa/05.2012). 
In the operational part, the working agenda for the FAC featured already under the sec-
ond sections, thus demonstrating the importance of this policy area for Poland and its 
Presidency (GB/05.2012). Expressing support for the post-Lisbon arrangements Poland 
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set itself the goal of ensuring coordination of various policy areas and subjects in exter-
nal relations. Referring to the priorities under the term of ‘EU external relations’, it 
aimed at presenting a more comprehensive approach towards EU foreign policy and 
thus justifying the role for the Presidency (PLa/04.2012). The issues of the develop-
ment, humanitarian and trade policies were presented as the main areas under the Presi-
dency’s management (Polish Presidency 2011a: 14). Poland’s performance would be 
pursued in the cooperation with the post-Lisbon actors, the HRVP, EEAS and POTEC 
as well as the EP; it was clearly noted that the latter institution now plays a significant 
role as it ‘has been vested with significant powers in the area of EU external relations 
under the Lisbon Treaty’ (Ibid.). Finally with reference to relationship with the HRVP 
and EEAS it was emphasised that the Presidency would support these actors ‘in particu-
lar in matters relating to the stability, democratisation and development of the EU 
neighbourhood, as well as issues pertaining to the development of the CFSP’ (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, by prioritising the implementation of the ENP, upgrading cooperation 
with the EaP countries both in political and economic terms the Programme clearly pre-
sented the Polish national preference for its six-month term in office.  
8.3.2 Role Preference – the Domestic, European and International Context 
 
Poland started its preparations well in advance and from the very beginning it was de-
claring that one of the key priorities would be the EaP and keeping the issue high on the 
EU agenda (PLa/04.2012). Even though the preceding Presidencies were moving the 
institution of the Presidency further from exerting any leadership, Poland was vividly 
declaring that there was still a space on the European stage for the Member State in the 
chairmanship of the EU Council to actively take part in European foreign policy mak-
ing. Simultaneously Poland was expressing the view that this should be done through 
close cooperation with the POTEC, the HR and EEAS without challenging and under-
mining their positions. As stated by a Polish official: ‘The Presidency has not disap-
peared. There is still a role for us; you just need to know how to do this. If you get the 
HRVP on board of your agenda and secure agreement in advance you can still play an 
active role, particularly in the areas which are not of traditional HRVP’s interests’ 
(PLi/05.2012). Thus, Poland spotted an opportunity for negotiating the terms of deputis-
ing the HR. The  same official stated that ‘(the HRVP) needs a deputy and MEPs do not 
want to talk to EEAS, they want somebody of relevant political importance (…) she 
needs us [Member States] and we need her – with the right division of labour this is a 
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win-win situation’ (Ibid.). Thus, the need for deputisation of the HRVP emerged as a 
key factor enabling the Presidency’s performance in EU foreign affairs. 
As argued before, Poland was able to manage, to some extent, expectations towards its 
role as the Presidency. The extensive cooperation between the HRVP and Polish FM, as 
well as ensuring the support of the EP, enabled Poland 'to escape accusations of under-
mining the post-Lisbon system' and rather presented it as 'a opportunity for pursuing 
jointly with the HRVP and EEAS particular priorities' (PLi/05.2012). Furthermore, up-
on the inauguration of the Polish Presidency FM Sikorski confirmed his support for the 
HRVP by publicly pledging to be ‘a loyal deputy’ (Euractiv 02.07.2011). This was 
practically demonstrated by not commenting on the subject of possible support for Pal-
estine with reference to the UN membership bid; as stated by Sikorski: ‘We [EU FMs] 
have agreed to withhold our national positions to help Cathy Ashton reach a consensus. 
There is a need for the EU to speak on this with one voice’ (Ibid.). Therefore, the pur-
suit of the particular role preference was preceded by a period of extensive preparations 
focusing on managing expectations towards its Presidency. This was used by Poland to 
project their own understanding of its role as the Council chairmanship with reference 
to European and international partners. It can be argued that Poland managed to some 
extent to create expectations towards its Presidency as well as to ensure that these were 
reflected at the European level; thus adjusting the post-Lisbon Presidency’s functional 
scope. 
Such an approach was enabled by the thus far constructive engagement of Poland in es-
tablishing the EU policy towards its Eastern neighbours and by the particular expertise 
in this field. This was further affected by the sound economic situation of Poland, as it 
was the only country in the EU recording economic growth amid the ongoing economic 
crisis.
109
 The stable political situation was expected to be maintained even though the 
Polish government agreed to schedule parliamentary elections during its Presidency 
(SGCa/05.2012). This decision was criticised at both domestic and European levels as 
the continuity of the Polish Presidency could have been endangered (Szczerski 2011) as 
it was in the case of the Czech Presidency in 2009. According to the opinion polls the 
Civic Platform was steadily leading and thus it was expected to win elections and con-
tinue the Presidency’s management administration with minimal changes 
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(PLa/04.2012). On the other hand, the Polish government expected that a successful 
Presidency would further boost its election results (Ibid.). 
The international situation, in particular the deteriorating situation in Belarus and the 
Arab Spring events in North Africa, were expected to have a considerable effect on the 
Polish Presidency and its original plans as it would be the Southern dimension, rather 
than the Eastern one that would dominate the EU working agenda. Moreover, as the sit-
uation in the rest of the EaP countries was deteriorating in terms of democratic stand-
ards and their further integration with the EU stopped being a priority for the national 
authorities, North Africa actually started to look more promising and open for EU initia-
tives (research interviews). On the other hand, even though the international agenda 
drew the focus away from Eastern Europe, this particular context also helped to keep 
the overall issue of the ENP high on the agenda. The Member States and European ac-
tors admitted that the EU approach followed thus far had failed and needed to be re-
viewed as presented in the 'renewed approach for the ENP' in May 2011. Thus, Poland 
used this attention and focused its strategy on promotion of a more efficient and ambi-
tious policy which should provide a balanced support for both dimensions of the ENP 
(GB/05.2012). This would also help to portray Poland as 'more of neutral brokering' 
thus expanding its traditional focus from the East towards the entire ENP (Ibid.). 
Poland set itself high expectations which were result of both its performance thus far 
within the EU, in particular with reference to Eastern Europe, and its very favourable 
domestic political and economic situation (Kucharczyk and Łada 2013). As argued by 
the authors, as a relatively big country, with the government efficiently operating on the 
European scene, Poland was also expected to go beyond the day-to-day administration 
of the Union and become a model of the division of competences between the rotating 
Presidency and the new post Lisbon institutions of POTEC, HRVP and EEAS. A more 
lasting applicability of such a model would be definitely appealing to big Member 
States (EPc/05.2012); however this would also depend on the overall assessment of Po-
land’s performance. 
8.4 Polish Presidency in Office – Role Enactment 
 
The Polish Presidency had been preceded by intensive preparations which had started 
three years in advance; these not only focused on preparation of the Presidency’s pro-
gramme, extensive training and intensive cooperation with European institutions and 
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Member States, but also on introducing more structural changes in management of Eu-
ropean affairs at the national level. Placing the MFA in charge of the overall manage-
ment of EU affairs was supposed to ensure more effective policy making and coopera-
tion at the European level (PLa/04.2012).
110
 This stage of preparations culminated with 
the Polish REPER moving to the new headquarters in the very centre of Brussels in 




112. Poland’s performance in the area of external affairs was part of a wider 
Presidency strategy aiming for not only a standard membership test for the Polish ad-
ministration, but also a test of its leadership on the European stage as one of the heavy-
weight Member States. Thus, performing as a loyal deputy of the HRVP and ensuring 
efficient functioning of the post-Lisbon foreign policy making was as important as 
demonstrating leadership capacity on the substance of this policy.  
8.4.1 Organisational Management 
 
The experience of the Hungarian Presidency became crucial for arranging continuation 
of the bilateral working arrangements between the EEAS and the Presidency. From 
March 2011 onwards the Polish team was taking part in weekly coordination meetings 
between the Hungarian Presidency and EEAS initiated by SGC (SGCa/05.2012). This 
enabled Poland to observe and clarify some of the EEAS's expectations towards the 
emerging working relations as well as establish contact at the working levels 
(PLa/04.2012). By the end of the Hungarian Presidency all of the WGs dealing with 
foreign affairs were under the EEAS's chairmanship and it was the EEAS's representa-
tives that emerged as the main agenda setter and organiser of these groups' proceedings.  
At the level of WGs the Presidency's role was limited to chairing the FAC configura-
tions on trade and development. However, these two have been to a large extent domi-
nated by the Commission and its working agenda; for example the Polish team was re-
sponsible for facilitating the adoption of the joint position of the EU, based on the 
Commission’s proposal, for the 8th ministerial conference of WTO during the FAC 
(trade) on December 14, 2011. Polish officials did not have any influence on the sub-
stance of the proposal. Thus, overall the Presidency’s direct leadership at the level of 
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 See also Copsey and Pomorska 2010. 
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 COM (2011b) ‘Speech by President Barroso at the opening ceremony of the Permanent 
Representation of Poland to the EU’, 23.03.2011, Brussels. 
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 CEU (2011e) ‘Speech of Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council at the opening of 
the new Polish permanent representation’, 23.05.2011, Brussels. 
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WGs was limited and mostly associated with informal activities to a large extent fo-
cused on the EaP and its various components. 
In order to compensate for the decreasing direct influence Poland aimed to access the 
meetings' agendas in a more informal manner by establishing close coordination and 
working relations with the EEAS's chairs (PLa/04.2012). However, such an informal 
approach was not always effective as the EEAS’s representatives did not want to allow 
for establishing a precedent of a more active Presidency as this could have undermined 
the EEAS’s position (EEASa/04.2012). The Polish Presidency also made a use of the 
few remaining formal resources, such as Gymnich meeting and chairmanship of Coun-
cil's bodies, such as COREPER to ensure promotion of its priorities. Thus, Poland used 
COREPER II to compensate for its limited influence on the agenda and management of 
the WGs to pursue establishment of the EED (PLb/04.2012, PLh/05.2012). This will be 
further discussed in the section discussing agenda shaping of the Polish Presidency. Al-
so the extensive pressure, but most of all the good personal relationship between the 
HRVP and the FM, ensured considerable influence on the agenda of the Gymnich meet-
ing which was organised in Poland. Increasingly, for the country in the chair Gymnich 
meetings become one of the main mechanisms available for influencing the European 
agenda (ESc/12.2010, HUb/07.2011, PLh/05.2012). During most of the meetings 
chaired by the EEAS Poland took the floor in the national capacity and, compared to the 
previous Presidencies, in a much more assertive manner presented its national stance on 
issues of national importance (GB/05.2012, FR/05.2012, SGCb/05.2012). This might 
indicate that under the permanent chairmanship the country in the chair would increas-
ingly act in a national, rather than European capacity. Consequently, the role of the 
Polish Presidency emerged not only because of the fragmented management and chair-
manship over various external affairs, but also due to the particular preferences and con-
siderable effort that Poland exercised towards negotiating its position and scope for ac-
tion on the European stage.  
8.4.2 External and Internal Representation 
 
Poland was the first post-Lisbon Presidency to negotiate the scope for deputising the 
HRVP in the function of the EU external representative. Thus, the choice of venues dur-
ing which Sikorski deputised the HRVP closely reflects the national preferences of Po-
land and its foreign policy’s national role conception. The FM represented the EU dur-
ing official visits in Afghanistan and Pakistan accompanied by the EEAS Coordinating 
Chapter VIII Poland in the Chair of the EU Council (January – June 2011): 'Testing the Limits 
of the Post-Lisbon Presidency's Influence' 
234 
 
Director for Asia Viorel Isticioaia Budura (MFA PL 2011a). Poland acted in its EU ca-
pacity discussing bilateral relations, as well as in the national one discussing support for 
the democratisation of these countries.   
In the area of development the Polish Presidency chaired the EU Delegation to the Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly EU-ACP in Lome (Togo, 21-23.11.2011) and hosted and co-
organised with the Commission, the European Development Days in Warsaw (15-
16.12.2011). The agenda of the latter reflected the Presidency’s focus on democratisa-
tion policy and the ENP (PLa/04.2012). Finally, the Polish Presidency coordinated and 
represented the EU in the framework of the 4
th
 High Level Forum on Effective Assis-
tance (HLEA) in Busan (29.11-1.12.2011). Polish representatives were included as ob-
servers of the Sherpa Group whose responsibility was to prepare the final document of 
the Forum (MFA 2012: 141). However, the influence of the Polish Presidency was re-
stricted due to the status of the observer as well as the general stance of the Commission 
which was reflected in the instructions prepared for the Polish team (SGCb/05.2012). 
According to the division of labour between the HRVP and the FM the latter represent-
ed the EU in the areas which had been of national preference while at the lower level 
the Polish officials were acting in response to the HRVP and EEAS’s requests 
(PLa/04.2012, 28). The latter was more frequent, often organised ad hoc and did not 
reflect Polish preferences (SGCa/05.2012). Therefore, while the FM represented the EU 
during his visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan, presenting a clear Polish initiative during 
its mission in Afghanistan, the Minister for European Affairs Dowgielewicz represented 
the HRVP in front of the European Parliament during the FAC briefings. For example 
on October 17 and 18, 2011 Minister Dowgielewicz took part in the EP’s discussion on 
Libya, Syria and the peace process in the Middle East (MFA 2012: 235). Thus, at the 
higher political level the Polish Presidency was deputising the HRVP according to 
‘more or less’ national indications, at the lower it was more accommodating to the 
HRVP’s preferences (EEASa/04.2012). 
8.4.3 Neutral Brokering 
 
The assertive and national focus of the Polish Presidency was also reflected in the di-
minished role that Poland played in the function of neutral brokering. Compared with 
the previous Presidencies, in particular the Hungarian one, Poland did not continue the 
role of honest broker and advocate of the EEAS with reference to other Member States; 
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on the contrary in December 2011 the Polish FM co-signed a letter criticising the man-
agement of EU affairs thus far under the HRVP’s leadership.113 It was argued that the 
letter was not meant as a personal criticism towards the HRVP, but rather a constructive 
proposal in the anticipation of the approaching review planned for mid-2013 
(PLh/05.2012). 
One of the rare instances of Poland’s performing the function of brokering was achiev-
ing a solution with reference to the subject of the EU representation in international or-
ganisations. This was demonstrated when the UK mission to the United Nations blocked 
the EU from presenting shared positions due to the particular wording. British officials 
argued that statements should be issued as ‘on behalf of the EU and its member states" 
rather than ‘on behalf of the EU’ (Borger 2011). Therefore, one of the more practical 
achievements in the area of EU external relations was the adoption of the agreement on 
delivering EU statements in international organisations which contributed to ending the 
period of ambiguity that largely harmed the EU’s image on the international stage. 
Thus, the agreement clarified terms in which to apply the wording ‘on the authority of 
the EU’ and in which ‘on the authority of the EU and Member States’; nevertheless the 
practical operationalization was to be followed. 
In addition to this, it was argued that Poland, to some extent, acted as an honest broker 
with reference to the ENP; however these efforts were hindered by Poland’s image as a 
strong representative of the Eastern neighbours. Therefore Polish attempts to revive and 
implement the EU democratisation policy were met with some suspicions from Member 
States (SGCa/05.2012). This was particularly visible with reference to the Polish initia-
tive of establishing the EED and it will be further discussed in the subsequent section of 
this chapter. As demonstrated above, the Polish Presidency did not see the function of 
neutral brokering as one of its priorities. The original role preference focused on suc-
cessful exercise of political leadership which will be the subject of the subsequent sec-
tion.  
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 The letter was co-signed by foreign affairs ministers of 12 EU member states (Belgium, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden). A 
copy of the letter is available at 
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8.4.4 Policy Entrepreneurship/Political Leadership 
 
As argued earlier the Council chairmanship was not only a ‘membership test’ for Po-
land, but most importantly it was an opportunity to establish itself as a key player on the 
European stage. Thus, exercising political leadership in the area of foreign affairs was 
seen as a key factor to achieving the status of European decision maker along with 
France and Germany.  
One of the most visible Polish initiatives was a speech delivered by FM Sikorski in Ber-
lin on November 28, 2011 during which he called for further German leadership in the 
management of the ongoing crisis as well as the future of the EU.
114
 This was one of the 
most visible efforts to present Poland as an important Member State taking part in shap-
ing the future of the EU (PLd/05.2012). The agenda shaping of the Polish Presidency 
will be further explored with reference to the Warsaw Declaration adopted on the occa-
sion of the EaP summit, the substance of the EaP and finally the European Endowment 
for Democracy being a clear example of agenda setting. 
8.4.4.1 Warsaw Declaration  
 
The main priority of the Polish Presidency in the area of EU external relations was 
keeping the issue of the EaP high on the agenda in order to mobilise support for the 
September summit. This was supposed to be the highlight event of the whole Presiden-
cy. Under the priority of ‘Europe Benefiting from Openness’ the EaP was framed within 
the ENP and discussed alongside the Southern dimension. As the analysis will further 
demonstrate Poland used a few available procedural resources as well as managing to 
access additional resources through close cooperation and coordination with the HRVP 
and EEAS. The Gymnich summit took place in Poland on September 2 and 3, 2011. 
The agenda of this meeting was set as an outcome of the compromises between the 
HRVP, EEAS and the Polish Presidency (PLa/04.2012, EEASa/04.2012). In order to 
accommodate Polish requests the subject of the approaching EaP summit and the EED 
were included in the working agenda of the second day of the meeting. Comparing the 
participation of this summit to the first EaP summit held in Prague in 2009 the Warsaw 
Summit managed to gather the key heads of states from Member States as well as Euro-
pean actors. This could have been read as support not only for the project of the EaP, 
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but also for Poland and its Presidency (research interviews). This however did not trans-
late into substantial outputs with reference to the substance of the policy. 
The Warsaw Declaration was a result of a compromise as the Polish Presidency did not 
manage to include any substantial reference to the membership perspective for EaP 
countries. The only reference is acknowledgement of ‘the European aspirations and the 
European choice of some partners and their commitment to build deep and sustainable 
democracy’ (CEU 2011f). Also additional emphasis was put on ‘the particular role for 
the EaP to support those who seek an ever closer relationship with the EU’ (Ibid.). The 
reference to visa liberalisation can be seen as a partial success of the Polish officials as 
the further progress would be subjected to a technical decision based on meeting the 
specified conditions by the neighbouring countries. The original plans were to have a 
timeline set for ‘a long term’ perspective of the liberalisation process. The final wording 
refers to making the progress conditional ‘in due course on a case-by-case basis’ (CEU 
2011f) and was claimed to be a result of Polish lobbying (PLa/04.2012, PLh/05.2012). 
The gradual ‘creation of an economic area between the EU and partner countries’ (CEU 
2011f) was also perceived by a Polish official as a successful change of language to in-
clude reference to the possibility of gradual economic integration (PLa/04.2012). Never-
theless, there was still no reference to the possibility of full economic integration. The 
summit also resulted in some practical outcomes, for example a plan to establish an 
Academy of Public Administration (to be based in Warsaw) and open up the Erasmus 
programme for students from EaP countries (Ibid.). 
The efforts towards adopting a joint declaration on Belarus failed, as the neighbouring 
countries refused to sign it. The declaration, signed only by the EU countries, con-
demned the democratic record of Belarus. Poland also planned to adopt a ‘modernisa-
tion package’ making further cooperation conditional on terms of a full amnesty for po-
litical prisoners, setting up talks with the opposition and holding parliamentary elections 
in line with international standards (PLh/05.2012). The failure to adopt a joint declara-
tion was portrayed by the Polish opposition and international press as a failure of the 
Polish authorities and a lack of sufficient negotiations held before the summit.
115
 The 
issue of Belarus turned out to be particularly contentious as Belarussian FM Siarhiej 
Martynau refused to attend and the Belarusian Ambassador in Warsaw Viktor Gaisenak 
who was supposed to officially represent Belarus refused to participate during the sec-
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ond day of the summit. The Ambassador could not participate in all of the meetings due 
to his lower diplomatic rank vis-à-vis other diplomatic representatives and thus stated 
his reason as discrimination against the authorities in Minsk. Despite some Polish plans 
to allow President Lukashenka to attend the summit, he was not invited due to the EU-
imposed visa sanctions (PLa/04.2012). 
8.4.4.2 Eastern Partnership 
 
The daily management of the EaP is based on the mixture of both technical and political 
decisions driving the legislative management of various policy portfolios. This is where 
the influence of the Polish Presidency can be noted in several areas. In the second part 
of 2011 decisions were taken on starting negotiations on DCFTA (free trade component 
of the Association Agreements) with Moldova and Georgia, and visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements with Armenia and Azerbaijan (EEASa/04.2012, 
SGCb/05.2012). It is difficult to evaluate the influence of Poland in this case as these 
decisions should be based on the fulfilment of technical conditions. Nevertheless, it was 
acknowledged by some of the interviewees that Poland’s pressure was the key in speed-
ing up adoption of the negotiations mandate by the Council (EEASa/04.2012). 
The Association Agreement with Ukraine, which was anticipated to be finalised under 
the Polish Presidency had been planned as the second key event of the Polish term in 
office.  This failed due to Timoshenko’s conviction, perceived in European capitals as 
an instance of politically motivated justice and designed to limit the potential political 
competition for the approaching parliamentary elections. The extensive efforts of the 
Polish Presidency were twofold. First all, the visits of the Polish President in August 
2011 and then in November 2011, and a joint visit of Polish and Swedish FMs, also in 
November 2011, were supposed to convince the Ukrainian President to release Timo-
shenko from her sentence.
116
 Secondly, the extensive lobbying within the EU resulted in 
the compromise solution of announcing the finalising of the negotiations during the De-
cember EU-Ukraine summit and making the initialling conditional on future political 
developments in Ukraine (Rzeczpospolita 19.12.2011).  
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 There were two main ideas –changing the Ukrainian law and removing the prosecution on the 
grounds of political responsibility or on the basis of the poor health conditions of Timoshenko. Neither 
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8.4.4.3 European Endowment for Democracy 
 
The idea of the EED emerged in the aftermath of the events in Belarus in December 
2010 when the opposition marched the streets in an attempt to protest against the ma-
nipulation and forging of the results of the presidential elections. The lack of effective-
ness of the approach implemented thus far towards the Belarusian authoritarians and the 
lack of effective channels of support for the opposition triggered a discussion at the 
Polish MFA on other potential means of handling the situation (PLb/04.2012, 
PLd/05.2012, PLh/05.2012). The idea of an endowment fund, based on the example of 
the US National Endowment for Democracy, of which Poland had been one of the main 
beneficiaries during its democratic struggle in the 1980s, emerged as one of the ideas to 
enable the EU take a more flexible approach towards the countries experiencing demo-
cratic aspirations under authoritarian regimes. FM Sikorski officially presented the idea 
at the FAC in January 2011. The general idea of setting up a more flexible and rapid 
instrument was met with  considerable interest from Member States and thus the Polish 
government decided to add it to its Presidency’s agenda (PLa/04.2012).  
Poland used other European actors to put the EED on the European agenda by framing 
the issue within the two major ongoing debates: the external instruments in favour of 
democratisation and the review of the ENP. This was done through Polish MEPs at the 
EP.
117
 In May 2011 the Commission and the HRVP issued a joint communication on the 
review of the ENP which supported the establishment of the EED as a part of a new 
more effective EU approach in its democracy support. This allowed for placing the issue 
on the agenda of the other European actors thus using their political position and re-
sources to promote the idea. This also resulted in fleshing out the general idea of setting 
a flexible and quick source of funding for actors involved in democracy promotion out-
side the EU with more details and substance.
118
 However, with the constant pressure put 
by the Polish officials throughout its Presidency the issue managed to be kept high on 
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 The Polish MEP Andrzej Grzyb introduced the EED to the EP resolution of 7 July 2011 on EU external 
policies in favour of democratisation (2011/2032(INI)) and Marek Siwiec added it to  the European 
Parliament resolution of 14 December 2011 on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(2011/2157(INI). 
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This was particularly visible in the case of the EP, which decided to draft a report on the modalities for 
the possible establishment of a European Endowment for Democracy (EED) (2011/2245(INI)). During the 
process of drafting the report numerous consultations were organised with various stakeholders to 
identify the most appropriate institutional design of the EED and its operating arrangements. 
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the agenda, but on the other hand this strengthened the perception of the EED being a 
Polish pet project thus referring to national preferences (EEASa/04.2012). 
Poland also employed considerable national resources supporting the promotion of the 
EED. In June 2011 Poland presented the EED’s operational and institutional arrange-
ments in the form of legal expertise. It was commissioned externally by the Polish MFA 
and it envisaged the legal foundations of the EED as the basis of an international con-
vention. The proposal was handed over to the EEAS which was to continue working out 
the details (PLb/04.2012, 24). Having the support of the Commission and the HR al-
lowed for a wider promotion of the project. The EED was mentioned in several speech-
es by the Commissioner Füle and the HRVP Ashton as an important component of the 
reviewed approach within the ENP. However both of them referred to the general idea 
of the EED and never elaborated on the substance of the EED. This was left to the 
EEAS, which in cooperation with the Commission DG Development and Cooperation 
EuropeAid organised several consultations with civil societies, political foundations and 
think tanks to explore their experience. This also enabled to accommodate the expecta-
tions of a variety of stakeholders involved in democracy promotion. Poland also man-
aged to make use of its high-profile Poles working both in the Commission and the 
EEAS whose strong emphasis on moving the project forward gave the EED an im-
portant impetus for advancing the works (EEASa/04.2012, EEASb/06.2012). 
Poland also used the spotlight generated by its Presidency to hold various seminars, 
meetings and consultations on the subjects that were particularly important for the Pres-
idency. Most of these events were devoted to the issue of the ENP and its renewed ap-
proach. One of the most important events was the European Development Days held in 
December in Warsaw, which Poland decided to use to discuss the EED with stakehold-
ers from neighbouring countries. The subject of the ENP and EED was thus presented 
and kept high on the agenda through the whole six-month period. The extensive discus-
sion enabled Poland not only to gather support for the initiative but also to elaborate 
comments on the potential institutional set up and working arrangements of the EED. 
Even though the general idea was welcomed by most of the Member States some seri-
ous concerns were raised as far as the legal choice of the international convention was 
concerned (PLh/05.2012). Moreover, some of the Member States expressed their firm 
opposition to the EED’s ability to support the fledgling political parties in targeted 
countries (FR/05.2012). The information supplied by the EEAS on the EED was re-
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garded by the representatives present at the meeting as too general and lacking concrete 
details on how the EED would work (research interviews). This caused a perception of 
Poland’s rushing the decision without having necessary details worked out and without 
securing support from all of Member States (EEASb/06.2012).  
Realising that the EED had become a very complex and contentious issue Poland ad-
justed its original aim of having the EED established before the end of 2011 and decid-
ed rather to aim for a more general political declaration. The declaration would present 
a general support for the idea and more concrete details would follow in the course of 
2012. Nevertheless, even having some general agreement on the EED proved difficult. 
After some pre-meeting announcements the declaration failed to be adopted at the FAC 
on December 1, 2011; instead the EED was only mentioned in the Council conclu-
sions.
119
 Running out of time, Poland used one of the last venues available for the Presi-
dency and put the subject of the EED’s declaration on the agenda of the December’s 
meeting of COREPER II (PLa/04.2012, PLh/05.2012) The declaration was placed first 
on the agenda of the ANTICI’s meeting and then adopted at the subsequent COREPER 
II meeting on December 16, 2011 (Ibid.). 
Nevertheless, the final outcome as presented in the declaration presents a lack of ability 
of the Polish Presidency to settle contentious issues. In an attempt to secure the support 
of all of the Member States and thus having the declaration adopted before the end of its 
term in office Poland agreed to give all representatives to be present in the decision 
making body of the EED voting rights regardless of their financial contribution. The 
institutional set up of a private foundation was another concession from the Polish 
side.
120
 Therefore, as has been argued in the academic literature, Member States often 
rush the initiatives through in order to secure some tangible results in order to declare 
their Presidencies effective and successful. Such rushed solutions might not present the 
most appropriate and effective compromises, as in case of the above-mentioned exam-
ple, where Poland gave up the only source of possible funding for the EED. Conse-
quently, the Presidency increased Poland’s capacity to place its initiative onto the Euro-
pean agenda; however it also restrained Poland’s negotiating capacity to achieve an out-
come close to its original preferences. 
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8.5 Role Assessment 
 
After the initial period of membership Poland started to perceive European foreign poli-
cy as an additional venue for its national interests. The six-month term in office enabled 
the Polish administration to gain intensive experience of post-Lisbon European foreign 
policy making. With reference to the downloading dimension Poland understood that in 
order to secure any advancement of its national priorities it needed to play according to 
the already established rules, in this particular context rules referring to the Presidency’s 
role vis-à-vis the new post-Lisbon institutional architecture. Poland decided to use its 
term in office to upload a more active scenario for the Presidency’s chairmanship. The 
emphasis on communicating support for both the HRVP and EEAS was aimed at por-
traying Poland as acting according to the established rules for the ‘supporting Presiden-
cy’ scenario thus securing the perception of acting according to both formal and infor-
mal rules, and expectations from other Member States and European institutions. Thus 
Poland kept on balancing between its ambitions to secure some tangible outputs and not 
be accused of undermining the emerging post-Lisbon system.  
On the eve of the Presidency one of the Polish MEPs, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski noted that 
Poland may ‘set the pattern of how far a Lisbon Treaty Presidency can go’ (Euractiv 
07.06.2011). In addition to this, FIIA expert Tiia Lehtonen summarised the Presidency 
as ‘Poland on the way to the club of heavyweight EU members’ (FIIA 2011). All of the 
think tanks’ interviewees agreed on the positive assessment as well as the significance 
of the Presidency for Poland. Both CEPS and EPC’s representatives argued that Poland 
has managed to put itself on the map as a large influential European country, ‘fully as-
sured of its role within the EU’ (CEPS/01.2012, EPC/01.2012). Furthermore, when 
asked about the area of the greatest contribution of the Polish Presidency a researcher at 
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung pointed to Poland, as ‘the first big Member State to hold the 
Presidency after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty’, being able to solve a series 
of problems, such as finding the role for the PM of the country in the chair and accom-
modating the increasingly powerful position of the EP’ (HBS/01.2012). Finally, another 
CEPS representative pointed to Poland’s contribution towards ‘normalisation’ of the 
system, as different actors have a better idea of what their respective roles are’ 
(CEPS/01.2012). Therefore, it seems that the alternative scenario for the post-Lisbon 
Presidency as performed by Poland resulted not only in a positive assessment but also in 
upgrading Poland’s position on the European stage. As noted above, Poland’s perfor-
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mance was assessed positively by European actors. Firstly, the HRVP issued an official 
letter which ‘highlighted the high quality of Polish Presidency, including the extraordi-
nary commitment of Poland and the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs to actions sup-
porting the High Representative ‘(MFA 2012: 41). The EP’s President Martin Schulz 
stated that the Presidency was ‘without a doubt one of the very best Presidencies we 
have had’ (Euractiv 14.12.2011). This was further acknowledged by the President of the 
Commission Barrosso who emphasised the ‘extraordinary capacity [during] probably 
the most difficult period since the European integration started’ (Ibid.). This was mostly 
affected by the Polish active stance on ensuring unity of EU Member States divided 
among the lines of being members of the Eurozone (SGCa/05.2012, EEASa/04.2012). 
Therefore, the overall positive image of the Polish performance enabled it to play a 
more active role in the areas of external relations, and thus informally expanding the 
existing scenario to include not only institutional entrepreneurship and indirect agenda 
shaping but also direct agenda setting with reference to the EED. Yet, as demonstrated 
above, the influence of the post-Lisbon Presidency should not be overstated as it de-
pends on the complex interaction of a number of actors working within the extensive 
framework of EU foreign affairs. 
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8.6 Role Institutionalisation under the Polish Leadership – Towards Role 
Prescription 
 
The Polish Presidency further demonstrated the continuation of the emerging post-
Lisbon trend with general expectations towards the institution itself and the individual 
Member States in the chair. Thus, particular expectations based on Poland due to its 
membership thus far and its expertise empowered the Polish Presidency to play a more 
active role with reference to the Eastern dimension of the ENP. This was a clear illustra-
tion of the Polish role conceptions of both its foreign policy and its European member-
ship strategy. As noted by Bunse and Klein ‘Polish Presidency demonstrated that na-
tional presidencies can revive the visibility and activism even in the foreign policy 
realm if the country in the chair works in close cooperation with the new more perma-
nent EU institutions’ (2014: 90). Poland’s particular emphasis on exercising political 
leadership during its Council chairmanship resulted in its pursuing a different role pref-
erence of not only a more active, but also more assertive role in EU external relations. 
The particular role making of Poland enabled the functional scope for the Presidency’s 
role to expand. Adjusting the scenario introduced by the Belgian Presidency, and fol-
lowed by the Hungarian Presidency, Poland decided to use the already established prac-
tice of HRVP’s deputisation to negotiate terms of the Polish Presidency’s performance 
in the area of foreign affairs. It can be argued that Poland, after the Belgian Presidency, 
was one of the institutional entrepreneurs as its performance demonstrated features of 
active role making. Through enactment of its role preference Poland established itself 
and thus the institution of the Presidency at that time in a more privileged position vis-à-
vis other Member States, demonstrating role playing with the already established prac-
tice of the supportive Presidency. Therefore, the uploading dimension of the Polish 
Presidency not only refers to agenda shaping of national priorities and  securing out-
comes close to national preferences, but also to the design of the emerging post-Lisbon 
institutional system of foreign policy making through its deliberate role making. The 
strategy was not always successful as the cooperation with both HRVP and EEAS be-
came challenging. It was in particular the case of the emerging EEAS which anticipated 
its role to be challenged by the active Polish Presidency and thus aiming at 'limiting the 
potential political role of the Polish Presidency' and ensuring continuation of the more 
functional scenario introduced by the Belgian and followed by the Hungarian Presiden-
cies (HUb/07.2011). Furthermore, it also shows that the Member State in the chair is 
capable to some extent of negotiating its role through deliberate role making. This can 
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be done by using remaining limited resources and indirectly accessing the WGs agenda 
through cooperation and coordination with the EEAS. Yet this is highly dependent on 
the particular personalities of the EEAS's representatives and how they conceptualise 
their roles. Finally, the Euro-enthusiastic Presidency combined with the sound econom-
ic and stable domestic situation enabled Poland to maximise its capacity at both the 
working level in Brussels and the political level in Warsaw towards the Presidency 
which shifted Poland into ‘a higher political level within the EU’ (SGCa/05.2012). 
This alternative scenario as proposed by Poland, a supporting yet political Presidency 
has not been formally institutionalised, but it might have a more lasting effect on the 
emerging post-Lisbon system. Poland managed to set a precedent for a more active and 
influential Presidency pursued within the limits of the post-Lisbon context 
(HUd/07.2011, HUf/07.2011). Officials from both the Commission and EEAS suggest-
ed that such behaviour ‘might be on the brink of violation of the Presidency’s neutrali-
ty’ (HUb/07.2011, HUd/07.2011). Nevertheless, some of the Member States’ officials 
agreed that Member States having expertise in particular policy areas might be per-
ceived as ‘legitimate to play a more active role if they are able to contribute something 
substantial to EU foreign policy’ (ESc/12.2010).  This should be done with close coop-
eration and coordination with the HRVP and other European actors (Ibid.). Consequent-
ly, this would indicate that it is rather the nature of the post-Lisbon foreign policy rather 
than the institution of the Presidency that entitles Member States to contribute to com-
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The aim of this thesis was to examine the role and the inter-institutional position of the 
CEU Presidency in the area of EU foreign policy in the post-Lisbon context. The provi-
sions of the LT transferred management of EU foreign affairs from the level of the 
Member State to the level of newly established European institutions, namely the PO-
TEC and the HRVP. However, with rather generally envisaged provisions, the LT failed 
to introduce a clear scenario for post-Lisbon European foreign policy making, and left 
this to be worked out in practical terms during the implementation phase. The primary 
focus of this research was on the informal adaptation of the LT’s formal provisions re-
garding the position and functions of the Presidency in this particular policy area. The 
first objective was to provide a better understanding of the position of the Presidency 
within the inter-institutional relations in the area of European foreign policy in the af-
termath of the critical juncture by exploring its subsequent institutionalisation. Second-
ly, the extent to which the process of role institutionalisation is a consequence of the 
implementation of the formal provisions of the LT, and the extent to which it is pur-
posely shaped by involved actors. The actors become the implementing agents who are 
in the position to clarify the created ambiguous institutional set up in due course of the 
implementation of the provisions and the emerging system. This required the opening of 
‘the black box’ of the institutional change at the point of critical juncture, and examin-
ing the Presidency at the very moment of the institutional change. This study sought to 
answer three research questions: 
To what extent is the process of role institutionalisation based on the previous role of 
the pre-Lisbon Presidency (previous functions as well as the existence of pre-Lisbon 
intra role conflicts between agenda shaping and neutral brokering), on the institutional 
feedback emerging from the fledgling system, and on the particular role making of the 
Member State in the chair (role preference and role enactment)? 
To what extent is the preference held by the Member States towards its time in the of-
fice (role preference) guided by informal expectations held by other involved actors, the 
national role conceptions of the countries with reference to its foreign and European 
policies, and the role assessment of the previous presidencies’ performance (role as-
sessment)? 
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What is the capacity of the country in the chair to project its individual role preference 
to the structural level and shaping the role prescription of the Presidency in the post-
Lisbon European foreign policy (role making)? What are the key factors affecting this 
capacity for role making? 
To explore the institution of the Presidency during its institutional change, this thesis 
put forward an analytical framework combining institutionalist and role-based insights 
which allow studying the institutional change as a constitutive process of mechanisms at 
the agential level, the role making of individual countries in the chair, and the structural 
level of the institutional feedback stemming from the emerging post-Lisbon European 
foreign policy making system. The model of the Presidency's role institutionalisation 
aims to capture the agency-structure relationship as well as integrate previously identi-
fied factors which further affect the Presidency's performance. Finally, drawing on pre-
vious research on the variations between individual Presidencies, this project applied a 
role-based concept of national role conception to explain conceptualisation of the Presi-
dency's role and functions by individual Member States. The final result, the framework 
exploring the process of the Presidency's role institutionalisation post-Lisbon, allows for 
a more comprehensive and in-depth explanation of the studied phenomenon based on 
the example of the first four post-Lisbon presidencies held by Spain, Belgium, Hungary 
and Poland.   
9.1 Comparing the Spanish, Belgian, Hungarian and Polish Presidencies: The EU 
Council Presidency at the Critical Juncture 
 
Firstly, the analysis of the Lisbon Treaty clearly points to the lack of a clear role pre-
scription of the post-Lisbon Presidency in EU foreign policy making. As argued by 
Fernàndez, '(…) the significance of the Presidency for the Member States has varied 
throughout the process of European integration in accordance with the transformation of 
this institution and that such transformation has been driven by the institutional deci-
sions taken by the countries at critical points in the history of European construction’ 
(2008a: 25). The LT created such a critical point that would affect the Presidency's role 
and position according to both formal and informal institutional decisions. The original 
decision to remove the Presidency from the post-Lisbon Presidency has been limited by 
the functional demands created by the emerging post-Lisbon system. Thus, the first 
Member States in the chair were still to play a role. Yet, it was not clear what kind of 
role it should be. The comparative analysis of these four individual Presidencies makes 
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it possible to trace the subsequent Presidency's role institutionalisation as a result of the 
particular role making by Spain, Belgium, Hungary and Poland both constrained and 
empowered by the emerging system of the post-Lisbon European foreign policy mak-
ing. Therefore, the Presidency's performance was to a large extent conditioned by the 
lack of fully operational system which produced further functional expectations towards 
it. Firstly, the Presidency was expected to take over the chairmanship of the WGs asso-
ciated with the foreign affairs until the HRVP would be able to nominate permanent 
EEAS’s chairmanship. In more general terms, the HRVP's 'impossible job description' 
(Euractiv 10.12.2009) triggered the functional expectation towards the Presidency to 
ensure the HRVP's deputisation and functional support. Secondly, this created further 
expectations towards the Presidency to perform functions not only of an organisational 
manager, but also of an external and internal representative of the CEU and the EU, and 
finally of a neutral broker. The latter function informally expanded to ensure a channel 
of communication between Member States and the HRVP, and later the EEAS. This, as 
in the case of Belgium and Hungary, was also in focus with reference to the manage-
ment of the EU affairs, and on mediating between different visions of the post-Lisbon 
European foreign policy making. Thirdly, maintaining of the Presidency's role in some 
policy areas, for example trade and development, as well as regarding some Council's 
preparatory bodies, namely COREPER II, ensured the Presidency's role in the overall 
coordination of the EU external action. Therefore, due to emerging functional expecta-
tions, the Presidency has also become responsible for ensuring coherence and con-
sistency of EU foreign policy during its six-month period.  
These emerging informal expectations, being the results of the functional requirements 
that have stemmed from the emerging post-Lisbon system, created an opportunity for 
the Presidency to play a more active role. However, it was up to individual Member 
States in the chair to decide how they would address this opportunity. The lack of a 
clear role prescription enabled individual countries, Spain, Belgium, Hungary and Po-
land to pursue their own visions towards their role while in the chair of the Council. 
This comparative analysis also demonstrates how different countries in the chair em-
phasised different functions according to their particular role conceptions in European 
and foreign policies. The latter was also affected by informal expectations expressed 
towards individual countries; Belgium's original role preference focused on ensuring a 
functional scenario with the Presidency ensuring a supporting role towards the new ac-
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tors, while Spain and Poland decided to include policy entrepreneurship and agenda 
shaping in their role preferences. Both Spain and Poland, medium-sized countries with 
particular national interest in EU foreign policy took advantage of the lack of the clear 
scenario and took on the role of political leaders with reference to the ENP. Such an in-
terpretation of the Presidency's role was different in these two cases. Spain was general-
ly criticised, and at the same time excused by the lack of fully operational post-Lisbon 
system, for overstepping the boundaries of the post-Lisbon provisions and exercising 
the 'pre-Lisbon Presidency'. In the case of Poland the role assessment was more ambiva-
lent as on the one hand its policy entrepreneurship with reference to the EaP and the 
EED in particular was perceived as 'bordering on the post-Lisbon scenario', and on the 
other hand, it was praised for its effective, enthusiastic and pro-European performance. 
This might indicate that the post-Lisbon institution of the Presidency might continue its 
pre-Lisbon role ambiguity and thus allow individual Member States some leeway in 
their interpretation of their role in the chair of the CEU chairmanship. 
 However, as demonstrated by these two examples, the entrepreneurial role of the Presi-
dency needs to be performed in the framework of 'the HRVP's deputisation' ensuring 
agreement on the particular division of labour in the pre-Presidency period. Finally, pol-
icy entrepreneurship has been to a large extent limited by the permanent management 
exercised by the POTEC, HRVP and EEAS, and thus created a strong expectation to-
wards the Presidency that any agenda shaping needs to be ensured through extensive 
coordination and cooperation with the European institutions. This thesis presented some 
preliminary insights into the post-Lisbon Presidency's nature of agenda shaping, but fur-
ther research is needed to explore whether the Polish Presidency's policy entrepreneur-
ship capacity was enabled by the transitional character of its Presidency or whether it 
would became a more permanent feature of the Presidency's portfolio. Finally, the ex-
ample of Hungary illustrated the importance of the domestic political situation as well 
as the ideological stance of the government as intervening variables affecting both the 
Presidency's role preference and its subsequent behaviour while in the chair.    
Overall, this thesis concludes with several findings to suggest that the post-Lisbon Pres-
idency has continued with some of the pre-Lisbon institutionalisation patterns. Firstly, 
the post-Lisbon Presidency can be still characterised as a complex role set combining 
formal and informal functions. Secondly, this informal scope makes the Presidency 
more dependent on the particular role preferences held by the individual countries in the 
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chair. Thirdly, the process of role institutionalisation illustrated the interactive process 
of the structure-based factor (the institutional feedback) and agent-based factor (the role 
enactment of the countries in the chair). In addition to this, during critical junctures, the 
role set expands to include a function of institutional entrepreneurs tasked with interpre-
tation and implementation of the formal provisions into every day practises. Thus, the 
first post-Lisbon Presidencies possessed additional capacity to act as institutional entre-
preneurs. This has gradually decreased as the new system matured and functional and 
informal expectations became more stable and applicable across subsequent Presiden-
cies. The post-Lisbon role assessment focuses on the contribution towards the greater 
functioning of the post-Lisbon system, and thus focuses on its effectiveness in ensuring 
support towards new actors and coherence across various policy areas. Nevertheless, 
with the permanent presidencies of the HRVP and the EEAS, the rotating Presidency 
might shed its hat of a neutral broker and focus more on pursuing national preferences, 
as it was in the case of the Polish Presidency. Limited formal functions might result in 
shifting the Presidency in EU foreign affairs more towards an intergovernmental func-
tion.  
Consequently, the process of the post-Lisbon Presidency’s role institutionalisation dur-
ing the 2-year period of the implementation of the LT’s provisions was based on all of 
the indicated factors: firstly, the previous pre-Lisbon Presidency’s role and its functions; 
secondly, the institutional feedback emerging from the fledgling system and on the par-
ticular role making of the Member States in the chair. Thirdly, each of the four first 
Member States had a different role preference of its time in the office and this was both 
influenced by particular role conceptions of national foreign policy and the European 
membership strategy. Fourthly, this role preference was also adjusted in a response to 
particular expectations held towards the individual Member States, but also towards a 
more general role of the Presidency institution itself. The latter was to a large extent af-
fected by the performance of the previous Presidencies and their assessment. One of the 
key assessment factors was if the Presidency managed to benefit to the better operations 
of the post-Lisbon system and to the performance of the newly created actors being in 
charge of the post-Lisbon foreign policy making. Finally, the comparison of the case 
studies of the Hungarian and Polish Presidencies enables to conclude that these two 
countries had a different capacity while pursuing its original role preference of the Pres-
idency. While both Hungary and Poland officially announced the Presidency’s plans to 
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play a more active role in EU foreign affairs and in particular to shift the focus of the 
EU agenda to the Eastern neighbours, Hungary did not manage to follow up with this 
political role. Hungary’s functional and supportive role performed towards the HRVP 
and the EEAS was favourably assessed at the European stage and set an example of the 
post-Presidency’s role. Poland managed to pursue a more active role on the EU stage, it 
also managed to promote some of the key national interests, such the EU relations with 
the EU Eastern neighbours and the declaration establishing the EED. Therefore, Poland 
also offered the first example of successful agenda setting in the post-Lisbon European 
foreign policy making. With reference to agenda shaping, due to its diminished formal 
role, the capacity of the Presidency to act as a policy entrepreneur depends more on the 
national influence capacity of the country in the chair than the influence capacity of the 
institution itself. This, however, should be the subject of further research, together with 
the ongoing consolidation of the post-Lisbon institutional architecture.   
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and external of national preferences) 
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9.2 Towards the Role Prescription of the Post-Lisbon Presidency 
   
As concluded by Carta ‘the rotating Presidencies throughout the first two years contrib-
uted massively to shape the rules of procedures regimenting the EU’s institutional ma-
chinery’ (Carta 2013: 91). The Presidency's role in the post-Lisbon context has emerged 
both as a result of the formal provisions as envisaged in the LT and as that of the subse-
quent process of informal adaptation of these provisions to more practical working ar-
rangements among the actors involved in European foreign policy making. Therefore, 
the role of the post-Lisbon Presidency has developed as the result of unintended conse-
quences of the structural deficiencies that emerged from the implementation of the LT, 
enabling the country in the chair to play a greater role. The LT has created a multi-actor 
and complex environment, in which the performance of one actor affects the roles and 
performance of others. Thus, the Presidency's role depends both on how other actors 
interpret their own role and also on how capable they are in performing these roles. This 
further affected the Presidency's role and inter-institutional position in terms of the more 
specific institutional feedback. 
As argued on the basis of the Presidency's role institutionalisation, its role and particular 
functions develop both as a result of the institutional feedback and the particular role 
making of individual countries in the chair. The impact of the latter one is argued to be 
conditioned by the subsequent stage of the role assessment, as the consolidation of the 
Presidency's scenario into a more stable role prescription would be dependent on being 
enforced by subsequent countries in the chair of the Presidency. As argued earlier, the 
Presidency’s being to a large extent conditioned by the informal expectations in the pre-
Lisbon context has been regarded as being very sensitive to the norm-based approach 
and other actors' assessment., As demonstrated by the example of the subsequent Presi-
dencies, Belgium's role preference was conditioned by a rather negative assessment of 
the Spanish Presidency. Furthermore, the successful assessment of Belgium's perfor-
mance in its supporting and functional role resulted in expectations towards the Hungar-
ian Presidency to continue this approach. Overall, the assessment of the post-Lisbon 
Presidency is based on its overall impact on the new post-Lisbon system, and its contri-
bution towards ensuring the system's coherence and effectiveness. This creates an ex-
pectation of a supporting and functional Presidency; however, this is only a minimalist 
scenario which should be performed by individual countries. The overall role ambiguity 
of the post-Lisbon Presidency in EU external actions has enabled particular Member 
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States to project their individual role preference towards interpreting the supporting and 
functional aspects of the Presidency. Thus, it is up to individual Presidencies to estab-
lish their particular strategy for the Presidency in the framework of the HRVP's depu-
tisation. For this reason, one might still expect some variations among Member States.  
A supporting and functional scenario for the post-Lisbon Presidency is nowadays a ra-
ther consolidated part of the expectations towards the Presidency's role; even though 
this has not been directly institutionalised. However, the Presidency’s role was 
acknowledged in some of the documents, from which the most important was the re-
view of the EEAS presented by the HRVP. Its presentation in mid-2013 gave the HRVP 
a chance not only to review the structure and function of the EEAS itself, but also the 
overall functioning and effectiveness of the post-Lisbon system. The document attempt-
ed to address some of the unintended consequences that emerged in the aftermath of the 
LT's implementation, and provide more formalised working arrangements. The overall 
tendency seems to point towards further limiting the role of the Presidency. Thus, the 
chairmanship of the remaining WGs under the current rotating management is argued to 
be transferred to the permanent management under the EEAS (HRVP 2013: 6).  As ex-
plained by the HRVP, 'given the close relationship between the work of these groups 
and the policy areas covered by groups already chaired by the EEAS, and in the interest 
of policy coherence, it would make sense to consider a change in the relevant CEU de-
cision to provide permanent chairs for these groups as well (with the transfer of support 
staff from the CEU Secretariat to the EEAS)’ (ibid).  
Moreover, 'there should be a special relationship between the EEAS and the Enlarge-
ment Working Group (COELA) working group’ (2013: 6). The review acknowledges 
the emergence of the HRVP's deputisation framework by highlighting that 'concentra-
tion of responsibilities in a single post generates a huge and relentless workload for one 
person’ (HRVP 2013: 13). The assessment of the current arrangements is 'ad-hoc and 
involve the Minister of the rotating Presidency, Members of the Commission with geo-
graphic responsibilities, senior EEAS officials and EUSRs' and should be formalised, 
‘including a more direct co-ordinating responsibility on behalf of the Union for the 
HR/VP over one or more members of the Commission' (…) at the same time, the High 
Representative could involve Member States’ FMs in more specific tasks and missions' 
(Ibid.). This point seems to positively assess the thus far involvement of the Presidency 
in the HRVP's deputisation function through involving the FM of the country exercising 
CHAPTER IX Conclusions 
256 
 
the Presidency. The role of the Presidency is also acknowledged with reference to at-
tending the EP's briefings and debates as 'Ministers from the rotating Presidency can 
also make a very valuable contribution' (HRVP 2013: 13); however, it was also noted 
that: 'there are occasionally situations where the person standing in for the High Repre-
sentative has not personally attended a key meeting or event and where another senior 
EEAS representative could provide a more informed contribution. It would therefore 
make sense to revise the Declaration on Political Accountability to allow EP plenary 
debates to follow the practice in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament where 
senior EEAS officials, Heads of Delegation or EU Special Representatives also take the 
floor' (Ibid.). Such an undertaking could formalise the role of the Presidency by making 
it a part of the more inter-institutional framework of the HRVP's deputisation.  
A five-year period is still quite a limited time for the assessment of the post-Lisbon in-
stitutional system; however, some preliminary assessment can be made. First of all, the 
interviewees supported the added-value of the permanent Presidency over the FAC, 
pointing to grater continuity of the agenda; with reference to the coherence of the EU 
external action further coordination should be ensured among relevant actors, namely 
the HRVP, EEAS, the Commission as well as the Presidency. However, it was rather 
the cooperation among the first three institutions that was conceived of as being the 
most pressing. Additionally, it was also highlighted that the removal of the Presidency 
from the exercise of agenda shaping allows the development of a more European agen-
da, even though, the lack of long-term strategic thinking on the side of the HRVP and 
the EEAS has largely undermined the potential significance of this institutional change. 
Finally, it was also noted that without the Presidency being formally tasked with the 
management of EU affairs, the latter was negatively affected by the lack of the 'Presi-
dency effect', as countries in the chair are less including to invest their time and powers 
into driving the EU foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, as seen by the example of the 
Polish Presidency, large Member States might still engage extensive national resources 
in the EU's service during its six-month period in the office. The initiative of the Euro-
pean Endowment Fund ‘shows the potential of the new architecture and the possibility 
of the Presidencies to gather different expertise from both the EEAS and the Commis-
sion to promote new initiatives’ (Carta 2013: 92). It is evident, in this sense, that ensur-
ing the Presidency's involvement and close cooperation can positively affect the EU 
foreign policy making particularly in the areas of expertise of countries in the chair. It 
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was not the aim of this thesis to undertake the assessment of the effectiveness of the 
post-Lisbon European foreign policy making; however, such an assessment might have 
further impact on the Presidency's role. The Presidency’s further development will de-
pend on the performance of the POTEC, HRVP and the EEAS, the overall effectiveness 
in performing their functions as well as the assessment of countries who are ultimately 
the main decision makers in EU foreign affairs.  
9.3 The post-Lisbon Presidency post-2011 
 
The subsequent Presidencies continued with the established practice of providing 
functional and organisation support for the HRVP and the EEAS. Some of the countries, 
for example, Denmark, Netherlands and Luxembourg pursued their Presidencies in line 
with the Belgian example exercising no political leadership, rather focusing on the 
supportive and functional management of the EU foreign affairs for the HRVP.  In the 
case of the Danish Presidency, this can be illustrated by the example of the EED as the 
final design of the organisation and its establishment was managed by the EEAS with 
no involvement of the Danish officials.  
 
Other Presidencies still attempted to have some influence on the EU’s agenda. Even 
though Cyprus’ position to a large extent was undermined by the ongoing conflict with 
Turkey and its boycott of the Presidency, Cyprus still focused on providing expertise 
and organisational assistance for both the EEAS and the HRVP in the area of the 
Southern EU neighbourhood (Christou 2013). The Irish Presidency took a particularly 
active role in with reference to EU security and defence policy. In the anticipation of the 
December European Council Ireland put a particular focus on promoting the discussion 
on ‘the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the EU’s security and defence policy, the 
development of civilian and military capabilities in support of that policy; and the 
strengthening of Europe’s defence industrial base’ (Tonra 2013). Thus, clearly aiming 
to strengthen the EU security and defence policy. Italy was the first of the biggest EU 
Member States and one of the major players on the EU stage to hold the post-Lisbon 
Presidency in the second half of 2014. As pointed out by Carbone ‘there were two 
Italian presidencies at work’ (2015) and thus resulting in two separate agendas as in the 
case of the Hungarian Presidency. While the political Presidency focused on promoting 
the strengthening of the EU on the basis of intergovernmentalism, the bureaucratic’ 
Presidency focused on administrative and functional support for the EU institutions. 
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Both Lithuania and Latvia managed to turn the EU agenda to the East while hosting the 
third and fourth summits of the Eastern Partnership. Even though, neither of the 
summits managed to provide any significant advance between the EU and its Eastern 
neighbours both Presidencies managed to have an impact on the pace of the EU policy 
making system and the final impact on the EU’s actions (Vandecasteele 2014, 
Borońska-Hryniewiecka and Dudzińska 2015).  
 
Moreover, the individual Presidencies still attract particular expectations towards its 
time in the office, for example, Lithuania was expected to provide a space for improving 
the relations between the EU and Belarus (Dudzińska and Dyner 2013). The focus on 
the Eastern border of the EU was continued by the Slovak Presidency in the second half 
of 2016 only to be shifted back to the Southern border in the beginning of 2017 when 
Malta took the rotating chairmanship. Even though the permanent management is now 
provided by the HRVP the individual Presidencies can still provide a particular 
expertise and support in policy areas which are of particular national interests. Thus, 
even though with the subsequent Presidencies the post-Lisbon role and inter-
institutional position have been clarified the role prescription remains flexible enough 




January-June 2012 Denmark 
July-December 2012 Cyprus 
January-June 2013 Ireland 
July-December 2013 Lithuania 
January-June 2014 Greece 
July-December 2014 Italy 
January-June 2015 Latvia 
July-December 2015 Luxembourg 
January-June 2016 Netherlands 
July-December 2016 Slovakia 
January-June2017 Malta 
Table 11. The list of the EU Council Rotating Presidencies 2012-2017 
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In the concluding section I will reflect on the theoretical and methodological approaches 
employed in the thesis by outlining their strengths and limitations. I will also provide a 
discussion of the potential avenues for future research stemming from the empirical and 
theoretical findings. 
9.4 Role Theory, the Presidency and Institutional Change 
 
Role theory proved its particular added-value towards providing a more in-depth analy-
sis of the performance of individual Presidencies' by highlighting the impact of particu-
lar features of the Member States as well as the particular overall context. One of the 
most useful features of role theory is its flexibility as it can be combined with other ap-
proaches. Thus, when combined with new institutionalism, role theory has made it pos-
sible to capture the institutional changes of the Presidency as a result of the interaction 
between the structure and agency, namely institutional feedback and the role making, 
respectively. There were variations between how the Member States in the chair of the 
first post-Lisbon Presidencies interpret and enact their role, and this can be explained by 
the role-based insights included in the proposed model. Therefore, the individual inter-
pretation of the Presidency’s role by the Member State in the chair as well as their sub-
sequent performance might either be empowered or constrained by the functional ex-
pectations stemming from the system. The application of such a role-based approach 
might offer an alternative solution for the ongoing structure-agency debate as well as 
offer a new manner of conceptualisation of the institutionalist argument of a more grad-
ual and endogenous institutional change. Operationalising the concept of 'incomplete 
contracting' through the process of role institutionalisation enables to capture implemen-
tation of the formal provisions through the process of informal institutional adaptation 
and possible role expansion.  
As observed by Elgström in the pre-Lisbon period the Member State in the chair had ‘a 
certain degree of freedom in their role performance’ (2003: 13). By focusing on the 
Member States’ identity and their previous experiences it was possible to understand 
‘what was for them the appropriate interpretation of the Presidency role’ (Ibid.) Study-
ing the Presidency through the lenses of role theory enables to better capture its hybrid 
nature. As argued by Leal 'the Presidency (…) represents an interesting EU entity, nei-
ther purely intergovernmental, nor supranational, but a little of both' (2010: 288). By 
using various role concepts, such as role preference, role expectations and role enact-
ment, it is possible to escape the 'logic of consequentiality versus logic of appropriate-
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ness' debate, and to focus on the actual behaviour of the country in the chair across vari-
ous policy areas. The empirical findings suggest that the post-Lisbon Presidency would 
continue as a complex role set with some defined formal functions, such as chairman-
ship of some Council's preparatory and WGs, and some informal ones, the HRVP's 
deputisation. While the first feature would entrust the Presidency with functions, the 
second feature would allow for a more individual interpretation of the role of the 
HRVP's deputy. The function of deputisation might be interpreted as a mere functional 
replacement of the HRVP by acting according to the instructions, or might be used as a 
basis for negotiating the terms of such deputisation. Such negotiations might enable the 
Member State in the Chair performing more sensitive functions of agenda shaping and 
political leadership in, as arranged with the HRVP, areas of EU foreign affairs. Thus, 
role theory makes it possible to overcome the deterministic explanations that treat the 
Presidency as a national or Community function, rather enabling the exploration of the 
Presidency's performance as an opportunity for projecting particular national role con-
ceptions to the European level. 
As noted in the Introduction, one of the limitations of this project was that the main 
comparative analysis is based on the example of the first four Member States in the 
chair of the Presidency, after the provisions of the LT began to be implemented in 2010. 
This created a unique transitional period, but the context of exercising the Presidency 
may change over time and the identified role conceptions, role expectations and factors 
shaping the context of the role institutionalisation process may be only applicable to this 
particular context. As argued before, the main purpose of this study was to develop a 
test model enabling the examination of the mechanism of incremental and endogenous 
institutional change. The applicability of this model to studying the institutional change 
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Annex I Interview Schedule 
 
The stage of preliminary interviews was conducted with officials of the Spanish and 




Institutional affiliation Date 
ESa/12.2010 Spanish Presidency 
(CFSP Division) 
December 2010 
ESb/12.2010 Spanish Presidency, 
REPER (East Europe 
Division) 
December 2010 
ESc/12.2010 Spanish Presidency, 
REPER (Political and 
Security Committee) 
December 2010 
BEa/03.2011 Belgian Presidency, 
REPER (ANTCI) 
March 2011 
BEb/03.2011 Belgian Presidency, 
REPER (COREPER II) 
March 2011 
 
Table 12 List of coded interviews with the Spanish and Belgian Presidencies’ 
officials 
For example the code ESa/12.2010 refers to an official involved in the Spanish 
Presidency based in the CFSP Unit who was interviewed on December 2010. The latter 
‘a’ identify this person as a first person from the Spanish Presidency to be interviewed 
for this project. 
 
The interviews were divided into three themes: 
 
1. The role conception of the Spanish/Belgian Presidency 
- How did you understand Spain/Belgium role in the chair of the post-Lisbon 
Presidency? Did this change at any stage of the Presidency? 
- Is this interpretation different to the previous Presidencies held by your country? 
- What are the main functions to be performed by the Presidency? 
- Are you aware of any particular expectations facing your country or the 
institution of the Presidency itself? 
 
2. The performance of the Spanish/Belgian Presidency 
- What are the main activities performed by the Presidency’s officials? 
- Could you please give some examples of functions performed by the 
Presidency? 
- Are there any particular policy areas where the Presidency plays a more active 
role? Is the Presidency still capable of influencing the foreign policy making 
within the EU system? 
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3. The Presidency’s assessment 
- How do you think your Presidency was assessed at the national, European and 
international stages?  
- Do you the Presidency can be still a relevant player on the European stage? If 
yes under which conditions?  
- Did your Presidency manage to clarify the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in 
practice and the new role of the Presidency in the new system? 
 
 
The main stage of the project focused on interviewing national officials involved in the 
Hungarian and Polish Presidency. Few of the officials, as indicated in the table were 




code   
Institutional affiliation Date 
HUa/12.2010 Hungarian Presidency, 
REPER (COEST) 
December 2010 
HUa/03.2011 March 2011 
HUa/07.2011 July 2011 




HUc/12.2010 Hungarian Presidency, 
REPER (FAC) 
December 2010 
HUc/03.2012 March 2011 
HUc/09.2012 September 2011 
HUd/07.2011 Hungarian Presidency, 
REPER (ANTICI) 
July 2011 




HUe/03.2011 March 2011 
HUe/07.2011 July 2011 




HUf/03.2011 March 2011 
HUf/07.2011 July 2011 
 
















code   
Institutional affiliation Date 
PLa/03.2011 Polish Presidency, 
REPER (ANTICI) 
March 2011 
PLa/10.2011 October 2011 
PLa/04.2012 April 2012 
PLb/04.2012 Polish Presidency, MFA 
(Development Policy) 
April 2012 
PLc/03.2011 Polish Presidency, MFA 
(Development Policy) 
March 2011 
PLc/09.2011 September 2011 
PLc/05.2012 May 2012 
PLd/05.2012 Polish Presidency, MFA 
(Development Policy) 
May 2012 
PLe/03.2011 Polish Presidency ,MFA 
(Development Policy) 
March 2011 
PLe/09.2011 September 2011 
PLe/05.2012 May 2012 
PLf/03.2011 Polish Presidency, MFA 
(Eastern Department) 
March 2011 
PLf/09.2011 September 2011 
PLf/05.2012 May 2012 
PLg/03.2011 Polish Presidency, 
REPER (COEST) 
March 2011 
PLg/09.2011 September 2011 
PLg/01.2012 January 2012 




PLi/03.2011 Polish Presidency, 
REPER (COREPER II) 
March 2011 
PLi/09.2011 September 2011 
PLi/05.2012 May 2012 
PLj/04.2012 Polish Presidency, MFA 
(Institutional Affairs) 
April 2012 





Table 14 List of coded interview with the Polish Presidency’s officials 
The interviews were structured in a similar manner following the three themes of the 
Presidency’s role conception, the actual performance during the 6-month period in the 
chair and the final assessment and post-Presidency reflections. 
The interviews were divided into three themes: 
 
1. The role conception of the Hungarian/Presidency Presidency 
- How did you interpret the role in the chair of the post-Lisbon Presidency? Did 
this change at any stage of the Presidency?  
- Was this different with interpretation of your own Presidency’s role in 
comparison to other countries that were in the chair before your country? 
- What are the main functions to be performed by the Presidency? Is this new 
functional scope clear for you? 
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- Are you aware of any particular expectations facing your country or/and the 
institution of the Presidency itself? 
 
2. The performance of the Hungarian/Polish Presidency 
- What are the main activities performed by the Presidency’s officials? 
- Could you please give some examples of functions performed by the 
Presidency?  
- Are there any particular policy areas where the Presidency plays a more active 
role? Is the Presidency still capable of influencing the foreign policy making 
within the EU system? 
 
3. The Presidency’s assessment 
- How do you think your Presidency was assessed at the national, European and 
international stages?  
- Do you the Presidency can be still a relevant player on the European stage? If 
yes under which conditions?  
- Did your Presidency manage to clarify the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in 
practice and the new role of the Presidency in the new system? 
 
 
As indicated in table 12 and 13 few of the officials involved in the Hungarian and 
Polish Presidency were interviewed three times, before the Presidency began, during the 
Presidency and after the Presidency was concluded. In these cases the first interview 
focused on the questions relating to the Presidency’s role conception, the second on the 
actual performance and during the final interview previous questions were repeated in 
order to check for any variations and the interview was concluded by collecting answers 
on the Presidency’s assessment.  
The final stage of the interviewing focused on officials from the EU institutions and 
experts on the EU foreign policy and the post-Lisbon EU policy making system 
focusing on the performance of the individual Presidencies and their impact on the 














   
Institutional affiliation Date 
SGCa/05.2012 Secretariat General of the 
EU Council (Institutional 
Relations) 
May 2012 
SGCb/05.2012 Secretariat General of the 
EU Council (Institutional 
Relations) 
May 2012 
SGCc/05.2012 Secretariat General of the 
EU Council (External 
Relations) 
May 2012 
GB/05.2012 UK REPER (Political and 
Institutional Affairs) 
May 2012 
FR/05.2012 France REPER (ANTICI 
Counsellor) 
May 2012 
EEASa/04.2012 EEAS (COEST) April 2012 
EEASb/06.2012 EEAS (Democracy 
Support) 
June 2012 
EEASc/04.2012 EEAS (ENP) April 2012 
COMa/05.2012 European Commission 
(EuropeAid ENP) 
May 2012 
POTEC/04.2012 Cabinet of POTEC April 2012 
EPa/05.2012 European Parliament SG 
(Foreign Policy Advisor) 
May 2012 
EPb/05.2012 European Parliament 
(Presidency Services) 
May 2012 
EPc/05.2012 European Parliament 
(Planning Unit) 
May 2012 




EPe/04.2012 European Parliament 
(EaP) 
April 2012 
EPf/04.2012 European Parliament 
(Secretariat of the 
Committee on Foreign 
Affairs) 
April 2012 
CEPS/01.2012 Centre for European 
Policy Studies (EU 
Institutional Unit) 
January 2012 
EPC/01.2012 European Policy Centre 
(Foreign Policy Unit) 
January 2012 
HBS/01.2012 Heinrich Böll Stiftung 
(CFSP Unit) 
January 2012 
CES/11.2011 Centre for Eastern Studies November 2011 
UA/01.2012 Mission of Ukraine to the 
EU (Foreign Policy Unit) 
January 2012 
Table 15 List of coded interview with the remaining interviewees 
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Annex II Chairmanship of the Preparatory Bodies of the Foreign Affairs Council 
(FAC) 
 
1. Category 1 chaired by the rotating Presidency: preparatory bodies in the area of 
trade and development. 
2. Category 2 chaired by a representative of the High Representative: geographic 
preparatory bodies. 
3. Category 3 chaired by a representative of the High Representative: horizontal 
preparatory bodies, mainly CFSP, except the following preparatory bodies, 
which shall be chaired by the six-monthly Presidency: 
- Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX), 
- Working Party on Terrorism (International Aspects) (COTER), 
- Working Party on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism 
(COCOP), 
- Working Party on Consular Affairs (COCON), 
- Working Party on Public International Law (COJUR),  
- Working Party on the Law of the Sea (COMAR). 
4. Category 4 chaired by a representative of the High Representative: CSDP-
related preparatory bodies. 
For categories 3 and 4, the rotating Presidency was to chair the preparatory bodies 
during a transitional period of up to six months after the adoption of the Council 
Decision on the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). For category 2 this transitional period was set up to 12 months. 
